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Business

Asking the experts for advice

by Thomas Schellen October 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Volatile times bring out the best virtues of proper financial planning. That’s why to ensure that an investment pays off, one must get smart advice on products that meet an investor’s needs, paired with sound guidance in overall portfolio allocation and backed by thorough contextual research. But before committing to a relationship with a top finance house in volatile times – which appears a permanent condition in Lebanon for now – the investor is increasingly asking for information on what the experts are thinking. Around the world, brokerage firms and asset management experts indulge those requests by producing – carefully non-committal, of course – investment advice columns, market outlooks, and research highlights. So that being the case, why would the larger share of capable investment counselors in Beirut respond to an inquiry into the general direction of their advice over the coming six to 12 months with “I refuse to answer that question”?

Tailoring advice

Well, first because there is no one-size-fits-all piece of investment advice. To draw up a real portfolio one needs to tailor it to the situation of the client, the experts contend.

Not only the income situation but also personal need, age, gender, family situation, occupation, market knowledge, risk aversion and perception of local risk all must be taken into the equation, said the chairman of Financial Funds Advisors, Jean Riachi. “It is a very complex analysis that needs to be done on every person.”

This would explain why good investment advice can contribute as much to a person’s financial peace of mind as a bespoke suit can do for his appearance. It also reveals how client psychology is at least as important to financial services as economic occurrences are. Two individuals with the exact same profile on income and personal situation, in theory, should have the same portfolio. But, if one is experienced in investing in mutual funds while the other isn’t, “in reality, they should not have the same portfolio because their risk perception is not the same. If someone has never invested, he is likely to panic at the first drop and people get out of mutual funds if they are disappointed during a very short period – even though we tell them at the beginning that they should have a long-term approach,” Riachi said.

That speaks volumes about how young the relationship between the Lebanese and modern investment tools really is. In the past decade of a newly materialized post-war investor landscape in the country, financial institutions had to juggle the universal expectations and disappointments of their clients in context of a situation where these, often inexperienced, clients had to deal with either distant markets or very immature local investment environments.


Maturing investor confidence

For the financial firms, this evolution thus involved their share of conflict experiences, where disgruntled clients showed their mastery in the rituals of blaming others. But while it appears still common practice among local financial firms to guide overenthusiastic or excessively self-confident clients discreetly into the direction they should move without letting them feel that they are being nudged along, the brokers and traders also agree that the maturity of Lebanese investors has increased substantially.

It is refreshing then, that a few experts would volunteer some general advice for investor directional thinking over the coming six to 12 months. Arab Finance Investment House general manager Jamil Jaroudi, taking the perspective of SHARI’A-compliant advice, suggested that a good portfolio for investments in Lebanon could allocate 20% to 30% to productive real estate, 20% to 30% to liquid assets, 20% to Mourabaha trade finance paper and 20% to industry or agro-industry. In line with the assessments by international ratings agencies, one could not advise clients to keep all their money in Lebanon, offered the head of capital markets at Fidus, Nicolas Sawan. “A conservative client could keep 20% of his bonds in Lebanon and the remainder in investment-grade bonds,” he said.

In geographic allocation, a conservative investor today should not keep more than 50% of his total wealth in Lebanon, whereas an aggressive one could go up to 80%, Sawan suggested, and in asset allocation, fixed income and funds could account for 40% to 50% of a sound portfolio, equity markets 40% and the rest in cash. US markets, still appearing bullish in the longer term, could open some opportunities for traders, with some volatility towards the end of the year. Capital-guaranteed funds should benefit from the rising interest rate environment allowing fund managers to achieve higher returns in coming months, and for gold, the Fidus manager sees a bullish cycle operating, with an upward outlook in the longer term. His highest bet is on oil prices. The price of $70 per barrel is, he predicts, meaning investors favoring the taking of risks in the futures market could buy oil futures. According to Sawan, the best performing fund at Fidus was the Societé Générale International SICAW Fund. Managed by SoGen asset management, it achieved increases of 42% in 2003 and 6% this year. The broadest consensus the Beirut financial experts share in their outlook on the local market seems to be that tourism related and other productive real estate investments are a definite buy recommendation in Lebanon either through funds or direct project participation, while the equity and securities market at the Beirut Stock Exchange for many is a ‘not yet’ – which is actually better than the essential doubts some traders voiced on the BSE’s role two or three years ago. In this context, one important hopeful sign for greater public sector readiness to support the growth of the BSE is last month’s decision to list two of the eurobonds. Experts hailed the first-time listing of sovereign bonds on the exchange as a move towards making the BSE a more interesting place.

Nonetheless, the trading of securities still may have a ways to go before it can attract all potential issuers of funds on the local market. The Middle East Capital Group, which was a strong driver in listing banks on the BSE in the 90s, today would not in principle reject the idea of listing funds on the BSE. “Why not?” the firm’s new CEO, Walid Mousallam, told EXECUTIVE in his first interview with a Lebanese publication. But for the time being, he is not considering it, as MECG is currently able to structure their funds in the way they want and which makes sense for the firm. “We don’t see the need and we don’t see the benefits,” he said. “It would help the BSE but you don’t do these things unless you see the benefits of doing them. Taking such steps needs more market rationale.”

Controlled optimism

For Bank of Beirut, the sole private sector issuer to list funds on the BSE in the past two years, the rationale exists and has already worked, said Najib Semaan, Bank of Beirut assistant general manager in charge of treasury. “The BSE should be activated for listing more funds, bonds, and securities markets instruments. We have several funds listed on the BSE,” he explained. “In the past, we priced them by ourselves but there is always a bias if you price your own products, even as we always had the net asset value under control of an external auditor. For this reason, we took most of our fixed-income funds to the BSE.”

Lebanese investors hungry to be active participants in financial markets will continue to think and access in international terms. As controlled optimism about the local market potential is an increasing note of consensus among Beirut’s financial experts, local investors may, however, also benefit surprisingly from thinking domestic openings in the coming six to 12 months.

SUCCESS OF FUND RESULTS IN REPLICATIONBank of Beirut is so satisfied with the performance of its funds that it will issue another fund before the end of the year. The bank revealed to Executive that it is in the final stages of preparing the launch of Beirut Income Fund II, which will succeed the dollar-denominated Beirut Income Fund. “This is the first time that we replicate a fund due to success,” said Michel Chikhani, head of the BoB asset management department. After diagnosing a market need for better-managed local investment products, Bank of Beirut started in 1997 to work on developing their asset management and devoted two years of effort to preparing for client activities. When the bank introduced their first Beirut Income Fund in December 2000, initial investor appetite came from some 200 persons. As BoB developed their funds portfolio, which today spans four listed and three unlisted funds, this participation increased over the last four years to over 3,000 investors, 70% of which are resident or expatriate Lebanese.

The funds are based on a range of securities including Lebanese eurobonds and Treasury Bills, Certificate of Deposits, income securities by domestic banks, time deposits and fixed income instruments. Four out of the seven investment funds managed by Bank of Beirut are listed on the BSE, namely the Beirut Lira Fund, Beirut Interbank Fund, Beirut Golden Income Fund, and Beirut Global Income Fund. BoB collaborated with First National Bank in the creation of two of its funds.

According to Chikhani, Bank of Beirut approaches the subject of investment funds under the maxim of working to diminish risk associated with underlying assets while allowing for increased liquidity and securing improved returns for investors. Since most investors are oriented heavily toward the short term, the bank sees no obstacle to its funds business in the fact that current legislation limits funds to five years in duration.

“On average, our dollar and Lebanese Lira denominated funds have outperformed deposit rates by 3% to 4% and outperformed underlying assets by 1.5% to 2% on an annual basis from their launch,” Chikani said.
 

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Venture capital in Lebanon stays hidden

by Nicolas Photiades October 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

If only every great idea could guarantee a swarm of investors knocking at your door. But the harsh reality is that, even after going through all the right motions (from hammering the fantastic idea into a solid business plan and assembling a capable team), entrepreneurs and growth-minded companies customarily face their greatest difficulties in attracting capital. And although nobody doubts that there is a shortage of liquidity in the country, most would-be business tycoons find that start-up money is even scarcer in Lebanon. Simply put, venture capital, for all those who are still asking themselves, refers to any investment in private and unlisted companies. Real venture capital is the investing in start-up and early stage companies. In Europe and North America, venture capital has long reached middle age, with the number of transactions being now levelled out. Once the domain of both little and big players, venture capital has become increasingly dominated by the mega financial institutions, such as global banks, insurance companies and giant pension funds, which all work through specialist business units or subsidiaries. Even in places like Western Europe, it is rare to see successful independent firms, which have been able to raise large amounts of money for venture capital purposes. Although the technology bubble of the late 1990s saw a resurgence of independent venture capital firms, most have now died a violent death or are dominated by the mega financial groups.

In Lebanon, we are light years from achieving what Europe and North America achieved. While the West has used the venture capital tool to grow itself out of recession and debt traps, we in the land of the cedar are still cogitating about the true meaning of venture capital. True, there were some speeches by senior bankers towards the late 1990s to early 2000s, which preached the necessity to establish venture capital funds in Lebanon, but nothing came out of it. Just talk, while our young entrepreneurs are still facing the limited choice of either emigrating to greener pastures or, worse, facing the local banks and their deadly corporate loans. Indeed, at the moment, most private sector firms, whether they are start-ups or established institutions are suffering from expensive over leverage, which is draining most (sometimes more) of their cash flow.

The current situation

Some attempts were made in the mid to latter part of the 1990s to provide the Lebanese economy with a financing alternative to classical banking. The European Union, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, etc, all provided the local banks with funding to be directed specifically to emerging and start-up companies. These supranational loans were however, always small in size and did not really benefit the end-users (start-ups, etc.) as the banks often misused these funds and allocated them to other sectors. Moreover, the banks never really concentrated their efforts on asking the above mentioned supranational entities for funding to support venture capital, and rather concentrated on asking for funds in order to develop retail and consumer banking.
 

At one stage, some Lebanese financiers and bankers did decide to take the bull by the horn and established independent and proprietary venture capital/private equity funds, such as the Lebanon Fund, launched by Lebanon Invest, which got listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange. Banque Audi also followed the venture capital and private equity path by using its own money to invest in start ups and private equity. These investments were made via a holding company that is still wholly owned by the bank. Middle East Capital Group, another local investment bank also used its capital to carry out some venture capital and private equity investments in Lebanon and the rest of the region. However, these funds never really got 100% engaged in venture capital and rather concentrated on private equity, which is more investments in existing companies that needed to be turned around, restructured or have their operational and strategic direction changed, rather than seed money investments for start-up and early stage companies. Moreover, the cost structure of these funds was always high since the start and significantly affected their performance. Such a lackluster profitability from the part of the venture capital pioneers was a major discouraging factor to other banks and investors, which did not see venture capital as an interesting revenue diversification or investment option.

All these attempts to go into venture capital have been commendable for a small market such as Lebanon, which was just coming out from a twenty years glitch in terms of financial innovation, but is still largely insufficient. For new companies and entire sectors to emerge, boosting as a result the economy, a strong and diversified venture capital industry must be developed and set up. This can only be done with the goodwill and commitment of private Lebanese and Arab investors, which would see a developed venture capital financial sector as one of the ways of boosting the legendary entrepreneurial spirit of the Lebanese, whilst growing the local economy out of a debt and stagnation trap.

Where to go for funding

For the moment, the best way for young entrepreneurs to finance their new venture is to visit their local bank and ask for a Kafalat guaranteed loan. Kafalat is a government-owned sort of insurance company that guarantees bank loans for venture capital purposes. The cost varies from loan to loan, but is generally lower than the cost on a straight loan from the bank to the entrepreneur. It is worth noting however, that few banks would directly lend money to the entrepreneur without a Kafalat guarantee anyway, and given the relatively small size of Kafalat, the number of loans such an institution is ready to guarantee is generally small. Kafalat-guaranteed loans have a ceiling of around $200,000 and automatically exclude new ventures or start-ups needing more than this amount, such as technology oriented ventures, which are capital intensive and need more than $200,000 to build up a solid starting base.

The Islamic Angle

Another funding source for young Lebanese entrepreneurs is Islamic finance. Islamic banks are mostly engaged in financing products such as MUDARABA (trust financing) and MUSHARAKA, (venture capital financing), which are equivalent to participation transactions. MUDARABA is a form of partnership where one side provides only capital and the other only labor and entrepreneurial skills, while MUSHARAKA is a partnership contract where both parties provide capital towards the financing of a project or a venture. Most small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the Arab world, more particularly in the Gulf region, are actively seeking to finance their business through capital participation and profit and loss sharing, making Islamic finance in the form of MUSHARAKA or MUDARABA quite attractive.

Most SMEs and start ups in Lebanon and the Middle East can only rely on their weak cash flow to grow organically and cannot have access to outside capital. Their only chance for external capital growth would come in the forms of independent private investments, Islamic banking, or venture capital and private equity funds. While private investors are very selective and only look for investments with established track records (in other words, venture capital is not an option) and venture capital funds do not really exceed the number of fingers on two hands throughout the Arab region, Islamic banking, through its business nature and the SHARI’A rules governing it, is the only serious funding source for start ups and emerging companies.

Basle II compliance

Islamic banks are not yet covered by the new Basel II banking regulations and are subject to a less stringent regulatory regime. Very often, Islamic banks are established under laws specifically designed for them and their regulatory requirements are less detailed and constraining than those with which conventional banks must comply. Such a regulatory environment allows Islamic banks to have a competitive edge over conventional banks, which will soon have to comply with Basel II regulations. The latter make venture capital investments very costly and onerous for conventional banks, which will have to apply a risk weighting of 150% from 2007, the date the new Basel II capital regulations are applied throughout the world. In other words, if a conventional bank invested $1 million worth of assets in venture capital, it would have to set aside at least $120,000 of capital.

With the advent of Basel II, the slim hope of seeing conventional banks getting involved in venture capital is slowly dimming away. However, a whole new market is opening up for Islamic banks, which will be able to diversify and expand their MUSHARAKA and MUDARABA activities, with little competition. For the moment, Islamic banks concentrate mostly on MURABAHA, which is the largest category of development-related financing and the most common form of SHARI’A-compliant short-term financing employed by Islamic financial institutions. It is undertaken by the bank purchasing specific goods at the order of the ultimate buyer and simultaneously selling them to that buyer on a cost-plus basis.

With the venture capital market freeing up from conventional competition, Islamic banks will have the possibility of diversifying their assets and of getting rid of their concentration problem. The latter has been the main characteristic of Islamic banks over the last ten years, and can only be solved with the creation of new markets, such as Lebanon, and the hiring of venture capital experts, whose job will be to boost the MUSHARAKA and MUDARABA parts of the business.

Lebanon is going in the right direction with the establishment of the first Islamic institutions in recent months. What is now needed is for the opening of branches or subsidiaries of large Islamic financial institutions such as Kuwait Finance House, Al Rajhi of Saudi Arabia, Dubai Islamic Bank, etc, in Beirut. Such power houses would have a major positive effect on the local economy and would fill an important gap left by the local conventional banks, which is that of venture capital financing.

Venture capital has worked wonders in the West and has boosted moribund economies to prosperity in less than a decade. The US and Western Europe have rightly relied on the patriotic feelings and national commitment of their institutional and individual investors to fund a nascent venture capital sector. The outcome of such an investment gamble has paid off, as the beneficiaries of venture capital funding have repaid their faith in a major way, as the value of transactions in the buy-out, start-up and early stage markets more than quadrupled in less than ten years in Europe (between 1986 and 1995). What is urgently needed in Lebanon is for our individual investors to emulate their Western peers and place some more faith into the capabilities of their young entrepreneurs. The massive arrival in Lebanon of Islamic banking would provide the institutional investor base for both venture capital and private equity.

(BOX) How do banks finance their own expansion?

The capital needs of banks in Lebanon vary significantly from one bank to another. The twenty largest banks in the country are generally able to attract external capital more easily than their smaller peers, which are struggling to look more attractive to potential capital suitors. The larger banks’ better financial performance, more solid track record and qualitative aspects make it more attractive for a regional individual investor to provide them with fresh capital injections. In recent months, a few large local banks have been able to lure Arab and Lebanese individual investors into their capital, with the most recent example being Banque Libano-Française (BLF), which had to replace its majority shareholder, Crédit Agricole of France, with a regional investor. Replacing a Western financial group with another is virtually impossible at the moment, as the Lebanese market is too small and risky to attract any strategic institutional investor from Europe or North America.

For the smaller banks, which fall below the largest twenty in terms of total assets, raising capital externally is a tall order. Although, some, such as Banque BEMO, have succeeded in recent years, this was only due to a healthy qualitative and quantitative performance, as well as to a clear strategy of maintaining a certain optimum size. Such attributes are always likely to attract external regional investors, who have become increasingly picky in recent years, and who have steered away from the majority of the thirty smaller banks in the country. The latter have not really reached the level of attractiveness required for external capital financing.

However, banks in Lebanon have shown significant resourcefulness as regards to capital raising. Most have relied on the good years in the last decade to grow organically (internally), whilst some have taken advantage of favorable market conditions to carry out Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and list on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). The current stagnation of local and international equity capital markets for emerging market banks has led some Lebanese banks to resort to issuing preferred shares (a hybrid of debt and equity), in US dollars and carrying a high dividend/interest rate. These issues have been mostly placed with the banks’ customers.

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A: Omar Razzaz, World Bank country manager for Lebanon

by Executive Contributor October 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

In September the World Bank issued its annual report Doing BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, co-sponsored by the International Finance Corporation, the private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group. The report examines investment climates around the world, based on the regulatory performance and reforms undertaken in 145 nations. Comparing data and showcasing examples of best practice, the report demonstrates how governments can create a better business environment, which benefits all firms, as well as society as a whole. EXECUTIVE met with Omar Razzaz, the World Bank’s country manager for Lebanon, to discuss how the country’s business environment fares by international standards, the challenges facing reformers and the advantages offered to investors.
 


The World Bank’s annual DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 report just came out, with more countries and benchmarks than ever before. Governments are coming forth and requesting to be a part of it – what is the value of this report?

This is a yearly report with very critical information, not just on laws and regulations, but on the actual experience of businesses. That’s why it is meaningful. Businesses are not just interested in the legal framework, but how things work on the ground. The report tries to address the type of indicators that really matter to a business: how easy it is to start, how easy it is to operate and how easy it is to close a business. The other side of this report is that it looks at these indicators on a yearly basis, so you can see change all the time. A country that ranks very low but has gone on a pro-active program by the government to improve its business environment will be registered by the report very quickly. That is why the DOING BUSINESS report is increasingly noticed by investors around the world. Where a country ranks is as interesting to them as the pace at which it moves.

How would you assess Lebanon’s business environment based on the findings of the report?

Lebanon has its strengths and weaknesses. Among the strengths, you have the relative ease with which one can get credit and close a business – by regional standards that is. Where Lebanon does not do well is in terms of starting a business: the procedures as of now take 46 days, and the cost of starting a business is 130% of income per capita. This is much higher than in other countries in the region, as well as elsewhere in the world: just look at Latvia, another small country, where the cost is 17%. It has to do with the number of procedures, the time it takes and the uncertainty that’s involved in the process. The solutions are there: if you reduce the steps, if you automate them, if you set up a one-stop shop where investors can come and you give them clear procedures, it would dramatically change the situation. And it can be done fairly quickly: Jordan managed to reduce the time required to set up a business by nine weeks. The one other aspect in which Lebanon doesn’t do very well is the enforcement of contracts. In this area, Lebanon really stands out. It takes 721 days on average to enforce a contract and it involves 39 procedures. This is two or three times longer than even in developing countries. It is very difficult for a business to operate in an environment where you have a contract that you can’t have enforced. And there really is no reason why this has to continue. Lebanon, in terms of its jurisprudence, in terms of its human capital, has some of the best legal institutions in the Arab world. To improve that situation is a matter of will, of putting in the systems, and of training.

Have there been any significant attempts at implementing the necessary reforms to improve the investment climate here?

There have been very important islands of reform in Lebanon. If you look at the area of property registration or the application of VAT on transactions – these are areas that can take a very long time and in Lebanon it has been streamlined. But in the last two years, there hasn’t been a concerted effort by the government to systematically upgrade laws and regulations and undertake reform. This is a major drawback, because with a debt to GDP of almost 180%, the fiscal and monetary policies can only take you so far. They can reduce debt perhaps, and bring it down to 150-160%, but that is still a high level. The only way to reduce the debt is to grow out of it and increase your GDP. So it’s critical for Lebanon to focus on the investment environment to find ways to increase that pace of growth.

But this year, Lebanon witnessed a positive turn in many of its economic indicators: there’s been a sharp increase in export, tourism, construction permits, and bank deposits for instance. The country has experienced its highest GDP growth since 1997. Is this just cyclical growth or will it have a long-term impact, notably on the level of investment?

Our assessment is that this is not short-term. Lebanon has definitely benefited from this situation – it has allowed growth to reach 5% for instance. But the DOING BUSINESS report suggests that if a country moves drastically on reforms, it could add up to 2% on its growth rate. So what the Lebanese economy has done this year is fantastic, but if the country had improved its regulatory procedures for business, it might have added 2% more, thereby growing at 7%. And for Lebanon to deal with its debt problem in a sustainable way, it needs to grow at around 6% to7% every year, and this is achievable. When you look at the composition of the investments and the growth, tourism is fantastic and does create jobs, buying real estate is great. But what you want to see is more Lebanese expatriates and Arabs starting businesses that will create value added, jobs, on a sustainable basis. And for that to happen, you really need to make operating a business a much more straight forward undertaking.

How does this country fare by regional standards? Does it have any comparative advantages to other Arab countries in the eyes of investors?

Lebanon has to think dynamically in terms of its comparative advantage. It shouldn’t necessarily try to reclaim what it had in the 1960s, but rather think in terms of today – an era of information technology, globalization – to figure out its strengths and weaknesses. The most important element that Lebanon has that foreign investors would want is an innate cultural talent for creativity and service. If you look at the industries that are blooming, they are service industries, industries that relate to creativity, advertising, marketing, TV production… I’ve heard that six out of ten commercials in the Arab world are produced in Lebanon. This says something about the human capital in this country. This a multilingual country that is very exposed to information, trends from the West, and its juxtaposition between the Arab world and the West gives it a tremendous advantage in picking up important trends that might be relevant to the area, and modifying them to local tastes. Studies now show that for countries to compete, for countries to succeed, it’s not a matter of capital or resources, it’s a matter of the know-how that exists in a country and the systems that the country has that allow it to utilize that knowledge. The Lebanese have the know-how that is very hard to acquire by formal training. What they lack are the systems. And it’s incredible, because for most countries, the systems are the easy part to acquire. This is something you can buy with money, and a little bit of decision-making and coordination. Yet you find the systems that allow investors to invest money, to register, to get information, to have day-to-day operating procedures that are clear without dealing with a huge amount of red tape, to be the missing part here.

Yet at the same time the World Bank is pushing for educational programs in Lebanon to provide better technical and vocational training?

Here we come to the issue of equal opportunities. Lebanon has a long way to go before it can be proud of offering its population equal opportunities. There is a tremendous human capital in Lebanon, but that doesn’t mean everybody has access to the same quality of education. Those who have access to quality education, to private schools, to private universities, have tremendous talent. But those who are left behind are relegated to competing with unskilled workers, which is a very difficult thing to do in Lebanon given the relatively open borders and the inflow of foreign workers and high standards of living. For the average Lebanese, this is one of the hardest places to live. You can neither do what pays, because you haven’t been equipped, nor can you compete in the unskilled or semi-skilled professions because the standards of living are too high. And that is why vocational training and education are critical.

Speaking of unequal opportunities, is the lack of progress in improving the business environment excluding marginalized groups from participating in the formal economy in Lebanon?

This is very important. The more you deregulate entry for start-up businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, which are the ones that are most employment generating here, the more you create opportunities for employment, formal employment, which gives more protection to workers and has a snowball effect. In contrast, if you have high minimal capital requirements, then many of the businesses will stay in the informal sector. They will not be able to borrow, to expand, to pay taxes, which gets you into a vicious circle of the economy not growing and public finances not improving.

Another problem which Lebanon faces is the fact that it ranks internationally among the top violators of intellectual property rights. To what extent does this act as a deterrent to investors?

To the extent that Lebanon wants to move into the information age and the high-value added economy. In India, about 5000 to 6000 workers in Bangalore are producing about a third of all of India’s foreign exchange earnings, just because of the tremendous growth of the IT industry. Lebanon is so well positioned to enter that area. If it updates and reforms intellectual property rights and puts in the IT infrastructure, it can benefit a lot from it. Many countries make money out of piracy, but that’s not what Lebanon is about. Given Lebanon’s human capital, it needs to make the leap into becoming one of the producers of intellectual property, not one of the countries that live off piracy.

Closely related to this issue is the prospective of Lebanon joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), which the government hopes will happen in 2005. Is the country ready for it?

Lebanese business are ready for it, in the sense that there is a business acumen, an entrepreneurship that allows Lebanese businesses to excel anywhere in the world. My concern is whether Lebanon can bring the cost structure of doing business down. As long as these procedures, which we have been talking about, are prohibitive, as long as the cost of power is the way it is, as long as telecom is so expensive, as long shipment and agro-processing is costly and delayed and inefficient, Lebanese businesses will be greatly disadvantaged. Again, it’s about putting in the systems that will allow businesses to compete. It’s not about the innate ability of Lebanese businesses to compete with European businesses. If anything, I think lowering the barriers will allow for greater innovation.

Lebanon of course, also suffers from its external environment – the instability of the region, which affects investments into MENA as a whole. What impact do you think recent regional developments, most notably the passing of UN Resolution 1559, will have on the country?

These recent events have thrust Lebanon onto the international scene, which means that what the country does or doesn’t do is much more noticed today than it was yesterday. This poses both a challenge and an opportunity for the country. If the next government is a decisive government that takes strong actions on consolidating the freedoms in the country, protecting them, enhancing the transparency and accountability of the government, improving the business environment, taking concrete steps on the macro-economic level to put the country on a more sustainable path towards growth and debt reduction, this is going to be noticed, and noticed very favorably. If it turns out to be a government that is unable to take any serious action towards fundamental social and economic problems, and if it is perceived as even moving back on Lebanon’s uniqueness, which is its freedom, that will be registered as well. We are hopeful and the World Bank will be very active in continuing its support and will work with any government that comes in, to assist it in enhancing Lebanon’s performance and thereby it’s image in the world.

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Society

Down but not out

by Marianne Mirabeau October 1, 2004
written by Marianne Mirabeau

There was a time, in the late 90s, when Lebanese basketball could do no wrong. Lebanese teams – brimming with home-grown talent and the odd high-profile import – beat everyone in sight, games were shown on prime-time TV and crowds of enthusiastic fans blocked streets for hours, celebrating victory after victory. Lebanon appeared to have found its national sport and the sponsors could not get their checkbooks out fast enough.

That was then. Today, the clubs, deserted by their sponsors, are propped up by wealthy patrons, marred by scandals, feuds and crises. The recession did not help, but when Antoine Choueiry, advertising mogul and the so-called “Godfather of Basketball,” recently announced his retirement from the presidency of Sagesse and indeed from the sport in general, basketball’s last hope appeared to have hung up his shirt. So what went wrong and what now for the sport that promised so much?

A sport supported by patrons

Essentially Lebanese basketball was always a loss-making concern, largely dependent on patrons willing to pick up the check. In the first division, all teams have one to two main patrons, covering virtually the entirety of their budgets, which averaged $1.5 million in 2004.

Relationships were formed out of a love for the sport, politics and business interests. Hence BLC Bank became one of Champville’s main sponsors, contributing $350,000 annually to the team, because tuition fees to Champville School were deposited with BLC. UFA insured the club and went on to sponsor the team to the tune of between $200,000 to $300,000 annually (although this jumped up to $800,000 in 2004 when UFA General Manager Henri Chalhoub was nominated team president).

“Each club has a certain person paying the deficit,” said Federation of Lebanese Basketball (FLB) Manager Roland Tabet. “For Blue Stars, it’s [Banque Saradar’s] Mario Saradar or [Loto Libanais’s] Rainier Jreissati. The club is not making a profit. None of them are.”

The Choueiry factor

It was Antoine Choueiry’s goal to make the game financially self-sufficient when he took over Sagesse in 1994. He may have failed in his bid, but his tenure as the sports most high-profile patron changed the face of the game. “Regardless of what anyone might say about Antoine Choueiry, what he did for basketball was memorable,” said Carlo Vincenti, who represents William Lawson, a former major sponsor of Sagesse. “His approach to basketball was very interesting, and it is what Lebanon needed – a more global approach, a more commercial approach.”

Choueiry injected significant amounts of capital both into his own team as well as into that of others. “He backed other teams up financially such as Antranik and Hannibal. He used to pay them $150,000 so they could play in the league,” explains a major Lebanese sports agent, who did not want to be named. With a solid group of teams competing at the highest level, Choueiry upped the ante by buying overseas professional players (mainly from the US) to shore up the quality of his own team. Such a move catapulted both Sagesse and the Lebanese national team on a winning streak, which culminated in Sagesse’s victory at the Asian Basketball Championship in 1999 and Lebanon’s qualification for the World Basketball Championship in Indianapolis, USA, in 2002. The media took the bait and the hype surrounding the sport reached a frenzy in 2000, when Choueiry, who controls 70% of Lebanon’s ad-spend, convinced LBCI to broadcast basketball games during prime time. “He got all the teams together and brought LBCI in to cover them, broadcasting the games live on satellite TV,” said the sports agent. “People started watching more and more basketball.”

Summing up the philosophy behind his strategy, Choueiry was quoted as saying that “to be competitive in sports, you need money, to get money, you need sponsoring, to get sponsoring you need exposure, for exposure you need TV, for TV to be interested you need true competition of a certain level. This needs important teams, to get important teams you need money.”

The sponsors liked what they saw. Despite representing a non-sport oriented product, William Lawson went from an obscure Scottish Whisky to a household name in three years by sponsoring Sagesse. “It was definitely effective in terms of brand building. When we started (sponsoring Sagesse in 1999), basketball wasn’t that big,” he said. “And basically while we were sponsoring Sagesse, it started winning tournaments, starting with the Lebanese championship, the Pan-Arab games and then all the way to the Asian Basketball Championship. So there was a major hype around basketball, and we got a lot of exposure from it. Before Choueiry you would never have seen a basketball game playing on prime time on LBCI. What sponsors need is the exposure – for them a basketball game playing at midnight or a game playing at 8:30 pm makes a big difference.”

The sport of choice

The increasing exposure made basketball the sport of choice in Lebanon, both in terms of audience and practice. According to Tabet, the number of licensed basketball players in Lebanon has been steadily increasing since 2000, when the Federation counted approximately 6,000 players. Today, this figure stands at 15,000. “Everybody loves basketball,” boasted Riaydi coach Fouad Abou Chacra. “In every family in Lebanon you have someone playing basketball. It’s the biggest sport.”

For Pepsi, the growing appeal of basketball in the country, especially among the youth, served as a big draw to get involved in the sport, and from 2000 on, the multinational signed up. “Pepsi wants to get close to what the youth likes, and in Lebanon, that sport is basketball more so than football,” explained Roula Safi, a regional account director at Impact/BBDO, Pepsi’s regional advertising agent.

Piggybacking on the significant exposure brought to basketball through prime time TV coverage, Pepsi went on to sign deals with LBCI, as well as buying ad space on courts. They launched a major ad campaign around Rony Seikaly, a fading, but high-profile Lebanese NBA player, and organized a promotional competition in 2003 to attract young, new talent to basketball.

“LBCI has done a good job of promoting the game, creating a hype – that’s why we have been sponsoring the game for the past three years,” Safi added. “As all the games are retransmitted, there is a lot of brand visibility, so branding on courts has been a good investment for us.”

Too much hype?

The sport reached it peak in 2000, after which the hype began to fizzle. Explaining William Lawson’s decision to terminate its sponsoring contract with Sagesse in 2000, Vincenti said: “Once you’ve reached the top it’s difficult to keep the interest going. They won the Asian Championship… then what? When you win the Lebanese championship ten years in a row, it becomes boring.”

For now, the brand is not considering returning to sport sponsorship any time soon. “Lebanon is not sports-oriented,” Vincenti said. “Actually, they are quite sports oriented, but not toward local sports, it’s much more international. Football is small and basketball was basically the most popular sport.”

It’s the economy stupid! Compounding the slump was the slight problem of a recession. Sponsors are pulling out, contracts are going for less, and advertising spots are being sold for a fraction of the price they used to. Getting one’s brand on the coveted center circle of the basketball court once went for $50,000 to $100,000, depending on the club. Today, it can go for as little as $6,000.

“The economic situation in Lebanon has been getting worse in the past five years, and thus the overall advertising budget is also down proportionally, by nearly 30% compared to what it was six years ago,” Choueiry complained last year.

Tabet agrees. “Instead of having a contract for $50,000, probably now they are negotiating for $15,000 to $20,000.”

Following the withdrawal of LibanCell, Sagesse is now saying goodbye to Adidas, its second biggest sponsor and one that had been with the team for years. “Adidas sponsored us for five to six years,” said Barakat. “This is in part because they are transferring their regional headquarters to Dubai, but it is also due to the fact that they are cutting down on their sponsoring budget and focusing on big international teams.” Adidas declined to comment on the matter.

The vote of no-confidence will undoubtedly affect the earning power of Lebanon’s top players, many of whom earn as much as $20,000 a month. “Even Lebanese players are earning between $5,000 and $7,000 per month,” said Barakat. The unraveling of the sport

However the sport’s struggle to obtain sponsoring cannot only be blamed on the economy. Crises, scandals, and mud-slinging have destroyed confidence among fans, players, team owners and sponsors alike. Topping the list of scandals is Café Najjar’s decision to dissolve its team following the brawl that erupted between its players and an Algerian team at the Arab Championships in Jeddahin May 2004. “Georges Najjar was unhappy with the fact that a team associated with his company, which is expanding into Algeria, was seen fighting on TV with the Algerian team,” the agent explained. “There are problems in Lebanese basketball,” admitted Joseph Abdel Massih, a member of Champville’s Sports Committee. “The championships never really finish. Every year you have a problem at the end of the championship. The clubs and the Federation need to solve these problems –sponsors don’t want to see players wearing their jersey having problems. Everything has to be calm.”

To others, the problems go beyond the perpetual feuds between the FLB and the teams. “The problem is that we’re in Lebanon – no law is applied, there is no legal recourse,” a Blue Stars affiliate complained. “It’s the law of the jungle, the law of the strongest that prevails. And who is the strongest here? Choueiry.” But while Choueiry’s sudden departure from Sagesse left a few rubbing their hands in glee, the most prevalent reaction was that of widespread regret. That the sport will suffer a set-back financially due to his retirement is beyond doubt and many patrons are abandoning what they see as a sinking ship. Henri Chalhoub is apparently to leave Champville and take UFA’s sponsorship with him. “I am almost certain that we won’t sponsor Champville anymore,” an associate of Chalhoub confided.

The challenges ahead

As patrons and big sponsors desert the court, the onus is on the sport to clean up its act, and on the teams to build up a strategy to re-attract enough sponsors to become self-sufficient. “Within five years, we plan to have sponsors covering our budget,” said Riyadi coach Abou Chacra. “We can achieve this target. This team will be able to attract all the big companies – it has the biggest number of supporters and it’s the oldest club.”

Others are more cautious in their predictions. Acknowledging that Choueiry’s departure will require an extended recovery period for the sport, they do however, point to the strengths Lebanese basketball has been able to build up over the recent years: the number of enlisted players, the enduring preference for basketball over other sports, the continued broadcasting on LBCI and the on-going plan to establish a Lebanese-Syrian-Jordanian Superleague.

“This [super league] will attract sponsors,” said Sagesse technical director Rizkallah Zaloum. “Next season the sponsorship will increase.” Pepsi is cautiously confident. “We do research assessments on the game’s appeal every year, notably to see if it is still attracting youth,” said Safi on behalf of Pepsi. “If it is still generating the interest that it is now, that will serve as a major factor in our decision as to whether or not we will continue sponsoring the sport.”

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Society

Battle of the Titans ends in merger

by Anthony Mills October 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

This year, more than four million cinema tickets will be sold in Lebanon, despite the offer of a cheaper alternative by hundreds of cable TV and DVD pirates. The ABC mall cinema in Achrafieh has finally thrown open its doors – after months of delay. A 12-screen multiplex north of Beirut, reportedly the Middle East’s biggest, is slated for completion by year’s end. The big story however, is the merger between Lebanon’s two major cinema distributors, Planete and Empire. The move comes after an almost ten-year battle for market supremacy, one in which Empire ultimately prevailed.

Both companies confirmed to EXECUTIVE that Planete has committed to a November 4 management takeover by Empire, in a possible prelude to a buy-out. The announcement comes after Planete saw the 65% market share it acquired in just a few years after its 1995 launch drop to less than 25% in 2004. The official announcement of the deal will come in mid-October. The decline in Planete’s share of the roughly $20 million Lebanese cinema sector was precipitated by an aggressive Empire campaign to rebuild its market share, primarily by renting more space for cinemas. Unable to follow suit, because unlike Empire it had already spent a fortune buying cinema space, Planete looked on helplessly as Hollywood studio giants Warner and UIP re-defected to the Empire camp two years ago, and revenues plummeted. “We had different strategies. We invested much more than they did. Our strategy was to run theaters we owned. Theirs was to manage theaters. Now we understand that their strategy was the right one, and we were wrong,” declared Planete Manager Gilbert Chammas.

Planete’s brisk march to success after it broke into the sector almost 10 years ago took Empire by surprise. “We hadn’t taken Planete seriously,” admitted Empire Manager Gino Haddad. “But after the first year we saw that their figures were good. They began to eat away at our market share.”

When, after only a few years, Planete had a bigger market share than Empire, the alarm bells started ringing. The problem, explained Haddad, was that Empire simply didn’t have enough screens to satisfy distributors by playing all their movies, and keeping them on offer long enough. And so, a number of the distributors had decided that their interests would be better served by Planete. Empire’s response? “We opened more cinemas,” chuckled Haddad. “And we took the prime locations: Sodeco, Dunes, and recently the ABC mall cinema.”

In the absence of a counter move by Planete, the additional high-end Empire screens quickly tilted the market share balance back in Empire’s favor. Distributors began drifting back. But Chammas contended that they didn’t move back solely to maximize ticket sales. “When UIP was with us, they used to have 400,000 to 500,000 admissions a year. With Empire they now have only 150,000,” he asserted. He refused to reveal what he believed the distributors’ true motives were, saying only that Empire benefit from the alliances.

“Planete was starting from scratch,” echoed Haddad. Empire, on the other hand, has been around in one form or another for almost a century. The business distributed Lebanon’s three highest-grossing movies ever – TITANIC (about $2 million),” The PASSION OF CHRIST (about $1.4 million), and THE MASK OF ZORRO (roughly $600,000 – and sold about 2.6 million seats in 2003.

“Planete, I think, welcomes the management takeover move because all the major movies shown in Lebanon are now shown by Empire,” declared Haddad. “This year, our market share has grown to 78%. If things had continued like this, maybe next year we would have had 85%. And that’s how it would have ended. This is actually in the interest of Planete.” “It’s a win-win deal,” agreed Chammas.

Negotiations began over six months ago, according to Haddad. Both he and Chammas declined to disclose who initiated the merger discussions, but they stressed that the talks were amicable. Asked if Empire planned an eventual buyout of Planete, Haddad said: “There is the possibility of a buyout if the price is convenient for both parties.” Yes, he added, there had been discussions about whether or not Empire would be interested in buying. Planete was valuing itself in excess of $5 million, he said. Chammas confirmed the possibility of a buyout at a later stage. Haddad claimed, though, that Empire was adopting a cautious approach to the buyout option. He said the earliest a buyout would come in a year, after Empire had had time to assess the prospects of Planete cinemas under Empire management.

“Buying today is a risk, because in ten years’ time, I can’t tell you if Abraj and Zouk will still be doing the same figures,” he said. It is still unclear, he explained, what effect the ABC mall cinema will have on other cinemas. “ABC is exactly four-and-a-half minutes’ drive from Abraj, along the motorway. For every cinema that goes up, one goes down. ABC has gone up. Either Sodeco or Abraj will go down.”

Under the terms of the management takeover deal, Empire is to assume control of Planete’s Tripoli, Zouk and Abraj cinemas, which will retain their Planete brand identity. Planete will continue to manage its Concorde venue in Verdun. Overall, Planete theaters count a total of 28 screens and about 5,500 seats. The merger will give Empire control of 60 screens in Lebanon.

Empire is to pay Planete a percentage of revenue or “rental fee.” Haddad said he was unable to reveal figures, but said the fee would represent a “good chunk of revenue,” at least equal to current Planete earnings. A product of the merger, said Haddad, will be the homogenization of cinema movie selections across Empire and Planete screens. The curtains will be drawn on an almost-10-year Empire-Planete tussle for exclusive agreements with international distributors and on the mutually exclusive Empire and Planete movie listings these fluctuating alliances spawned. Soon, choice of movies will no longer figure among the criteria used by cinemagoers to decide which cinema to head for. Instead, they will be paying greater attention to décor, surroundings, location (including proximity to home), and atmosphere. “We want to get to the point where, like in the United States, people choose the site, and not the movie,” stated Haddad. “Having all the good movies in each cinema will increase revenue.”

And once the audiences are choosing sites, not movies, Empire intends to charge more for high-end venue tickets than for others. Just as moviegoers pay £11 to see a movie at a Leicester Square cinema in the heart of London, and less in the suburbs, so, Haddad explained, Lebanese audiences will be charged more to watch a movie at the ABC mall in Achrafieh, than at a cinema in Tripoli. “We might price tickets at new sites, with the best seats, sound and screen, at $10. But we would price the same movie at an old, dying site at $5.00,” he said. Even Sodeco tickets would cost less than ABC ones.

Another product of the deal will be the amalgamation of Empire Espace and Planete Zouk, both north of Beirut, to create a 12- or 13-screen 3,000-seat multiplex venue, complete with a media store and entertainment facilities. Espace Planete, as it will be known, will be the biggest multiplex venue in the Middle East, according to Chammas, and is scheduled to begin screening before the end of the year.

Empire believes there is money to be made from the massive influx of Gulf Arabs. The company’s newly-opened cinema at the ABC mall in Achrafieh attracted flocks of Gulf visitors in July and August, according to Haddad. In part to cater to Gulf Arab visitors, Empire is pioneering a staggered show-time approach – already standard practice in America and Britain – at its ABC mall cinema. Instead of showing movies at fixed times, a new screening begins in one of the nine theaters every 15 minutes. This routine allows viewers to dispense with the bustle of getting to the cinema ‘on time,’ and to integrate their cinema visit with a ramble around the mall, or a bite to eat at one of the shopping center’s cafés or restaurants. Gulf Arab families who have come to Lebanon to relax welcome the stress-free approach.

Although Gulf Arabs still represent a fraction of Lebanon’s annual box office receipts, they spend far more than Lebanese viewers at the concessions stands. “The average Lebanese spends a dollar or two. A Gulf Arab spends $7 to $10,” observed Haddad. And concession takings constitute between 20% and 30% of Empire’s overall annual revenue, he noted.

When it comes to taste, the younger Lebanese crowd isn’t too hot on Arabic movies, apart from the iconic ones like “West Beirut.” That explains why you might see only one Arabic movie a year in an Empire cinema, observed Haddad.

And there is no hope at all in Lebanon for art house movie theaters, which are popular in the West. “We tried,” said Haddad. “But no one wants to go to those kinds of cinemas anymore here. If there was a huge library in Lebanon, like in France or England, with old, interesting books, how many people would you see in it?” Home theaters are taking a steadily increasing, but bearable, toll on cinema owners. DVD and cable TV pirates, on the other hand, have, for several years been slashing huge chunks out of cinema revenues. According to lawyer Walid Nasser, who has been tasked by major American film studios with limiting the damages to their interests caused by piracy in Lebanon, cinemas here have lost more than 50% of their audiences because of the problem. “And the government is doing nothing about it.”

Nasser said there were as many as 700 pirate cable companies operating in Lebanon, with up to 750,000 subscribers, who pay an average of $10.50 each a month. This translates into a total monthly revenue of over $7.5 million for pirates.

“You can buy fake DVDs from Malaysia here for $2. We have pirated cable TV providers who play all the new movies. It’s a huge problem. In other countries they are finding solutions, but not in Lebanon. There are too many people involved. There’s too much money being made by people who control the market and have an interest in keeping things as they are,” lamented Haddad. “It’s like the electricity problem. In Jounieh, everyone pays. In Dahieh, no one does. It’s simple: politics. At the border, when they bring over pirated DVDs, someone gets $100 and a phone call. And even if pirates do get arrested, nothing happens to them. They have to pay $400 or $500, or another phone call is made.”

“There was one case in Sidon, where we went to raid a major pirate,” recalled Nasser. “He had a Kalashnikov on his desk. That put an end to the raid pretty fast.”

Asked if some pirates were protected by powerful public figures, Nasser said: “Frankly, I wouldn’t be surprised because of the amount of money that’s collected on a monthly basis – $7.5 million is a lot of money.”

If piracy was being combated properly in Lebanon, Haddad said, Empire would double its DVD sales. On a positive note, though, in contrast to other Arab countries, censorship in Lebanon is no longer proving too much of a headache for cinema industry professionals. “We have come a long way from the days when you couldn’t show a breast,” remarked Haddad.

TYRING TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT IN A CHANGING MARKET

Cinema runs in the blood of the Fathallah family. Since its inception in the age of silent movies, the Fathallah family cinema business has been passed down from generation to generation. Today, the Fathallah Films Co. rests in the hands of A.K. Fathallah, independent owner of the one-screen Aresco Palace and Montreal cinemas in Sanaya and Hamra respectively. Unable, though, to compete with Empire and Planete in the English-language film market, or to survive on Arabic film screenings alone, A.K. is battling the unthinkable: an inauspicious shutdown of the family’s cinema business interests.

Years ago, Fathallah Films used to distribute to cinemas across Lebanon, from Tripoli to Sidon, and throughout Beirut and its suburbs. Today, it finds itself confined to two locations in Beirut.

“There used to about 20 theaters in Hamra. We are the sole survivors. We’re trying to continue,” mused A.K.. “These days, we can show only Arabic movies, because Empire and Planete, who own all English-language film distribution rights for Lebanon, won’t give us any movies. Sometimes they say they don’t have enough prints, sometimes that they are waiting for confirmation from America. But the truth is they have their own cinemas and have no interest in letting anyone else show their films.”

A.K.’s audience numbers have been given a modest boost by the increase in Gulf Arab visitors. This year, A.K. opened a cinema for two months in Bhamdoun, to tap into the summer Gulf market up there. But there just aren’t enough popular Arabic movies, or Gulf tourists, around to pack A.K.’s cinemas consistently. During the lulls, he rents out his theaters for plays and shows. A mark of desperation? “It’s difficult,” A.K. concedes.

Increasing cable piracy since the end of the war in 1991 has only made matters worse. “The last five years have been terrible,” declared A.K.. “Everything is working against cinema. And no one is helping. They ask me for my certificates. Why does no one ask the pirates for theirs? People can watch 100 stations at home and pay nothing. Nowadays, to get someone out of their chair to go to the cinema, you need to offer a big choice or a big movie.”

Fathallah Films’ plight has been aggravated by changing audience preferences. Today’s younger generation in Lebanon is shying away from Arabic movies and one-screen cinemas, in favor of action-packed American blockbusters and multiplex venues. Back in 1980, Fathallah Films drew audiences to one of its cinemas for a year with the same Arabic movie. Today, that would be inconceivable. A.K.’s cinemas draw about 55,000 viewers (or roughly $260,000 revenue) a year, a far cry from Empire’s 2.6 million. No one has offered to buy out Fathallah Films’ cinema interests – an ominous indication, maybe, that, from a market perspective, they are simply not worth buying. This explains why the company has, in recent years, placed ever-greater emphasis on its non-cinematic interests. “We are shifting from cinema to television,” stated A.K. Fathallah Films distributes programs, including documentaries and cartoons, to television broadcasters like MBC and Dubai Television. Asked if Fathallah Films could survive today on cinema alone, A.K. responded: “Never. It’s impossible to survive on our two cinemas and low audiences.”

“I hope we don’t have to close down our cinema interests altogether,” he added. “I love cinema. My brother loves cinema. Our family started this company with cinema.”

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Head shots

by Michael Young October 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

Oh, how Adam Smith would have shuddered to know that the “invisible hand,” which he described as the guiding force of markets, can be seen most often these days cutting the necks of videotaped hostages in Iraq and Saudi Arabia – and that this, too, is guiding a new and exotic market, that of execution CDs. In September, the passion to film atrocities was evident in Beslan, South Ossetia, where Chechen gunmen shot footage of the booby trapped gymnasium where they were holding hundreds of captive schoolchildren, though the exact reason why they filmed remains unclear. Perhaps it was to warn off Russian security forces by showing them the surfeit of explosives in the room; perhaps it was to record the event for posterity or for propaganda purposes. That said, few experiences are more ghastly than watching similarly reasoned videotapes from the Chechen war, where rebels filmed themselves cutting the throats of pleading Russian prisoners.

Everywhere, it seems, militant Islamists, or self-described “freedom fighters,” have been transformed into ghoulish Irving Thalbergs, producing what was hitherto an urban legend: snuff films. And where there is sensationalism, there is supply and demand: According to a Reuters reporter in Iraq: “The hottest-selling item at Baghdad’s video CD market is not a movie or a music video –it’s an ordinary Egyptian whose beheading was filmed by his Muslim militant captors.” And how big a market is that? “We see about 300 to 400 clips a week,” said one shopkeeper, who didn’t have the nerve to watch what he was selling. At about 70 cents a CD, that’s (for Iraq) a respectable $210 to $280 a week. The paradox of the execution CD sales, much like that of al-Qaeda’s ability to use new computer technology or to decipher and exploit the Byzantine ways of international financial transfers, is that utterly illiberal gentlemen are at ease in the ways of the free market. The market is, in theory, amoral, so that whichever product finds an aficionado should also find a price for its purchase. In fact, that rule is repeatedly broken, for example in the sale of child pornography or the distribution of drugs. But where do the execution CDs take their place?

The answer would appear simple: in the dustbin. But that’s clearly not where Iraqi shopkeepers are storing them, or where avid spectators are watching them. Why? Because somehow death has been hitched to things regarded as legitimate: anti-Americanism, the alleged apostasy or guilt of the filmed victims, perceived resistance, and the like. More easily illustrating this trait, another of the big CD sellers in Iraq show images of the young cleric Moqtada al-Sadr edited in with war scenes showing people lying in their own blood. Watching exhibitionist violence becomes eminently acceptable if viewers regard it as part of a justifiable experience, a fact splendidly exploited by Al-Jazeera, which has embraced, if not largely propelled, the market of videotaped captive-taking.

In that context, for example, Iraqi viewers may watch CDs with images from Abu Ghraib (with spliced-in scenes from a Hungarian pornographic film showing alleged American soldiers raping Arab women) because he or she feels it is a duty to confirm the evil nature of the American occupation. NBC correspondent Hanson Hosein recently quoted a shopkeeper: “The Abu Ghraib scandal CDs are very popular … people are angry at what the American soldiers are doing.” Of course, one cannot underestimate the brute titillation some members of the public feel while watching someone being butchered. It’s apparently not all stern duty. And one suspects that not a few Al-Jazeera viewers (or those of Al-Arabiya, which is less beloved by the chop-chop set) watch the edited murders much as they would a spectral scene from Werner Herzog’s NOSFERATU THE VAMPYRE. What is the moral of the atrocity CDs or videos making the rounds in Baghdad or Riyadh? That even those who wish to carry the world backwards to some vague time immemorial will adopt the most modern techniques to do so; that even the most outrageous of human actions can produce a market of sorts, proving that free minds and free markets need not invariably be one; that human beings will readily watch other humans being killed for various reasons, and will usually seek to justify this on moral or political grounds; and that even the most ardent defenders of freedom, in particular the freedom to broadcast and watch atrocity tapes, can define it truly only as the right to be free without harming others.

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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For your information

Interminable terminal

by Executive Contributor September 28, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

The saga concerning the private jet terminal at the Beirut airport continues. The new terminal was supposed to open its doors last June, but until now it has not. “We are facing technical problems with the air conditioning and lighting,” said Samir Fakeh, head of the Civil Aviation Department. “The system does not function as it should.”

Fakeh was not able to indicate the exact nature of the problems, nor was the SNAM contracting company responsible for the overall finishing of the 120,000 square meter terminal, which hosts eight VIP lounges, a 300 square meter shopping area and restaurant. No retail space has been rented out yet.

The building took some two years to construct and forms the backbone of a $33 million investment to better facilitate the growing fleet of private jets flying to Beirut. So far, 13 private jet companies from Europe and the Arab world have handed in requests to rent space at the new facility. Despite the delay, none of them has canceled yet, said Fakeh. Still, he would have liked to tap into the busy summer tourist season. He was unable to give an estimation of possible losses, which may run into hundreds of thousands of dollars.

An indication of possibly the real reason for the delay came in Fakeh’s answer to when the facility might open. “Maybe in September,” he said, “but maybe we’ll have to wait for the presidential elections to be over.”

Fakeh did not want to go into further details. It’s no secret, however, that differences in opinion over the second mandate of President Emile Lahoud have paralyzed much in the country. The new VIP facility appears to have fallen into the stagnation trap due to the ambient political rivalries. And like many other sectors, the opportunity costs are swiftly mounting.

September 28, 2004 0 comments
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For your information

Ineke Botter

by Executive Contributor September 9, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

With the mass migration of almost one million 03 mobile numbers to the 71 prefix set for the night of September 17, Ineke Botter, Managing Director and CEO of Alfa, would have every right in the world to be a bit nervous. After all, the switchover involves several private and governmental entities, not to mention the Lebanese public itself who is not necessarily given to listening to patient lessons on the need to reformat the country’s collective digital phonebook. The thing is that Botter is not particularly nervous – at least not outwardly. In fact, while the four week lead up to the switchover will undoubtedly involve her in a blizzard of PR and outreach efforts, she’s as focused as ever on the big picture: Revamping the mobile network, offering expanded services and, hopefully, expanding the customer base so overall rates might eventually come down.

Executive: Lebanon is set to see the mobile code 03 change to 71 in mid September. What is Alfa doing to inform a potentially confused public about the switch?

Ineke Botter: We are doing a lot now. We started with a kick off interview on LBC…. and the Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT) will organize a press conference shortly. We are talking to each and every paper and magazine, and we will have a billboard campaign with Alfa, MTC, Ogero and MoT along highways – around 1,500 in all. We will also have a number of inserts in magazines etc. When the mobile code 03 is transferred to 71 on the night of September 17 and into September 18, if you make a call nationally to 03 then you have to change to 71. If it is an international incoming call however, then it will be forwarded automatically to 71 forever – although the caller will get a message to dial 71 next time. So we are doing a lot of “pretty” work and a lot of work after the 18th of September. The reason why we are doing all this is it has already incurred a lot of work for ourselves for over a year now – lately we have a project team of about twenty people and endless suppliers involved all making sure that this is a seamless enterprise at least from a technical point of view. So one month before, we want to make sure that people understand how [the changeover] will function so we don’t get any overload in customer care with questions that are basically crystal clear if we explain them over time. The other aspect here is that we are trying to make people aware that they really need to do something. This means that [customers] have to change in their mobiles the codes from 03 to 71. Once it is done it will not happen again, so it’s a one-off. The final issue I want to mention is that people will most probably have to print new business cards and stationary, so the public cost is so big that we found it necessary to inform people well beforehand.

Executive: Is there a number now for how much the switchover may cost consumers?

IB: There is no estimation of the cost… Although there is international benchmarking, it is very dependent on the local situation because, for example, printing costs are a lot lower here than in Europe… definitely though [the cost to consumers] will be in the millions.

Executive: Is one month of publicity really enough time? Why didn’t alfa start earlier?

IB: Well the MoT is the owner. Of course, the mobile operators are the first ones involved in this project. We are very willing to do whatever is necessary to inform the public, but you have to recognize that in May, for example, there were other items on the agenda, the elections. So the changeover was not the top priority, and I think people have to understand. It is quieter now though so I think people will understand.

Executive: Why was this step necessary in the first place?

IB: The fixed line network uses 01 and 02 and then all of a sudden 03 is mobile and then you have 04 and 05 etc [local numbers]. So to have a numbering plan in place, the MoT decided that this needed to be harmonized. The first step was that they restudied the fixed line network so you have to dial an area code and then the number. Now, 03 will be put aside and used later in the fixed line network. The other reason was that, at the moment, [the MoT] had to introduce a new number block for one million new numbers… So we released 70 [in June] which you now have and you will have 71 and if the market ever grows to 100% [penetration] you might have 72.

Executive: What is your biggest concern about the switchover?

IB: Well it is not a big concern, but there will be some outages in some systems because they have to migrate. This is just a fact of life that we have to do. One of the things that will be affected is the Intelligent Network for prepaid subscribers. In any event, we are now determining with suppliers at which hour we will be doing something, and we will send out this schedule to customers. My expectation is this will be a very small issue. And we will compensate if there is some loss.

Executive: Is the introduction of new numbers –the 70 prefix – helping to bring down Lebanon’s notoriously high mobile rates?

IB: The MoT decides on the prices, not us. After 14 months here, I have said this a million times: it is not us. Each and every new service or tariff change we need to ask approval. We do have the expertise in house to act as a consultant to the government to say ‘if you lower the prices by XYZ then we can predict to you the following customer take up.

Executive: You can show them this. Have you shown them?

IB: Sure….but you have to look at the other side of the coin, which means what is the investment per subscriber and how can I recoup that investment. You have to study your addressable markets, then you have to see what the revenue stream is for the government… all while investing for these additional customers. So these calculations are not on the back of an envelope. You can say, for example, ok we estimate the market growth at 30%, which means for the government that the investment will be so much. And that investment needs to paid from the revenue stream which, at the moment, goes straight to the state budget.

Executive: So even if the government wanted to drop mobile prices tomorrow and expand the customer base, the network itself is just not ready for this?

IB: First of all this network is old, so the first calculations that you have to do is to see how you have to replace network elements – we have to replace quite a bit of the network, for the existing customer. Second, you have to look at services you want to offer to your current customer base. If we want to go to the 2.5 generation G – the EDGE technology – at the moment a lot of the network cannot support it. Then, the third thing is that we want to have a bigger uptake of new customers so we would need to build out to cater to this [lower level] market segment…. My top priority is the replacement of network elements, while doing this we can also add capacity itself.

Executive: It has been more than a year since Alfa came to Lebanon, how has business been thus far?

IB: The first year after the take-over has been a challenging time starting with the ramping up of the number of personnel. As you might remember, we lost 57% of the employees when we arrived and had to start recruiting at great speed, then of course, all recruits had to be trained on the job, which was and is a great task and achievement for everyone involved. Then, there was the rebranding from Cellis to alfa which involved over 50 people. That said, from a management and operational point of view, I’m quite happy. We have increased subscribers by 15% and also increased our roaming partners by 13%. Now, what we urgently need is investment in replacing equipment and expanding the network, as I said, to cater to the continuous growth of subscribers. Also, alfa wants to take the next step in launching more data services, again, a project that needs time and substantial money but will support the development of the economy. To a certain extent, I compare Lebanon to the Netherlands where I’m from: both are trading companies really… and traders need the newest business tools to make sure they are on the cutting edge.

September 9, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

On the edge of oblivion

by Nicolas Photiades September 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

Fitch, the powerful international rating agency, warned in July that Lebanon risked being downgraded if the government failed to act on its much promised monetary reforms and privatization, the two conditions that determined the Paris II donor conference. While the first condition has been more or less met, the second has been postponed ad vitam eternam, while politically, a consensus of complete stagnation has been reached, and will remain, until after the presidential elections.

So, while the Lebanese party through the summer, the bottom line is that the country is still teetering at the edge of the abyss and remains the laughing stock of the international capital markets and investors. Its B- rating is shorthand for the fact that we are one step away from default and collapse.

Lebanon’s credit rating (which determines the country’s ability to repay the principal on its debt and service interest) has stabilized to B- (by Standard and Poor’s) and B2 (by Moody’s) since 2002. When the country was rated by these international rating agencies for the first time in the mid 1990s, the rating was not significantly higher and was below investment grade anyway, at BB- (S&P) and B1 (Moody’s). As of 1994, when Lebanon became a successful and frequent bond issuer, the necessity for a credit rating was imperative. International investment banks and the global capital markets needed a rating in order to accurately price the bond issues that were sold to institutional investors world-wide, and benchmark them against issues made by other countries.

Lebanon’s sovereign credit rating is one of the lowest of the world. Indeed, only Bolivia, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela have a similar rating on S&P’s scale, while Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Paraguay are rated below B- at CCC and selective default (SD) levels. The remaining 106 rated countries all have credit ratings above B-, including Mongolia (B), Pakistan (B), the Philippines (BB), Ukraine (B), Benin (B+), and the Cook Islands (B+). With a higher credit rating, these countries can borrow slightly more cheaply than Lebanon, which is at the top end of the table in terms of credit risk. Lebanon’s B- rating signifies that the country “generally lacks characteristics of the desirable investment” or is a country where “significant credit risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains.”

As we all know, the reason for Lebanon’s low rating stems principally from its large fiscal deficit and public debt burden, which accounts for more than 180% of GDP and is the highest amongst rated countries. The fiscal deficit, at above 10%, is also regarded as high and has not shown signs of going below the 10% mark for some time. Furthermore, the country’s external financing or liquidity remains heavily strained, despite the Paris II. Lebanon has not delivered on its promises and therefore cannot expect aid from foreign governments and institutions such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank. Moreover, the central bank is believed to have little if not negative net foreign exchange reserves, which can only be replenished with external, non-debt, capital inflows.

Another reason for the country’s low rating is the uncertainty surrounding the government’s ability to generate additional revenues (despite the introduction of the VAT) and diversify the economy. But the most serious reason, which triggers a negative reaction from rating agencies, is the political infighting that has been plaguing the country’s economic reform efforts for more than six years and which has brought about a substantial drop in confidence from international investors. In other words, the outside world sees Lebanon as having too much debt, insufficient revenues and lacking political will. The rating agencies see Lebanon’s strategy to raise funds to finance its fiscal deficit as backfiring. By raising public debt to unsustainable levels, the government has become highly reliant on attracting investor funding to Lebanon, and has also become extremely vulnerable to external conditions. Indeed, if the world’s capital markets experienced a downturn and the flavor for emerging market debt once again disappeared, the government would not easily be able to turn to local banks, saturated with Lebanese government debt securities. This financial flexibility will then be substantially weakened, and the credit rating may then go below the single B bracket. The most immediate and obvious consequence of a low credit rating is the high cost of borrowing for Lebanon. International capital markets determine the price of indebtedness (or the level of interest) according to how risky the borrower is, and the credit rating assigned by internationally recognized and accredited rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch, is used by these markets as the symbol that distils all credit information into a single letter and as a benchmark, according to which pricing is determined. Lebanon’s B- rating means that the cost of borrowing is extremely high, not only for the government, but also for the whole economy, which has to align by the benchmark set up by the government’s rating. If Lebanon is downgraded further, the cost of borrowing for the state would increase by 200 basis points (2%). Therefore, Lebanese Eurobonds would carry a coupon of around 520 basis points (5.2%) over US Treasuries, compared to the current spread of 340 basis points. If on the other hand, Lebanon were to reach the holy grail of investment grade (probably not in our life time) and get upgraded to BBB level, it would pay 200 basis points less than it currently pays, or a spread of around 140 basis points over US Treasuries (similar to Mexico, which is rated BBB- by S&P). Simply put, the government would have more money to channel into growth projects. At the moment, the high cost of borrowing, coupled with the high level of indebtedness has forced Lebanon to direct most of the country’s revenues into debt servicing, leaving virtually nothing to fund badly needed growth projects. The low credit rating firmly embeds Lebanon amongst the world’s third world countries, and puts the country on an equal footing with some pretty mediocre nations.

An even worse case scenario would be the discontinuing of the country’s rating, which would cause the cost of borrowing to shoot up to astronomical levels. Raising funds at whatever the cost would be extremely difficult, and the global capital markets would completely marginalize Lebanon. We would be the Phnom Penh, rather than the Hong Kong, of the Middle East.

So what to do? First and foremost, the country needs to establish political stability. Rating agencies loathe politically unstable sovereigns and have frequently stated that Lebanon needs to establish a consensus within its fragile political coalition. The public and investors alike need to know that there are no more political conflicts within the ruling coalition and that there is a clear and firm intention to carry out an efficient recovery program. Second, social stability must be solidified. The strengthening of democracy and transparent governmental efforts to create jobs and slow down the country’s brain and youth drain are vital. The government today is ignoring this issue and is focusing instead on fiscal and monetary economics. Ignoring social economics has been a major error.

Third, Lebanon must navigate skillfully in very rough regional and international diplomatic waters. The regional environment has never been worse, and the country cannot afford a faux pas if it wants to carry out an efficient fiscal, monetary, and social economic adjustment program. Fourth, the Lebanese government must finally carry through on its promises to revive a moribund privatization and reform program. Until now, Lebanon has been sluggish at best in its attempts to carry out privatization. As regards to the latter, the timing is awkward: emerging market initial public offerings (IPOs), an essential method through which a successful privatization is made, are virtually dead, whilst strategic institutional investors are either not attracted by the Lebanese market or simply have too many problems of their own to contemplate investments overseas. In addition, factors such as divisive domestic politics, the unclear and most often deteriorated financial situation of companies to be privatized, labor union staunch resistance and endemic disputes between the government and the rare foreign bidders, make privatization an insurmountable task.

It is therefore vital for the government to start using securitization tools to restructure public entities that are candidates for privatization, in order to make them more attractive to increasingly choosy foreign bidders, and carry out successfully a couple of privatization transactions. This would kick start the privatization program in a serious manner, show a clear political will, and bring in much needed cash into the coffers (the partial privatization of the telecommunications and the electricity sectors could very well bring in revenues in the range of $2 billion to $3 billion).

Last but not least, the Lebanese government should actively explore the growth route. A clear option for the Lebanese government is to grow itself out of a debt trap. The rating agencies always preach for the diversification of revenues and for the protection of cash flow. Lebanon has lost sight of its growth-orientation and has focused more on fiscal and monetary economics. The introduction of the VAT and attempts to boost the tourism sector are moves in the right direction, but remain insufficient. The government should seriously tackle the strengthening and the restructuring of existing inefficient sectors to further boost government revenues.

The communication of a clear political will and commitment as regards to privatization and securitization to the world financial community, the execution of a large, immediate and transparent privatization, and more importantly the immediate halt in the political infighting and the announcement to the world’s diplomatic community that all is well within the triumvirate, are merely quick ingredients for a small upgrade. However, the BDL’s monetary tools have bought the country some time, but are insufficient and cannot be sustained without parallel reforms and privatization. However, the BDL could also crack down on inefficient banks and restructure and “specialize” the financial sector, and get permission to use the idle $4 billion worth of gold reserve (either sell it partially or obtain cheap funding with it as collateral). These are only the immediate steps that need to be taken by the Lebanese government, in order to stabilize the current rating situation. If carried out efficiently, together with the provision of much needed financial aid, Lebanon would probably move up a few notches on the rating scale. But it would take much more efforts by the country in the long-term to attain the elusive investment grade rating (BBB).

You have been warned.

Nicolas Photiades is an independent financial adviser on financial, capital optimization and strategy.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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The bigger picture

by Yasser Akkaoui September 1, 2004
written by Yasser Akkaoui

No matter how much it hurts to see the constitution tinkered with, the extension of the presidential mandate should not be our main problem. At the end of day, these minor maneuverings (and they are very minor) are inconsequential in the region’s grand scheme, one that is driven by the heady whiff of economic rewards for those who fall into line. Lebanon is small country with a big debt, a Middle East backwater, driven by self-interest. We are missing the bigger picture.

Whatever they might think, our politicians are not real players. There is not one who bestrides the regional, let alone world, stage, so let’s drop the posturing and get on with the job at hand: getting the country out of its economic misery by creating an environment of political cooperation and consensus and setting an example of hard work and selflessness.

Instead of arguing over whose people get what jobs, we should argue over how to draft the national economic recovery program. National unity should replace personal greed and a ministerial portfolio should be a privilege, rather than an opportunity to build a pension plan.

This is the only way to regain the confidence of the international community. They know our leaders are high-profile, low-caliber operators. They will not be impressed with the imposition of a new presidential term however competent the incumbent and they will want to see results –privatization, transparency and civil service accountability to name a few – before they grant further soft loans.

Lebanon went to the last donor conference in Paris, took the money and left. Paris III is now mission impossible. The international community, now bitten will be more than shy; it will be downright obstinate before Lebanon’s whiny supplications. If we were to stand any chance of getting help, it was going to take a wholesale shake-up of our political landscape and this does not look likely given the perpetuity inferred by the presidential extension, hence the need for a genuine demonstration of willing to correct our economic woes.

And let us not forget the likes of Fitch and Moody’s, which will be carefully scrutinizing their rating of Lebanon. Political infighting was always seen as an entry in the negative column. If it gets any worse in the light of this recent edict, they will no doubt be swift to act.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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