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Infographics

Forging an economic path to new sovereignty

by Executive Editors March 26, 2024
written by Executive Editors

Crisis situations are nothing if not an opportunity for change. In this sense acting as a supreme motivating force for change, the economic crisis was expanded by a national security crisis and threat to sovereignty of Lebanon. In the 2023/24 issue of Executive, we explore the magazine’s consultative Economic Roadmap under a perspective of building security and ultimately a new expression of sovereignty that is both networked and interdependent, instead of being defined as indivisible and territorial. 

Economy is the aspect of a polity that is always in flux. By definition, economy is never at the same time static and growing. The investigations and inquiries of Executive Magazine over the three years since March 2021 have shown that some sectors of the economy meet the criteria of both serving greater societal need and opening larger economic development potential. 

Specializations of economic activity that have these two characteristics of great need and reward included renewable energy and production of food stuffs. Improvements of productivity and output in these sectors will therefore translate into the increase of security for the whole of society. In an additional advantage, meeting societal priority needs for food and energy is acknowledged globally under targets of food security and energy security (see stories contained in this pdf issue that summarize our 2023 findings on these sectors). 

The economic crisis of Lebanon has in this sense spurred on the identification of economic activities with high potential for job creation and market growth. Such potentials for boosting the economy were discovered through stakeholder consultations curated by Executive in manufacturing, hospitality, knowledge and creative industries, tech entrepreneurship, and niches in the real economy such as healthy cosmetics and organic products in food and beauty. 

Further priority efforts of private and public sectors are needed for creation and improvement of financial markets and social safety networks, which are curiously interdependent to one another in the respective assurances of social security and financial security (see special report in issue 270 and dollarization comment in this pdf). 

A new aspect of security needs is cybersecurity, which is the meeting defense needs of an increasingly digital society and in many ways is the equivalent of national security in the physical territory of a country. The importance of addressing those two security needs has been heightened immensely and the value of national security has been put in sharp relief by events in the last quarter of 2023.

It must be noted, however, that the economic sectors of above stated potential were not at all times the first focuses of private investment. Neither were they the recipients of incentives by legislators or public sector support. This has to change as much as private and public capacities can facilitate. 

A further factor of detriment was made evident through Executive’s research, namely that the sectors with the highest job creation potential in the real and the services economy, and the priority issue of security, are interconnected with national public sector and governmental capacities that have been long and deeply deficient are still not being developed. The implementation of the economic roadmap through private and civic efforts and achievements of its purpose and vision layers cannot be completed without building and reforming the state and its institutions.  

March 26, 2024 0 comments
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Uncategorized

The secret of the seventh Roadmap: meet ERMI

by Executive Editors March 26, 2024
written by Executive Editors

The Executive Roadmap is a dynamic, consultative and collaborative undertaking that documents solutions and bundles of measures which are seen as answers to Lebanon’s economic and structural woes by committed residents from many walks of life. To the best of the editors’ knowledge, the Roadmap is the longest-running, often relayed on or copied, and most crowd-sourced economic plan under publication in Lebanon. It also is distinct in its origins and character from rescue plans that were conceived in public sector, business community and civil society contexts of the country’s acute economic crisis in the past four years. As such, the Roadmap is a testimony to the will of the people beyond any political affiliations. It is a permanent draft that is in its seventh annual iteration, thus in its pdf iteration marked as Draft 7.0.

At the same time, Draft 7 marks the entry into Executive Roadmap’s third phase of iteration and development. This new phase is externally determined on one hand by the national circumstances that entail more severe external threats and internal dangers – but also new economic and social impulses that highlight the potential for restructuring and rebooting what Executive codifies as economic democracy. On the other hand, the new phase of RM iteration represents a significant editorial effort of making the Roadmap Drafts more accessible, visual, and indeed inviting to new stakeholders aspiring to share in the shaping of Lebanon’s fortunes.

To this end, the Executive Roadmap is now garbed in fancy digital attire. The visual representation and navigation have been redesigned from scratch. Its 390 recommendations have been condensed and aligned in style to be sharper, under the intent of serving as content platform in workshops, roundtables, and new interaction formats where Executive will in this year and henceforth be inviting contributions and debate. When compared side by side with the 7.0 pdf version, the Executive Economic RoadMap Interactive, or ERMI, are one in spirit and fully aligned in content but distinct in appearance and nuance.  

Three phases of Roadmap evolution

Induced by years of observing and analyzing administrative and political deficiencies that have been widening instead of being resolved, and of social and economic pathways that were directed at walls and cliffs instead of sustainable solutions and stairways to greater prosperity, the Executive Roadmap to save Lebanon was first prepared in the second half of 2018 and published in December of that year as a substantive plea for implementation of reforms and creation of efficiencies. 

In the earliest iteration, direct consultations with stakeholders as well as the archive of Executive informed Draft 1.0’s formation with analysis pieces, industry reports, business features, interviews, expert comments, by-invitation op-eds, and editorials. Extracted from a loose list and organized into four pillars (Build & Reform; Strategize; Combat; and Develop), the aggregate of the magazine’s stakeholder contributions and insights was translated into an actionable document of 16 Policy Priorities laid out on 48 pages. Three internal and twelve external stakeholders were listed on the masthead of Draft 1.0. 

The mindset of Executive editors at this moment in time, expressed in the Facts & Figures 2017-18 end-of-year issue, was deeply concerned, but still hopeful. The issue’s Economy & Policy overview piece warned “The Lebanese state has no plan for where to take the country economically in 2018 and beyond.”

It can thus in hindsight be said that the first steps of the structured Roadmap process, while yielding Draft 1.0, were embedded in an increasingly uneasy calm, the relative peace of the status quo ante that lulled Lebanon in the entire post-conflict reconstruction and development period of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. In the months following publication of Draft 1.0, the country was still engulfed in deceptive calm (while the July 2019 issue of Executive was titled “Breaking Point” and argued that, if Lebanon were a corporation “its management would need to be fired and fired fast”, editors continued to emphasize the great value of the financial system and called upon banks “to make every effort they can to be absolutely trustworthy”).

But in editors’ anticipation of likely deepening social and economic chasms and breakages in the country’s integrity, Executive’s Roadmap was, in a parallel effort to the regular coverage, materially reviewed and substantially expanded through consultative meetings held with diverse civil society organizations and stakeholder groups (that in some cases did not even consider themselves being prima facie economic stakeholders). Because of these interactive, on-the-ground consultations, the number of credited Roadmap contributors multiplied more than sixfold; Draft 2.0, published as a standalone document in spring 2019, introduced 268 newly proposed measures.

A first for Executive in the preparation of Roadmap 3 was an intense cluster of five economic and financial roundtables organized in a downtown Beirut hotel just ahead of national day 2019. Stepping out of the conference venue and walking less than 50 steps after the successful conclusion of the last roundtable session meant that participants and conveners of the gathering were immersed in one of the most vibrant and enthusiastic Martyrs’ Square convocations of civil demands for change. Draft 3.0 was thus informed by the civil thawra at the end of 2019, but was still in many ways an effort of finding ways to avert the tsunami of despair that had been looming higher and higher in the preceding months. The number of credited contributors and stakeholders in the project again rose, almost doubling from Draft 2.0.

Aspirations of rescue in dire straits 

As the liquidity and banking crisis merged into the structural economic meltdown, the Roadmap process entered its second phase of iteration and became a crisis response and rescue tool. Draft 4.0 sought to help chart the way through the crisis by highlighting proposed emergency measures while attempting to “complement the emerging political will, doctrine, and resolve, which centers Lebanon’s well-being.” Draft 4.0 was presented in print in the “Fight for Hope” December 2020 – January 2021 issue of Executive. 

As the immensity of the Lebanese political, economic, and social crisis was building up in 2020, the crisis turned into a mega- and meta-crisis of the Lebanese convivial model. Executive’s Roadmap Drafts went in search of new perspectives and ways forward. 

In this overwhelming crisis context it is important to acknowledge that the work on RM Drafts 5.0 and 6.0 was marked by many financial and personnel impediments because of the—in national memory unprecedented, and, also by Executive in its magnitude wholly unexpected—mega-crisis with its exacerbation of the Covid-19 pandemic and the restrictions on residents’ lives that were initiated by a surprisingly proactive state to curb the spread of “corona.” The other exacerbating factor of the national pain in the first and biggest crisis year was of course the Beirut Port explosion of August 4, 2020 unleashed by human failure and criminal political negligence.

Under the impact of the mega-crisis of 2020 to 2022, RM Drafts 5.0 and 6.0 saw addition of measures urging fast action on issues such as negotiations for an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and provision of vaccines. A most noteworthy effort of opening new perspectives for economic recovery on basis of private sector productivity and focus was the addition of the Enable pillar, documented in Draft 5.0. This pillar emerged out of consultative roundtable work with international agencies and private sector industry leaders in March 2021.

The Enable pillar consequently covers seven sectors of promise in manufacturing and services. These seven sectors – manufacturing; agro-industry; media and content development; hospitality; knowledge enterprises; specialized chemicals (with utility for health and beauty); and renewable energy – were judged by consulting experts as best positioned for new growth. The recommendations in this pillar present strategic recommendations and proposed practical measures, directly and primarily addressing private sector decision makers. The number of credited contributors in Draft 5.0 reached more than 180 and the number of proposed measures culminated at over 360. Draft 6.0 at the start of 2023 reiterated the content of Draft 5.0, adding new accents and shifting emphases. 

Due to financial restraints, Drafts 5.0 and 6.0 were disseminated solely in electronic format. Ideation of ERMI started in mid-2023. In the iteration’s design and collation phase, Executive agreed on parallel production of a mindfully shortened, more visually appealing and intuitively interactive ERMI and the reference Draft 7.0 that combines revised introductions for each Policy Priority with annotations that record edits and streamlining of proposed measures versus Draft 6.0.  

Through the looking glass(es) of many innovative minds 

As the crisis landscape has ceased economic and social escalation and shifted in 2023 to a wider need for integrated regional development and stabilization, Executive deems that the third phase of our Economic Roadmap iterations is upon us in form of ERMI, whose abridged proposed measures content-wise mirror pdf Draft 7.0 as the comprehensive summation of the Roadmap process’s phase one and two. 

In preparation for the day after regional instability – or more precisely the day after the day after – the start of phase three in the Executive Roadmap denotes the time of joint striving for a new sovereignty that is realistic, modular and interdependent rather than indivisible and implemented in antagonism to and isolation from Lebanon’s direct neighbors. Executive has worked on the first iteration of the third phase by empowering ERMI while in parallel providing Draft 7.0 as final pdf iteration and reference document containing the longer-form Policy Priority descriptions and proposed measures.  

Digitized but not yet fully digital, ERMI offers the experience of an abridged Roadmap version that encourages more debates by condensing lengthy proposed measures into shorter versions and omits some proposed measures, mostly such measures which overlap and have been included in earlier drafts in more than one pillar and Policy Priority. We also condensed the introductions for each theme and designations of Policy Priorities for easier interaction in ERMI.  

The editorial condensing of measures notwithstanding, ERMI is even more committed than Drafts 1.0 to 7.0 to the stakeholder diversity and consultative approach that is the governing mindset of the Executive Roadmap process since day 1. The editorial commitment to continuity of this process is evident in the structure of five verticals (pillars) and 26 topics or Policy Priorities with a total of 52 sub-categories that are denoted in both RM7 versions by the numerated entries 1.1 to 26.1. 

The affiliated measures are denoted in the second decimal layer, from 1.1.1 to 26.1.24. The integrity of the Roadmap numbering system has been retained, even where individual measures have been retired from ERMI for reasons of redundancy or inappropriateness in the 2024 timeframe. In short, numerical identifiers of Policy Priorities and proposed measures in reference Draft 7.0 and EMRI are 100 percent the same.   

For complete elucidation of the roadmap numbering scheme, it is additionally to note that the subdivisions of Policy Priorities in Roadmap pillars 1 to 4 number between 10 and 12 per pillar. This grouping is numerically set off against the Policy Priorities in the industry-addressing fifth “Enable” pillar that covers seven industrial sectors (policy priorities 19 – 26) with no further subdivisions. 

In terms of intended priority audiences, pillars one and two have been compiled with the primary target of serving and inspiring public stakeholders, pillars two and three are designed to appeal civil stakeholders, pillar four and even more so pillar five aim to reverberate with private sector stakeholders. All five pillars, however – and this is the raison d’etre of moving the Executive Economic Roadmap into expanding interactivity with more and more digital functionalities envisioned for future EMRI iterations – seek to unleash innovative thinking and garner input and debate from all types of mindful stakeholders.

March 26, 2024 0 comments
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Leaders

Reading beyond the ominous signs

by Executive Editors March 22, 2024
written by Executive Editors

Lamentations over the state of the world, the ongoing extinction of a Mediterranean conurbation, and the mass murder of a populace in our corner of the Middle East are currently ubiquitous on the world’s streets and in virtual public squares. In the global market place of opinions, minds are bombarded with both constant protests against war and genocide and constant hue and cry lambasting the parties bearing the blame of the ongoing armed conflicts. 

From the vantage point of our small geopolitical neighborhood, this has the perverse effect that apparently vote-seeking philippics about concrete wars, genocide, and everything and everyone that is – verily or presumably – not adequately functioning in the global system, currently are detracting from giving what it takes to meet this troubled region’s urgent need for radically new, sustainable and long-term solutions. 

Such detraction is all the more tragic under the Lebanese socioeconomic perspective. Any valiant effort for a full national reboot, the need of which has been stated openly and unmistakably for seven consecutive years by the economically literate in this country who trusted this magazine as their forum, is today forced to confront the bickering, self-centered of the country’s political class and their external beneficiaries. Additionally, all calls and efforts for producing solutions to the Lebanese economic dilemmas are now drowned out by the political maneuvering, fake news and propaganda assaults in the massive info-war that has been raging since last October on multiple fronts around Lebanon. This is nauseatingly counterproductive because the crisis of the Lebanese economy is not solved in the least. 

A horizon hanging full of mourn 

However, before it is conscionable to discuss if and how the worsened Lebanese situation, heightened national security, and persistent economic threat level can be rationally addressed, it is a human obligation to acknowledge that Lebanon, while suffering, is far from being as bad off as the Palestinian territories, long the nexus of universal suffering in this part of the world. With the Palestinian pain at a tortuous and wrongly justified historic peak level, it must be expected that nothing other than dirges will become the emblems of living in Gaza and all of Palestine and that those Arab dirges will for years be sending their worthy message to the world. 

This outlook on future perception of the Palestinian cause is diametrically opposed to the way how, in the global battlegrounds of opinion manipulation and mind twisting, it is today impugned as barbaric and disgracious to open one’s mouth, asking for example what delineates genocide when the stage is Gaza, or “coldheartedly” compare what percentage of Gazans have been killed in five months with the percentage of civilian casualties during two years of warfare over Ukraine. But most depressingly, and regardless of the inevitable rectification of the current vile rage against calling out the mass extinction of Gazans and deliberate “inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction in whole or in part” for the genocide it is, the stories of monstrous suffering and unbearable pain in Gaza will only lead to the eternally unanswerable question of “why?”. 

“Why” is the essence of lamentation, whether one searches today, 7 decades, or 27 centuries ago. And even if one dirge were to ask, “where are signs of hope and peace?”, such a question’s indisputable answer can only be the negative affirmation: not with terrorists, not with the tyrants of power, and – with 99 percent certainty – not in geopolitics. 

And yet

However, an equally indisputable fact about the future of what is today the world’s most concentrated war zone, is that the there will be a “day after.” Even as no one can predict how many more needless deaths it will take for the power of atrocity raging in Gaza to finally wane, it is a fact of history that wars do cease. 

And this means there will be the day when all partisan non-starter solutions and peace-of-the-cemetery plans for Palestine, and by extension Lebanon, will be substituted with an endeavor of somehow realizing non-violent coexistence and a multi-faceted and fair regional framework that fortifies these peoples’ yet to be built sovereign path of self-determination, prosperity and virtuous interdependence.   

Notably, even if there will also be a “day” marked by the need to heal the souls of victims and unmask the lies that have been and still are ruling the war, the “day after” on country level will require return to economic life and implementation of political coexistence with neighbor countries.  

Being cognizant of all this, it would be wholly unconscionable to approach the economic “day after” for Lebanon without a cogent plan. 

The Executive Economic Roadmap, throughout seven iterations, has adhered to the concept that balanced cognitive processes are crucial for a diversified and sustainable economy.  This has motivated the roadmap’s structuring into pillars in adherence to the thought that what is crucial in an economy’s intensification and expansion, are applied methods of information processing for balanced growth and conservation while also considering juxtaposed innate tendencies such as aggression and cooperation. This mindset, used since the first draft of the Executive Roadmap, is the mindset that we relied on when revising our current roadmap draft 7.0 and its more appealingly digitized version, the Executive Economic Roadmap Interactive, or ERMI, which we intend to be maintaining and updating under this designation in continuity. 

Beating the Red Queen from a new baseline

The 2024 departure line for the next attempt of igniting Lebanon’s economic democracy is marked firstly by new dangers, namely the specter of foreign aggression against Lebanon and the equally threatening specter of violation of liberty from inside. But the course of our roadmap is also newly distinguished by the opportunity to analyze where Lebanese sovereignty has in the past 30 years been faked and how thoroughly the people were deceived by a false sense of economic security. 

The race to a sustainable country is secondly entering a new phase this year on strictly national grounds. With the old Lebanese fiefdom system of fake freedoms and pretend economic security gone, the target of economic salvation is no longer delineated by a polity that either masters structural reforms and gains approval from international development finance institutions (DFIs), or has no other chance but to run for the foreseeable future in what is sometimes called a Red Queen’s race (in allusion to Lewis Carroll). Being trapped in the latter would running and striving at the highest speed that Lebanon’s business community can muster – yet without a chance to escape dependence on handouts by DFIs and others from abroad. 

The vision driving ERMI is that of an interdependent and networked real sovereignty with meaning in the digital age. This concept of sovereignty as supreme but not indivisible or absolute can only succeed if based on social and economic security, and constructed by way of consultative collaboration from an economic democracy that practices non-confrontational conflict management. 

Executive invites all to access ERMI. Join our journey to security and realistic sovereignty by delving deep into propositions for betterment of Lebanese social and economic compacts. 

Testing far-out methods 

Many methods have been used throughout human history when seeking conflict resolution and post-conflict scenarios. Some involved looking for celestial signals. By some trait encoded in the human being, turning our eyes to the skies is ingrained in our kind. Turning their eyes to the skies was what the augurs– one might describe an augur as a political consultant and futurist – of antiquity’s Mediterranean super power Rome did routinely and professionally over 2,000 years ago. 

Another no less astounding but very different story of reading the skies is the tale of the Mediterranean seafarers who, close to three millennia ago, navigated to distant African and Northern European shores. 

They did so not by auguring from mystical sights but by using a combination of celestial and terrestrial observations, imprecise mathematical calculations, and experience. Thus ensued the narrative of long-distance trade and the fame of requisite Phoenician skills eons before sailors started to use the compass, not to mention GPS.

Thus, despite the boost in appreciation for metaphysical decision-finding that the performances of leading players in today’s empires may have unwittingly caused in the past few months, it is the method of combining intuitive, experiential, and evidentiary elements that Executive continues to trust as far as the salvation of the Lebanese polity and economy is concerned. 

Yet, outside of our economic roadmap, how can a contemporary human being react to the recent revelation of seemingly irreversible moral bankruptcy and operational catastrophe of the overextended geopolitical system? 

It is in this context that the anachronistic proposition of auguring sneakily arises in this writer’s notoriously simple mind. When contemplating and agonizing about the political maneuvering and grandstanding that falsely claims to be a search for peace in the Middle East, it suddenly sounds sane, almost compellingly so, to resort (like a Roman augur) to reading aerial movements as arguments for a Pax Deorum. 

However, to return to a more realistic mental ground, about the short-term potential of ERMI one must make no mistake: what in a best-case scenario is on the cards for Lebanon will not be, for a great and indeterminate while, a day of peace or prosperity. It will be a day of newly endeavoring for economic sanity. This effort can be informed by two prior stages of mapping of the Lebanese economy’s needs, but it will also in the coming post-crisis years remain an absurd aspiration to succeed on terrain that has up to this day been hostile to sane and sustainable economic life in so many different ways. In this spirit let’s just recall one apt motto of Lebanon’s 2006 mental rebellion against being bombed into the “stone age” by a most belligerent neighbor: Keep walking.

March 22, 2024 0 comments
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Banking & FinanceEconomics & Policy

Saving the economy or saving face?

by Mounir Rached March 22, 2024
written by Mounir Rached

An alternative to ineffective banking reforms and recovery plans

The latest version of the bank resolution law has the same pitfalls as the previous ones.

Mainly, the law proposed the creation of a committee entitled to determine which banks to be resolved and which to be restructured. The committee is composed of the central bank’s governor and vice governors as the main decision makers, which implies that Banque du Liban (BDL), the debtor, is determining the destiny of banks, the creditors. It is an absurd situation.  The decision-making process should be in the hands of an independent committee.

 It has other pitfalls such as the discretionary classification of deposits into qualified and nonqualified deposits. The proposed reforms would also require depositors to provide evidence of how they earned all deposits exceeding $500 thousand dollars and confirmation from the ministry of finance of the respective country where the deposits originated. This is impossible, especially in cases where earnings originate from Arab oil countries that don’t impose a tax regime. 

An alternative reform plan 

It is, therefore, imperative to devise an alternative plan that resolves the insolvency issue without depriving depositors of their legitimate financial savings. Furthermore, deleting deposits can’t be undertaken without the consent of the majority of depositors under a “collective action clause-CAC” requiring a single aggregated vote of consent of 75 percent. A massive bail in is an aberration and departs from good practices as noted by some member of the IMF Executive Board. Deposits of banks at BDL are liabilities and should not be classified as losses under any circumstances. The solution is neither to delete nor to refund deposits, but to safeguard them in banks’ balance sheets and create liquidity and trust in the financial system. 

Creating trust and liquidity are the indispensable elements of resolving any banking crisis. To achieve these goals, it is essential to implement the following:

1. Protect all deposits: First, assure that deposits are protected and maintained as banks’ liabilities. Any emerging losses incurred from liquidated banks should be dealt with through the proper legal liquidation channels (liquidation law 110) and not through ad-hoc discretionary measures. The government should declare adherence to the constitution safeguarding all financial and real assets.  Safeguarding personal (national and foreign) and institutional savings is necessary to regain trust.

2. Adopt a free market-determined exchange rate: Unify and free the exchange rate for all public and private transactions and remove all restrictions on bank transactions in foreign exchange.  The central bank may intervene in the foreign exchange market as part of its stabilization monetary policy and to avert unexpected market pressure. A free foreign exchange market will diminish the role of the BDL in hoarding significant amounts of reserves.  Required reserves ratios can be significantly reduced, thus generating foreign exchange liquidity in the banking sector.

A free foreign exchange market creates trust as it allows depositors and banks to freely make transactions from their foreign exchange accounts in either Lebanese pounds (LBP) or dollars at the market rate. With a unified market determined rate, the depositors will be unconcerned about whether they are reimbursed in Lebanese pounds or in dollars from their accounts. The virtual and digital role of money can be resumed with the use of checks and credit cards and other digital schemes such as PayPal and e-wallets. With all banks accessing the foreign exchange market, the market will become larger and more competitive, limiting opportunities for manipulation by single foreign exchange traders.

A free rate can equilibrate financial markets and the balance of payments by promoting production of import substitutes and exports of goods and services. It restores the real value of financial assets and liabilities, promotes savings and investments, attracts foreign investments, and promotes growth. 

3. Reschedule financial assets and liabilities: Reschedule all public and private financial assets and liabilities in foreign exchange and LBP accounts including deposits and public debt for short, medium, and longer-term periods not to exceed 5 years.  This measure can be designed to ease the initial strain the banking system may face when a free/ floating exchange rate is adopted. The BDL can initially allocate a portion of its reserves to reduce a possible initial turbulence in the foreign exchange market. Rescheduling of financial assets and liabilities may be guided by the term-structure that prevailed in 2017-2018 before the crisis. The BDL could supervise the process to ensure its adequacy according to the prevailing conditions in banks.  The rescheduling should include all client deposits at banks and the liabilities of the BDL toward the banking sector. Any write-off proposals to reduce liabilities of banks has to be acceptable to depositors individually or in the context of a Collaborative Action Clause (CAC). The government cannot devise a plan that reduces deposits without acceptable and appropriate compensation, which requires the participation of creditors and legal transparency.

Foreign currency debt consisting of $33 billion (composed mostly Eurobonds) is being held by foreign financial institutions and private holders (approximately 50 percent), Lebanese commercial banks (7 percent), the BDL (15 percent), and by bilateral and multilateral obligation (3 percent), with the remainder being held by Lebanese banks and private holders. A large part of the portion held by international financial institutions (IFIs) was acquired at a discounted price during the crisis.  Netting out BDL-held Eurobond debt and the discounted value of IFI-held Eurobond debt could entail a reduction in foreign currency debt of nearly 20 to 25 percent. The government may be able to reschedule dollar debt on terms consistent with debt sustainability with the consent of creditor.

Public debt in LBP mostly held by BDL and banks has been diminished in dollar value by 98 percent, or the exchange rate depreciation rate.

4. Balance the budget: Pursuing fiscal reform with the objective of achieving a balanced budget with a primary surplus is a key ingredient in generating stability in the foreign exchange market and improving external transactions outlook. A free rate enhances government revenues from trade taxes, VAT and income taxes. It can allow the government to adjust its expenditure including wages, investment spending and, at the same time, contribute to a balanced budget target. 

In addition to the impact of adopting a free market-determined rate, several additional fiscal measures should be considered that can improve budget performance and debt sustainability by enhancing revenue collection, such as adopting an appropriate tax structure combined with an efficient- spending programs. 

5. Efficiently reform the banks: Banks’ troubles stem from the default of both the BDL and the government in servicing their obligations.  Their non-performing assets can be resolved as part of rescheduling their liabilities.  Bank reform can be supervised by the relevant financial agency at the BDL in collaboration with the Association of Banks of Lebanon. Exchange rate reform should precede any resolution or liquidation of banks. Commercial bank losses could be limited as most bank assets are collateralized except for sovereign public debt.

The BDL recapitalization could be replenished gradually from government sources as Article 113 of the code of money and banking stipulates that BDL losses have to be borne by the government. The rescheduling of BDL assets and liabilities combined with freeing the currency market could be sufficient to allow the BDL to resume its normal operations. However, the BDL is indeed in need of implementing an administrative restructuring plan in order to reduce the centralization of its current structure. 

6. Corporatize public enterprises: The public enterprise sector has been a major burden on state finances with most of the dollar debt burden emerging from financing their financial gap, prominently within the power sector. The power sector alone received transfers of $50 billion over the past two decades including interest cost estimated at $26 billion.

Corporatization of state-owned enterprises will create an opportunity for depositors to invest in the private sector, and reduce the liabilities of banks. The emergence of a new corporate class will be a fertile ground for allowing banks to play their proper intermediation role and grow again instead of relying on the state for their livelihood.

A salvage plan for whom?

All recovery plans that have been presented since mid-2020 by the governments of Prime Ministers Diab and Mikati, respectively, continued to focus on writing off presumed losses and diluting them rather than on reviving the economy. They presumed the crisis as a bankruptcy rather than an insolvency or liquidity case.

These plans, endorsed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), assumed losses equivalent to over 90 percent of deposits and concluded that the burden of losses should be borne by the depositors, as they falsely claimed that both banks and the government are bankrupt. Residents and non-residents alike have already assumed large losses from restricted and undervalued dollar withdrawals. As noted at the onset of this comment, no version of the bank resolution law has resolved this fundamental flaw. Any new recovery plans must not further penalize the people.

This article reiterates and expands on a similar argument from this same author published by Executive in February 2023. 

March 22, 2024 0 comments
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Editorial

Those who raid other people’s pockets

by Yasser Akkaoui February 5, 2024
written by Yasser Akkaoui

Fulfilling your work orders in a timely manner is the absolute minimum requirement if you want to keep your job. Parliament, whose job description is the protection of the people’s interests, has started this year by – for the first time in almost forever – nominally satisfying one of its standard yearly obligations by voting on the budget before the end of January. 

But this theoretically commendable fulfillment of parliamentary responsibility indicates nothing about its real job: legislating a budget that will sustain and improve the livelihoods of the people. This is not, as many vested experts know and state loudly, what the 2024 budget is about: at best, it is weak temporary fix and a dead-end solution. 

It’s no surprise that the establishment continues protecting a system that has been serving them for decades. One that took so much effort and corruption to perfect. To understand the workings and delusions of the powers that really are in charge among Lebanon’s political class, my mind leaps back to a film that was made in the heyday of venture capitalism and hostile takeovers about the thrills and the perverse “romanticism” of being a corporate raider. 

Other People’s Money with Danny DeVito, Penelope Ann Miller, and Gregory Peck was a 1991 flick whose slick and obnoxious winner was “Larry the liquidator”. He got both the company (with the declared goal of tearing it apart), and (in the movie’s concluding scene) a hint at further romance with the smart lady that had opposed him and lost. Just like in this movie, to me it seems that there those in our political class who believe they can steal the people’s money, liquidate our national assets with impunity, and still have lady Lebanon fall for their oily charm. 

Should the people adore their elected representatives for approving the budget for once within the legal deadline? Applaud the government for presenting a budget without a strategy describing how the country’s resources will be managed and without clear economic performance indicators to hold its managers accountable for? 

Despite the budget’s passing, it stinks again and the odor is so foul this time because there is so little left to steal. Continuous improvement can only be achieved when everyone is empowered to achieve its responsibility to protect the people in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. Our government and its budgetary perpetrators cannot be permitted to continue raiding our remaining, minimal financial safety by dipping, without creating any prospect for real growth and structural reform, into what are other people’s pockets.

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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Last Word

Taking the local path towards enhanced economic security and urban stability

by Taina Christiansen February 5, 2024
written by Taina Christiansen

In Lebanon, nearly 90 percent of the population live in urban areas, making it a country of cities. Therefore, applying an urban lens onto the future economic – and social – stability of Lebanon, where localized urban investments are seriously considered and encouraged, must be at the heart of Lebanon’s sustainable and inclusive tomorrow. Local economic development and investment, where local dynamics and the involvement of respective authorities and stakeholders are at the centre, should be a key consideration within the overall ongoing deliberations of macro-economic reforms in Lebanon. 

Urban social stability and safety is intricately linked to people’s inclusive access and rights to key basic services, such as housing, water, electricity, infrastructure, public spaces, education, health and more. In Lebanon, this is no exception. Haphazard urbanization and expansion of informality across Lebanese cities, coupled with historical mass internal and external displacement – amongst other factors – has made it challenging for government institutions at national and local levels, to resolve or at least mitigate conflicts over land, resources, property rights and equitable services for urban inhabitants. Appropriate economic management in Lebanon can tap into strategies that improve efficiency of revenue collection (as part of a broader financial strategy) and contribute to the beginings of a renewed social contract – which in turn can improve urban affordability for the poor, and contribute to enhanced social stability and safety. 

Financing sustainable urbanization is an investment in Lebanon’s present and future. Lebanese local government capacity must be expanded to harness private sector participation, leverage local assets through value capture, and partner with the central government to invest in urbanization. At the global level, United Nations member states have clearly committed to this through the New Urban Agenda, where the need for a strong municipal finance system is clearly highlighted as a requirement for advancement towards the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. Lebanon’s 1977 Municipal Law outlines the range of sources of finance available to municipalities. This includes fees collected by the central government on behalf of municipalities in an Independent Municipal Fund (IMF) – managed by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and Ministry of Finance – which in theory sees funds redistributed back to municipalities and unions of municipalities. In practice municipalities rely largely on funds from the IMF, some more than 30 percent, others up to 70 percent and smaller municipalities almost entirely. However, these allocations have been beset by delays – for multiple reasons – even prior to the ongoing economic crisis, and current distributed allocations are on hold. Local authorities have thus sought international assistance to finance part of this gap, even more so since 2019 (with a previous increase since the onset of the Syrian displacement crisis in 2011), through innovative ways to support municipal finance and capacity building in order to enable service delivery and contribute to social stability through investments in Lebanese cities and localize development and humanitarian assistance. 

The system for financing local governance and development in Lebanon stands to benefit from a comprehensive overhaul to move closer towards self-sufficiency of municipal services. Doing so, will afford local authorities a real chance in addressing local social instability in a bottom-up approach. As summarised in the UN-Habitat Lebanon and ESCWA State of the Lebanese Cities Report 2021, a key aspect of national and sub-national public finance reform, must re-consider the fairness of the intergovernmental grant system to better take into account actual differences in local needs: “A particular and well-known source of bias in the budget allocation is its blindness to the pressure on municipal services exerted by people who are not registered in a given municipal jurisdiction. This mismatch, which disproportionately affects urban communities, is symptomatic of complex issues spanning voting rights reforms, lack of national population data, and the long-term policy approach to rights afforded to non-Lebanese nationals. This suite of recognized issues may find traction as part of the overall governance reforms.”

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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FinanceOverviewSpecial Report

A laboratory to study financial challenges

by Thomas Schellen February 5, 2024
written by Thomas Schellen

By the strange virtue of its unresolved economic and financial crisis of now four year duration, Lebanon has become an examination room and nation-scale laboratory for analyzing an economic and financial catastrophe. The reasons are plain: this crisis of a small, highly and deeply dollarized country was composed of interconnected financial, economic, social, political, and external shocks and has been playing out at the cusp of a hyper-connected, hyper-(mis)informed, heavily globalized, extremely financialized and increasingly digitized world that cannot but expect to see novel and very hard-to-manage long economic waves and superfast financial cycles.  

The people who were involuntarily subjected to this experiment seem to have shown a rebalancing of newly precarious and informal financial safety with equally precarious and massively externally secured social stability. They have done so through their behavior and coping adjustments over the past four years, which, a cynic might note, were not significantly distorted by government interference or by any notion of trust between people and their government. 

It could further be hypothesized that firstly financial safety and price stability, the domains of central bank policy making that are also the mission of Banque du Liban (BDL), the Lebanese central bank, are not only requirements of stability and/or growth in economic outputs but also quintessential for social security and stability. 

Secondly, it could be said that the slowly improving levels of financial safety, economic performance, and social stability in the country show no indication of sustainability. The evidence of informed altruism and healthy self-interest are focused on the here and now of rational coping, not on national or institutional rebuilding. 

Attributes that characterize the Lebanese economy after four years of disruption and administrative chaos are economic informality, the dollarized cash economy and the inflow of remittances. Many economists and stakeholders in the industrial sector have told Executive that they consider economic informality to have doubled in the past three years, from an already high level that in the mid-2010s was estimated to be in the 30 to 40 percent range. As to the cash economy and remittances, the World Bank estimated earlier in 2023 that last year’s cash economy was worth $9.86 billion, or 45.7 percent of GDP by World Bank computation, and that remittances equaled 31.7 percent of GDP. 

These estimated numbers present a blurry snapshot of the current level of “normalization” in people’s daily affairs, snapshots taken with substantial x factors of further growth of the cash economy and increasing pressures of informality in the first nine months of 2023 as well as fluctuations in inflows from remittances and external financing through diverse channels. It is clear, however, that external financial lifelines have been sustaining anything from peer-to-peer emergency aid to rebuilding of schools and hospitals to salaries of teachers, from civil society research pursuits to non-governmental aid efforts and private household sustenance. 

Hands-on normalization 

This journalist’s daily experience of normalization of living conditions at the end of summer 2023 begins with the personal comfort of mornings that are once again filled with the excited sounds of hundreds of children before the school bell chimes and the national anthem rings out from the school yard next door. For more than two years after the Beirut Port blast, there had been only the sounds of demolition and restoration. 

Further anecdotal observations of everyday life around the wider neighborhood and on trips around Lebanon in the second and third quarters of 2023 have made this observer sense a superficial “normalization” trend in traffic and transportation patterns from the availability of service taxis to the experiences of urban congestion on streets in the Beirut conurbation. At night, the city’s streets are – although sporadically – lit better and there has been “normalization” in the supply of electricity to those who can afford it. There is a new normal also in the supply chain flows and retail market availability of increasingly hard-to-afford consumer goods and especially imported foodstuffs, as in the difficulty to find a table at a mid-range but overpriced eatery in shopping malls during the expat visitation season.

The socioeconomic “normalization” delivers a picture full of contradiction. On one side it shows a social landscape of unbearable inequities that have sunk back into hiding but on the other side it also shows a panorama of how a society’s economic and social coping efforts have proceeded under a new survival formula. It is to be interjected here, however, that the perceived relative normalization of the economic crisis and living circumstances, where insufficient household incomes were the main source of societal pain, has in October 2023 been overthrown by exponentially rising fears over acute shortages of everything from shelter, food, and water to medical care and communication services because of the threat of war and foreign aggression that again came to loom over Lebanon. 

Nothing normal in finance

The new normal in the financial services sector, by contrast to the societal picture in the first nine months of 2023, has stayed and is quite anti-normal and disturbing: commercial banks, which a little over one year ago overwhelmingly turned themselves into barricaded obstacle courses attracting only the most desperate or daring of customers, have retained their dysfunctionality. On the other hand, visible activity in the financial retail market has been swamped with flashy storefronts and marketing messages of purveyors of money exchange and cash transfer services. All in all, the new normal in finance is a market in alternation dominated by new and recurring stories of corruption and by the reality of zombie banks that have lost many decades’ worth of trust and human capital.

But is the ill health of financial markets really a recent problem? In the analysis of Fouad Zmokhol, dean of the school of business and management at the University of St Joseph in Beirut, financial safety in Lebanon has been a problem long before the onset of banks’ liquidity problems. “Financial safety and financial stability are headline issues in all economies, specifically the large developed countries. Taken into the Lebanese scenario, we have to be realistic in saying that financial safety and stability was never in existence in the country,” he tells Executive, emphasizing that financial safety and social stability were absent even during the 30 years until 2019, and that safety which was thought to exist during that period, was in truth fictitious.

For Zmokhol, the 1989 Taef agreement to end the civil war involved a pact among warlords to usurp economic power in Lebanon and embark on a debt financing strategy for the country, thereby accepting a huge pileup of public debt and a government that was running on deficits and debt machinations that precluded achieving real financial safety and social stability.  

Other indications for the situation of financial safety were elucidated throughout the first nine months of 2023 by the developments, or absence thereof, of banking and financial market reforms, by audits of the financial entities, by the changing of the guard at the central bank, and by fragile but fresh shoots of innovation. 

The issue of first magnitude is the absence of financial sector reforms and correlated deterioration in the capacity of banks and financial market participants to channel stored monetary value into productive investments. 

For investment expert Khaled Zeidan, chairman and general manager of financial consultancy Capital EE, pillars of the financial system are yet to be constructed – probably beginning with capital markets – but there is no going back to the previous system which was so deeply flawed that it practically failed by design. At the exit from the meltdown of the financial system, “the funding of the economy is the issue, because there is no medium to long term deposit base in the country now,” he tells Executive. 

On a best-estimate assumed current GDP in the range of $25 to 27 billion today, the economy would require about 30 percent, or approximately $7 billion, in funding to securely resume growth but such large access to finance could not be supplied by commercial banks in the foreseeable future. “How do you fund the economy? Let’s say banks come back under a restructuring plan and you will have something like five or six banks instead of over 50 banks as before. Assuming that these banks will be able to address the market needs, I don’t expect them to be capable of addressing more than 30 percent [of it],” Zeidan elaborates. 

A second facet in the recent financial developments is the effort of unmasking and cleaning up the sector’s governance breakdowns and illicit practices of the past 10 or 20 years. In a case of crucial institution-building failure for example, a thorough mess was made of seriously delayed regulatory innovation and underwhelming supervisory empowerment of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). 

What many say were political and clientilistic delays in reaching CMA operability, and therefore capital markets functionality, run into years of failures as far as establishing, staffing, and properly operating the CMA institution needed to invigorate the historically anemic but principally vital Lebanese capital markets. The extent of this failure has become clearer this summer, in the revelation of a long-suppressed CMA report of malpractice findings at financial brokerage Optimum Invest (OI) from before 2016. 

The report actually surfaced in public debates in conjunction with the forensic audit of the Lebanese central bank, whose governor was at the same time the chairman of the CMA. However, public discourses of the OI case were not so focused on the OI report’s systemic implications – which among other things suggest that conflicts of interest and cronyism were deeply permeating and damaging the sphere of financial intermediaries. Instead, the primary focus of public attention throughout the summer of ‘23 was once again on the person of then-central bank governor Riad Salameh and his alleged culpability in every problem at Banque du Liban as investigated by a forensic audit – whose language was loaded with innuendo and whose preliminary findings appeared less than spectacular and revelatory to informed observers (for more on the culprits and victims, see story page zxxx). 

The views of the professionals 

Being not just an informed observer but an active professional stakeholder in the arduous task of unraveling the web of legal violations in the financial sphere of Lebanon is lawyer Iman Tabbara, who serves as board member in the Lebanese Private Sector Network (LPSN). She tells Executive that a group of lawyers, including herself, had been tracking the issue of not only the forensic audit conducted by financial services firm Alvarez and Marsal (A&M) but also two slightly earlier central bank audits by consultancies KPMG and Oliver Wyman. The lawyers actually obtained a court decision that forced the Ministry of Finance to make their results accessible. “As to the outcomes of the three audits, we were very well aware that the practices [of the central bank] were not in accordance with the applicable laws or the accounting standards that we knew of. Even the figures highlighted in the forensic audit we knew in an approximation,” Tabbara says. 

Having gained the audit results, law firms were able to prove that their allegations of rule violations at the central bank were backed by relevant numbers and not just politically motivated witch hunts. But for Tabbara, the audits were still falling short from many of their objectives such as bringing financial sector and banking transparency and facilitating better accountability in commercial banking through individual audits of the top 14 commercial banks. 

Moreover, in some ways audit debates in media and society, in their singular concentration on personal corruption findings at the top of BDL,  even contributed to the Lebanese people being sidetracked “from the bigger issues that the regulatory authority was unregulated and that the central bank was the gate keeper or accountant of the deeply rooted, deep state”, Tabbara says.

 Despite these shortcomings, the audits confirmed that legal professionals’ criticism of the central bank’s adherence to laws and standards is warranted. The audits flagged specific failures in BDL practices and behaviors, such as the A&M audit’s testifying to non-implementation of “Chinese Walls” of separation of responsibilities and authority between the governor, central bank departments and BDL-associated entities. “It was very alarming to us because it showed how one man, to whom all authority had been given, could design something of a monetary policy irrespective of any checks and balances in the central bank,” Tabbara elaborates. 

Her conclusions confirm to private sector stakeholders how important the completion of the audit and resolution process for central bank and the banking sector is. “There is no doubt that the private sector needs a proper and healthy banking system. Today we are unfortunately in a cash economy, which means that the banking sector is no longer playing its part. When the banking sector is no longer playing its part, this will affect the private sector negatively, in many ways,” she says.  

A new guard 

While it cannot be said today that any closure has been achieved in either the audit process or the process to repair the banking sector’s brokenness in terms of trust, capacities, manpower, and capital, an important intermediate step has been taken this summer in the changing of the guard at BDL’s leadership level. The experts and stakeholders in finance who talked with Executive during the research for this financial safety report commented very positively on the ascendance of First Vice-governor Wissam Mansouri, and specifically acknowledged his decisions on monetary issues such as retiring the relatively nontransparent Sayrafa platform in favor of the external Bloomberg platform for lira exchange rates. 

Commenting on the early declarations and decisions of the acting BDL governor, USJ’s business school dean Zmokhol notes four positive signals, including Mansouri’s commitment to the central bank’s regulatory responsibility and approach to exchange market operations that aims to maintain balance at times when having to buy dollars for fuel or similar purchases. “[Mansouri] says he will not lend to the government while not being sure if the money would come back and has stopped the Sayrafa platform because he saw it as neither transparent nor ethical, and went into Bloomberg platform, which, however, has other pitfalls,” says Zmokhol – who otherwise sees no signs of progress towards financial sector rebirth on the level of Parliament or in the presidential issue. 

Asked about his view on the adoption of the Bloomberg platform, Zmokhol approves the move in principle firstly because international platforms will not enter any local political games. “The second positive aspect is the psychological effect of being linked again to the global economy and appearing back on the radar of actors in global markets through presence of [the Lebanese lira] at a sort of floating rate,” he adds. 

On the side of risks and potential pitfalls, the economist names the possibility of high and sudden fluctuations and currency speculations on a platform that is managed internationally, as well as such platforms’ computation of exchange rates relying on official money supply data and other official economic data that do not reflect the totality of monetary flows and economic activities, due to the massive role of the informal economy. “Providing a free float in a small economy may mean that you can have some major players, from locals to foreign banks to exchange offices and speculators, who can play around with the exchange rate by simply making big transactions,” Zmokhol warns. 

Other negative effects would in his view be inevitable if locally controlled exchange rate information tools and data streams, such as opaque apps with unknown sources and concealed agendas, were continuing to contravene the concept of a unified exchange rate. Zmokhol finally sees arbitrage opportunities and risks of significant deposit withdrawal pressures in situations where either the Bloomberg market rate and a still existing low rate at the banking deposit level were scissoring, or when BDL were to adopt the platform’s rate for depositors’ withdrawals from hitherto inaccessible “old” dollar accounts – albeit this would in the short term be a boon to deposit holders. 

Innovate and live 

According to all who were queried by Executive, the start of the fourth quarter in 2023 is too early for new banks entering the Lebanese market from the region or new local banks acquiring operating licenses. Expectations are that this will change at some point because of currently unmet market opportunities. Capital EE’s Zeidan, who reasons that Lebanon’s resilience during the crisis years proved stronger than many had expected, says for example that there is a great opportunity for large regional banks to enter the financial market in Lebanon and do “huge business”. 

As the country’s innate power of survival in the past three years has defied most conventional financial and economic logic, Zeidan and others among Lebanon’s entrepreneurial minds and economists  still have faith in Lebanon’s capacity to rise quickly into a new financial culture. Tender shoots of innovation are present on the digital edge of the financial market (see story page 20) and in online banking (see interview page 26) – despite the still underdeveloped aspects of digital finance.  

Thus it is undeniable today that on many fronts of finance, many more efforts are required. For a financial feat of the magnitude needed for new and more sustainable economic growth, – and based on the assumption that the political system becomes adequately functional – Zeidan in this sense calls for functioning capital markets and “multiple different verticals”. 

To his mind, it is imperative for the Lebanese to develop market verticals for short-term commercial paper and longer-term debt, or bonds, and specialties such such as leasing or microfinance, plus the necessary support system of credit assessment. At the same time he has at least one eye firmly locked on the digital finance and tech realm, including e-wallet operators. 

By his reading of the financial system, Lebanon can in no way “be restructured to be the way it was before the crisis” and may not have a future as a regional commercial banking hub – principally because of what he says is a global shift away from commercial banking. At the same time, he regards the long-term lesson of the financial crisis as a positive one. Since the county’s financial elites have quasi fallen on their own sword of corruption-prone and narrowly self-interested practices, Lebanon’s banking and finance model cannot be rebuilt with same mindset, he tells Executive: “This resulted in a new paradigm, where the Lebanese are forced by circumstances to reinvent the finance model that we [have used until] now. This, in my opinion, is going to give us an advantage five, six, or ten years down the road.”

Editor’s note: Interviews for this article were recorded in October 2023 and do not reflect updates  or changes that may have occured since.

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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CommentEconomics & Policy

Beyond the “Muddle-Through” Option

by Lamia Moubayed Bissat, Sabine Hatem & Iskandar Boustany February 5, 2024
written by Lamia Moubayed Bissat, Sabine Hatem & Iskandar Boustany

Lebanon stands today at the crossroads of a more strenuous and challenging muddle-through phase on one hand, and progressive recovery on the other. 

The road it will end up taking will ultimately depend on a series of sound and rational decisions, chief among which is the reform of the country’s taxation system. A new tax deal could ensure the country greater fiscal stability, allow for the funding of social programs, and rebuild trust between citizens and the government. 

These policy objectives are fundamental if the country is to exit one of the worst financial crises of modern times and alleviate the despair of a sizable part of its population that has been plunged into poverty. 

Inevitably, such a system needs to reconcile growth with equity, particularly given the extensive financial damage that has been wrought upon individuals and households. 

In the report “How can a new tax system restore growth and equity”, The teams of the Institute of Finance Basil Fuleihan and Financially Wise-Lebanon, make the case for a new tax deal that would be designed to address the current system’s inefficiencies and weaknesses. The full report is available here.

A Decade of Contradictions

The decade that preceded the crisis can indisputably be considered one that was marred by contradictions. Broadly speaking, the current tax system continues to be an amalgamation of tax policies implemented in an ad-hoc manner without a medium-term plan or strategic foresight. 

Quick-fixes can’t replace a long-term vision. Piecemeal tax measures eventually created a dysfunctional tax regime that was neither sustainable nor conducive to greater economic growth. Despite constituting the largest share of total State revenues, the picture is much grimmer when benchmarked to the country’s GDP. In that regard, tax revenue has dropped from 15.1 percent to no more than 6.6 percent between 2019 and 2023. 

Nearly deprived of its main source of revenue, the State’s functions have greatly slowed down or in many cases come to a halt. Tax collection, already limping prior to the crisis, has been unable to offset this collapse in tax revenues. 

Consequently, current spikes in VAT collection are no reason to celebrate. They need to be viewed as circumstantial and unsustainable. Low tax revenue aggregates and low tax revenue predictability are symptoms of the system’s overall inefficiencies

Human Capital: On Depletion Mode

Decades of constant weaving to build talents and skills within the tax administration, a great deal of them the work of the Institute of Finance Basil Fuleihan, have been dealt a critical blow by the economic crisis. 

The tax authority has witnessed a significant level of deterioration in staff productivity, owing greatly to the country’s deteriorating work conditions, escalating living expenses, currency depreciation, income erosion, weak substantive leadership, and the departure abroad of skilled human capacities, mostly to join higher paid jobs at big consulting firms advising ministries of finance of the region. With little incentives and an overwhelmingly negative outlook, productivity within the public sector has stalled. 

The tax administration can’t be left on autopilot. This talent drain imperils the tax administration’s ability to roll out reforms and weakens its rapport with taxpayers. Ultimately, this would lead to increased tax fraud and evasion, an issue that the country has had to deal with well before the crisis.

Keeping the Books in Order

History has demonstrated that tax records are correlated with successful statebuilding. In Lebanon, the tax administration faces several challenges in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of its registries and operations. 

While data regarding taxpayers is available, the registries remain vulnerable to inaccuracies and potential cybercrimes due to the absence of automated verification processes. Weak risk management allows for tax loopholes, often benefiting specific groups of taxpayers and affecting overall revenue predictability.

Dysfunctional system that widens inequalities and deters voluntary compliance

Food on the table—or the fulfillment of basic needs—precedes voluntary tax compliance. While the depletion of human resources exacerbates compliance checks, complex and continuously changing procedures, corruption, inefficiencies, interruptions in automated services, to name few of many constraints prevent people from opting for voluntary tax compliance as a rational choice. 

Such dysfunctions widen inequalities among taxpayers at a time where the rift between those earning in US Dollars and those earning in Lebanese Pounds continues to widen. Undoubtedly, tax dispute resolution that is timely and effective will prove unavoidable in the settlement of unpaid taxes. At present time, confidence in tax dispute resolution is at its very low. 

Progressivity: A Lost Gamble? 

Lebanon has a set of progressive taxes that are by all measures far lighter than their equivalent tax schemes in OECD countries. Yet despite their relative competitiveness in that regard, the evidence points to significant flaws within their inherent design. These shortcomings primarily stem from the absence of cumulative filing, which eventually creates loopholes that undermine the intended progressivity. 

Owning a house and living abroad is a go-to strategy for those seeking to circumvent progressivity altogether. Indeed, non-residents are exempt from progressivity, and the built property tax, among others, lacks cumulative progression. 

While income tax progressivity was eroded by currency devaluation and the existence of multiple exchange rates, the 2022 budget law amendments widened the gap between different earning categories and accentuated disparities across labor income categories.  

The Road Ahead

Ultimately, the achievement of equitable taxation hinges on a country’s social contract and its capacity to harmonize taxation goals with economic and societal development objectives. This process typically commences by formulating a clear strategy for the government’s fiscal role, resource allocation, income redistribution, economic growth, and economic stabilization, all of which need to be in coherence with broad macroeconomic principles.

The Lebanese case is intrinsically unique, and given current challenges, two avenues remain possible: 

A. Firstly, a far-reaching, long-term exercise that would entail anchoring reform within a national political and policy dialogue. This participatory approach would allow reconfiguring the country’s tax system towards greater progressivity. This would include consolidated tax structures, a wealth tax, earmarked taxes, targeted incentive schemes, bolstered administrative capabilities, and enhanced public financial awareness.

B. The second scenario which might as well go in parallel with the long-term plan, would involve implementing immediate, corrective measures to stabilize the existing system in the short to medium term. These measures encompass bolstering revenue collection, stemming the loss of skilled personnel, enhancing policy design, streamlining procedures, and intensifying citizen engagement.

Finally, evidence around the world has shown that when citizens like what the government is doing with its tax revenue, then they are likely to comply. Conversely, if citizens disapprove of how the government is spending taxpayers’ money, or cannot find enough concrete evidence that their money is being put to good use, their appetite for evasion augments.

In a country where inequities are at record heights, fostering equity in society is a building block for restoring the lost trust. Tax reform is fraught with complexities, resistances, and defiance, but it is a must for a country that needs to recover.

Lamia Moubayed is the President of the Institute of Finance Basil Fuleihan and vice chair of the United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA)

Sabine Hatem is the Senior Economist and Director of Partnerships at the Institute of Finance Basil Fuleihan

Iskandar Boustani is a senior consultant in Public Financial Management.

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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FinanceQ&ASpecial Report

The digital option

by Thomas Schellen February 5, 2024
written by Thomas Schellen

A new tenant has made a home in the business center of Beirut. Monty Holding and its numerous business units have established a highly visible all-round inclusive presence. They’ve achieved this virtually by venturing on the arduous endeavor of strengthening digital finance in Lebanon, and physically in visibly invigorating the Gefinor business center. They’ve added a corporate flavor reminiscent of the region’s most active investment hubs – from an office of payment gateway unit, MontyPay, and the publicly accessible “Monty Café” on the ground floor, right up to a private business club at the center’s highest point. To understand the digital banking proposition of the group’s Banque du Liban licensed financial institution, MyMonty, Executive sat down with Charles Matta, a member of the group’s MontyFinance technology venture team and the chief strategy and partnerships officer of MyMonty.

E  Is it right what I heard about Monty earlier this year acquiring a license for an e-wallet from Banque du Liban?

That is 100 percent correct. We [have initially] acquired a license as a Financial Institution (FI) that allows you to provide a broader spectrum of services. Under the FI [status] we applied for an e-wallet license that was granted three months ago. There are also other licenses [that we will be seeking] to have the full spectrum but as we speak, we have two licenses from the central bank of Lebanon. 

E  Will you work as financial intermediary under your local license? 

The FI status allows you to do lending and brokerage activities, meaning trading and fiduciary activities for assets under management and so on.  But [for us] the primary purpose of the FI is digital lending because that is something that is not [available] in the market. This would be a major product under the financial institution. 

E  By descriptions of the My Monty financial concepts that you gave on our website and in other interviews, your business concept and vision is that of digital banking, sometimes called a neobank. Is there a geographic scope to your business model? Is the scope focused only on this country, on the Arab region, or other? 

Basically, the scope of the vision is to have digital banking across the globe. It is not just Lebanon, not just the region, because digital obviously surpasses geographical borders. But for all the well-known reasons which we respect, regulatory authorities are bound to a geographic location. Hence, we applied for a license to operate in Lebanon. It unfortunately is not a digital banking license as the whole infrastructure for a digital banking license has not yet been defined by the regulator. 

E  In operating an e-wallet as a private sector Financial Institution, what is your target group in Lebanon? 

We follow the same approach and vision in Lebanon, the region, and globally. We cannot call ourselves a bank here because we don’t have a banking license, but we are proud to call ourselves an impact bank globally. Why impact? Because it is financial inclusion of a target segment that is unbanked, under-banked, or under-served. An under-banked person is one who may have a bank account for transactional purposes or emergency purposes but who is not actively using these financial services. This is our target group internationally. Unfortunately, under the environment of the Lebanese crisis, I can call everybody an unbanked or an under-banked person. I would say that in Lebanon, all the people are our target segment because all are in need of new financial services. 

E  When talking about Lebanon as a market, which is a minuscule market in global terms, did your plan to address this market by rolling out a digital bank originate before the pandemic, did you devise it during the pandemic, or did your strategy perhaps change due to the economic meltdown?

Internationally, where our overall vision is focused on the unbanked and under-banked, the fastest strategy to acquire unbanked customers is through mobile [phone] operators. Presenting that strategy [here in Lebanon] started in 2016. We held one of the first summits as a group where we invited some of the local banks to the Four Seasons [hotel] to talk about mergers between mobile operators and banks. Everyone was surprised; it was [like we were talking] Chinese to them. It was not something they cared about. But our vision started at the time, and we worked on it internationally. The first project was a credit card that was issued by a local [banking] player and a mobile operator in Asia. 

As you said, Lebanon is a tiny market that might not show if you put it on a score card. But if you zoom in, you understand that it has a huge value from a financial aspect. People are educated, smartphone penetration is very high, and the crisis is a huge opportunity for new players as most of the people lack all trust in the legacy players. All this triggered us to move in, [spurred on by] pain points in our own daily lives. Part of our team is located here and [we had to deal] with problems in salary domiciliation, usage of funds, and all this. This was a big driver for us. The licensing process unfortunately took a bit longer than we expected. We were planning to roll out our products more than one year [ago] but this [slow licensing] is understandable when a new player is coming into the market. 

E  So, while some e-wallet startups and electronic money transfer platforms in Lebanon were motivated by the crisis and the emergence of near monopolies in the money transfer market, you had the strategy of developing an e-wallet already before the crisis. Was your e-wallet vision inspired in any way by the success of the famous Alipay platform in China? 

Even Asia in general was an inspiration for mobile money because of the super apps that they have built, one of which is Alipay. From our side, we believe that the potential for such services is huge because you can easily target millions of subscribers when you go through a mobile operator. For example, we are in advanced discussions with a mobile operator in Indonesia that has more than 100 million subscribers. 

E  But you are not particularly interacting with mobile operators in Lebanon at this time?

No. [Our value proposition here] is direct-to-market acquisition of customers. But for inclusion, it is to note that we are offering three things: we have the direct-to-customer approach, but we also sell our services as a technology provider under a white label, empowering other [providers] who are interested in offering these services. The third thing, which we are currently discussing with the regulator, is agent banking, allowing non-financial services providers, including mobile operators, to leverage on the whole package. 

E  In the “New Economy bubble” of “click and mortar” bank-type ventures, some large mobile telephony groups from Europe and the Middle East – Africa realm were assessing the potential for financial inclusion through mobile telephony. Did your group have experience in Africa back in those earlier iterations of the digital financial economy?

We have international experience. We have 25 offices around the globe and are connected to more than 1,000 mobile operators in many more countries. We have a big customer base in Africa and Asia and have, from mobile operator perspectives, huge experience in Africa and long relationships with mobile network operators there. 

E  In how many places do you do direct-to-customer digital banking?

The trading name of our brand is MyMonty and we are currently live across the whole European Economic Area, 31 countries including the UK in Europe with a digital banking application that we rolled out in 2021. We are currently working on [further] markets, starting with the US. Another strategic market that we are advanced on is the Philippines and there are three markets in Africa where we are very advanced. We follow a light operating model internationally, so we start by partnering with an existing banking license [holder] and act as a digital bank. 

E  In simple terms, 99 percent of your business is outside of Lebanon. What then is the plan you have for this market in the coming 12 months? 

Even though there are large international markets that I have spoken about, there is that special relationship with Lebanon, especially since Mountasser [Hachem], the owner of the group, is himself Lebanese. We also have a big team in Beirut [of about 700 people] and even though the market is tiny from a population perspective, we see a large opportunity. We are putting a lot of efforts into our rollout plan for Lebanon. We are planning to go live by mid-December of this year, with an e-wallet proposition where customers can onboard digitally and have an account. [Editor’s note: This interview was recorded in October 2023] We already closed a number of deals with local providers [from payment to payout providers] and on top of this have a virtual lending product as I mentioned at the beginning of this interview. 

Our major goal is to gain the people’s trust. We are working a lot with other players who are our peers in the market and want to really bring awareness into the market, of understanding the importance of having an e-wallet account and the use of these accounts. As regulations are shaping up, we have bigger plans, but our first strategic objective is to show the capabilities that we have and that we have succeeded in delivering internationally and are planning to deliver in our home country. We want to gain people’s trust in terms of financial services. 

E  Would the lending product be of a retail lending type, similar to attractively priced car loan products that some banks were pushing into the market in the years before the crisis? And what is your equity proposition? 

We will have different lending products, the first one starting with an advance on your salary. Every person will have the right to get an advance on their salary as long as the salary is domiciled with us. The mechanism will be purely digital at our end. There will be other fintech related lending products down the line. At a financial institution, lending has to come from equity as we are not supposed to have deposits. Se we are lending from our own money, from equity that is injected into the financial institution from our part. 

E  Thinking beyond the very large local challenge of rebuilding trust, trust has always been a fickle asset in the business of banking and trust in the digital era has become hyper-fickle if one goes by the evidence of how fake financial news and rumors can go viral and cause a bank run. We have recently seen digital bank runs, are those not scary for you as operator in this space? 

I see it as the opposite because bank runs have always [involved] physical branches. In digital banking, you feel as if you are digitally owning the money. If I take my own case, I felt insecure and that I did not have access to my money when the banks closed back in 2019. But even as the banks closed, money was available online and I did small purchases online. When this still worked, I felt much more comfortable as a consumer. I do not disagree that digital banks have a long road ahead in proving their trustworthiness. Traditional banks have existed for centuries, digital banking is very new. A good indication of trust in digital banking is that the average deposits remaining in digital accounts has increased significantly, by almost 250 or 300 percent. 

E  When compared with when?

From five years ago. So, you see that when people first start [using a digital bank], they look at digital banks as being much cheaper in terms of transacting and much more reachable. But with time, there are other services and people start using them.

E  You mentioned impact finance as your value proposition. Impact investing and socially conscious investing with focus on inclusion have been highly touted propositions for years but on the other hand, the digital era since the beginning of the 2000s has seen numerous failures of digital banking visions that were not as powerful as the brick-and-mortar banking model. But in Lebanon, the question has turned into a question of if and how this country can find a future as a place of finance.

The situation looks shaky, but I believe that every experience you go through is temporary. If I go back to 2019, Lebanon was among the top five countries regionally in terms of FinTech [startups]. Development, technology, innovation, and so on, and this was just prior to the October 2019 crisis. Things can turn around very fast. Everything in Lebanon can be a quick fix if there is an international and local decision.

E  From your perspective, is inclusion still just a hype word that sounds great in speeches, or is it something that is happening? 

Inclusion is a huge problem that [development finance institutions] have been talking about internationally. But I believe honestly that Covid 19 had a positive impact on it and drove up financial inclusion. When you look into Africa, it is very unbanked and under-served, whereas mobile money penetration is at very high percentages. But this still does not represent a full digital banking proposition with the whole spectrum of financial services that the consumer has the right to benefit from. However, we as a group interact with international players in Africa, Asia, the US and Europe, and we see a lot of advancement when it comes to mindsets, readiness and acceptance by banks to collaborate.

E  Did you see the readiness for more collaboration also in Lebanon? And from the perspective of digital finance, what was for you the bigger change factor in this country, the pandemic or the economic meltdown?

In Lebanon, it has been quite a journey. I would say we have two, three banks that we were able to collaborate with on different opportunities. This has not been the mindset before. To be honest, not just in Lebanon but in the region, banks have [previously] been in very strong positions and did not need to collaborate. But I believe the need is striking them.  Even in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, we see and hear of a lot of collaboration opportunities today that were far away two or three years ago. In Lebanon, I believe both [the pandemic and the economic crisis] were change factors. Covid-19 has driven up customer expectations on digital readiness and digital savviness. The [economic] crisis has driven banks or major players to have a more collaborative mindset, to collaborate seeking to have different and more diversified revenue streams. Both aspects [of the Lebanese crisis years] had their positive impacts in terms of digital readiness. Unfortunately, they had many negative impacts on people, their trust, their money, and their health when it comes to Covid-19. But speaking about digital readiness, [this crisis] has helped internationally and locally. 

The interview has been edited for brevity.

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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FinanceOutlookSpecial Report

Fated to return through inventiveness

by Thomas Schellen February 5, 2024
written by Thomas Schellen

Banking everywhere is being confronted with deep societal paradigm shifts and digital transformation challenges. Demands for better governance and heightened societal and environmental accountability are being leveled by civil societies, regulators, and, at least verbally, some governments and the community of nations. They are reflected in innumerable global discussions on diverse topics such as universal financial inclusion, climate risk mitigation, and gender awareness, which are augmenting the age-old discourses on the role of finance in economic justice, prosperity, and productivity.  

The challenges of a fundamental redesign of money, banking, and all financial relations matter hugely, perhaps more than ever, for every human being – much more so in a year like 2023 when armed conflicts of historic consequence are shaking every assumption of a world heading towards peace. The reasons for the financial challenges alone are so many that they cannot be enumerated and much less argued in this short elaboration on financial safety in Lebanon. But the combination of operational and fundamental systemic banking challenges in the global financial system are also decisive for Lebanon’s future, although – or rather exactly because – its banking industry has fallen back into a pre-financial, quasi stone age of its own making and the resuscitation of legacy financial structures is looking more difficult with every passing week. 

This means that, with dim prospects for reconstruction of financial markets from the regulatory and political top layer, the gap between the progress in best banking practices in Lebanon’s regional partner economies and the dysfunctional market here widens. Can innovative approaches designed to be disruptive to digital finance invigorate operational integrity and competitiveness? The many disappointing examples of the past 25 years raise doubts. Can digital propositions, from new e-wallet operators to online banks boosted by a regime of yet imperfect licenses, progress into systemic pillars of domestic financial markets? When set against challenges of lacking digital infrastructures, ever growing cyber threats, and not yet clear legal frameworks, the answer is far from certain. Will they find enough trust and fulfill their promises of ethics and inclusiveness to the point of efficiently redrawing financial markets on the domestic scale and fulfill currently still nascent aspirations to perhaps claw back a role beyond the confines of their small economy?

Tracking the year’s global tremors 

On the international banking industry’s operational side, dangers of bank runs and overexposure to various risks have spiked in the first half of the year. These dangers and overexposures have been documented to great international attention in a few hyper-speed bank runs on overstretched US and Swiss lenders. Being digital bank runs, these depositor and investor stampedes underscored a hitherto almost theoretical, severe downside of the digital era.

 In another big financial system tremor with worldwide implications, but one involving the more conventional grounds of a national property market, specters of trouble for China’s financial stability have kept making headlines since early in 2023. Drawing attention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and all presumed guardians of global financial stability, this trouble factor, which is linked to the continuing real estate crisis in the People’s Republic, was flagged repeatedly in the IMF’s latest Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) that was released on October 11, 2023. 

And even at the top of the increasingly stressed development finance system, change pressures have recently been acknowledged. According to recent remarks by Ajay Banga, the new World Bank president, “operational dysfunctionality”, or a diminished ability to meet its purpose of boosting equitable prosperity and reducing poverty, has been hinted at in the world’s eponymous, and largest, development finance institution (DFI).

The World Bank “needs to run better” as it is engulfed in the global economy’s current “perfect storm” of challenges, Banga lectured an audience of sympathetic peers at American NGO, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), at the end of September – about four months after taking office. 

Pointing to the current conflagration of global social and economic crises, Banga said that the World Bank was now needed more than ever, but immediately moved on to describing a personal shock: seeing the institution not being able to lead from the front and get things done as needed made him understand, in his words “that there is something dysfunctional in the way the institution needs to be changed and operated with. And that’s kind of what was my biggest surprise.” 

Parallels and divergences, noted from a dysfunctional sliver 

Despite the local banking sector’s strength relative to the size of the national economy, and despite the renown of Lebanese bankers in the international halls of finance, the country’s financial market was a niche market even when it was at its strongest. Today, seen against the broad range of worldwide operational and systemic challenges, Lebanon’s state of continued financial incapacitation is infinitely less relevant than the above cited troubles of the DFI system, the Chinese financial sector, and some surprisingly vulnerable banks in the United States and Switzerland.

In this context, the relative (in)significance of the Lebanese system in the eyes of shakers such as the IMF, can perhaps be read from the fact that a query into the latest GFSR returns 98 matches for “China”, three for “Middle East”, and zero mentions of Lebanon. Similarly, neither the September 2023 issue of the IMF’s Finance and Development magazine, which offered a preparatory focus on Arab financial markets ahead of the October annual meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, nor the public statement on the IMF’s 2023 Article IV mission to member country Lebanon, were sources of enlightenment on practical or even theoretical solutions for restoring the operational integrity of the country’s financial system. 

This is especially noteworthy against the background that the IMF’s efforts at addressing the Lebanese emergency have not yielded fruits in the past three years. In a side note to this from the Marrakesh annual meeting’s press briefing on the Middle East and Central Asia, a journalist’s question about the prospects for an easing of the IMF’s reform demands before disbursing any funds to Lebanon was deflected with a reminder on the required three “prior actions” for an agreement that were listed in the staff level agreement of April 2022.    

While not answering the question of whether the IMF could have been more creative in its proposed solutions and more accommodating of the Lebanese case (see comment piece on page 18), the painful failures of producing salient banking reforms and legislation to protect the stakeholdes –from the average depositor to the IMF as prospective lender – are the failures in securing minimal operational integrity and must be laid at the doorstep of the local occupants of power. This political constellation has revealed a very inconvenient, deep incongruence in the operational structure of the post-Bretton Woods system of international economic and monetary control, a fissure that is as indicative of this system’s inherent weaknesses as it seems to be embarrassing to the IMF.

Digital, the best or the only gambit on the table?

But enough of that. On the flipside of the coin, or, as it were, the token of future finance in the digital era, Lebanon’s system is subjected to the same immense transformation pressures as the global financial system.

The overburden of under-addressed systemic risks and emerging radical changes in the global economy and especially its weaker clogs coincides with Lebanon’s devastating inability of creating stable and adequate regulatory ground and realizing top-down financial system reforms. Against this backdrop, the only discernible local flashes of hope come from fintech innovators, who are endeavoring on adventures in digital banking and operations relating to  e-wallets – which during the economic crisis astoundingly saw several steps of regulatory progress – with the unquenchable verve of Lebanese entrepreneurs. 

Local plays on the e-wallet proposition 

Market participants say that more than ten licenses for operation of a digital wallet, mobile applications that are also known as electronic or e-wallets, have been issued by the central bank of Lebanon, Banque du Liban (BDL), earlier in 2023. In response to this accommodative regulatory action, several corporate names that represent Lebanese and foreign investor interests as well as some mid to high tier Beirut-based money transfer enterprises and payment processors are either in the process of establishing their e-wallet brands or have already launched wallet apps, including new interoperability deals aimed to improve the apps’ utility and acceptance.

To visualize a digital wallet in one’s pocket, one can say that the common container for carrying one’s essential documents and currency has been restyled from leather or fabric to plastic and glass, and expanded from a few compartments to a portable bookshelf with an integrated strongbox: e-wallet is a catchy term for an app on a smartphone. More than to the pouch of victuals, bag of coins or billfold in the Renaissance-era roots of the term “e-wallet”, this mobile app’s everyday financial functionality can be compared to that of a slick payment card, such as a bank-issued debit card or credit card with numerous conveniences and preset options/limits.  An important mark of distinction of digital wallets is that they do not require their owners to have a bank account. Convenience and tech appeal has been another key selling point.

 Interestingly, the recent cohort of entrepreneurial e-wallet contenders in the local market includes licensees with dedicated visions of contributing to a new made-for-and-in  Lebanon. One example for this is Purpl, a Fintech startup that has commenced operating earlier this year and was conceived in a deep trench of the financial and economic crisis. Then there is MyMonty, a BDL-licensed Financial Institution under Lebanese ownership, which has a transnational profile in online banking and mobile phone-based Fintech services. While very different in scope, both enterprises hold e-wallet licenses and at the same time profess their dedications to Lebanon beyond what the local financial market today offers in size and growth prospects. 

Purpl was formed in 2021 by three entrepreneurs on the basis of a very critical assessment of the costs and services platforms of vitally important remittances in the Lebanese market. “We decided to tackle the problem of remittances,” says Purpl co-founder (CEO as of November) Wissam Ghorra who has previously worked with Lebanese banks domestically and in Switzerland. It was from the idea of creating a price-competitive and convenient digital remittances platform that, “what followed logically was the digital wallet, so that customers could cash out or have peer to peer transfers and spending options,” he adds.

MyMonty is a unit in Monty Holding owned by Lebanese businessman Mountasser Hachem. The company, which has offices in 25 locations around the world, wants to start offering digital lending in Lebanon beginning from later in 2023 and to date has obtained two BDL licenses, a Financial Institution license and an e-wallet license, strategy and business development manager Charles Matta tells Executive

[Editor’s note: this story does not reflect any updates that have occurred between writing and publication]

Self-funded and still under formation but not needing an e-wallet license is Vault-ki, a developer of a password storage solution for decentralized e-wallets – the variant of wallet apps that incorporate the blockchain philosophy of seeking independence from third-party guarantors of trust in a fiat currency. Founder Georges Haddad, who established his fascination and qualifications with both the blockchain and finance,  tells Executive that it is his dream to provide a made-in-Lebanon solution for a ubiquitous security need in the decentralized wallet sphere. 

“Anyone’s journey in the decentralized world starts with knowing how to safely store your passwords,” Haddad outlines as the baseline proposition of his venture , which he characterizes as “a solution on the periphery of Fintech”  that has international competitors but none that is a native enterprise to the Middle East.

 While very different in their business plans and at very different points of their business journeys, the commonality of the three ventures is that their founders, co-founders and executives who spoke with Executive incorporate a passionate commitment to Lebanon in their perspectives on digital finance – even as the concerned enterprises are in the short, medium, and long term clearly focusing on business horizons that range outside of the small Lebanese market. 

In addition to their Lebanese corporate DNA, the interviewed Fintech players share a conviction that the Lebanese financial crisis is an apt argument in support of the digital finance proposition and their respective corporate visions of online banking and lending (MyMonty), money transfer and e-wallet services (Purpl), and ancillary provision of a security product whose design as a stainless steel chain of blocks alludes strongly to the mental image of a blockchain (Vault-Ki). 

Vault-Ki’s Haddad opines that many Lebanese depositors and holders of moderate financial wealth would have been better protected if part of the monies in the Lebanese financial system had been held in decentralized e-wallets. If people come to share this insight, it will be good for his business. “Trying to succeed as a made-in-Lebanon product and operating from here, partly for the [local] market but mostly to sell abroad, is the business vision of Vault-ki,” he says, and enthuses: “This is not only because I am Lebanese and want to contribute on my scale to a better economy, but also because we have that story [of the recent crisis]. What better proof of concept [for owning a decentralized digital wallet] than what happened to Lebanon?” 

However, e-wallet propositions and even online banking in itself are extremely unlikely to become full substitutes of old banking and intermediation pillars in recreating local financial markets. Observers and entrepreneurs alike note that the market still lacks much in digital finance infrastructure and acceptance even as high smartphone penetration rates, general education levels, society’s eager adaption of tech gadgets, and age and other social barriers transcending user profiles of money transfer services signify growth opportunities. 

“I am not here to disrupt the banking system. I am here to offer alternatives to users, services that are complementary to banking services,” Purpl’s Ghorra tells Executive. According to him, the company encountered two client types over its first few months of operation this year. The first is people sending money to themselves from outside of Lebanon and using the platform for its lower costs when compared with cash transfer service providers, and the other is made up of individuals who resort to Purpl to receive remuneration of freelance work they did for their clients abroad. “We saw two personas and this is where our [customer acquisition] focus will probably be.”

MyMonty, whose global concept of an online “impact bank” is targeting unbanked, under-banked, and under-served individuals (which in Matta’s perception today includes every resident of Lebanon), locally uses a direct-to-market approach, something that does not point to quickly seeking a proportionally vast customer base in the country. Moreover, while this does not suggest an extremely rapacious appetite for  a rapid market share acquisition, Matta tells Executive that, “microfinance is definitely part of our proposition,” whereby acquisition of very small merchants and building of credit scores on MSME level is in the longer-term planning under the financial inclusion lens.

A slow but hopefully steady acquainting of scarred Lebanese bank customers with digital options appears to be the rational choice of market entrants, conceivably for a large number of reasons. This begins on the regulatory front where BDL regulators are said to be working diligently on moving their relevant frameworks towards greater completion. Although this is assumed to be done under a central banking rationale that e-wallet adoption by citizens will partially countermand unhealthy trends of informality and growth in the easy-to-subvert cash economy, it deserves also to be noted that minds at the central bank and among decision makers do not appear able to be firmly focused on the digital financial future. Lebanon is already suffering severe deficits in political, financial and institutional trust and now, further unspeakable dangers that outweight lacking a full set of central bank regulations for e-wallets and their providers. 

The long view and wide angle

Finally, on historic terms, the digital age has still much ahead before it can be seen as mature. Over the past 25 years, the virtual sphere has repeatedly been hyped and over-marketed despite numerous incidents showing that digital finance in general and the cryptocurrency realm in specific are not at all immune to human imperfections and criminal endeavors. As are other aspects of digital finance, the e-wallet concept and online banking are loaded with behavioral risks on the part of their users and vulnerable to theft and attacks by digital pickpockets, extortionists and cons. Quite a few technology driven financial solutions, or tech-fin as some experts say is a more apt name, were supposed to be disruptive and revolutionary by design but failed to deliver on their vast promises.  

Systemic points of weakness have been revealed in multiple jurisdictions and presumably digitally advanced societies, with the most significant systemic problems ranging from inept or lagging legislation and regulatory confusion to state intrusion. In the Lebanese financial arena, restrictive and uneven regulation of Fintech forays certainly combined with weak digital infrastructures and cultural reluctance of conservative bankers into creating a digital finance backwater in the 2010s when compared with Fintech sectors in jurisdictions that were hungrier for the competitive edges and unicorn-breeding potentials. 

Today the regulatory situation appears more hopeful but at the same time, the economic and general challenges keep piling up on all fronts. For Lebanon, acute threat of war builds while in tragic irony, the world’s top financial players convening in an Arab setting had nothing more relevant to offer to the Arab world than a formal “call for inclusive growth in the MENA region”, in which IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva claimed that “perhaps one of the most promising changes [in the Arab World over the past 20 years since the last annual spring meeting hosted in 2004 by Dubai] is that inclusive growth has become a household word and a unifying call across the region.”

As the human catastrophes and the violent drivers of emergent geopolitical compunctions seem to be racing into darkness, the Fintech entrepreneurs and stakeholders in Lebanon’s financial fate who spoke with Executive before the outbreak of the acute confrontations in Palestine may very well be fundamentally on point when they enthuse that the future of finance is digital. New and monumental obstacles may rise at any moment against the optimistic and fully confident late September remarks of Purpl’s Ghorra: “We are today building the foundations for the next financial sector in Lebanon and shaping them in the way we would like to see.” But try Lebanon must. 

February 5, 2024 0 comments
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