Business

Avoiding the double-hit

by Iyad Hourani
written by Iyad Hourani

After months of back-and-forth in cabinet over various wage hike proposals, Lebanese employers will finally face the inevitable. Wage Hike Decree (WHD) no. 7424 will have most employers opting for the “survival of the fittest” course in containing rising costs that could, otherwise, heavily impact their books.

The WHD will impose itself on companies’ income statements in two principal ways. The first is in the form of higher cash flows costs, from which there is no real escape. Employers may opt for cost-cutting strategies (such as cutting jobs, enforcing part-time work, putting expansion plans on hold, etc.) but at the end of the day, most companies will feel the impact. The second will appear in the form of higher non-cash accounting provisions within the income statements, such as the end-of-service indemnity provisions. Employers are fully aware that few fair measures for bypassing the higher cash flows exist; the question is can the same be said about the non-cash components, and the answer is yes. 

The aftermath

The recent WHD, effective February 1, raised the minimum wage to LL675,000, rescinding the 2008 cost of living increase of LL200,000. Moreover it imposes salary increases ranging between LL175,000 and LL299,000. 

This overall increase in workers’ wages is expected to have a major impact on company cash flows in 2012 and on their income statements: cash out-flows will increase as payrolls rise and consequently so will employers’ contributions to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Entities that mainly employ low-wage, low-skill workers will be significantly affected as their percentage increase in labor costs will be among the highest. As for their income statements, the financial hit will be a by-product of the increased provisions taken for the NSSF’s end of service indemnity (EOSI).

The NSSF’s EOSI branch is a mandatory program under which an employer pays contributions to the NSSF on behalf of its registered employees (the contribution being 8.5 percent of declared earnings, of which 0.5 percent goes to covering NSSF’s administrative expenses). At the time a worker cashes out his EOSI benefit, the employer may be liable to pay a settlement to the NSSF in the event that net paid contributions (8.0 percent), along with the interest credited, are insufficient to cover the EOSI amount. 

Employers typically keep, what is generally called an ‘EOSI provision’ to cover any possible future settlements payable to the NSSF. Under normal circumstances, this provision witnesses an annual growth due to a myriad of factors: the number of years served by employees, the evolution of declared earnings, worker movements, and so on. 

In addition to affecting employers’ total payroll, the latest WHD is expected to result in significantly higher EOSI provisions, which will further aggravate the impact on income statements in 2012.

Containing the adverse increase of the EOSI provision

Full implementation of International Accounting Standard no. 19 (IAS 19) — one of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) — can be seen as a readily available solution for employers wishing to mitigate part of the adverse impacts that will inevitably result from the WHD. In fact, fully complying with IAS 19 will likely cancel out most of (if not all) o the expected increase to the EOSI provision. 

Corporations in Lebanon are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with the IFRS, including IAS 19. However, the majority of employers overlook certain aspects of this standard, in particular those pertaining to long-term, post-employment benefits. Indeed, an alternative accounting practice is commonly used in Lebanon and in the region to determine these provisions (including the EOSI provision); however the inherent inaccuracies of this practice overstate the fair level of such provisions by 20, 30 and sometimes as much as 50 percent. 

The commonly used method effectively calculates the EOSI provision based on the assumptions that the entity will terminate its operation on the balance sheet date and that all its workers will cash out their EOSI rights at that date, which is contrary to what is known as “going-concern”.  

Over the last few years, an increasing number of corporations started determining their provisions, pertaining to post-employment benefits (EOSI provision in particular), in accordance with IAS 19. These are typically multinational or large local companies from different industries. Moreover, several organizations have carried out an assessment of the financial impacts resulting from the potential implementation of IAS 19, since it is likely to be requested by auditors in the coming few years, though many have yet to actually apply the standard. 

IAS 19 in a nutshell

IAS 19 specifies the accounting methods and disclosure requirements for determining the employee benefits costs (cash & non-cash). In particular, it prescribes an adequate and objective approach for estimating employers’ obligations related to post-employment benefits by allocating the cost of such benefits in an orderly manner over the period where employees are expected to acquire them. 

And as such, through the use of actuarial techniques, the EOSI provision would be determined as the present value of accrued rights (at the balance sheet date) expected to be paid sometime in the future.

Company XYZ with 400 Employees

In an effort to elaborate on, and give a tangible sense to, the above, let’s take the case of a mock company (XYZ) which employs 400 workers in Lebanon. 

The line graph on the following page shows the declared earnings distribution (before and after the WHD), as well as the distribution of Years of Contribution to EOSI, for XYZ’s employee population as at February 2012.

The line chart and bar graph represent an EOSI provision based on the accounting method that is commonly used in Lebanon, as does the table. It clearly shows a 26 percent increase to this provision caused by the WHD. It also reveals that by implementing IAS 19, the level of EOSI provision drops back to around its initial level, which tells us that the current accounting method used by most Lebanese entities significantly overstates what would otherwise be the fair level of EOSI provisions; by 32 percent in the case of Company XYZ.

This fictive example also shows that generally, the pace of EOSI provision’s evolution is relatively slower under IAS 19 than under the accounting method commonly used in Lebanon.

Not a crisis

The passing of crises, political turmoil and government regulations, has taught many corporations that long term strategizing in the face of mounting costs is key to sustenance and survival. Lebanese employers should consider the applicability of all available solutions to their situation. 

Although the recent wage hike decree will inevitably strain companies’ finances, avoiding the double hit on their income statements in 2012 is possible if they heed the words of the late American poet Robert Lee Frost that “the best way out of a difficulty, is through it.”

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Aided innuendos

by Jonathan Wright
written by Jonathan Wright

Sooner or later it was bound to come to post-Mubarak Egypt: the disagreement between Egyptians and Americans over whether and on what terms the United States should continue to give the Egyptian government more than $1.5 billion a year in military and economic aid. But few could have predicted the aid debate would rise over a relatively petty dispute regarding American-backed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have been operating in Egypt for years, without licenses perhaps but with the full knowledge and tacit acceptance of the Egyptian authorities. 

The Egyptian judicial authorities are pressing ahead with plans to prosecute more than 40 foreign NGO workers, including Americans who have taken refuge in the US embassy in Cairo. American politicians have threatened to withhold or cut the aid permanently if the charges are not dropped and the Americans allowed to leave the country. The US State Department, more cautiously, says that failure to reach a solution will affect the administration’s ability to help Egypt economically. Even the $3.2 billion in International Monetary Fund assistance Egypt is seeking to support its current account could be at stake. 

So how did it get to this stage, especially when the prime rationale for US aid to Egypt, the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, is not in any serious danger? None of the explanations are fully satisfactory. 

Some speculate that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the group of generals who have been running Egypt for the past year, whipped up a xenophobic frenzy to enhance their patriotic credentials and discredit the hardcore revolutionaries who continue to call for their immediate departure. The generals have pledged to hand power to an elected civilian president by the end of June but their commitment to similar promises leaves room for doubt). Besides, they have no obvious interest in jeopardizing the $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid, which enables them to free up defense budget money to support their comfortable lifestyles. 

Others blame Planning and International Cooperation Minister Fayza Aboul Naga, the only cabinet minister to have survived from the Mubarak era, who touts that the revolution last year was an American conspiracy to weaken Egypt. Bizarrely, Aboul Naga would in that case be acting alone against the interests and in defiance of the wishes of the generals, although she is reputed to have retained her cabinet position because she has one or more influential patrons on the military council. Another theory is that mysterious relics of the Mubarak regime, trying to provoke conflict of any kind, have promoted the investigation of NGOs from within the system. That begs the question of why SCAF and the government cannot counteract the influence of such forces.

The dispute over the NGOs, which include the foreign-assistance affiliates of the two big American political parties, has revealed the internal Egyptian debate over how a democratically elected government should deal with Israel, and whether it should accept aid from the US at all. The Muslim Brotherhood, holding almost 50 percent of the seats in the recently elected parliament and bound to dominate the next government, is keeping its options open. If the US cuts the aid, Egypt would have to reconsider the peace treaty with Israel, a Brotherhood spokesman said. But the corollary of that is that if the aid continues the peace treaty is safe — some comfort for the US and Israel, for whom the peace treaty is central to their regional policy. That’s also very much in line with SCAF's thinking; Wikileaks documents show that the generals see the aid money as the price Washington pays for peace with Israel. 

American army generals also want the aid to continue; they value the right to fly warplanes over Egypt at will, preferential treatment for US warships passing the Suez Canal and the cozy relationship with their Egyptian counterparts. 

The best-placed candidates in Egyptian presidential elections in May are also happy to take American money, if the terms are right. Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, for example, dismissed the NGO dispute as hot air and political theater. “There’s no patriotic body that rejects financial support and cooperation with others in the interests of the country,” he said in an interview. 

So everyone may get their way except the Egyptian people who overwhelmingly favor ending the special, and sometimes humiliating, relationship with Washington.

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Anthony Shadid

by Nadim Houry
written by Nadim Houry

Anthony made reporting look so easy. His writing was always fluid, transforming even the scariest of situations into the perfect setting for a good anecdote. I first met him in Tyre during the hot days of the July 2006 war when the Israeli air force was pounding southern Lebanon. Most journalists and NGO-types had gathered in one hotel in the city. It was hot, humid, and frankly a bit miserable. I was new to the journalists’ scene and it felt intimidating. Each evening, war photographers would trade stories on the day’s horrors dropping passing references to Grozny, Bosnia and Iraq.  

Anthony was different. Despite winning the Pulitzer Prize for his work on Iraq (he would go on to win a second one in 2010), he was approachable, modest and available to help others. He worked hard — was often the first out the door during that 2006 summer — but somehow never bragged about it. 

What set him apart was not just his beautiful prose or his attention to detail. It was his ability to get people to open up, to share with him intimate parts of their world. Iraqis, Tahrir square activists, southern Lebanese, Benghazi residents, all told him their stories, and he did a superb job relaying their fears, hopes and dreams. Steve Fainaru, a reporter who worked with him in Iraq was right when he called Anthony’s dispatches “poetry on deadline.” 

In an age of “embedded” journalists acting as scribes to invading armies, Anthony embedded himself in the societies he wrote about. He often reminded me of those mid-century anthropologists who spent months and sometimes years observing a society and striving to understand its unspoken rules. At his commemoration last month in Beirut, his brother said that even as a child, Anthony’s favorite past time on family vacations was to go discover. We should deem ourselves lucky that he shared his discoveries with us in writing.  

A few months ago, I met Anthony for coffee after he had returned from a particularly difficult and dangerous trip to Homs. He said it was one of the scariest trips he had ever made — a tall order for someone who had been shot in Ramallah and kidnapped in Libya. I teased him saying that with two Pulitzer prizes under his belt, maybe it was time to leave the running around the frontlines to others and write punditry. He smiled. He wanted to spend more time with his family, he said, but he loved reporting and there was so much going on in the region. That urge to go discover was still tugging at him.  

He died last month from an apparent asthma attack while trying to cross back to Turkey after reporting from northern Syria. Like so many great explorers before him, it was just one trip too many.

Anthony, you will be missed.

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Where outsiders fight

by Farea al-Muslimi
written by Farea al-Muslimi

Pessimists think of Yemen as the new Afghanistan or Somalia, while the optimists’ tend to see it as the new Egypt, or better yet, Tunisia. Situated somewhere between the two, there is also an opinion of growing prominence that recognizes in the new Yemen an awful lot of Lebanon. Most notably, Yemen, like Lebanon, is a proxy field for the region’s hottest “cold war”, between the Middle East’s two titans of theocracy: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This in itself is not new, but the new political landscape shaping Yemen has upped its significance for both sides.

Shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979 the competition between KSA and Iran began in earnest for influence in, and over, Yemen. The regional rivals set about inciting strife between Yemen’s two main sects, Shafai Sunnis and Zaidi Shias, who had previously enjoyed a largely moderate and tolerant coexistence with each other.  

In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia began funding what they called “The Scientific Institutions” which taught their Sunni students an extremist and intolerant brand of Salafi Islam, in an effort to marginalize Zaidi influence in Yemen. Recently ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh was also very adept at manipulating Saudi fears of Iranian influence to extract bundles of cash from the KSA’s monarchs, even to the point of empowering Iran’s allies in Yemen whenever the Saudi cash would wane. 

Sectarian tension was inflamed in the last decade through six wars — between 2004 and 2009 — in the Saada governorate between the Yemeni army and the Al Houthi group, led by Abdulmalik al-Houthi, a prominent Zaidi figure. Thought the causes of the conflicts were largely political, the sixth war had a massively negative impact on Zaidi-Shafai relations. KSA forces entered the affray on the side of the Yemeni army after several incidents along the border between Saudi troops and Houthi fighters. The Houthis called the Saudis invaders and the Saudis claimed Iran had manipulated the Houthis to instigate the border classes.  What is more, local and regional media expounded vitriol according to their allegiance to either KSA or Iran.

The government in Sanaa has long accused the Houthis of being Iranian-funded and armed; it has never produced any evidence of this. While it is undeniable that the Houthis have been well supported in Iranian media coverage Houthi spokesman Houhsi Muhamemd al-Emad denied in a recent interview with a Yemeni newspaper that Iranian support extended to financial assistance. He added that Saudi interference in Yemen should also be condemned. KSA has been paying monthly salaries to hundreds of Yemeni tribal sheikhs and other prominent figures via a “The Special Committee”, which the KSA itself formed, and which many Yemenis regard as simply a vehicle to buy loyalty. 

With the beginning of the Yemeni uprisings early 2011, the Houthis surprised all sides and joined the protests in the streets, peacefully standing side-by-side with their historical enemies: the Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen. Such a move by the Houthis was considered pragmatic and welcomed by many other Yemenis, especially given the Houthis’ cache of arms. Within months, however, violence broke out anew between minority Wahhabi Salafis and Houthis in Saada, which by then was fully Houthi controlled, and more recently at the Dar Al Hadith religious school in Saada (among those set up by KSA in the 1980s). The violence has also spread to the neighboring Haja governorate.

Now, with Iranian influence taking a battering in Syria, the Yemeni arena looks more promising for them. Saudi Arabia’s influence in Yemen is also in retreat for two reasons: Firstly, Saudi Arabia has stuck by the old, traditional elites and political actors whose power at home has been rocked by the uprisings. Secondly, the Houthis and Iran are establishing partnerships with leftist and liberals who are wary of the power the Sunni Islamists will have in the country post-Saleh. These relationships have been publicized during the many conferences and workshops Iran has held with Yemeni actors inside and outside the country. 

Thus, while the proxy war between Iran and KSA in the Levant may seem to have swung toward the advantage of the latter, on the KSA’s own southern doorstep the “cold war” pendulum seems to be swinging the other way.

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Economics & PolicyEnergy Wars

The most dire of straits

by Paul Cochrane
written by Paul Cochrane

The prospect of a war against Iran has been on the cards for decades. Since 2005, innumerable media reports have proclaimed that war is imminent, and this year will be the year it will happen. Think tanks, war strategists, risk consultancies and the various militaries have all compiled papers on how a conflict in the Gulf could play out. The headline of a 2009 article on the website of the United States Army sums it up: “Future Gulf War: Arab and American Forces against Iranian Capabilities.”

What is fundamentally different now is that there has been a sustained covert war by unknown actors against Iranian nuclear facilities and scientists over the past few years — from scientists killed by car bombs on the streets of Tehran to mysterious “accidents” and cyber attacks at nuclear facilities — and that an economic war has essentially been declared through the heightened sanctions by the US and European Union (EU) in recent months. 

Crucially, the oil sanctions, meant to hit Iran where it hurts given its budgetary reliance on hydrocarbons, have removed a major logistical obstacle to conflict, in that the EU, which imports 4 to 5 percent of its oil from Iran — some 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) — will not have to scramble for alternative energy sources in the advent of war; they are already doing so now.

While the sanctions are to go fully into effect by July, countries are already starting to abide by the decision; Britain, Austria, Poland and Portugal, for instance, cut their imports of Iranian crude to zero in the third quarter of 2011. Iran unilaterally halted exports to France and Britain last month and most international oil companies, with the exception of Asian firms, have also pulled out of Iran to abide by the new sanctions. 

The US has not imported Iranian oil since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, and its reliance on Middle Eastern oil is the lowest it has been in decades. From 2005 to 2011, the US’ overall oil imports have fallen from 60.3 percent of consumption to 47 percent, while from the Persian Gulf it has dropped by 26.7 percent to 18 percent of total imports by 2011, according to the US’ Energy Information Administration (EIA) figures.

But with the 30km-wide Strait of Hormuz the conduit for more than 20 percent of the world’s oil and 40 percent of traded oil on the markets, it is essential to the global economy that this oil keeps flowing. With almost 17 million bpd passing through the passage in 2011, the Iranians’ threat to block the Strait is taken very seriously. As oil expert Daniel Yergin notes in “The Quest”, his recent bestselling book: “the Strait is the number one choke point for global oil supplies.”

It has been a long-term goal of the US to ensure the Strait remains open, spending an estimated $6.8 trillion (including baseline costs such as training, pensions, long-term debt repayments and military base usage globally connected to the Gulf) between 1976 and 2008 projecting military force in the Persian Gulf, according to research by Princeton’s Energy Policy department, averaging $492 billion annually between 2003 and 2008.

The US imported 663.2 million barrels from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait in 2011. Through a rough calculation for 2011 using the five year annual average calculated above — $492 billion divided by 663.2 million barrels per year (b/y) — the US is paying $742 per barrel to ensure that this oil reaches its shores. When taking into consideration the 6.2 billion b/y that passes through the Strait annually, it is costing the “the world’s policeman” $79 a barrel to keep itself and everyone else in Gulf oil. 

The US Department of Defense’s January paper “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” states, “US policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while standing up for Israel’s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace.” The recent build up of naval activity can therefore be interpreted as the US reasserting its military dominance over the Gulf. But with the oil supplies for the main cheerleaders for confronting Iran — the US, EU and Israel —  largely cushioned  to any disruptions in the Strait (not least due to massive stockpiles in the US and EU), this has, more than ever, helped pave the way for the possibility of war.

Starving Asia

For Asian countries the situation is far more serious. Three-quarters of the Gulf’s oil exports are destined for the East; the closure of the Strait or a Gulf conflict would effectively starve Asia of energy, which would have serious economic ramifications regionally and globally. How to placate China, Japan, South Korea and India has therefore been a stumbling block in the West’s strategy to isolate Iran. Yet there is more at stake than energy imports. Russia and China were among the nine nations (out of 35) that voted against the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Iran file in November which said the Islamic Republic had carried out activities “relevant to” acquiring a nuclear weapon. While Iranian and Gulf energy supplies were a likely factor behind China’s “no”, Beijing is officially opposed to nuclear proliferation and has adopted a “studied neutrality” on Iran.  China is concerned with US encroachment in what it perceives as its own back yard, according to Kerry Brown, head of the Asia Programme at the Chatham House in London. He adds that there is a deep conviction in China that American policy in the Gulf aims to keep Chinese interests at bay, causing the country to feel increasingly contained. Furthermore, by controlling the Gulf, the US is able to use energy as a bargaining chip with China and other Asian countries. 

“Asian demand is rising exponentially; the US having oversight of the Persian Gulf means an inside track when it comes to the Asian powers, and a prize the US is not going to give up like Britain following the 1958 Suez Crisis; the US has learned its lessons,” said Professor Anoush Ehteshami, head of the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University in England. “Indicative is the US is buying less oil from Saudi Arabia than in the past 20 to 30 years but the relationship is stronger than ever.” 

Annoying the neighbors

The formidable Russian bear has been vexed and unsettled by some US regional strategies, facing encroachment in Eastern Europe from NATO’s planned deployment of a missile defense system, and in Central Asia from the large US military presence in Afghanistan. While Russia does not rely on Gulf oil and would stand to gain from rising oil prices upon the closure of the Straits, regime change in Tehran would equal the loss of a geo-strategic and non-aligned partner, and open the way for Russia to be circumvented as an energy corridor to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, home to 48 billion barrels of oil and 449 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to statistics from BP. 

Such a scenario would likely raise the hackles of Moscow and Beijing alike. Their grievances would only be compounded by their strategic setbacks in Libya where they curried particular favor with the former Gaddafi regime, and the current risk, especially to Moscow, of the fall of Bashar al Assad. Already the Russians have lost $4.5 billion in weapons contracts in Libya, according to the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT), while $18.8 billion worth of contracts with Chinese companies are now in jeopardy, according to official Chinese statistics. Furthermore, the Russians could have already lost $13 billion from the effect of a United Nations arms embargo on Iran according to CAWAT, and face billions in losses from cancelled weapons contracts with Syria where it has already invested more than $20 billion in the infrastructure, energy and tourism sectors, according to the global analysis and advisory firm Oxford Analytica. That’s enough to make any bear irate enough to start a fight, and arguably the main reason why there is a lot more at stake than just the flow of oil out of the Gulf being interrupted.

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Assessing the damage

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

 

The annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank offer a relatively informal atmosphere for finance ministers, central bank governors and private sector executives to discuss the previous year and set a direction for the next. In Istanbul last month, the meetings reviewed a year of economic turmoil and vast change in government policies. Representatives from the Middle East recalled that the 2008 annual meetings in Washington occurred in a week when crude oil prices dropped 17 percent, the United Arab Emirates federal government guaranteed bank deposits and intra-bank lending and the Saudi stock exchange dropped to their lowest level in four years.

This year’s affair was far calmer. The broad consensus in Istanbul was that the worst was over and that the Middle East had survived the global crisis better than most of the world. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were praised by many, including Mohsin Khan, the former regional IMF chief, for their conservative banking policies. “Both countries didn’t allow their banks to hold structured products, and this was a very smart move,” he told me. But whatever the successes they may claim for the past year, representatives in Istanbul acknowledged that major challenges remain, especially over unemployment and poverty.

The region already has relatively high jobless figures. The World Bank projects unemployment will rise by 25 percent in 2009 and 2010 in the Middle East and by 13 percent in North Africa, despite regional growth second only to Asia.

“The message, globally, is that, yes, there are signs of recovery, but it [the situation] hasn’t settled deeply,” said Shamshad Akhtar, the World Bank vice-president for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). “We already had 20 million people unemployed [in MENA], and we have new entrants to the labor force [due to high population growth], so we have a problem.” The IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook, launched in Dubai on October 11, projects regional growth will fall from 5.4 percent in 2008 to 2 percent in 2009, before rebounding to 4.2 percent in 2010. A particular danger is that a disproportionate number of people, especially in Egypt and Morocco, live just above the $2-per-day income threshold for poverty, meaning the region cannot afford complacency over joblessness. This has been the major factor behind the World Bank’s increased lending in MENA from $1.8 billion in 2008 and 2009 to over $3 billion in 2009 to 2010. “Demand is steep,” said Akhtar. “Our clients need [to finance] reforms – and not just at the macro-level. Countries want to strengthen their financial structures, they want more microfinance. They want affordable mortgages and pension reform. They want to restructure social safety nets.”

The World Bank’s 2009: Economic Developments and Prospects, launched in Istanbul, drew attention to the opportunity presented by the economic crisis for governments to “ease infrastructure bottlenecks and restructure ineffective — yet expensive — subsidies programs.”

Iran is the clearest case, with around 30 percent of GDP going into subsidies. Egypt’s food and energy subsidies are around 30 percent of government spending and 10 percent of GDP, while in Morocco 90 percent of subsidies go to groups other than the poor.

At the macro-management level, the annual meetings generally endorsed the region’s approach to the economic crisis, although there was also a clear sense that governments had much left to assess in their performance.

The region’s monetary reaction to the crisis was “unprecedented,” especially in guarantees to banks, explained Khan, now senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “Back in 2007, there was a lot of worry about the inflation rate. There was talk of reining in monetary expansion, the revaluation of exchange rates…that has changed.”

Governments, much like in developed countries, have lowered interest rates as inflationary pressures have eased. Although inflation is considered a danger in Egypt — where the IMF projects a rise to 16.2 percent in 2009 from 11.7 percent in 2008 — representatives at Istanbul agreed it would not become a regional issue in the near future. Their greater fear is that the global economic recovery could falter and depress the price of oil.

In the Gulf Cooperation Council, fiscal policies — especially with the vast reserves of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia — have been at the forefront of the response to the downturn. But many in Istanbul pointed out that fiscal stimuli have been less innovative than monetary changes, as several state infrastructure projects in the Gulf are already in the pipeline.

The shadow of politics, as ever, loomed over discussion at the annual meetings of the regional outlook. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved quickly to squash a poorly-sourced story in The Independent that secret meetings were underway to abandon the dollar as the currency in which oil contracts are made.

But their anger at the report reflected a sense that the region can ill afford any further disruption — and that any serious sharpening of tensions, especially over Iran, could quickly upset a mood of cautious optimism.

GARETH SMYTH has reported from the Middle East since 1992, mainly for The Financial Times

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Banking & Finance

Financial quotes of the month

by Executive Editors
written by Executive Editors

“Looking at the present situation in the Eurozone area one has to be more optimistic than one would have been six or seven months ago.”

Mario Draghi, European Central Bank president

“There will be no more ‘Kodak moments’ — after 133 years, the company has run its course.”

Don Strickland, a former Kodak vice-president

“Our wish and hope is [that] we can stabilize this oil price and keep it at a level around $100.”

Ali al-Naimi, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister

 “We want to be number one.”

Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, ruler of Dubai and prime minister of the UAE

“This battlefield is not limited by borders; it is fought behind the scenes. You can’t see it and blood isn’t spilled, but there is a battle in new and developing worlds.”

Dan Meridor, Israel’s minister of intelligence and atomic energy, following the hacking of the websites of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and El Al airline

“We expect to increase revenues from the region this year… There are very few places in the world today [where] I can … [readily] write a big cheque and this is one of them.”

John Vitalo, Barclays’ chief executive officer for the MENA region

“Right now, the US Congress is considering legislation that could fatally damage the free and open Internet.”

Warning on Wikipedia’s home page on January 18 when it shut down the site to protest proposed piracy bills in the United States

“If the content industry would like to take advantage of our popularity, we are happy to enter into a dialogue. We have some good ideas.”

On Megaupload’s homepage, one of the Internet’s largest file sharing sites, after the arrest of seven individuals including founder Kim Schmitz

“We are confident that the privatization of the stock exchange will be of a great benefit to Kuwait’s economy, investors and the listed companies.”

Abdullah al-Gabandi, head of the exchange privatization committee at Kuwait’s Capital Markets Authority

“We will have a partial managed float, allow the rate to be determined by the market and intervene when necessary.”

Adib Mayaleh, governor of Syria’s central bank
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Banking & Finance

For your information

by Executive Editors
written by Executive Editors

RBS closing Middle East M&A arm

Royal Bank of Scotland, majority owned by the government of the United Kingdom, is in talks to sell its Middle East merger and acquisition business as part of a global restructuring at the bank. RBS did not give a timeframe for the sale or details on the possible buyers. RBS is currently working on four M&A deals in the Middle East, which include the sale of 50 percent of Saudi Arabia-based Aujan Industries to Coca-Cola for $980 million, and aims to close these deals in 2012. The exit by RBS from the region follows moves by other investment banks such as France’s Credit Agricole, which closed its regional offices for Middle East M&A and relocated the business to Paris. Lloyds Banking group, another UK bank, is in talks to close down its operations in the United Arab Emirates. Several European investment banks struggling to cope with the European sovereign debt crisis are looking to exit non-core businesses such as those in the Gulf region.

Kuwait privatizes bourse

Kuwait has hired British multinational bank HSBC to help with the privatization of its stock exchange, the third largest by market capitalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council, after Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The privatization plan, outlined in the new Capital Markets Authority (CMA) law, calls for an initial public offering of 50 percent of the stock exchange to Kuwaiti citizens and an auction of the remaining 50 percent to listed companies, with a maximum ownership per listed company of 5 percent. Currently the Dubai Financial Market is the only publicly traded exchange in the GCC. The CMA law in Kuwait was established in March 2011, more than 30 years after the formation of the Kuwait Stock Exchange, and it is the first stock market regulator in the country. “This will make Kuwait one of the first countries in the region to privatize its exchange and we are confident that the privatization will be of great benefit to the Kuwaiti economy, investors and the listed companies,” said Abdullah al-Gabandi, head of the exchange privatization committee at the CMA.

News Corp invests in Dubai’s media

News Corp, which is at the center of a phone hacking scandal in the United Kingdom, wants to boost its presence in the Middle East media industry. It is acquiring a minority stake in Dubai-based MOBY Group, the largest media company in Afghanistan and owned by the Mohseni family. Under the terms of the deal, News Corp gives up its 50 percent ownership of Broadcast Middle East, a Farsi-language television company owned by both News Corp and MOBY. In exchange, News Corp receives a minority stake in MOBY. No financial details were provided. News Corp already has a solid presence in Middle East media through its 15 percent stake in Rotana Media Group, majority-owned by Saudi billionaire Prince alWaleed bin Talal.  “Merging our Farsi joint venture into MOBY allows us to expand our activities with what is surely one of the most dynamic and exciting media businesses in emerging markets anywhere,” said James Murdoch, deputy chief operating officer at News Corp.

Knickers in a twist

Kuwaiti retailer Alshaya, one of the largest retail companies in the Middle East, invested in struggling United Kingdom lingerie company La Senza by acquiring 60 of its domestic stores as well as the brand in the UK, from KPMG the administrator of the now bankrupt chain. The remaining 84 stores and 18 concessions were shut down. La Senza was owned by private equity firm Lion Capital, which acquired it in 2006 from Theo Paphitis, famous for his BBC business investment show “Dragons’ Den”. Alshaya, which operates several British retail brands such as Debenhams, Mothercare and Next, intends to invest $156 million in the business. It already works closely with Limited Brands, the United States-based owners of the lingerie brand through franchise agreements for the Victoria’s Secret, Bath & Body Works and La Senza brands. The stores in the Middle East will not face closures as Limited brands confirmed that “our businesses in other territories, including the Middle East, is [sic] not impacted in anyway and it is very much business as usual.”

Qatar goes nutty

Al Rifai International Holding, a Lebanese based manufacturer of nuts, has sold a 15 percent stake at an undisclosed amount to Qatar First Investment Bank (QFIB), a Doha based Islamic investment bank established in 2009. Al Rifai sells nuts, kernels and Middle Eastern delicacies throughout the Middle East and Europe and its sales in 2011 grew by 50 percent. QFIB’s move is its first into the food and beverage industry and it provides the bank with access to new international locations. “From the outset, our strategy was to focus on sectors that benefit from key drivers of economic change,” said Emad Mansour, CEO of QFIB as he expects the fast growing global savory snack market to reach $85.4 billion in 2012.  “The partnership will also allow us access to multiple sources of funding and risk mitigation tools, thus helping our group implement and further develop its growth and improvement plans,” said Mohammad Rifai, CEO of Al Rifai. The holding previously raised $15 million in September 2010 through a private placement led by MedSecurities, a subsidiary of BankMed.

Lebanon’s risky debt

The cost of protecting against default on Lebanon’s debt rose further in 2011 as spreads on the country’s five-year credit default swaps widened by 150 basis points (bps) last year, compared to only 28 bps in 2010, and ended at 447.5 bps according to CMA Datavision, a CDS and bond-pricing firm. The widening of the spreads in 2011 mainly occurred in the first two quarters of 2011 due to the turbulent political situation in Lebanon and revolutions that shook the Arab world. The spread performed better in the fourth quarter relative to the rest of the year as it only widened by 17.8bps. The worst performing countries in this quarter were Greece, with spreads widening by 57 percent, followed by Slovenia at 46 percent, and Egypt at 35 percent.

A binary battle at the bourse

Unidentified pro-Palestinian hackers attacked the websites of the Tel Aviv stock exchange and El Al Israel Airlines, as well as the marketing websites of three banks (First International Bank of Israel and two subsidiary banks, Massad and Otzar Hahayal). Stock trading and flights were unaffected. The hacker group, which goes by the name “Nightmare”, warned of an impending attack the night before the hacking through an email to Ynet, a popular Israeli news website. Ynet reported that the email was sent by OxOman identifying himself as a Saudi hacker who has also exposed the numbers of thousands of Israeli credit cards in recent weeks. In retaliation, Israeli hackers calling themselves IDF team, named after the Israeli Defense Forces, attacked the website of the stock exchanges of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. Both exchanges, however, denied the claims that their sites had been attacked, with Abu Dhabi blaming the slowdown of its exchange on technical faults. “If the lame attacks from Saudi Arabia will continue, we will move to the next level which will disable these sites longer term,” the IDF-Team wrote. “You have been warned.”

Lebanese dynasties among the region’s billionaires

The  Lebanese Hariri and Hayek families made it to Arabian Business’ list of top Arab 50 billionaires. Saad Hariri, former prime minister of Lebanon, was ranked 28th richest Arab, down one spot from 2010, with an estimated fortune of $3.8 billion, up from $3.7 billion in 2010. His older brother Bahaa is ranked 32nd, up seven places from last year with an estimated wealth of $3.35 billion, up from $3 billion in 2010. His younger brother Ayman also made the list, ranked 36th, up from 44th place in 2010, with an estimated fortune of $3.15 billion, up from $2.4 billion last year. The two other Lebanese on the Arab rich list, Nick and Nayla Hayek, are newcomers to the list and amassed fortunes running Swatch group, the world’s largest manufacturer of watches. They ranked 38th place with a fortune estimated at $3.1 billion.

Kafalat loans down 3 percent in 2011

Kafalat loans, extended by commercial banks to small and medium enterprises and supported by the Lebanese government, decreased by 2.6 percent in 2011 to reach $165 million. The number of loan guarantees amounted to 1,272 in 2011, down from 1,404 in 2010, while the average loan size increased to $129 in 2011 from $120 in 2010. The agriculture sector received the most Kafalat loans as it had 41 percent of the total guarantees. It is followed closely by the industrial sector at 38 percent. Tourism received 17 percent of the total Kafalat loans.

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Economics & Policy

For your information

by Executive Editors
written by Executive Editors

Fishing for phonelines

Lebanon’s telecom sector is set for a tumultuous month as the operating contracts of both mobile network operators Alfa and mtc are set to expire. Last month Prime Minister Najib Mikati confirmed to the press that a decision to renew the management contracts of Alfa, owned by Orascom Telecom, and mtc, owned by the Kuwaiti telecom company Zain, was anything but assured. Speaking at a press conference after meeting with the telecommunications minister, Mikati said that a decision to renew the contracts which were to expire on January 31 had not been taken and that the government was considering three options: renew the contracts with the same companies, adopt contracts with other companies or bring the sector back into the government’s fold. A new tender, however, would take between three and six months, during which time the existing contracts would be renewed, the premier said. Mikati also announced that a $47 million project to increase the number of available landlines by some 7,000 lines would need another two years to be implemented.

Beyond puppy fat

New studies released last month show a worrying trend among the Lebanese who seem to be piling on the pounds as the years progress. Research from a three-year collaborative study conducted by the National Center for Scientific Research, the American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph University and Universite Saint-Esprit de Kaslik, showed that obesity among children and adults has almost doubled over the past 15 years, thus increasing the risk of diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disorders, according to researchers. “Research has shown that diet in the first two years of a child’s life sets the stage for chronic diseases and other health problems later on in life,” said Professor Nahla Hwalla, lead researcher and the dean of the Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences at AUB. According to the new set of data, which was collected in 2009, one in six children younger than 10 years old are now obese, while only one in 10 children under 10 was obese in 1997.

World Bank and IMF diverge in their gloom

Leading global economic bodies were seen to take a divergent stance on Lebanon’s economic prospects last month when the World Bank posited an estimation of last year’s growth twice that of its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund. According to the World Bank, Lebanon’s gross domestic product should have grown by 3 percent last year, while the IMF maintained a 1.5 percent estimation, a figure also touted by government officials. In the Middle East as a whole, growth in 2011 was weighed down by the effect of the unrest across the region, while higher oil prices buoyed the growth of oil exporting countries, which added $200 billion in revenues on 2010. Flows of foreign direct investment across the region, and mostly in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, were seen to have fallen by nearly 40 percent. Going forward the Bank added that the Middle East and North Africa is “highly exposed to an exacerbation of the European crisis, with strong and broad links through trade, tourism arrivals, migrant remittances, and to a lesser degree, finance.” The net effect of oil was also seen to be one of the factors weighing down growth this year with GDP impacts ranging between -0.8 and -1.2 percent for oil importers and -0.2 and -0.6 percent for oil exporters.

Inflation flummox

Figures released by different economic institutions last month point to a common theme, that prices are still on the rise. But just how much prices have risen continues to be a matter where no consensus can be reached. According to official figures from the Central Administration for Statistics, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the major indicator of inflation, rose just 3.1 percent over the course of 2011. The main drivers of the rise were prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages, which rose 5.8 percent and constitute one fifth of the weight of the total consumer basket used to compile the index. The only item that saw a fall in prices was transportation, dropping 2.6 percent. Many economists have criticized the government’s figures, which are relative to December 2007 baseline prices. Conversely, the privately owned Consultation and Research Institute which has been monitoring prices since the 1970s, said the CPI had risen 4.6 percent because of a rise in prices in every item except for housing.

Tourist numbers tumble

Figures released by the tourism ministry last month indicate that the country received nearly a quarter less visitors in 2011 than 2010, with 1.7 million and 2.2 million arrivals in those years, respectively. The figure represents the first decline since 2005 and 2006 when the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and a 34-day war with Israel, respectively, tarnished the industry. Arab visitors constituted 35.1 percent of all those coming to Lebanon while 29.3 percent came from Europe and another 14.8 percent from Asia. The nationalities that visited Lebanon most were Jordanians and Germans, both constituting 7.8 percent of total visitors.

Minimum wage up… finally

After months of political wrangling a decision to raise the minimum wage and salaries across the country was taken by the cabinet. According to two decrees issued by the cabinet, the minimum wage will rise from LL500,000 ($331.67) to LL675,000 ($447.76). Salaries between LL500,000 and LL1 million ($663.34) will receive a salary increase of LL200,000 ($132.67), while wages ranging between LL1 million and LL1.5 million ($995.02) will rise by a maximum of LL250,000 ($166.67). Salaries more than LL1.5 million can rise by up to LL299,000 ($198.34). Pay raises will be dependent on any other rises granted since the last correction of wages in 2008. The move comes after the finance minister reneged on his promise not to approve the measure until a long standing draft law on competition was passed. The labor minister has also refused to sign a third cabinet decree to increase transportation and education allowances because, he claims, it was technically illegal.

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Feature

Syria’s rebel army

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

Outnumbered, outgunned and isolated, the defected soldiers of the ‘Free Syrian Army’ are still managing to hound the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. From one desperate day to the next, these rebels claim to protect demonstrations and conduct skirmishes on government forces, while living in constant fear for the safety of themselves and their families.

1) Defecting Syrian soldiers gathered under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are contributing to a growing armed resistance to the regime in Damascus.

2) The rebels live a furtive existence, holed up in abandoned farm houses, hidden away in the Syrian countryside.

3) The body of a demonstrator, freshly killed by security forces in the town of Qusayr, is cleaned by FSA members and sympathetic locals. The FSA have tried to assert their role as armed protection for civilian demonstrators against attacks from government forces.

4&5) Despite reports of a dramatic rise in arms smuggling into Syria, the FSA soldiers outside the village of Qusayr said that most of their weapons were bought from sympathetic soldiers still serving in the regular Syrian army. 

6) A defected security agent tells his story to a journalist in a safe house outside of Homs. So far, defections from the ranks of the security forces have been limited, but this deserter said that if a ‘safe zone’ was arranged, those “without blood on their hands” would flee in droves.

7) An FSA soldier stands guard on a misty night outside a countryside hideout.

8) The next morning, FSA fighters modify a pickup truck in order to mount it with a heavy machine gun, in a similar fashion as those widely used by the rebel fighters in Libya last year. Similar to Libyan rebels, the FSA are calling for a NATO imposed ‘no-fly’ zone.

9) However, with international intervention looking unlikely, the FSA seem set for an uphill struggle as they continue to launch operations from farmyard hideouts such as these.

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