• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
Feature

Dubai vs Singapore

by Executive Editors October 23, 2010
written by Executive Editors

The set up

The catalyst of colonial trade turned two humble coastal towns into regional powerhouses

We had to create a new kind of economy, try new methods and schemes never tried before anywhere else in the world, because there was no other country like Singapore,” wrote the nation’s first prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in his memoirs. 

Countries the world over have since sought to emulate the Southeast Asian city-state’s model of progress which has seen a small developing nation turn into a global hub of trade and finance in a matter of decades. Some have called it an economic miracle.

Similarly, Dubai has also had to cast its own economic mold in moving away from hydrocarbon dependence into what the International Monetary Fund called a “Singapore-type diversification into global trade and services.”

Though separated by nearly 6,000 kilometers of the Indian Ocean, analogies and similarities between the two abound, and much of Dubai’s development has — both intentionally and not — followed in the footsteps of Singapore. At the same time, Dubai has not been shy to take its own road when it saw fit.

In this Executive Special Report, we compare and contrast the various ends and means to economic development these two regional hubs have pursued, and critique the successes and failures of each along the way — as well as the very different paths they have taken through the storm of the global financial crisis.

A similar past apart

Though small in size, both Dubai and Singapore have rapidly turned themselves from relatively minor colonial trading posts into major independent globalized economies. Observers have drawn comparisons between Dubai and Singapore’s meteoric rise from third to first world over the last century, noting that paternalistic, authoritarian rulers have steered the course to economic development in both places, carefully managing the creation of technology and services-led economies.

The parallels go back to the early 17th century, when both Dubai and Singapore — at that time just small fishing villages — were attacked by Portuguese raiders. Once the Portuguese had left, the British stepped in, establishing colonial control over both Singapore and what was at that time called ‘Historic Oman’ in the Arabian Gulf in the same year, 1819.

Matching the stats

* UAE
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Statistics Singapore, Dubai Statistics Center, CIA World Factbook

Though both areas were poor in natural resources (oil wasn’t discovered in Dubai until 1966), the British turned Singapore and Dubai into colonial entrepôts from which they could store and transport goods to the far flung corners of their empire. Working with local rulers, the British developed the infrastructure needed for import and export, building ports and, later, opening small airports in both Singapore and Dubai in 1937. The bustling trading hubs attracted merchants and businessmen from their respective regions, swelling the two cities’ populations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 

However; the post-colonial prosperity of these two small city states was by no means guaranteed. Dubai was still relatively undeveloped when it gained independence from British rule in 1971, battling an unforgiving climate and terrain and only just beginning to receive income from its oil wells. Singapore, with its ethnic tensions, fractious relationship with neighboring Malaysia and almost total dearth of natural resources and arable land was unsure of its ability to function as a stand-alone entity outside the wider economy of Britain’s regional colonies after its full independence in 1965.

Source: UAE Ministry of Labor
*Non-Emiratis are barred from being naturalized as UAE citizens 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics
**Stats are for citizens and permanent residents only, which make up 74.3% of the population.

Through a combination of top-down economic planning and free market principles Prime Minister Lee achieved his aim for Singapore, creating a modern, technology-led economy with one of the highest GDP levels per capita in the world and phenomenal growth rates almost every year since independence. 

Likewise, Dubai has achieved spectacular growth over the past 30 years, diversifying its economy far beyond the energy industry to create a gleaming glass and steel metropolis where only a few decades ago stood coral-built houses with Persian wind towers. Like Singapore, its high-performing banking, real estate and technology sectors attracted swathes of foreign talent, and like Singapore its government remains at most quasi-democratic.

The story of the rise of these two modern city states is remarkable, but the parallels only go so far. While Singapore’s place among the global economic elite seems assured, the troubles of the last few years have hobbled Dubai and raised doubts about its sustainability.

Economy

A more mature financial system puts Singapore ahead as Dubai ponders taxes

Before the crisis you heard it everywhere you went: “Dubai is the Singapore of the Middle East.” At the time it seemed like a plausible statement. After all, just like its eastern cousin, the statelet has metamorphosed from a barren undeveloped hinterland into a towering economic powerhouse within living memory.

On the face of things, the two city-states have more than a little in common. From a historical point of view, both Dubai and Singapore gained independence from the British Empire  just six years apart (1971 and 1965 respectively) and both had a solid platform from which they launched their bids to become regional centers of commerce.

Dubai, like its big brother Abu Dhabi, was dependent on income from the oil discovered in 1966 during the first stage of its development. The zenith of the desert state’s oil production came in 1991 when the emirate was pumping some 410,000 barrels per day, but that figure has been declining ever since. It was around this juncture that clear signs started to appear that Dubai was seeking to expand its economy away from oil to enact (as was mentioned in the introduction) what the International Monetary Fund called a “Singapore-type diversification into global trade and services.”

Location, location, location

For most observers, it is the ‘hub mentality’ that Dubai developed, drawing on its recent history as a free port, that ostensibly draws most of the parallels with Singapore’s economic model. By leveraging its key geographic location on the Strait of Malacca, Singapore embarked on a charted course to develop its jungle rainforests into what has become today, arguably, the world’s most successful economic transformation. Dubai followed the same modus operandi and today serves as the premier port and transport destination between the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Much like Dubai, international trade has always been central to Singapore’s model. But that reliance on international trade has always made Singapore’s economy, as well as Dubai’s for that matter, susceptible to global demand fluctuations. At the height of the downturn in global trade last year, Singapore’s transport and storage industry contracted by 7 percent, according to official figures. Dubai, with 80 percent of the UAE’s total exports and some 85 percent of re-exports in 2009, was hammered with a 20.3 percent year-on-year decline in direct foreign trade the same year.

*UAE figure
Sources: Statistics Singapore, Ministry of Manpower Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Dubai Statistics Center, Shuaa capital, Transparency International

Both Dubai and Singapore are large global port operators, with the government of Singapore operating the world’s largest through its flagship company Singapore PSA. The firm handled 9.5 percent of all global sea-borne container traffic last year, according to London-based shipping consultants Drewry. Dubai’s equivalent, DP World, comes in at a close third, handling 31.5 million containers in 2009 to make up 6.7 percent of the global total.

Similarly, both Dubai and Singapore’s trade figures are now back in the black and seem to have recovered from the drop in demand, helped by the pickup in global trade driven by emerging markets such as China and India, Dubai’s largest trading partner.

“If you just look at share, the euro zone, United States and even Japan are still the top export markets,” says Irvin Kwang Wee Seah, vice president and senior economist at the Singapore state-owned bank DBS Group. “But if you look at contributions to export growth, markets [such as] China and regional markets in Asia are becoming more important.”

“In a nutshell, the prospect of the logistics and transport sector depends on the traffic and trade growth between Asia, [the Middle East and Africa], and Europe,” says Fabio Scacciavillani, director of macroeconomics and statistics at Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC).

Apart from seaports, airports are also key to both Singapore’s and Dubai’s fiscal models. Dubai has been steadily increasing its capacity at more than 10 percent annually for the past decade and passed Singapore’s Changi airport in terms of passenger numbers in 2008. Last year Dubai International handled 40.9 million passengers, compared to Changi’s 37.2 million, and its 1.9 million tons of cargo outstripped Changi’s 1.63 million tons.

In addition, both large airports are the pride of their national carriers, which make up the core business case of their respective bases. Singapore International Airlines’ fleet numbers some 100 planes, but last year announced a fleet reduction of 17 percent. Dubai’s national carrier Emirates, on the other hand, has been on an expansion spree with President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum stating that the carrier is planning to increase its current stock of 147 planes by “a minimum of a hundred over the next eight years,” according to Reuters.

Airline and airport figures are one of the few cases where the desert city has economically overtaken its tropical counterpart.

Bring them over

Large airports and airlines also facilitate tourism, a growing sector that has been the focus of policy makers in both Dubai and Singapore.  “If you have a very good transport hub it facilitates tourist arrivals as well, which is a sector we are diversifying into today,” says Alvin Leiw, Standard Chartered’s ‘on-the-ground economic analyst‘ in Singapore.

Tourism currently makes up an estimated 6 to 8 percent of Singapore’s economy, according to DBS’s Seah. “No one has a clear idea [exactly] how big this tourism sector is, but definitely over the years it has become an increasingly important segment of the economy,” he says. Aside from their airports, both governments have poured billions into developing facilities to attract ever more arrivals.

Dubai’s tourist amenities include the world’s tallest tower and the Atlantis Hotel, which cost the government some $1.5 billion each to build. Singapore has built two “integrated resorts,” basically casinos with hotels, exhibition spaces, and even a Universal Studios theme park. The price tags for these developments are an estimated $4.5 billion (Resorts World Sentosa) and $5.5 billion (Marina Bay Sands).

The viability of the Singaporean mega resorts has so far been mired in a sea of economic question marks. To meet Citigroup’s estimate of $1.2 billion in revenue by 2011, every tourist arriving that year would have to visit one of the two integrated resorts and every adult over 21 would have to go to one of the casinos five times in a year, while every adult resident of the neighboring Malaysian state of Johor would have to visit twice yearly. Such visitation rates are already improbable, but a $75 dollar entrance fee for Singaporeans skews the possibility even further. “According to news headlines here they [the resorts] seem to be doing really well,” says Su Sian Lim, an economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland in Singapore, but she concedes that “the 100 [Singapore] dollar fee that Singaporeans have to pay is quite a deterrent and not every Singaporean is going to go there five times.”

As for Dubai, the same can be said about its Atlantis resort, which was the epitome of Dubai’s property boom-turned-bust. The resort opened with a grand $20 million party in September 2008, but it has already had to cut staff as part of the restructuring of its parent company Jumeirah Hotels and Resorts last year and was rumored to have reduced rates, something the hotel denied. 

A different base

While Dubai had its oil industry to fuel the nascent stages of its development, Singapore had no such comparable natural resource to draw upon. Instead, it created one. Manufacturing has been the backbone of Singapore’s economy since 1967, when the government introduced the Economic Expansion Incentives Act that hacked away at manufacturing taxes. By the 1970s the government had imposed a series of measures to focus on high value-added industries such as electronics. For years Singapore was the global hub for hard-disk manufacturing, before transitioning into the semiconductor business. “The next sector they put their bets on was the biomedical sector, which has grown phenomenally,” says Su Sian Lim, economist at RBS Singapore.

The south-east Asian nation’s high-tech manufacturing base has allowed it to weather shocks to its transport and logistics sector relatively better than Dubai, who’s manufacturing base is predominately lower-end and uses low-cost labor as its competitive advantage element. In 2003, using an Organization of Economic Cooperation Development method to classify industries by use of technology, only 1 percent of Dubai’s manufacturing industries and 0.5 percent of its labor force were engaged in high-tech industries. Moving to 2008 — the latest available data for the official break-up of Dubai’s GDP by sector — basic metals, chemicals, machinery and equipment make up the largest segments of the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, manufacturing made up 14.1 percent of Dubai’s output (at current prices) in 2008, compared to 19.5 percent in Singapore in 2009.  Looking at the data, it seems Singapore’s higher-end manufacturing approach has come out on top in the current global economic situation. During the last three downturns in Singapore — the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the dot com bust (2001), and the 2009 recession — the nation has rebounded within a year. After a contraction of 1.3 percent in 2009, Singapore’s real GDP expanded by 18 percent in the first six months of this year; total GDP growth for the year is estimated at 14.9 percent, according to a survey of 20 economists conducted in June by the country’s central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).    

Dubai has been less fortunate, to say the least. The IMF estimates that the emirate will continue to contract, by 0.4 percent this year. Nonetheless, the IMF’s Middle East director told Bloomberg that he expects to revise that forecast upward by an undisclosed amount, after the portion of Dubai World’s debt that’s up for restructuring has been resolved.

“A diversification strategy cannot be based on traditional manufacturing,” says the DIFC’s Scacciavillani. “It’s not an attractive model from the social or economic viewpoint to try to compete with countries where the wage level is low, such as China and India and in the not-so-distant future, Africa. The meaningful strategy would be directed at developing high value added sectors.” 

Another area where Singapore has performed markedly better than Dubai is in managing growth while minimizing the downturn’s adverse effects on the economy.

During the oil boom both cities experienced bumper growth, but it was Singapore that managed to keep its inflation under control, while Dubai’s consumers were forced to shell out more for less. In 2007, Singapore’s growth rate hit 8.5 percent with an inflationary level of 2.1 percent. The next year growth came in at a modest 1.8 percent with inflation reaching its highest level since 1981, at 6.6 percent. Compared to Dubai’s inflation figures from 2007 and 2008, 10.8 and 11.1 percent with 5.7 and 9.2 percent growth respectively, Singapore’s figures are enviable for consumers.

The reason that Singapore has such an ability to curb inflation stems from the amount of fiscal and monetary tools it has at its disposal, which Dubai lacks. To begin with, since both Dubai and Singapore are highly dependent on trade, most of their inflation is caused by import inflation and currency inflation.

Dubai’s dirham is pegged to the dollar and dependent on the greenback to determine its real value, but the Singapore dollar is pegged to an undisclosed basket of currencies. As such, the MAS uses this opaque policy along with other monetary tools to manipulate the real price of its imports.

According to Standard Chartered’s Leiw, another reason inflation has been kept in check is because of Singapore’s open door policy toward foreigners in top-tier and bottom-tier positions, a phenomena that resonates with the makeup and immigration policies of Dubai’s labor market. As this has been the trend for the past decade or so, he says wage inflation has been suppressed because low-wage foreign labor keeps it down. But if the government makes good on its promise to curb lower-wage immigration and focus on knowledge based industries, this honeymoon period for Singapore could come to an end, says Leiw. Dubai has also expressed the desire to cut the amount of low-wage labor coming into the country, a policy that could mean even greater inflation for the city’s residents.

Sit by or impose taxes

The fact that Dubai does not have a formal tax regime has been one of its most attractive features for businesses and expats alike. But its inability to manipulate taxation policy also greatly hinders the emirate’s ability to implement fiscal measures that would allow it to crawl out of the debt hole that reached an estimated 109 percent of the city’s GDP in 2009, according to IMF estimates.

Talk of imposing a value added tax (VAT) has been bubbling under the surface, with the IMF stating that the Emirati authorities have promised to impose a VAT in 2012, although they have never officially confirmed this. “It has been suggested to eliminate customs duties and substitute them with VAT, but it is a decision that needs to be taken at the GCC level, given that a customs union exists,” says Scacciavillani.

The government of Dubai has other fiscal revenues through various fees it levies, including road tolls, airport tax, hotel tax, house rent tax, visa fees and various license fees, although these would pale in comparison to a modern tax regime. 

According to DBS’s Seah, another way Singapore’s government manages downturns is through counter-cyclical fiscal policy; giving tax breaks to businesses and sectors they deem key to economic growth. During the last downturn the government fended off job losses by actually paying part of the salaries of all workers in Singapore.

“It was an extreme measure but they had the foresight to put a timeline on it,” says Leiw. The government also manages salary levels by manipulating the amount employees and employers pay into the state pension fund, The Central Provident Fund (CPF), which the government also uses to stimulate bond markets.

“What the government does is it issues securities to the CPF board, which basically in a way is then lent to the government for development and for the development of a secondary bond market,” says Leiw. “Essentially the government is borrowing money from the people and their savings. Which is why it has high ‘public debt.’” Indeed, the debt the Singaporean government owes, all $229 billion of it by the first half of 2010, is domestic debt with 80 percent of it classified as “registered stocks and bonds.”

“[Dubai] will still have to change key aspects of its economic policy if it hopes to enjoy the seemingly crisis-proof growth and expansion of Singapore”

No residents, no citizens

It is not hard to imagine that any imposition of further taxes in Dubai, such as the one Singapore uses for its CPF, would be a deterrent to much needed foreign labor due to the small number of actual Emirati citizens there are in the city. Without a tax regime however, the ability of the authorities in Dubai to manipulate fiscal policy will remain limited to say the least.

“In our government’s mind, if you have a large population who do not have a sense of ownership or sense of belonging to the country, at the first instance of any trouble — be it financial or international — these people will move because they are global citizens and they can go anywhere,” says Lim Ban Hoe, group director Middle East and Africa of International Enterprise Singapore, the Singapore state-run body that promotes Singaporean companies and international trade overseas. 

Because Dubai and the Emirates as a whole do not allow expats to have permanent residency or attain citizenship, the long term viability and commitment of the non-citizens to the city is always a question that looms.

“Dubai would benefit from having a population that has a longer-term horizon,” said one Dubai-based executive who spoke on condition of anonymity. He explained that the system was created when most expats were laborers and were not seen as having a long-term stake in the country, because they were not staying long. “Nowadays it’s not suitable anymore. Maybe in Dubai people would be more liberal but this is a federal issue.”

Singapore maintains a ‘dual path’ for residents wishing to pitch a tent in the country. They can either file for permanent residency, which gives them practically all the benefits of citizens, or apply for citizenship, which usually takes around seven years to achieve. This policy has caused some friction between citizens and expats and has prompted the Singaporean government to take measures to begin to curb the inflow of workers, though it still needs those workers to sustain its economic growth. 

Same but different

So, while Dubai’s economy has in some ways lived up to the promise of becoming the Singapore of the Middle East, it will still have to change key aspects of its economic policy if it hopes to enjoy the seemingly crisis-proof growth and expansion of Singapore.

Banking

Rumors are currently circulating around the water cooler of the global financial community that Standard Chartered Bank may be moving its headquarters from its home in London to a more easterly location. It’s no surprise that two of the rumored locations are Singapore and Dubai; each is certainly a regional financial center.

They both offer state-of-the-art infrastructure, a diverse international workforce and a history of attracting banking talent. But this is not a contest between equals: the two city states have very different operating environments, and Standard Chartered would have to decide if it wants to settle for the steady reliability of Singapore or risk the alluring promise of Dubai.

The City of London Corporation, an arm of the municipal government of London, conducts a yearly survey entitled “Global Financial Centres,” ranking cities by connectivity and worldwide notoriety, diversity within the industry and specialty in services  In this year’s survey, Dubai was labeled as an emerging global financial center and ranked 24 out of the 76 cities included in the survey, losing three places from last year’s survey. Singapore, having a much larger banking sector, held its fourth place slot for another year behind London, New York and Hong Kong.

The similarities between Dubai and Singapore are no happy accident. In fact, when the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) was in the planning stages, officials visited Singapore to draw inspiration from its success. But the two sectors have fared very differently in the financial maelstrom of the last two years, highlighting their significant differences.

A question of culture

The different operational behaviors of the two financial centers are rooted in their culture and demography, and dictated their vastly divergent experiences throughout the financial crisis.

Due to a decidedly savings-oriented culture, Singapore’s banks are deposit rich. Not only are compulsory savings mandated by the government in the form of the Central Provident Fund social security system, but “on top of that, Singaporeans tend to have a high level of discretionary savings and this is a key feature that distinguishes the two banking systems,” said Joseph Tan, director and Asian chief economist at Credit Suisse. Singapore’s banks therefore are able to fund most of their own operations, allowing them to avoid wholesale banking and interbank lending options.

“High savings, and consequently deposits, is an added safety feature especially in the context of a credit crunch,” said Tan. “When you have a credit crunch and interbank rates spike up, it can jeopardize your banking activities if you do not have a broad enough deposit base.”

Due to their ability to draw necessary capital from deposits, the only regulator action necessary in Singapore during the crisis was a deposit guarantee, as when news of the fall of several foreign banks began to surface, deposits began shifting from foreign banks to local ones.

In stark contrast, following the onset of the financial crisis, Dubai’s banks required a plethora of government support including a deposit guarantee, liquidity support and long-term government deposits.

Size matters

*Includes claims on official government entities
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Monetary Authority of Singapore, UAE Central Bank

Note: all financial figures as of June 20

This is obviously due in part to banks’ exposure to debt-ridden government entities such as Dubai World and defaulting Saudi family firms, but a lack of a savings culture and a proper credit screening system, along with a large amount of income repatriations out of the country, have also put the banks in a precarious funding situation.

“You have to appreciate that in terms of the working population in Dubai, they have more foreigners than locals and consequently repatriation flows are sizeable from Dubai,” said Tan.

In fact, the capital adequacy of Singapore’s banks is so sound that Trevor Kalcic head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations equity research at Royal Bank of Scotland, says that regarding the new Basel III regulations on capital requirements, “Singaporean banks fly through that without blinking an eyelid.” United Arab Emirates Central Bank officials claim that UAE banks also meet these standards, though they concede that this would most likely not be the case had it not been for the $13.6 billion liquidity support from the country’s finance ministry in 2009.

Keeping the books

On top of the obvious need for firmer capital adequacy standards, the financial crisis has also exposed the need for modern and dependable bankruptcy and insolvency laws — the area where the two markets differ perhaps most dramatically.

Singapore’s regulators are notoriously active, for example, stepping in when they noticed some banks selling very complicated products to unsophisticated investors just before the financial crisis. Debt trading and structured products were much less regulated in Dubai, which led to a bigger fallout when the United States housing market collapsed, followed shortly by the Dubai real estate market’s tumble.

Singapore is also better equipped to pursue delinquent borrowers and deal with insolvency. “The banks here are able to go after creditors with no trouble whatsoever if they are in default, simply because you have the legal infrastructure that would allow you to do that,” said Kalcic.

This process is notoriously difficult in Dubai, especially outside of the DIFC. Many bad debts are settled behind closed doors without passing through the legal procedures at all. Because of this, though modern insolvency laws exist in the DIFC, they are largely untested.

As Executive reported in June, the World Bank and Hawkamah, a corporate governance institute in Dubai, conducted a regional insolvency systems survey.

The UAE ranked eighth in terms of “effective insolvency and creditors’ rights systems,” falling behind the Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The only countries in the region to trail the UAE were Jordan and Yemen.

The UAE’s insolvency systems received just 74 out 155 possible points, compared to an average score of 124 points for Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries.

According to the World Bank, when a business is liquidated in the UAE, creditors get back an average of 10.2 cents for every dollar owed and the proceedings take an average of 5.1 years; in Singapore creditors get back an average of 91.3 cents on the dollar (the second best in the world behind Japan) in an average of 0.8 years. As a comparison, in the United States creditors average 76.7 cents on the dollar from defaults, with proceedings averaging one and a half years. 

“From a bank’s perspective, even just having your systems working on Sunday when the rest of the world is not, can be an issue. Especially when it comes to calculating and settling financial products. Even a simple thing like not working on Fridays does make a difference” –Joseph Tan, director and Asian chief economist at Credit Suisse

The tortoise and the hare

But with tighter regulations and greater reserves comes smaller profits.

“The flipside is that it’s a very low return market, the [return on equity] for the [Singapore] banks are somewhere around 10, 11, 12 percent,” said Kalcic. Before the crisis, return on equity (ROE) at the UAE’s banks hovered around 20 percent in most cases, with the sector’s aggregate ROE at 20 percent in 2006.

Raj Madha of Rasmala Investment Bank forecasted in a July report that the top six UAE banks would achieve an average of 14 percent ROE in 2011, with returns back up to the high teens by 2012-2013.  He said that the average ROE in the UAE banking sector as of July was 10.7 percent. Because of their different paths through the financial crisis, the challenges and goals of the two sectors are quite different.

Dubai is certainly still in recovery mode. Banks are scrambling to lower their soaring loan-to-deposit ratios and recover much needed capital, and their biggest challenge is the financial climate.

But for Singapore, the financial climate is less of a challenge than the local market. Singapore’s banking sector is saturated with both large universal banks and small niche banks and according to Tan, increasing profits and market share year to year is not easy.

“The biggest challenge going forward is how do you grow?” he said. Tan says that private banking is one of the more popular choices, in line with global trends, and that Singapore’s regulations are particularly suited to private banking. But one target growth area has been a challenge for the city-state: Islamic banking.

Though Islamic banking may seem unnecessary in a state which is only 15 percent Muslim, Singapore’s banks have the sector in their sights due to the regional appeal of the offering.

“It is quite difficult, we’re trying to develop the sector in a big way but we’ve got Malaysia up to the north and Indonesia down to the south. We have had some success where some sukuk bonds were issued in Singapore, but not a lot,“ said Tan.

The choice that Standard Chartered Bank has to make, and indeed any other institution looking to set up shop outside the Western bastions of banking, is like choosing between an older, more experienced investor and a younger, more dynamic one. Singapore is the safe bet. Dubai, the risky choice, but with risk can also come reward.

Real estate

Planning pays off as Singapore sails while Dubai shakes in the storm

The skylines of Dubai and Singapore look much the same: gleaming glass and steel towers jostle for space along modern redeveloped waterfronts, epitomizing 21st century urban culture in the new elite states of the global south. But the similarities end at the aesthetic, with Singapore’s urban development carefully controlled by a government committed to providing sustainable housing for all, and Dubai’s government — until recently — seemingly focused on building the biggest, flashiest and most expensive skyscrapers in record time, a testosterone-fueled testament to their new place on the world stage.

“I wouldn’t call it a master plan, but a conceptual idea,” says Ronald Hinchey, director at the Dubai office of international property consultancy Cluttons LLC, of Dubai’s extravagant vision for its property sector. Large developers in Dubai, part-owned by the government, made an outline for their own specific land parcels, but conventional detailed master plans only evolved some time between 2004 and 2007, he explains.

There was a basic outline for urban planning under the authority of the Dubai municipality and the respective authorities of the emirate’s different ‘zones,’ such as the free trade zones, says Fadi Moussalli, regional director at Jones Lang Lasalle Middle East and North Africa. But in reality, development was largely ad hoc, dictated by the whims of capital and prestige rather than the strategic forward thinking of the urban planner.

With the most successful home ownership scheme in the world, some 80 percent of Singaporeans own their own flats

A controlled rise

In contrast to the Dubai authorities’ laissez faire attitude to real estate development in the early stages, stepping in to manage the property market is something the Singaporean government has done often, and with much success. Singapore went through a slower period of evolution after independence in 1965, where sustainability and basic, mass housing were of primary importance as the government had limited resources to spend.

As of October 2009, the government’s Housing and Development Board (HDB) had housed 82 percent of Singapore’s 5 million people in the most successful home ownership scheme in the world. Today, some 80 percent of Singaporeans own their own flats (HDB has built nearly 900,000), aided by government grants disbursed through the Central Provident Fund. On average, they only spend around 20 percent of their monthly income on mortgage repayments. Planned communities also integrated work sites for local residents to prevent traffic congestion. 

Singapore’s government also keeps a tight reign on master planning, zoning, and architectural design. Francis Lee, chief executive officer of DP Architects speaks from the experience of designing some of the city’s landmarks: “Each and every building should be an integral part of an overall master plan. For architects and developers, it is good to work within a master plan of the city [Singapore], because guidelines, rules and parameters of the site and surrounding areas are known. We know what the views will be like from each corridor.”

Plot ratio is highly controlled in Singapore, especially near the port area where building height is low-to-mid rise. In the central business district, 280 meters upwards is the limit. Lee adds that the skinny, fashionable and tall buildings on small plots that are often not linked or integrated in Dubai don’t exist in Singapore, where about 4,300 skyscrapers symbolize the island’s economic status. He recommends that less harmonized areas on Sheikh Zayed road should be better integrated with the provision of covered walkways between buildings, which are required in Singapore by the government to protect pedestrians from the heat and humidity.

Today, the Dubai government seems to be taking more notice of Singapore’s way of working. According to Clutton’s Hinchey, the Dubai municipality now sets clear planning and building regulations, which have proved successful at regularizing and harmonizing urban development in the emirate, although the industrial free zones still have their own planning units, such as the Jebel Ali authority. And, with the emirate’s luxury market saturated, Dubai developers have begun shifting their focus to affordable housing.

Miscellaneous minutia

  • In Jones Lang LaSalle’s Global Real Estate Transparency Index 2010, Singapore ranked 16th, while Dubai came in 37th
  • Dubai has the world’s tallest building, Burj Khalifa, at 828 meters high; Singapore has the world’s tallest Ferris wheel, the Singapore Flyer, with a diameter of 162 meters
  • Terminal 3 at Dubai International Airport has the world’s largest floor space, at 16.1 million square feet

“Suddenly after the crisis, every developer is targeting low-income housing, but that’s a problem because there has to be specialization and not everyone will be able to achieve profitability,” says Masood al-Awar, chief executive officer of Tasweek Real Estate Development and Marketing. Laura Adams, residential sales manager of Better Homes, the largest realtor in the Middle East, adds: “There is an opening in the market for rental properties that cater to single expatriates on salaries of less than 4,000 AED [$1,089].”

Dashing out of the gates

In terms of the system of financing and investment in Dubai, EFG-Hermes analyst Jad Abbas says the focus of real estate players in the early days was off-plan sales, usually to bulk investors. These were used to finance the construction of commercial and residential projects; a cycle that picked up speed after the emirate eased foreign ownership rules and introduced the growing expatriate population to the freehold market.

One year after the 1997 law allowing foreigners to buy land via 99-year leases was passed, Emaar, the UAE’s first and largest property developer, delivered the first residential project where real estate sales were commercialized, delivered from a one-stop-shop to individual end-users. “People thought it was easy because [Emaar] had a monopoly,” says Awar, a former advisor to the chairman of Emaar, “but… it was the introduction of a new concept; pre-sale, end-sale, real estate by a private company, instead of in the hands of Land Department brokers.” 

The private market became more competitive in 2001 when freehold rights were introduced and Nakheel’s first Palm project was launched. By 2009 there were 795 developers and 899 projects registered in Dubai, according to the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA), the regulator introduced in 2006 to professionalize the industry. RERA ensured that accredited companies were registered with the land department, forced developers to hold their clients’ money in escrow accounts, and most importantly, standardized sales agreements.

In 2008, government statistics showed that “real estate, business services and construction accounted for 24 percent of Dubai’s nominal gross domestic product.” Nabil Ahmed, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, told Bloomberg that if building materials and financing are included, the figure was about 40 percent.

In Singapore, the government has maintained control of real estate development using its Government Land Sales Program (GLS), through which it leases land by tender to developers for 99 years and regulates its usage. The state owns most of the country’s land (by 1994 it owned 90 percent), and according to Tay Huey Ying, director of research and advisory at the Singapore office of Colliers, the program “has become an important mechanism for the government to regulate land supply to meet demand for properties by the private sector.”

In the private sector, The Far East Organization is the largest developer in the city-state, headed by Singapore’s wealthiest man, Ng Teng Fong, until his death in February.

City Developments, the second largest developer by market value, owns more than 650,000 square meters of lettable office, industrial, retail and residential space; it claims one of the largest land banks among private developers, with more than 335,000 square meters in Singapore.

Splash of the downturn

Dubai’s Palm Islands (Palm Jumeirah, Palm Jebel Ali, Palm Deira) project by Emaar’s rival, Nakheel (Dubai World’s property arm), typifies the incredible rise of Dubai’s real estate sector and its subsequent crash back to earth. The construction of the Palm Jumeirah alone necessitated extensive dredging that dug up 94 million cubic meters of sand and 7 million tons of rock at a cost of $12.3 billion. Though partly rescued by Abu Dhabi’s aid package, many of Nakheel’s projects are today still on hold as the firm works out its debt restructuring.

Singapore has also undertaken an extensive land reclamation project since the 1960s, but in a very different way to Dubai. The reclamations have expanded the island’s land area from 581.5 to 710 square kilometers, and were necessary to build infrastructure, such as the Changi airport’s runways, and to provide housing and build causeways for trade, rather than for luxury residential and hospitality projects. 

However, it was not just Dubai’s island projects that suffered when the financial crisis hit; the whole real estate industry has felt the pinch. Average office rents in the emirate have declined 45 to 60 percent since their peak in mid 2008, while housing prices have halved since then, depending on the area. According to Jones Lang Lasalle’s second quarter Dubai market report, the value of transactions, apartment rents and villa rents have all decreased year-on-year.

It took property prices in Singapore more than two years to recover from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, but the island nation has bounced back from the most recent global economic turmoil far quicker. Singapore’s property prices fell by 22.7 percent in the first quarter of 2009, but the country recorded the highest increase in prices in the second quarter of 2010 among all countries surveyed by the Global Property Guide. Property prices were up 34.03 percent over the year to the end of the second quarter, the highest recorded year-on-year increase in the country since 1995.

The price increase, which had begun in the third quarter of 2009, was due to “high liquidity due to the stock market recovery, the low interest rate… and strong demand by owner-occupiers upgrading from the public housing sector,” said Collier’s Ying. On May 21, the government upped the amount of land to be sold, which could potentially yield 13,905 private residential units within three years. The government also beefed up regulations to dampen rampant speculation by imposing taxes on homes sold within three years, and increasing cash down-payments on second mortgages from 5 to 10 percent.

Awar believes that Dubai’s real estate will rebound if the cost of financing, services and maintenance are reduced. Dubai’s hefty mortgage interest rate, usually at 2 percent above the United States base rate and averaging 8.5 percent in 2009, has remained stubbornly high, despite the fact that property values decreased more than in other regions. The emirate’s mortgage market is in its infancy compared to Singapore, and banks were not keen to re-negotiate loans in tough times as they did in Singapore.

Green shoots in the sand

Singapore’s real estate market was also able to come out of the downturn relatively unscathed thanks to quick government action to prevent unemployment. Given that nearly a quarter of the country’s population are non-resident foreigners who mostly rent, layoffs would have led to them leaving the country, flooding the rental market with vacant properties.

The government initiated the $4.3 billion Job Credit Scheme, effectively subsidizing company payrolls and preventing firms from firing staff. Collier’s Ying says the plan minimized distressed sales, buoyed the rental market, and “property repossession was kept at bay because some banks allowed borrowers to only pay interest during the crisis period.” By mid 2010, the property sector shot up again, so much so that the government had to step in to cool speculation.

Though Dubai’s real estate sector took a heavy hit during the recession and has been slow to bounce back, particularly compared to Singapore’s impressive recovery, there are positive signs. According to Hinchey, in a bid to regain credibility, Dubai is going for international best practice across all areas, including “writing an ethics law and valuing guidance law [to properly value land.]”

Architect Lee remains optimistic about the emirate’s comeback. “I sense that in the next two to three years Dubai will make a comeback and evolve eventually like Singapore has done. Hence, I maintain an office there, to await the upturn.”A

Telecom

Sculpted by their respective states, Dubai and Singapore’s telecoms triumph

With small populations, limited space and little in the way of natural resources, Dubai and Singapore were never going to be industrial giants. But the features that hindered industry were perfect for technology, allowing both governments to roll out ambitious information and communications technologies (ICT) infrastructure that has underpinned Dubai and Singapore’s rapid development.

Both city-states rank among the world’s best for telecoms and information technology, but Singapore clearly has the edge. According to the latest World Economic Forum (WEF) Technology Report, Singapore ranks second globally for network readiness, just behind Sweden. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) describes the island nation as a “market leader in the telecommunications industry,” and the International Telecoms Union’s (ITU) 2009 ICT Development Index ranks Singapore as having the best tariffs for landlines, mobiles and broadband in relation to gross national income (GNI) per capita.

The country has plans to roll out the world’s first nationwide broadband network, SingaporeOne, and the mobile phone penetration rate stood at approximately 134 percent in 2009.

As in many areas, Dubai is still sprinting to catch up with Singapore’s success. As both of the United Arab Emirates’ ICT operators, du and Etisalat, are nationwide, few figures are available for Dubai itself, but it can be reasonably assumed that the UAE data is reflective of Dubai’s situation. 

The UAE ranked 23rd in the WEF’s report, top in the region and ahead of a number of European countries, but behind the United States, Japan and the Scandinavian nations. It has the best internet, mobile and fixed line penetration of  all the Arab states, according to the EIU, and the Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone hosts more than 650 companies, including major global ICT suppliers such as Oracle, Microsoft, Sony and Cisco.

The ITU ranks Dubai’s tariffs as 6th globally, with the prices of mobile and fixed line services in relation to GNI per capita equal to Singapore’s.

Number of telephone lines (000’s)

Mobile subscriptions (000’s)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
*a – actual / e – EIU estimate / f – EIU forecast

Singapore had a head start, as it was already relatively more developed than Dubai when IT took off in the 1980s.

“In the late 70s and early 80s we saw the potential of IT in accelerating Singapore’s development, and decided that we had to systematically plan ahead and move quickly in this direction,” says Ronnie Tay, chief executive officer of the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), the government body that formulates IT and telecoms policy and regulates the industry.

The Singapore government has played a key role in guiding the development of the ICT sector, as it has in many other sectors of the economy, and the WEF puts Singapore first in the world for government prioritization of ICT. According to Chong Kok Keong, senior vice president of Crimson Logic, a Singapore-based eGovernment solutions provider, “besides putting in place an excellent telecoms and IT infrastructure, the government has also established a regulatory regime that facilitates industry development.”

Total IT spend ($ billions)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
*a – actual / e – EIU estimate / f – EIU forecast

Overall ICT prices (2008 data)

Displaying levels of government interference that would leave ardent free marketeers choking, the state carefully nurtured the growth of telecoms and IT, incrementally introducing competition as and when they saw fit. The government-owned SingTel had a monopoly on basic telecommunications services until 2000 (although it had initially been promised a longer monopoly), and although the government began selling shares in the company in 1997 it is still the majority shareholder.

“In the late 1990s, the global infocomm landscape changed dramatically and many countries were opening up their telecoms market to full competition and investments. We had to keep pace and brought forward the full liberalization to April 1, 2000,” says Tay.  StarHub was allowed to join the fray in 2000 and there are now three main telecoms operators in Singapore, while SingTel is a major regional player. There are 95 Internet service providers, according to the EIU, but only four of those carry any real weight and Singnet, a subsidiary of SingTel, has captured more than half the broadband market. Despite the ongoing dominance of SingTel, “liberalization has led to the entry of a host of new operators, and has created a competitive market,” a 2010 EIU report states.

Internet penetration per 100 people

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
*e – EIU estimate / f – EIU forecast

The Dubai government has also had a paternalistic hand in guiding the growth of its nascent ICT sector, limiting competition and investing heavily in infrastructure. The state-owned Emirates Communications (Etisalat) has dominated the market since its inception in 1976, and enjoyed a monopoly until the government set up the Emirates Company for Integrated Telecommunications (EITC) in 2005. The EITC rebranded itself as du in 2006, and quickly went about grabbing an impressive chunk of the telecoms and IT pie, securing a 32 percent share of the mobile market by 2009, according to EIU figures. However, the recent financial crisis may have stopped du’s planned march toward market dominance in its tracks. Etisalat is already a big name in the region, operating in 18 different countries, whereas du is currently only domestic but had plans to expand outside the UAE’s borders. “The financial crisis diminished du’s ability to carry out its expansion plans and catch up with Etisalat — it’s had to shelve its plans and the gap between them is growing, not shrinking,” says Riad Bahsoun, an expert at the ITU and vice chairman of the SAMENA Telecommunications Council.

This may lead the UAE authorities to open the market to a third operator, or push du to team up with another regional operator, such as Saudi Arabia’s STC, he suggests. Either way, says Bahsoun, the lack of competition in Dubai’s market isn’t a big problem. “Prices are already very low, and penetration rates are high, so the market is saturated — there would be very little for new operators to do.” Singapore is ahead in the ICT stakes at the moment, and its plans for the future as outlined in the Intelligent Nation 2015 master plan — including an ultra-high speed national broadband network and the leveraging of infocomm technologies to transform sectors such as education, healthcare, maritime and retail — ensure it will remain a major player for years to come.

But that is not to say that Dubai couldn’t give its fellow city-state a run for its money in the future. It is already showing signs of catching up, and the EIU predicts that by 2014, the UAE’s total IT spending will overtake Singapore’s. The WEF’s Technology Report ranks the Emirates as number two in the world for the importance of ICT to the government’s vision of the future, second only to Singapore, and according to Bahsoun the UAE’s telecoms sector is packed with “a young generation of very competent people who can drive growth and innovation.”

October 23, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Fueling Tehran’s plans

by Gareth Smith October 23, 2010
written by Gareth Smith

When Iran introduced gasoline rationing in 2007, Ehud Olmert, then Israeli prime minister, said the torching of some Tehran gas stations showed “economic sanctions are working increasingly well.” Threats to blockade Tehran’s gasoline imports brought rebellious Iranians to the streets and the Islamic Republic to its knees. But the more things change, the more they stay the same. Since 2007, there have been two more rounds of United Nations sanctions, far tighter United States sanctions and a European Union ban on investment in Iran’s energy sector.

And yet Iran’s nuclear program is further advanced, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is still president and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is still the supreme leader.

Iran’s reformists have long pointed out that sanctions strengthen the very people they are supposedly designed to undermine, enhancing the role of the state and its various agencies. US President Barack Obama was elected with a pledge to “engage” Iran, but once in office strengthened the sanctions regime developed under President George W. Bush, on the grounds it may push Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Many Obama supporters say this is the only alternative to military action — hence those who back sanctions need to show they are “working” or come up with new ideas for sanctions that will “work” better.

The saga of gasoline imports shows the pattern all too well. It was fear of sanctions — rather than, say, the chronic air pollution in Tehran — that led Ahmadinejad’s government to introduce gasoline rationing in 2007. Politicians had long dragged their feet over increasing the price of fuel from a subsidized price of 9 cents a liter, despite a consequent demand for gasoline that Iran’s own refineries were unable to supply.

When rationing was introduced in 2007, the allocation of cheap petrol was 100 liters a week, with motorists paying a higher price for any extra. The ration stayed at this level for three years, but was reduced to 80 liters at the beginning of the current Iranian year (in March) and to 60 liters in June, despite the usually higher consumption of the summer holiday period. During the summer, oil minister Masoud Mir-Kazemi put production at 44.5 million liters per day and imports at 20 million liters.

At the time of rationing, consumption was 75 million liters per day and appears to have fallen 14 percent to 64.5 million, while imports — 35 million liters daily back in 2007 — have fallen from 47 percent of consumption to 31 percent. A report in August from the Paris-based International Energy Agency forecast a 75 percent fall in the cost of Iran’s gasoline imports within five years, partly through opening new refineries and curbs in consumption. Incrediblely, the National Iranian Oil Company announced at the end of last month that a sudden 40 percent jump in domestic production had allowed the country to actually begin exporting gasoline, having covered domestic demand.

As production has increased and consumption has fallen, the sources of supply that have made up the difference have also shifted. Oil traders such as Glencore, Trafigura and Vitol, and companies such as Total and Shell began to end gasoline sales earlier this year as talk of sanctions increased. But the gap left by Western companies has been filled by Turkish refiner Tupras and state-owned Chinese companies including Sinopec.

Chinese companies have supplied around half of Iran’s gasoline imports in recent months, and there have even been reports that the Russian oil giant Lukoil, despite its substantial US retail operation, has resumed sales to Iran in a partnership with China’s Zhuhai Zhenrong. All this despite Lloyd’s of London — which has 15 to 20 percent of world marine insurance — announcing in July it would not insure or reinsure gasoline shipments to Iran. Iran’s trading partners and neighbors lack sympathy with the American approach, arguing sanctions should relate solely to Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs. The new UN measures passed in June blocked assets of individuals and entities allegedly involved in proliferation, whereas EU and US sanctions go much further. Washington’s financial sanctions seek to block from the US market not just Iranian businesses but third parties with significant dealings in Iran’s energy and financial sectors.

Widespread resentment at the US approach aids Iran’s search for partners willing to continue or expand trade. As one Iranian economist recently told me: “I actually believe Ahmadinejad likes sanctions. They help make him the underdog, standing up for his country’s rights against a superpower behaving unfairly.”

Gareth Smyth is the former Tehran correspondent for the Financial Times

October 23, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

When peace is the target

by Nicholas Blanford October 23, 2010
written by Nicholas Blanford

Two separate editorials on the same day in the Israeli press last month underlined the confusion that informs analysis on Syria’s intentions regarding the resumption of peace negotiations with Israel.

The right-wing Jerusalem Post castigated Syria for its “derisive” response to attempts by the Obama administration to engage with Damascus after the years of isolation under George W. Bush. A day after George Mitchell, the United States Middle East envoy, met with President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus to further hopes of a resumption of Israeli-Syrian accord, Russia confirmed it would honor its agreement to supply Syria with P-800 Yakhont anti-ship missiles. The Jerusalem Post surmised that the missiles would probably end up in Hezbollah’s hands, enabling it to fulfill General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah’s vow in May to target shipping along Israel’s entire coastline.

In fact, Hezbollah probably already has acquired anti-ship missiles larger than the Iranian Noor/C-802 system it used in 2006 to disable an Israeli warship off the Beirut coast. Iran produces a longer-range version of the Noor called the Raad, which could theoretically hit Israeli shipping off the coast of southern Israel from launch sites as far north of the border as Beirut.

The Jerusalem Post also noted that Assad “made it clear with whom his loyalties lie” when he met with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the Iranian president stopped briefly in Damascus a day after Mitchell’s visit.

“It has become abundantly clear that the Obama administration’s attempt to ‘engage’ Syria… has been a resounding failure,” the Post said. In contrast, the liberal Haaretz newspaper interpreted Ahmadinejad’s visit to Damascus as showing his “fear that Syria will weaken its strategic relationship with the Iranians.”

Haaretz blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the lack of progress on the Syria-Israeli track and urged him to heed the advice of the Israeli military establishment, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and accept Assad’s offer to resume talks. The conflicting viewpoints of these two Israeli newspapers may have earned a smile of satisfaction in Damascus. The Syrian regime is a master at fence-straddling, turning what normally would be a tactical ploy into a permanent strategy. Playing all sides at once ensures a degree of relevance and a steady queue of regional and international envoys knocking on Assad’s door. Critics of Syria insist that the regime’s ambiguity disguises an insincerity over its commitment to a peace deal with Israel. Peace would alter the geo-strategic environment of the region and compel Syria to make some hard decisions, such as reconfiguring its relationship with Iran and, therefore, also with Hezbollah.

There may or may not be some truth in such analyses, but we will not know because successive Israeli governments in the past decade have shown almost no interest in forcing Damascus to make those hard choices by pursuing peace. The last meaningful negotiations between Syria and Israel were in early 2000. Even then, Barak, the prime minister at the time, who enjoyed a broad mandate to pursue peace and the active support of the Clinton administration, got cold feet and could not bring himself to offer what he knew Hafez al-Assad wanted — the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to Syria — fearing it would not be accepted in Israel. No successive Israeli prime minister has shown any genuine interest in resuming talks with Damascus. Why would they? The border with Syria has been quiet since 1973.

The US is incapable of compelling Israel to talk to the Syrians if the Israelis are not interested. Given Israel’s succession of frail government coalitions, no prime minister is willing to risk his job for the sake of peace with Syria. Israeli leaders already have to contend with an increasingly militaristic and violent settler movement in the West Bank, so why antagonize the settlers in the Golan Heights as well?

I was once told an anecdote that well illustrates Israel’s reluctance to change the status quo with Syria. During a meeting of the Israeli cabinet in 2004, then Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom recommended attacking Syria and changing the regime. Ariel Sharon, the then prime minister, shook his head and said that that was a very bad idea.

“If we did that one of two things would happen,” he said. “Either we get the Muslim Brotherhood running Damascus or we get a democracy, and then we would have to make peace with it.”

Nicholas Blanford is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

October 23, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Editorial

Real estate reality check

by Yasser Akkaoui October 23, 2010
written by Yasser Akkaoui

The good news for the Beirut property market is that the dangerous bubble everyone said would form has not. The reasons are straightforward: the two-years between the 2006 summer war and the June 2008 Doha Agreement, a period that was punctuated by the March 8 downtown sit-in and a spate of political assassinations, saw the property market hit rock bottom. Many Lebanese sold up and left, faced with a future filled with uncertainty and plagued by security concerns.

Post-Doha, Lebanon had guarantees and political consensus. It had a new president and within a year held successful elections. Almost overnight, Lebanon became a safe haven for capital fleeing the Gulf Cooperation Council in financial disarray, seeking property and land as well as investment opportunities in the tourism and retail sectors. At the same time prices on the global commodities market rose, leading to a hike in the cost of building materials and the price of oil needed to ship them. These factors, and the new found demand from returning Lebanese, gave the impression that the market was growing at an unsustainable pace. The reality was that it had come from the depths and was merely adjusting to new market forces.

The market has now peaked. With the cost of construction materials and the price of land unlikely to fall, demand for big apartments has stalled for five consecutive months and developers are reacting to the demand for smaller apartments. In short, the market is finding its new comfort zone.

Optimists predict a mild correction, and developers that entered the market early and bought land before prices exploded will enjoy a larger margin of maneuver.

The real concern is that many of the residential and commercial units that were bought as investments are unlikely to perform as well as they should. The Lebanese lira is currently offering an average of 5.7 percent on deposits, a rate of return that most new properties will be unable to achieve in the rental market. In fact, landlords will be lucky to get half that in the current climate. They will have to take what they can get unless they want inflation to eat into a non-performing asset.

Prices won’t come down dramatically, so for Lebanon’s property market to genuinely perform in line with local spending power, it is incumbent on the state to create a blueprint for general prosperity. Until Lebanese incomes rise to meet housing prices, domestic demand will never be able to keep Lebanon’s property market where it deserves to be.

The market has adjusted; now it’s Lebanon’s turn to do the same.

October 23, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Dark days are upon us

by Paul Cochrane October 3, 2010
written by Paul Cochrane

It’s been a long hot summer. Temperatures hit all-time highs and Ramadan demand put power grids under serious strain across the Middle East. Few countries were spared as power outages hit Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sharjah, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. But in those places suffering from power cuts, people seemed largely unaware of the rest of the region’s electricity woes.

While Lebanese carried out their daily litany of complaints about blackouts, damning and blasting the government, many were surprised when I told them that Sharjah had such an electricity deficiency that residents were sleeping in air conditioned cars to avoid baking in concrete apartment blocks. It was so hot in the emirate that hospitals were inundated with cases of heat stroke and a construction worker died from heat exhaustion.

 In Damascus, residents hot under the collar due to a lack of air conditioning knew of Lebanon’s long-term electricity conundrum, but were unaware that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — those rich Gulf countries where many Syrians seek work — were also having blackouts. With an 8 percent annual deficit, the situation was so bad in Saudi Arabia that school children were passing out while taking exams and airplanes were grounded. Kuwait’s network hit 99 percent of capacity.

Power shortages in the region’s poorer, more corrupt and war ravaged countries — Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon — are daily occurrences and are not unexpected, but why are they happening in the energy-rich Gulf?

The problem is that peak demand occurs every summer at the same time across the region. Populations growing in size and affluence means more air-conditioners — and industrial activity is increasing. All of this, coupled with exceedingly low electricity tariffs and an incredible lack of forward-planning has resulted in a major shortage of megawatts (MW). And without the modern day wonder of air conditioning, the region, particularly the Gulf, is not a place conducive to working or living as the mercury rises.

Thomas Edison, one of the inventors of the light bulb, once said: “I shall make electricity so cheap that only the rich can afford to burn candles.” In much of the Middle East, Edison’s saying has been translated as: “We shall make electricity so cheap everyone uses too much of it, and only the rich can afford to run generators.” Lebanon is a case in point, with power “provider” Electricité du Liban to generate $800 million in bills this year, while the Lebanese will spend $1.76 billion on running generators.

But there is hope that such electricity shortages will be abated, with the cuts prompting such furor among the people that governments have been forced to invest in more power production.  The Gulf countries are to spend an estimated $200 billion on power plants, Lebanon some $4.7 billion, Iraq up to $10 billion. Everywhere else there are plans for upgrades and new plants. Renewable energy and nuclear power are also in the pipeline, as is the $560 billion Desertec solar power project in North Africa. And if other solar power initiatives get underway in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, the region will be able to produce up to 470,000 MW of sustainable electricity by 2050, according to research by the German Aerospace Center.

While such initiatives are laudable, practical solutions to the current shortages need to be implemented. It takes around three years to build a conventional power plant, and once output is increased, there is usually a corresponding rise in demand as people use more electricity. It’s a vicious cycle.

Before these projects get underway, thinking about how to lower overall consumption across the region should be part of every national power plan. Can we really call a ski slope in a mall in the desert an efficient use of electricity? Do empty office blocks have to be lit up like Christmas trees in the middle of the night? And when the whole of Lebanon lacks electricity, did the Maronite Church have to erect the world’s largest illuminated cross at Qanat Bekish in Mount Lebanon, a 240 foot high construction lit by a staggering 1,800 spotlights?

If temperatures are as high again next year and such wanton waste of electricity continues, power cuts are likely to be worse. In the meantime, higher tariffs to encourage people to use power more wisely would help to ensure more people are sleeping in their houses rather than their cars this time next year.

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Baghdad’s enduring nightmare

by Alice Fordham October 3, 2010
written by Alice Fordham

On wide, high-definition screens, images flash up for two seconds at a time: flayed skulls, charred limbs, disemboweled torsos, heads bloated and bulging around taped-up eyes. Men and women sitting in plastic seats flinch as they squint at the real-life horror show, trying to identify husbands, cousins and friends. This is the Baghdad morgue, where the grim body count of the last seven years has been a daily reality, where bodies were piled up and lay unclaimed by terrified families before being driven to vast graveyards with numbered plots.

As American-led troops battled resistance and then civil war, this building and its 50 employees dealt with the consequences. In 2006 and 2007, the morgue received 150 corpses a day. Today, although the stream of dead has slowed to a trickle, the morgue remains a nightmarish reminder of the fighting’s lingering effects as people come to hunt through the photographs of some 20,000 bodies which remain unidentified.

Abu Issam, 47, from the capital’s New Baghdad neighborhood, was looking for his cousin, a 60-year-old man who was kidnapped from his home by men in three cars in January 2006. As corpse followed corpse on the screen, he said, "I look at these pictures and say to myself, ’what is the guilt of these people?’"

Meanwhile, officially, the war is grinding to a halt. On September 1, United States combat operations in Iraq were declared over and, with some fanfare, Operation New Dawn began, a mission of advice and assistance with less than 50,000 American soldiers on the ground.

Media attention has begun to drift from Iraq; the pyrotechnics of Pakistan and Afghanistan are now more interesting than the rumbling violence in Baghdad. But in a country where people are still mourning for disappeared loved ones, divisions and grievances run deep and there is not yet a clear victor in the messy endgame to the war.

Since the end of combat, American soldiers supporting Iraqi colleagues have found themselves in lethal shoot-outs and open fighting in Baghdad, Diyala and Fallujah. Two American soldiers were shot dead on September 8 in Salaheddin by a man in an Iraqi Army uniform who was among the men they had been training.

Other troubles still plague Iraq. Hundreds of people die violently every month and, more than half a year after elections, there is no sign of a government being formed. The divisions between Sunni and Shia, which Iraqis insist were negligible before the 2003 US-led invasion, are still being deepened by violence and politics. There are frequent assassinations among the largely Sunni militias which defected during the American troop surge. The Iraqiya party, which campaigned on a platform of secularism, is likely to be overpowered in government by a coalition of religious Shia parties, alienating the Sunni voters who largely backed Iraqiya.

The infrastructural impact of the invasion lingers. Electricity production has never reached pre-war levels, which were not high, and after a scalding summer marked by riots, the electricity minister was forced to resign. Bureaucracy and bribery dog municipal functions of the state and the police are corrupt and brutal. Minorities are still targets. Christians are associated with the hated occupiers and during the scandal surrounding the planned Koran-burning in Florida, every church in Baghdad was threatened.

The best-case scenario for Iraq going forward is the rather modest one laid out by Barack Obama, in which violence is at a manageable level and there is some semblance of democratic rule. But the ingredients are all there for a deterioration, and if a government doesn’t emerge or there is a serious attack on a religious site, for example, the decline could be swift and have a wide-ranging fallout.

Some American soldiers feel frustrated at the perception in the US that the war is finished. Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Brown commands the infantry division whose two soldiers were shot. After attending the “very emotional” memorial service for the two who were killed, Lt-Col Brown said that his wife and family had felt this kind of danger was unlikely since combat operations ended.

“This sort of event was only in the back of their mind until the events of the last few days clearly codified that this is still a very dangerous place,” he said. A sharp personal reminder that on the ground, the war ain’t over yet.

 

 

 

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

The art of crime

by Peter Speetjens October 3, 2010
written by Peter Speetjens

The recent theft of a $50 million Van Gogh painting from the Mahmoud Khalil Museum in Cairo is hardly an isolated case. As art prices continue to skyrocket, the underworld is rapidly developing a taste for culture, turning art theft into a global business worth some $6 billion annually, according to the FBI. Only last May, for example, four modernist masterpieces, including a Picasso and Matisse, were stolen in Paris, while in 2008 a Cezanne and Monet were lifted from a Zurich museum. Meanwhile, thousands of Iraqi antiquities remain unaccounted for and Christian icons vanish on an almost daily rate, mainly in countries of the former Soviet Union.

That said, the way in which the Van Gogh still life “Vase with Flowers” was taken from the Cairo museum seemed like scene from the latest Adel Imam flick that could be called “Only in Egypt.” After all, where else can one enter a museum in broad daylight, move a couch under the desired painting, cut the canvas from its frame, and walk out without being spotted by either guards or cameras?

A museum employee admitted that the museum’s alarm system and most of the 49 security cameras had not been working for a while. “The museum officials were looking for spare parts but hadn’t managed to find them,” he told Agence France-Presse. The affair becomes all the more humiliating knowing that the same painting was stolen from the same museum in 1978 only to pop up two years later in Kuwait.

Admittedly, the theft of four paintings with a combined value of $130 million from the Paris Museum of Modern Art in May was nearly as embarrassing. Here too, the alarm system was out of order, as the museum was awaiting spare parts.

The security cameras however, did work. They recorded how a lone hooded thief broke a window around midnight, climbed in, cut the canvasses from their frames and left. Pity that the museum guards for some reason failed to look at their screens and only the next morning spotted the empty frames.

Yet even working cameras and guards that are awake can do desperately little against the threat of violence, which seems the underworld’s favorite modus operandi. In Zurich, for example, three men armed with automatic weapons stormed into the E.G. Buhrle Foundation, grabbed four paintings with a value of some $163 million and fled minutes later in a waiting car. Similar armed robberies have taken place in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paolo, Stockholm and Boston, where two thieves disguised as policemen entered the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in 1990 and stole some $500 million worth of art. The stunt is still known as the biggest art heist in history.

It should be noted that the stolen Van Goghs and Picassos are only the tip of the iceberg. Most thefts do not concern classic masterpieces and hence fail to write headlines. Furthermore, while stealing a work of art is one thing, selling it is quite another. The problem is that an art work is a unique piece. There is only one “Guernica,” only one “Vase with Flowers.” Consequently, it is impossible to simply offer the works on the market, especially since both the FBI and Interpol established art crime departments that, among other things, maintain a database of stolen works. Instead, as in an ordinary kidnapping case, art thieves will often try to obtain a ransom.

According to Interpol, the theft of cultural objects affects the whole world, but the two countries most affected are France and Italy. The organization furthermore notes that the illicit trade is sustained by demand from the arts market, the opening of borders and political instability in certain countries. The latter especially refers to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as looting has always been an intrinsic part of war. From the National Museum of Iraq alone some 7,000 to 10,000 artifacts remain missing, after the US army failed to protect the country’s leading cultural institution during the invasion.

In general, the future for stolen antiquities and art works looks bleak. Julian Radcliffe of The Art Loss Register estimates that only 15 percent of stolen art works are recovered within a period of 20 years. Hence, it may take a bit longer this time around before Van Gogh’s “Vase with Flowers” makes its way back to Cairo.

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

Musical Movements

by Emma Cosgrove October 3, 2010
written by Emma Cosgrove

Watches. “You either love them or you don’t care,” said Ronan Keating, sitting back on an overstuffed armchair in the library of IWC Schaffhausen’s new downtown boutique.

Keating cares. In fact, he gushes, unable to tame his passion for luxury watches. An Irish pop star and a former member of the 1990s boy band Boyzone, Keating is one of IWC’s many celebrity endorsers. He and Chief Executive Officer George Kern came to Beirut to open the brand’s new boutique in Beirut Souks on August 26, where the singer explained how he and Kern travel the world opening IWC boutiques.

“I’m like a kid in a candy store. This is something I have a passion for and I love watches,” he said. His prominent presence throughout the opening event highlighted the importance brands place on selecting an appropriate celebrity endorser; the right choice can lend credibility to a brand or even make it a household name, but the wrong one can sully its reputation.

At first Keating might seem like an odd choice; while he is not a completely unrecognizable figure outside the British Isles, his fame is somewhat localized to that northwestern edge of Europe. But IWC says it has a different strategy than other brands when it comes to its celebrity “family.”

“George didn’t have to convince us and start waving money in front of us, it’s not about that with the brand,” said Keating. “It’s a passion that we all share together.” Invited to become a brand representative when Kern saw him performing on Swiss television wearing an IWC watch, Keating is just one of many big names recruited to represent the brand in recent years. Other celebrities wrapping IWC around their wrists include Australian actress Cate Blanchett, French actor Jean Reno, French footballer Zenidine Zidane, Australian model Elle Macpherson and American actor Kevin Spacey.

Celebrity endorsements, the cornerstone of luxury watch advertising, can cost millions. The values of individual contracts are kept under lock and key and often vary greatly from company to company, star to star, but they rarely come cheap. Keating then, having recently been present at IWC’s openings in Kuala Lumpur and Vietnam, represents a significant strategic investment.

Building a brand is a complicated process, said Kern. “Millions of elements come together — advertizing, PR strategy, corporate social responsibility strategy, the way you decorate or the way you design stores.” When all the elements present at the boutique’s launch in Beirut Souks are scrutinized together, Keating’s presence  fits like a gear in a precisely tuned timepiece.

The opening featured the usual fare of hors d’oevres, champagne and branded miniature cakes. But after the ribbon cutting with Kern, Keating and members of the Atamian family, IWC’s Lebanese partners, Keating played a short, lighthearted acoustic set. Suddenly, the boutique’s styling, the utilitarian elegance of the watches and the music all blended with a melodic harmony.

Sure, the casual asides Keating tossed to the crowd during his set to profess his undying enchantment for IWC watches may have seemed a little over-the-top, but Keating’s limited local star power meant that he could walk through the crowd without needing security and without the usual surrounding wall of photographers. He shook hands and met actual people.

Perhaps it is an uncommon choice to use a lesser-known celebrity to keep the vibe light where a big name would shut down the show and hog all the attention. But ditching superstar power in favor of brand unity is certainly a bold move.

 

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

“Security and Development”

by Executive Staff October 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

The New York-based International Peace Institute’s recently published “Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections” is a scholarly work of valuable insight for the Middle East.

Edited by Neclâ Tschirgi, professor at the University of San Diego and former vice-president of the Institute, along with two other experts in the field, ‘Security and Development’ goes beyond rhetoric to examine the shortcomings of conflict prevention. The book begins with the point that often, underdevelopment and insecurity correlate — with higher levels of development meaning a lower likelihood of internal violent conflict.

After World War II, developed countries were overwhelmingly spared the ravages of military violence, while in the last several decades, most poor countries have suffered warfare — especially those that are home to the poorest billion of the world’s population, living in some 58 nations whose combined gross domestic product is less than that of metropolitan Chicago. After four lucid introductory chapters, the book illustrates such points in seven country case studies on the interplay between security and development in poorer states.

Awash with both insecurity and underdevelopment, the Middle East is seen by many in the West as the origin of much international terrorism, and close to 10 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the region is generally less secure; concurrently much of it still does not enjoy sustainable growth. This makes Arab countries the target of both security measures and development efforts, but the results have been far from satisfactory, as illustrated in the case study: “The Security Paradox in Unified Yemen.”

Defining the “security paradox” as the process whereby a country’s “internal insecurity is exacerbated by attempts to obtain international security,” the chapter’s authors Laurent Bonnefoy and Renaud Detalle paint a bleak but convincing picture of a state that is becoming more insecure as the West wages its war on terror inside Yemen.

Yemeni society is fraught with disaffection. Currently, Yemen suffers further as local and international security forces fight alleged terrorists on its soil; some of these people are “villains” that need to be dealt with (with or without Western involvement) but the net result of such antiterrorism efforts is destabilizing.

Internal stability suffers each time innocent bystanders are hit in attacks on terrorists, or targeted due to poor intelligence. Yet another mode of destabilization is the mass flight of people from an area reckoned to be a Western target, with lives and livelihoods disrupted. At the same time, despite much aid, Yemen is not developing. Unless strictly monitored and controlled, aid money can often compound local problems by abetting corruption and fueling nepotistic power structures.

As emphasized in the pithy final chapter, whatever the solution to this paradox, rigorous skeptical analysis of the sort found in ‘Security and Development’ offers a healthy antidote to ill-considered gung-ho antiterrorism operations coupled with lavish aid, which may actually end up making both the US and the global south, including the Middle East, less secure in the long run.

Though not necessarily for the lay reader, this carefully researched book should nevertheless interest regional security experts and practitioners whose Western colleagues are throwing vast amounts of money and force at problems such as those of Yemen, and other parts of the Middle East, with dubious results.

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

lacking a green shine

by Josh Wood October 3, 2010
written by Josh Wood

A quick glance at Lebanon’s smog-choked roads reveals that hybrid cars and green technology are yet to be embraced by the country’s drivers.

The vehicles are still a bit of a novelty in the West, accounting for a market share of only 0.5 percent in Western Europe and 2.8 percent in the United States in 2008 according to Polk, a firm that researches trends in the global automobile market. In Lebanon, the number of hybrid cars on the road is even lower.  But things may be changing soon.

In Lebanon’s proposed budget for 2010, a clause was included that would waive import tariffs on hybrid cars entering Lebanon. Currently, import tariffs and the 10 percent value added tax (VAT) on new vehicles can result in buyers in Lebanon spending up to 50 percent more than the market value of the car outside of Lebanon.

The Lebanese Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment pushed for these fees to be lifted to help Lebanon’s environment. The World Bank has reported that environmental deterioration — primarily caused by pollution caused by transportation — costs Lebanon more than $560 million per year. While the government nets a significant income from taxes on imported vehicles, some people are starting to think that the resulting damage is too high.

The finance and environment ministries further suggested that Lebanon’s 20,000 or so aging and smog-belching taxis could be replaced with hybrid or green technology vehicles.

Additionally, stringent reductions on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions for cars in Europe (where the majority of cars in Lebanon’s lucrative secondhand market come from) could also mean greener car imports in the coming years. The European Commission has mandated that by 2015 manufacturers’ cars in Europe must have a fleet-wide average of 130 grams per kilometer (g/km) of CO2 emissions or lower. If they fail to comply, manufacturers will face fines per car — a costly venture.

As these cars become more and more commonplace across Europe, they should filter down into the Lebanese secondhand car market. As manufacturers make their marques ever greener to appease the new European Commission regulations, environmentally friendly cars will inevitably become an ever more familiar sight in Lebanon’s showrooms in years to come.

Rare and pricey

One of the major problems facing the development of the hybrid market in Lebanon currently is that not every car manufacturer makes hybrids and out of those that do, not all export to Lebanon. “If they produce, we’ll import,” said Henry Nawar, a sales manager at Autostars, the Daihatsu and Subaru dealership in Lebanon. “I’ll be the first one to have one of our hybrid or electrical car products.”

 The Toyota Prius — the world’s most well-known hybrid car, having sold over 1.8 million units since it first went into production in Japan in 1997 — is currently available on a limited basis at Boustany United Machineries Company (BUMC), the sole dealer of Toyota and Lexus vehicles in Lebanon.

 But with the price of new cars in Lebanon already excessive compared to many other parts of the world thanks to the high tariffs, few people are willing to pay even more to have a clean conscience about the environment and a few more kilometers per gallon.

In Lebanon, the Prius retails at about $60,000 including import taxes — far higher than the $22,800 to $28,000 price tags found in the US.   

“The price is not a commercial price,” said Salim Haddad, general manager for Marketing Communication and Advertising, the advertising firm that handles public relations for BUMC.  If tariffs are dropped or lowered, Toyota’s range of hybrid vehicles should become more affordable and make models such as the Prius more alluring to the average consumer, not just those with unflinching environmental ethics and the thick wallets to pay for them.

Clean Luxury

The cost of hybrid cars in Lebanon today puts them primarily in the range of luxury car buyers, yet many of these hybrids lack the flash and power that their non-hybrid model equivalents have. Still, the market is starting to see some luxury hybrid models; if the tariffs are waived, these cars could offer a chance to be stylishly eco-friendly at a cheaper price.

Take Porsche’s Cayenne S Hybrid SUV. The 2011 model comes loaded with a 333 horsepower V-6 engine and gets 24 miles per gallon. It looks exactly the same as any other Cayenne, save for a small “hybrid” marking on its rear.

Currently, the hybrid version of the Cayenne sells for about $137,000 in Lebanon including VAT, according to Charles Tarazi, an owning partner of Porsche Lebanon. This price is about 7 to 8 percent higher than a non-hybrid Cayenne.

Minus the import tariffs, however, and the hybrid could end up a good deal cheaper than a normal Cayenne and boost its market share. So far though, sales on the Cayenne S Hybrid haven’t been great. “We’re getting a few to test the market, but so far [there has been] nothing positive,” said Tarazi.

BUMC has started to offer the Lexus LS 600h, a luxury saloon that emits 218 g/km of CO2 while achieving 30.4 miles per gallon and reaching speeds of up to 250 kilometers per hour. Yet, as with the other hybrids offered by BUMC, the LS 600h is only available on a special basis and has yet to go mainstream in Lebanon. A handful of other luxury car manufacturers have entered the hybrid market, though it is not known when or if these will be made available in Lebanon.

Will it Work?

As the 2010 budget is still stuck in the country’s bureaucratic maze it is too soon to confidently say whether hybrid (and other green technology) cars will see growth in Lebanon or not; members of the automotive industry in the country agree that the clause in the budget is key.

However, it’s worth noting that elsewhere in the region, efforts to promote green cars have met some success. In Jordan, the government issued a partial reduction on taxes on hybrid vehicles earlier this year and offered additional benefits for customers who want to trade in their non-hybrid car as part of the purchase. According to the Jordan Times, Jordan has imported 9,000 hybrid vehicles so far this year and customers trading in their traditional cars for hybrids have been able to save up to $5,600.

In Egypt, many cars in Cairo’s massive fleet of taxis have gone green, utilizing compressed natural gas as a cheaper and cleaner alternative to gasoline. Similar efforts have been made with cabs in the United Arab Emirates.

Still, in Lebanon as it stands today, “there’s been zero support from the government for hybrid cars for private use,” said Tarazi.

But some are optimistic things will change.

“It has a future and it has potential,” said Haddad. “The environmentally-friendly mentality is gaining [here]. We can’t really measure it because it hasn’t been commercialized yet, but we feel there is potential.”

As hybrids and other green cars have yet to feature on the Lebanese radar, few people in the country outside of the automobile industry are conscious of the potential environmental and cash-saving benefits they could bring to prospective buyers. 

Consumers will need to be made aware of the advantages of going green if we are to see more than a trickle of hybrids rolling down the streets of Lebanon, but the first step is lifting the tariffs. Thus, the country’s environmentally friendly future, as so much else, hangs on the fate of the 2010 budget.

October 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 404
  • 405
  • 406
  • 407
  • 408
  • …
  • 685

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

[contact-form-7 id=”27812″ title=”FooterSubscription”]

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • Instagram
  • Linkedin
  • Youtube
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE