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Society

Q&A – Stefano Macaluso

by Executive Staff August 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

Girard-Perregaux is one of the first of a number of high-end watchmakers to open monobrand outlets in the Beirut Souks. Executive sat down with Girard-Perregaux Vice President Stefano Macaluso recently to talk shop, the economy and the Lebanese market.

E  Monobrand outlets are a new phenomenon in Beirut’s high-end luxury market, and yet we’ve see a number of them cropping up already in the Beirut Souks. Any thoughts on what could be causing this trend?

The idea of monobrand outlets is, as you say, relatively new here in Beirut, and I think it reflects an increased interest by big-name brands in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general. At a time when luxury watchmakers were tallying losses in Europe and the United States, sales soared in this region. Even in Dubai, which suffered its own imploding economic bubble, we had our best year ever for top-end, extremely complicated pieces in 2009.

I think the Middle East continues to hold a lot of potential. Middle Eastern countries will not be affected like European countries, which resorted to big cuts in social investment.

The situation is still complicated in the United States and in Europe, but we are also reacting there, though a little behind our developments in this region, and will shortly be opening a monobrand boutique on Madison Avenue in New York. So the next stage for the brand, even if the market has slowed, is expansion.

E  How long have you had a foothold in Beirut?

Our first contact was [just over] a year ago, after I was invited by Ziad Annan [of A&S Chronora] to discover the location. I fell in love with the city immediately and saw great potential for growth, because as I’ve said, Lebanon was booming even in the face of global recession. With a strong regional partner and a good business climate, it seemed an opportune moment to open our own boutique.

We consider the location [in the Souks] to be very good, even if it is currently under construction. Compared with other sites in the Middle East in particular, I appreciate the architectural approach, as opposed to say that of Dubai, Abu Dhabi or Kuwait, which tend to opt for a more aggressive supermall approach. The Souk is a good compromise between the traditional market, with visibility for every brand, and the sophistication of modern architecture. In all, it feels like a more human approach to commercial development.

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Frozen in the past

by Caroline Anning August 3, 2010
written by Caroline Anning

There are so many things we need here,” says Seera Hablas, surveying the small, run-down village of Zouq Al Habalssa from the vantage point of the overgrown hillside, on which she keeps the hives of her beekeeping business. “We need the government to acknowledge that this part of Lebanon exists and needs attention — it’s as if the state only sees it as a place for martyrs and terrorists.”

Akkar, Lebanon’s northernmost province, with a population close to 300,000 people, has the air of a land forgotten. Covering nearly 800 square kilometers, it provides a large portion of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ recruits and militant Salafist networks are known to be active in the area, but for the most part this primarily agricultural governorate simply doesn’t feature on the mental maps of most Lebanese. Tourists don’t visit, investors don’t invest, and the government is conspicuously absent. As former Member of Parliament for Akkar Karim Rassi tells Executive: “Akkar is only around 100 kilometers from Beirut, but it’s like going back a few centuries.”

Zouq Al Habalssa is typical: infrastructure is crumbling, jobs are in short supply and education and healthcare provision is weak. Women are expected to stay at home, and the men — when they can find work — are mostly employed in the army; if not, says Hablas, they usually have to leave for Tripoli, Beirut, or further afield. Akkar, with its dated and uncompetitive agricultural economy, has little to offer them.

Out of sight, out of mind

“It’s difficult to work out exactly what Akkar’s problems are, because there is a real lack of accurate, up-to-date data on the region,” says Fawaz Hamidi, director of the Business Incubation Association in Tripoli (BIAT), a local non-profit business support organization, particularly because the province only became a governorate in 2004 after previously being subsumed under the North Lebanon governorate.

However, some things are broadly known: According to data from the United Nations and local non-governmental organization Mada, Akkar has the largest share of individuals living below the poverty line in Lebanon at 64 percent, with 23 percent living in extreme poverty.

It also has the lowest average individual income, with 16.6 percent of households earning less than $40 a month, compared to a national average of 4.5 percent. With approximately 80 percent of residents living in rural areas, Akkar has the lowest rate of urbanization in Lebanon, and it also has the largest average family size, with families averaging 6.1 members compared to a national average of 4.8.

Human capital is weak due to one of the country’s worst school systems, resulting in a poorly trained workforce and Lebanon’s highest levels of illiteracy.

In addition, despite being rich in water resources, a 2008 report by Mada noted that mismanagement in Akkar has led to a situation in which only 53.8 percent of houses in the governorate are connected to the public water supply — compared to a national average of 85.5 percent — and 20.9 percent have no running water whatsoever. 

 

Currently, 98 percent of the economy is comprised of microenterprises, primarily family-run agricultural businesses. All of this — coupled with Akkar’s limited infrastructure — has put off the private sector from investing in the region, exacerbating the already-major problem of access to capital, says Hamidi.

“There is no culture of equity funding, and micro loans are still expensive in Lebanon,” he says. “The banks don’t like to give small loans.”

According to a report conducted in 2008 by the International Finance Corporation, the advisory arm of the World Bank, only 11.5 percent of potential micro loan demand in Lebanon is being met.

The roots of Akkar’s troubles lie in its geography and history. With its relatively homogenous sectarian makeup (primarily Sunni, with a small Christian minority) and location well out of Israel’s line of fire, Akkar was not directly affected by the civil war, but the district’s remoteness, proximity to Syria and the long-term presence of the Syrian army led to it being economically and socially cut off from the rest of Lebanon.

While it escaped the war, it also missed out on the benefits of reconstruction, and concerted economic development has been virtually nonexistent in Akkar until recently. Residents have traditionally relied on Syrian markets for cheaper goods and services and, until its destruction in 2007, the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp also served as an economic hub for the region, acting as a tax-free zone where local people could procure smuggled goods at knockdown prices.

“North Lebanon has always been poor, but the South was also poor and it suffered so much from security threats, so it got the most attention,” says Sateh Arnaout, an advisor to the Council of Ministers on regional development, on leave from the World Bank. “That was reasonable, because if you’re in a country with limited resources you have to make difficult decisions about where to channel those resources, and clearly the South needed it most.”

Wake up call

However, several factors have coincided in recent years to bring Akkar to the attention of policymakers, non-governmental organizations and international donors. The Syrian army’s 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon drew the region back into the government’s sphere of influence to some extent, and after the 2006 war, says Arnaout, “attention started shifting to the other neglected regions, which is really all the ones that border Syria.” 

 

A 2008 report by the United Nation’s International Poverty Center highlighted that Akkar is now the poorest region in the country, quashing the previous assumption that the South was the sick man of Lebanon and redirecting the government’s attention northwards.

“Economic development in North Lebanon is now one of the government’s main priorities, as it realizes that prosperity in this area will contribute towards peace and stability in all of Lebanon,” Arnaout adds. Peace and stability in Akkar became a prime concern for both Lebanon and the Islamist-fearing West after the 2007 Nahr al-Bared conflict; an international Salafist group battled the Lebanese army for three months at the camp, located 16 kilometers to the north of Tripoli on the Akkar coastline, leaving some 450 soldiers, civilians and militants dead and hundreds more wounded.

The crisis resulted in the complete destruction of the camp, forcing some 30,000 refugees to flee their homes and damaging the economy and infrastructure of the surrounding area. The general consensus is that, to some extent, the poverty and isolation of the region contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, driving home the problems that can arise from leaving a large, remote region to fester.

As a result, the last few years have seen tens of millions of donor dollars and the usual footmen of economic development — engineers, development experts, sociologists and the like — file in to Akkar. The United Nations has a number of programs in the region, as does Relief International and several other major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, as well as well-established local organizations such as the Safadi Foundation.

Failing farms

Akkar’s economy is mostly agricultural, so this sector has been the focus of much of the development work. The existing system of small, family-run farms doesn’t work, says BIAT’s Hamidi, because “by the third generation the farmers have lost the know-how, they’re out of touch with international developments.”

Elias Wehbe, an agricultural engineer working with the Safadi Foundation, agrees: “Akkar has more potential than any other region, especially in agriculture, but [the farmers] don’t have any scientific knowledge,” he says, adding that until now the Bekaa has been seen as Lebanon’s breadbasket. European countries won’t take much of Lebanon’s produce because it doesn’t meet international standards, and the local press is full of scares about the toxicity levels of locally-produced goods, from strawberries to parsley.

“Farmers don’t understand about the fertilizers they’re using, and nothing is industrialized. There’s still so much still to be done in agriculture,” concludes Vanessa Campos Yakan, a spokesperson for the Safadi Foundation.

The work on improving the agricultural sector covers all areas, from identifying potential new products — with mushrooms and kiwis among the appetizing foodstuffs of the future — to conducting soil testing and vaccinating livestock. Unlike other aspects of development work in Akkar, this is one area where organizations tend to coordinate their projects.

Safadi, for example, has partnered with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on agricultural projects in Akkar: the UNDP provides the equipment and the Safadi Foundation contributes two engineers.

According to Abdallah Muhieddine, the UNDP’s area manager for North Lebanon, one of the most successful programs has been to offer farmers weather station data every two weeks to help them optimize their production methods. “One farmer reduced the cost of his fertilizers from $1,500 to $250 because of this weather prediction project,” he reveals. 

The UNDP also works with Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute (LARI), a government body, to test soil and water in Akkar in order to improve the quality of the produce and bring it up to international standards.

After years of absence, “the Ministry of Agriculture is much more active now through LARI,” says Wehbe. In addition to these broad-based programs, a number of NGOs fund individual agricultural ventures with small grants. Relief International, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provided part of the finances for Seera Hablas to revive her father’s beekeeping businesses in Zouq Al Habalssa, which had languished after all her brothers left to join the army. The venture has provided a vital source of income in a village where unemployment, especially among women, is very high, says Hablas.

Time for variety

Although agriculture is at the heart of Akkar’s spluttering economy, BIAT’S Hamidi believes that it can be only part of the solution to the region’s problems. “The key issue for Akkar is to diversify its economy… we can’t rely on agriculture alone, there needs to be two or three sectors to spread the risk,” he says.

With tourists pouring into Lebanon at rates not seen since before the Civil War, Hamidi suggests that Akkar should be looking to take advantage of the annual international influx, setting up eco-tourism lodges and nature trails to show off the region’s unspoiled natural beauty.

Some local residents are already getting in on the act. Tony Antoun used to own a dairy production business in Akkar, and expanded his successful enterprise to Baghdad. But in 2004, after the US-led invasion, Antoun was kidnapped on suspicion of being an American spy. He had to pay $500,000, everything he had, to secure his release.

“When I came back to Lebanon, I had nothing,” he says. “I was really in debt and had to sell my business. I thought the best thing to do would be to open a small business with low costs.”

He came up with the idea of opening a tannour, a traditional Lebanese bakery, calling it Hadbe w Nar (grain and fire) — “because when you have nothing, that’s all you need to get something started again.”

Inside the bakery, women knead the dough and press it against the baking hot walls of the oven pit with a practiced flourish, creating warm, deliciously crispy bread in a matter of moments. Over endless glasses of hot sage tea, Antoun talks about his plans to open a restaurant in the style of a traditional Lebanese house, as well as a number of reasonably priced holiday chalets in his picturesque location in the hills of Qobayat. 

“Relief International gave me a $6,000 grant, and arranged for access to a $65,000 loan from Kafalat [a Lebanese organization providing loan guarantees to small and medium-size enterprises], which will pay for the restaurant,” he says. “The money for the chalets will have to come from elsewhere, but there’s amazing potential for tourism here: the hospitality of people [here] is the closest to the traditional Lebanese hospitality. But there’s no interest from the government or others; no one thinks to go to Akkar when they come to Lebanon. We need to promote our region.”

With outsiders staying away, the low-income levels in Akkar mean that the local market is limited: “The only problem here is customers,” explains Antoun. “There’s no lifeblood in the region. I only make around $1,000 a month here; in Beirut I would make that in a day.”

Essential investments

Creating a viable, diverse local market needs more than soil testing and bakery funding; serious work is needed to upgrade infrastructure and stem the tide of the fleeing workforce.

“We need major investments in railways, roads, telecommunications, electricity; none of this is happening,” says Hamidi. Some moves are being made to improve infrastructure — the UNDP, for example, has installed solar panels on the roofs of schools and hospitals in Akkar — but so far the work has been largely tokenistic. And, Hamidi argues, the famous “Lebanese entrepreneurship” that people speak of just isn’t a reality on the ground, especially in places like Akkar. The poor quality of education in the area, particularly in the government-run schools, means that many people are not qualified for jobs even when they are available.

“I go to the villages in Akkar, and all I see is guys smoking arguileh [water pipe] by the side of the road all day,” sighs former MP Rassi.

“One guy in my village is 37, jobless, retired from the army. Because he gets his retainer from the army he doesn’t feel the need to do anything. He just keeps his minimal salary, doesn’t work and waits to die.”

Some NGO workers also complain of a growing culture of entitlement in Akkar. Both the UNDP and Relief International have programs that try to strengthen municipal councils, with the aim of creating bodies that can actually spur economic development in their areas and respond to the needs of the local population. Unlike the organizations associated with local heavyweights — such as the Safadi, Mouwad, Fares and Hariri foundations, who are around for the long term and whose operations are both philanthropically and politically motivated — groups such as Relief International have a greater interest in building up sustainable local institutions that can take over their development work.

Akkar exists under the yoke of the client-patron political system, which is found across Lebanon but is particularly prevalent in rural, disenfranchised areas. A few major families dominate politics in the area, including the Fares and Frangieh clans.

“The linkage between the local and national level is individual,” says the UNDP’s Muhieddine. “It comes from the local leaders in society who have a personal relationship with the MP,” he explains. “The local leaders’ power is boosted by the services provided by their patron in the national government, while the national MP benefits because of all of the local guy’s village votes for him. This is not a situation conducive to economic development — it leads to stagnation and maintaining the status quo.”

As such, both the UNDP and Relief International are working to strengthen the municipalities, which are currently, for the most part, not fit for purpose.

“We aim to strengthen the social networking between local people and the municipal authorities by building knowledge and skills regarding local economic development, better engagement and participatory approaches,” explains Vrinda Dar, chief of party for Relief International. “Economic development can neither happen nor be sustained just by injecting money.” 

However, an injection of money seems to be exactly what people are looking for. Dar says she found “most municipalities” initially negative to the scheme, which only offers limited USAID funding and focuses on capacity building and facilitating public-private partnerships.

“Some people, when they don’t see the money, they don’t want any part of it. So I don’t bother with them,” says the UNDP’s Muhieddine. “I’m not here to solve all the villages’ problems. I provide ideas, experience, tools, access and a road map to development. What’s the point of coming in, building something, cutting the ribbon in a nice ceremony and then what? They just wait for the next donor.”

Achieving independence

Eventually, Akkar will need to be weaned off its donor dependency if it is to develop fully, and the state and private sector will have to take over. After its long absence, the renewed interest of the central government (see box on p.67) in the governorate is promising, but with its huge debt burden it does not have the funds to act on its own.

And after years of neglect, the problems facing Akkar are great; both human capital and basic infrastructure, the building blocks of economic development, are lacking. It will take a prolonged, concerted effort and investment from the government, donors and the people themselves to pull Akkar out of the past and into a prosperous future.

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Chasing the dragon

by Thomas Schellen August 3, 2010
written by Thomas Schellen

With monster-sized bank offerings and strong growth in primary markets activity,  the global landscape of initial public offerings made a strong showing in the first seven months of 2010. However, in Arab markets, the picture included pea-sized volumes, vastly overestimated listing numbers and IPOs that went into hiding.  

Keeping count of initial public offerings in the Middle East and North Africa during the first half of 2010 was a simple task, with the total raising of funds in the $1.2 billion range from 16 IPOs with completed subscription by June 30. The tally for standard entries into the sphere of public trading across the MENA is mouse-like next to the 800-pound gorilla in the 2010 global IPO market, China.

Saudi Arabia was the stage for seven offerings across the MENA, followed by four in Tunisia (which included one with a double listing in Morocco), two in Syria, and one each in Egypt and Qatar. Four of these stocks, including Mazaya Qatar Real Estate, which closed its subscription at the end of January, have yet to start trading.  

No starker contrast could be imagined to the Far East. Roaring with new issues to the tunes of $22.6 billion and $8.9 billion, the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in the Middle Kingdom led the world IPO action in the first half of 2010, according to a report by the World Federation of Exchanges. That was before the IPO of Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank) raised $19.23 billion in July in a dual offering on the Shanghai and Hong Kong bourses.

The biggest offering in an Arab stock market so far was the 1.02 billion riyal ($272 million) measure by Saudi Arabia’s Knowledge Economic City Co. in May. It attracted almost 2 million investors and subscription demand reached $469 million, said lead manager NCB Capital. At the time of writing, the stock has yet to commence trading on the Saudi Stock Exchange.

The average offering size for MENA IPOs in the first half of 2010 was in the vicinity of $75 million. Regional investors did not limit themselves to the region’s primary market opportunities; China’s AgBank IPO, for example, was rather attractive to GCC money. With subscription to 6.8 billion shares or a stake of over 22 percent, the Qatar Investment Authority is being cited as the largest single holder of AgBank shares issued in Hong Kong. The Kuwait Investment Authority also was a massive subscriber, picking up 1.95 billion shares. The AgBank price per share on July 22 closed near $0.42, confirming that alone the Qatari investment in this Chinese IPO is worth over two times all initial public offerings on MENA exchanges for the year to date.

Including one Middle Eastern IPO in July, of the Saudi Al Jouf Cement Co., the cumulative value of 17 MENA IPOs in the first seven months of this year is $1.38 billion, more than $500 million short when compared with the region’s 11 IPOs in the same period last year, according to Zawya.com data.

The value disparity is mainly on account of the April 2009 Vodafone Qatar issue, which pushed the average offering size in the first six months of 2009 from about $94 million up to over $170 million.  

However, the demand for IPOs in the region has otherwise shown definite upsides in year-on-year comparison. For the offerings in 2010 to date, average subscription demand has exceeded more than nine times the capital offered, which indicates a resurging investor interest when compared with the paltry appetite of four times demand in the first half of 2009.

Investors also saw improved returns on primary market subscriptions when reviewing the performance of IPO stocks in relation to market indices across the Gulf Cooperation Council. While stock market indices provide depressed numbers for the first half in general and individually for the time since floatation of the 2010 IPO stocks, the performance of the new stocks was solid, and overwhelmingly positive for the parameters of first-day, first-month and total time since trading debuts.   

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Executive Insight Booz and Co

by George Atalla August 3, 2010
written by George Atalla

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have helped many countries in the Middle East modernize their highways, upgrade their communications infrastructure and build new power plants. But such partnership models have proven less effective for governments seeking to outsource certain services, such as health care.

Handing over such services to the private sector requires a greater level of collaboration and trust between governments and their partners than straightforward infrastructural works. Creating an electronic payments system, for instance, goes to the heart of what government does and affects its everyday transactions in a way that the construction of a sewage plant does not.

To better manage such services, the Egyptian government is developing a new approach to partnership called ‘joint ownership’, which could be broadly applicable throughout the region. This approach transforms the way in which public services projects are structured and offers opportunities for private sector entities around the world to capitalize on the region’s rapid growth.

In the joint ownership model, both the government and the private entity get a stake in a newly formed private company. The government awards a contract to the jointly owned company, giving it the right to be the sole provider of the service in question. It also contributes regulatory support, clearing a path for the company to operate without interference. The private sector contributes the technical and management know-how, as well as a portion of the financing for the project.

Successful system

The Egyptian government conducted its first experiment with the joint ownership model to launch a nationwide e-payment system in 2007. The newly formed company, e-finance, was created with an initial investment of 60 percent from the government and 40 percent from its private-sector partner, and was granted concession rights that made it the sole entity allowed to operate an electronic payments platform for the Ministry of Finance.

The Egyptian government was also able to ensure the buy-in of the banks, pension fund managers and others that needed to be part of the system. The private partners, meanwhile, provided know-how in the areas of software development, banking, automation, and e-services, as well as designing, installing, managing and maintaining the e-payment system. The new system allows civil servants, who used to line up at cashiers’ windows every week for cash payments, to receive their salaries automatically via an ATM card.

Hundreds of thousands of pensioners now receive their income from the government in the same way. The company is expected to become profitable over the next several years, once the infrastructure is in place and the system reaches its projected number of processed transactions.

The experiment proved so successful that the Egyptian government is now considering other areas in which joint ownership might be effective. For instance, there are opportunities to replicate this model for services as diverse as carrying out customer handling and data processing at customs, providing state-of-the-art training to Egyptian and regional civil servants, and even for conducting government-wide procurement services.

 There is a caveat to these partnerships: They are short-term commitments. Governments, after all, should not be the owners of companies. Their economic role should be to set and enforce the regulations that enable competitive markets. But as long as both parties understand this condition, they can reap several immediate benefits from joint ownership.

Complimentary pairing

Most importantly, the partnership offers access to resources that neither side would independently have access to. The public partner gets the technical, financial and management resources of its private-sector partners: the private sector’s often higher salaries mean it enjoys better-trained workers and deeper expertise than exists in government.

In turn, the public partner can offer concession rights and support regulatory changes that may be vital for the new company’s success.

Second, the venture’s risks are shared in a way that can increase the initiative’s prospects of success. For instance, political, legal and environmental risks are borne by the public partner; after all, the public partner can directly influence outcomes in those areas. Risks relating to the design of the service or financing fall to the private partner, which presumably has more expertise in those areas.

Finally, jointly owned companies offer straightforward exit strategies in the form of initial public offerings or strategic sales that are not available in most other types of PPPs. In particular, if the company is prospering, the public partner can push for an initial public offering, giving it a way to cash out of its position. Or the public partner can sell all or part of its stake to a strategic investor.

The same structure that bestows benefits also creates some risks. If the government has granted concession rights, the new company may be a monopoly player in the market. To address this issue, contracts need to clarify what services must be provided and what is reasonable for consumers to pay.

The joint ownership model also creates a conflict of interest for the public partner. The government would normally push to maintain low prices for its services, but as a stakeholder in the company, it should be maximizing profits. This risk can be diminished by creating a separate entity within the government to monitor the performance of the company.

In the long term, the real priority for any Middle Eastern government must be to figure out what fixes are required in its legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, so that its private sector can launch public-services projects without such intensive government involvement.

This is the true sign of success — when the government doesn’t need to offer itself up as an owner in order to spur private sector participation. Until that happens, joint ownership will remain a potential short-term strategy.

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Finance

Life saver Lang

by Emma Cosgrove August 3, 2010
written by Emma Cosgrove

Before 2006, Near East Commercial Bank (NECB) was going nowhere. “There was no increase in revenues, no increase in assets — no increase at all,” said Dominique Lang, the Swiss banker who has acquired the task of reviving it. “It was, in our opinion, a dormant company, but it had a good name and good staff.”

Where the Central Bank saw a stain on Lebanon’s thriving banking scene, Lang saw an opportunity.

Playing the long game

Lang, a Swiss banker for nearly 30 years and chairman of Nomina Finance in Zurich, and his business partner Alfred Wiederkehr finalized the acquisition of the bank in April of this year — a deal nearly 10 years in the making.

NECB has been located at the Place de Beyrouth since 1978 when SNA insurance group owned it, before the Caland family took control.

Since 1993, Lang had been aware of Lebanon’s banking potential through a business relationship with the Caland family, and he became a shareholder at NECB when he and Wiederkehr wholly subscribed to a $9 million capital increase at the bank in 2006, gaining a 43 percent stake. Lang remained a shareholder until 2007, when the Central Bank began putting pressure on NECB to shape up its neglected balance sheets. He then became chief executive and soon enough, the sleeping bank began to show signs of life.

And indeed, the Central Bank’s concerns were not unwarranted. At end-2007 NECB had $142 million in assets and just $17.6 million in loans, with 40 percent of these considered “doubtful” and 10 percent classified as “bad debt.” The bank posted $3 million in losses that year.

But soon after Lang took over the management of the bank, he began to clean house.

“The bank had a big portfolio in real estate which was bringing in no money so we sold the biggest part of this portfolio. The operational result was then in the black,” he said.

Lang dropped most of this underperforming portfolio in favor of much higher-yielding treasury bills. This move significantly improved the bank’s interest margin and sped up the transition from red to black. The recovery was helped as well by the fact that NECB managed to spend significant time in red figures without losing a single depositor — a feat Lang attributes to the relationships between bank staff and clients.

In 2008 the bank made $283,000 in profits; 2009 saw more growth to almost $2 million. And according to Lang, the bank has already generated $2.6 million in profits for the first half of 2010 “The bank is now back to a normal situation,” he said.

It was this success in bringing NECB back from the brink, combined with the owning family’s dwindling interest in the bank that led Lang and Wiederkehr to buy the remaining 57 percent of the bank. The decision was made in January of 2010 and the deal, the value of which both parties have agreed not to release, was approved by the Central Bank in April.

According to Lang, the central bank was very receptive to the acquisition. He says that the close involvement of the Central Bank and Banking Control Commission (BCC) with regards to strategic planning has helped, and was not a hindrance as some of the bigger banks often complain.

Selling secrecy

Now Lang has the job of improving the bank past mere profitability.  A feasibility study is currently being conducted regarding the opening of two new branches in Beirut and Lang plans to continue the bank’s niche profile, focusing mainly on retail and private banking. He plans to focus on small and medium loans (ranging from $50,000 to $500,000) as smaller loans have a better profit margin and entail much lower risk.

Further, Lang says that the banking secrecy law and the know-how within the sector are good selling points to international clients.

“We see a slight demand from people in Europe, in Switzerland, to have an alternative to banks in Europe for the secrecy,” he said. “Lebanon is one of the remaining countries that has a law for banking secrecy. Until now we have brought [international] private clients for an approximate amount of $250 million.”

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Comment

A perversion of principles

by Michael Young August 3, 2010
written by Michael Young

Recently, The Economist took an interest in Arab autocracy, titling a leader on the subject “Thank You and Goodbye.” The premise for this statement was that the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were getting old, therefore change is coming to both countries “for good or ill.” Change is indeed coming, but the rule in the Arab world has tended to be that the more things change, the more things remain the same.

The tenor of the leader was interesting, if for the wrong reasons. After listing the advantages and disadvantages of the policies of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, the magazine carried its argument into a minefield of “ought to.” It advised that the regimes in both countries ought to do this and ought to do that, without really explaining why they would want to do so, given that they have spent decades avoiding the path of rule of law, democratic elections, human rights, and so on.

 

What positive developments there were during their respective rules came on relatively non-political fronts. Mubarak has managed to bring in investment, causing the Egyptian economy to grow quite rapidly of late. King Abdullah has sought to loosen the reins of the Saudi system by expanding education and opening up avenues for internal dialogue. However, as the framers of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean process learned years ago, against their initial hopes, Arab regimes’ economic and social liberalizations have not generated much in the way of political openness.

One reason for this is that the business community in the Arab world has tended to avoid rocking the political boat. Prominent businesses or businessmen often have established close ties with regimes (when they are not actually also regime figures), and therefore see few advantages in challenging a profitable status quo. Income disparities in the region also tend to be great, while higher education is of relatively low quality, making it even more difficult for a middle class to emerge and challenge the order in place.

That conundrum is one reason why even usually sharp observers, not least The Economist, are obliged to resort to the circular “ought” formulation – condemned to repeat, with little expectation of a response, what the Arab world needs by way of amelioration, without which reform would be impossible.

But this circular argument also leads to a paradox, one related to revolutionary change: Arab regimes are bad, but they are often better than their likely alternatives, namely militant Islamists who would impose far worse governance systems than the ones we have today. However, for these Islamist oppositions to be marginalized, Arab regimes need to open their systems up politically and economically, to reduce the popular discontent that allows the Islamists to thrive. Yet here is where things goes sour: If regimes become more tolerant, this could be exploited by the Islamists to expand their power, and many have actually done so quite successfully at the ballot box, as in Algeria, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and even Egypt.  Where does this paradox lead?

Greater acceptance in the West for Arab regimes that abuse their societies, since this keeps Islamists at bay; and a higher likelihood of revolutionary change, because if a regime falters — as happened in Iran in 1979 — the Islamists, having no alternatives, will embrace violent and absolute transformation.

In other words, if Arab regimes untighten their fists, stability may suffer, and if they keep the fist tightened stability may eventually suffer too, in a dramatic way. So the West, particularly the United States, which provides many Arab regimes with vital financial and economic aid, is at a loss about what to do. That’s why the Western states also have a package of ‘oughts’ in hand, though few of them are ever adopted that could threaten the regimes implementing them. 

Here is an irony: standing against those lamenting Western “neo-imperialism” in the Middle East is a reality of harsh Arab sovereignty. It is a sovereignty based on instilling the fear in the hearts of the outside world, the West in particular, that tinkering with the machine of the dictators may have terrible consequences. So Arab regimes everywhere remain free because their people are kept in chains.

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, 1935-2010

by Nicholas Blanford August 3, 2010
written by Nicholas Blanford

Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah was a difficult man to pigeonhole, although many tried. From the early 1980s, he became, in the minds of many, synonymous with Hezbollah and was forever described as the group’s “spiritual leader” who had personally blessed the suicide bomber who blew up the United States Marines’ barracks at the Beirut airport in 1983. It was a tag that endured, even though Fadlallah eschewed a formal role within Hezbollah.

The claim that he blessed the Marines’ barracks bomber has also been put down as a rumor deliberately circulated by Lebanese military intelligence during the presidency of Amin Gemayel to discredit the cleric.

Fadlallah, despite being a leading advocate of an activist and modernist Islamism, tended toward dispensing guidance and advice and disdained the parochial obligations of running a political institution. Yet his teachings and writings served as an inspiration for Hezbollah’s founders and he continued to wield influence from afar during the party’s formative years. Among his early followers was a skinny bespectacled youth named Hassan Nasrallah, who even before reaching the age of 10 was a regular attendee at Fadlallah’s sermons in Nabaa.

Even though the official marja (religious reference for followers) for Hezbollah is Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khameini, it is no secret that many members of the party actually followed Fadlallah. I know of one Hezbollah fighter who was utterly inconsolable on hearing of Fadlallah’s death and in his grief made unflattering comments about Khameini.

Fadlallah was a magnificent public speaker with a showman’s knack for whipping up an audience. But in the 1970s, he faced stiff competition from Imam Musa Sadr for the hearts and minds of the Shia community. Sadr was an Iranian of Lebanese ancestry who had arrived in south Lebanon in the late 1950s and soon made a name for himself as a progressive and dynamic cleric determined to better the lot of the marginalized Shia. He established the Amal Movement in 1975.

Both Sadr and Fadlallah were brilliant orators, but there the similarities ended. Sadr was slim, tall, charismatic, enlivened with boundless energy that saw him holding meetings, lectures and sermons up and down the country. Fadlallah was short and portly, a scholastic figure who centered his activities on his Nabaa neighborhood, glossing over doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunnis and emphasizing the unity of all Muslims.

Sadr’s purview essentially was limited to the communal betterment of Shias in Lebanon within the Lebanese system, while Fadlallah advocated the creation of a modern Islamic state and espoused a universal Islam that ignored man-made frontiers.

Sadr regarded Palestinian militant activities in south Lebanon with misgivings because of the suffering it brought upon his Shia constituents, but Fadlallah embraced the Palestinian cause, considering the eradication of the Zionist state as a moral and Islamic imperative.

Sadr vanished, mysteriously and famously, on a 1978 trip to Libya. For many Shia, dismayed at the more secular direction of the Amal Movement under the subsequent leadership of Nabih Berri, it was natural to gravitate toward the bolder views of Fadlallah.

Fadlallah originally objected to suicide bombings, but changed his stance in the mid 1980s when Lebanon was in the grip of Israeli occupation. In justifying suicide bombings, he said “there is no difference between dying with a pistol in your hand or exploding yourself.” But he pointedly added that suicide operations could not be condoned lightly and that if alternative means of attacking the enemy were available then they should be used instead.

Fadlallah supported Hezbollah’s goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon, but recognized that given Lebanon’s pluralistic society, the attainment of an Islamic state was an impossibility in the short term. His perspective helped shape Hezbollah’s decision in the late 1980s to reverse its outright rejection of Lebanon’s power-sharing system of governance and to submit candidates for Lebanon’s parliamentary elections in 1992.

NICHOLAS BLANDFORD is a Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

 

 

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Shifty as a desert fox

by Paul Cochrane August 3, 2010
written by Paul Cochrane

As readers of a business magazine, I am no doubt preaching to the converted, but it really does pay to scan the financial pages to know what’s going on with the movers and shakers of this world. If you had confined yourself to reading ‘straight’ news and the op-ed pages, or watching TV news for that matter, you would have missed out on the biggest media deal in the Middle East this year. A deal that has been a long time coming and is set to have major implications for the region’s TV landscape.

In February, global media ‘emperor’ Rupert Murdoch, owner of News Corp, acquired a 9.09 percent stake for $70 million in Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal’s Rotana Group, which has six TV channels and is the world’s largest producer of Arabic music.

Murdoch has been itching to get into the booming Middle Eastern market to extend his control over the planet’s media consumption, with an empire already spanning the Americas, Australia, Europe and Asia with the Fox network, the Star TV network, Sky News and a plethora of newspapers including The Wall Street Journal   (WSJ) and The Times of London. Signs of News Corp’s entry into the region started with Rotana launching two Fox channels last year. Then came the stake in Rotana, which sparked speculation that a Fox Arabic news channel was in the pipeline.

Bin Talal denied this in February, but in July the prince announced that he is to launch, independently of Rotana, a 24-hour Arabic news channel in partnership with the Fox network. Murdoch’s move into the region then took a further twist in mid-July, with news that British pay-TV broadcaster BSkyB, 39 percent owned by News Corp, is in talks with a private Abu Dhabi investor to launch an Arabic news channel.

Such developments would have previously lit up the news wires and the blogosphere, as happened when News Corp bought Dow Jones, owner of the WSJ, in 2007. Instead, the News Corp-Rotana deal seemed as if it had never happened. Few regional newspapers ran any form of commentary, and the news was nowhere to be seen outside the business pages.

Perhaps editors assumed that Bin Talal’s news channel, whenever it may launch, will have little impact, given that there are 487 Arabic satellite channels already broadcasting in the region. But one might have thought that in the Arab world, of all places, there would have been more than a muted response to the entry of a media empire that banged the drums of war louder than any other organization for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and, moreover, is rabidly pro-Zionist.

The more likely reason for the media’s silence is more alarming.  Elsewhere, when News Corp expanded, people decried the fact that media consolidation would lead to less diversity in opinions and affect freedom of expression.

Yet in the Middle East, the major media outlets and newspapers have long been in the hands of the few. Bin Talal is the biggest shareholder in News Corp outside of the Murdoch family, at 7 percent, while he owns the majority stake in the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation’s (LBC) satellite channel and is a stakeholder in Lebanese newspapers An Nahar and Al Diyar. Other Middle Eastern media heavyweights are owned by or linked to Gulf royalty. Clearly, no one wanted to ruffle any feathers or affect future job prospects by critiquing the deal. As Bin Talal is one of the richest men in the world, Murdoch’s buy-in is not solely about further monetary gain.

The prince said as much in February: “The [News Corp] transaction is way, way beyond finance… Rotana does not need to be financed. It has near zero debt.” Perhaps when Murdoch acquires a further stake in Rotana — which he is entitled to do in late 2011, to 18.8 percent — courageous voices in the media will speak up about what a strange tie-up this is, between a Saudi prince and a media mogul whose outlets continuously bash Arabs and Muslims while offering unflinching support for Western and Israeli military aggression in the very region where he is investing.

Or, perhaps, there will just be a short story in the business pages to let us know it is, well, business as usual.

PAUL COCHRANE is the Middle East

correspondent for International News Services

 

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
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Real Estate

Cityscape speaks – Damac Properties

by Nada Nohra August 1, 2010
written by Nada Nohra

Our message over the previous years has been growth, new projects, new demand, but this year it is very much construction and delivery,” says Niall McLoughlin, senior vice president of corporate communications at Damac Properties. With that message, Damac has been marketing every stage of its progress, assuring buyers and investors that the units they bought will be delivered on schedule. Last year, Damac announced that it had 11,313 units under construction. The company has delivered 3,029 in the last 12 months, and will deliver the rest by the end of 2010.

McLoughlin explains that Damac has been working with customers and transferring their investments from longer-term projects to the ones under construction or that are almost completed. “We have approached our customers on a case-by-case basis. It is a winning situation for them because they get the product earlier. It may also be a question of consolidating their portfolio to ease payment terms for them,” says McLoughlin. This strategy has been very successful, as it helped decrease potential payment defaults, which is the last thing either developers or customers want.

The company has also dedicated a new management team to focusing on customer queries, handling them case by case. “Losing a customer is not good for us, and also not good for the customer,” says McLoughlin.

Currently, Damac is not planning any news launches. The company is issuing enabling works contracts for its projects in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. “By the end of the year, we anticipate awarding two to three main contractor works with a value of over AED 1billion [$272 million],” explains Mc Loughlin.

As for the long term, McLoughlin says the company will be looking to expand regionally, but not before the time is right. “Now the market is not ready for expansion, so our short-term objective is consolidating and constructing what we have launched,” he adds. 

 

August 1, 2010 0 comments
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Finance

Regional equity markets

by Executive Editors July 23, 2010
written by Executive Editors

Beirut SE  

Current year high: 1,200.49    Current year low: 991.49

>  Review period: Closed – June 22 at 1079.28 Points          Period Change: -1.5%

The MSCI Lebanon index trended lower in a not overly dramatic fashion in the June 2010 review period, leaving all the excitement for Lebanon’s army of devoted football fans. When compared with its high of 1,180.98 points for the first half of 2010, the index softened by just over 100 points. However, the banking sector could show off another victory with a 31% y-o-y rise in its Q1 2010 aggregate net profit of the top 12 lenders. Market cap leader Solidere scored a goal of $189 million net profit last year in a stable performance.

Amman SE  

Current year high: 2,744.07                Current year low: 2,320.14

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 2,388.94 points          Period Change: -0.5%

Having just passed across a multi-year low of 2,320.14 on June 20, the best wish for the Amman Stock Exchange may be for this to have been rock-bottom for the market and for new stamina to appear after the disappointing first-half. Sadly, endurance training seemed to be of no help to the insurance sector, which dropped 15.2% at the bottom of market trends. Banking, industrial, and services sectors, by contrast, traded range bound with the ASE general index and banking even achieved a tick into positive territory, starting from June 21.

Abu Dhabi SM  

Current year high: 3,239.74                Current year low: 2,467.04

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 2,551.39 Points                      Period Change: -2.0%

Abu Dhabi’s exchange has dropped a sizeable 7% from the start of 2010, though this decline is only half as steep as the plunge Dubai’s DFM took over the same period. The ADX exhibited some noticeable volatility in June and sector indices fluctuated in uncoordinated trends. The only sector index to end the period in positive territory, however, was the industrial index. Market cap leader Etisalat weakened 2.4% as Methaq Takaful and Gulf Livestock were beaten down 28.4% and 26.8%, respectively. The best gainer was Finance House, up 18.6%. 

Dubai FM  

Current year high: 2,373.37                Current year low: 1,487.93

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 1551.19 Points           Period Change: -1.8%

The ‘lord of the dip’ award goes hands-down to the Dubai Financial Market for the first half 2010. With the halfway point for 2010 quickly approaching, the DFM was down 14% for the year to date at its June 23 close and danced around 1,500 – levels last seen in February 2009. No vigor, no football competition, no cultural happening seemed to energize the DFM, where a 10.7% climb of Aramex stock was the only upward outlier. The vast majority of shares tended to the red, as did the sector indices, except for transport. 

Kuwait SE  

Current year high: 8,140.20                Current year low: 6,528.60

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 6,653.00 Points          Period Change: -0.7%

The fact that the Kuwait Stock Exchange closed less than one percent down in the review period cannot soften the harsh realities of the bourse’s massive slide in May, which didn’t stop until the index hit a 15-month low of 6,528 on June 15. It remains to be seen if this will be rock bottom for 2010, or if investor nerves have worn so thin that share price performance in Kuwait will fall further. Banking and industry were better than the general index; real estate and investment underperformed.

Saudi Arabia SE  

Current year high: 6,929.40                Current year low: 5,407.31

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 6,343.47 Points          Period Change: 3.6%

After its immune system took a hit from various contagions in the second half of May, the Saudi Stock Exchange resurged in June, in a manner of speaking. Compared to its GCC peers, the SSE index was second best performer in the review period and for the year to date it is still the best student in the GCC securities college, with a 3.6% climb. Most SSE sub-indices moved range-bound with the TASI in the review period; a news-driven 23.1% spike in the Energy and Utilities index was the upward exception.

Muscat SM  

Current year high: 6,933.75                Current year low: 5,263.94

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 6,173.33 Points          Period Change: -1.3%

The Muscat Securities Market had more losers than winners in the review period and the general index seemed to be finding its feet after two months of down pressures. While the industrial sub-index was the June market’s consistent best performer, banking had the most erratic ride. Brokerage Financial Services Co was the MSM’s best individual performer in June and shot up 19.6%, reversing a comparable drop it had suffered in May. National Mineral Water Co found no such mercy, dropping 21.6% from June 1 to 23.

Bahrain SE  

Current year high: 1,613.01                Current year low: 1,390.81

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 1,413.19 Points          Period Change: -2.6%

Although the BSE’s bow beneath the 1,400 point line between June 15 and June 20 was merely a six-month low, and although the year-to-date performance of minus 3.1% is only the fourth worst in the seven GCC security markets, Bahrain’s investors will still be hoping the second half of 2010 bestows more blessings than the first.  While Esterad Investment fell 28.3% in the review period, a gain of 2.63% was made by Al Salam Bank – Bahrain, the period’s best performer.

Doha SM  

Current year high: 7,801.33                Current year low: 5,731.30

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 7,072.08 Points          Period Change: 4.2%

Though the Gulf region has no team in the World Cup to bring home glory,  the Qatar Exchange took this month’s trophy for greatest market vigor. After its epic 1,250-point slide between April 13 and May 25, the ensuing gains of June made for a picture perfect V-shaped performance, albeit a V that is still rather short on the upside. The QE’s four sector indices all were positive, with insurance coming out on top as best performer. Was it because the country iterated another energetic bid to host a World Cup (2022)?  

Tunis SE  

Current year high: 4,772.39                Current year low: 3,337.48

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 4,957.85 Points          Period Change: 0.4%

Minimal volatility and sideways trading at the ceiling of historic performance was the game on the Tunisian Exchange. The period close represented a tiny retreat, by not even 15 points, from a new index peak of 4971.35, which was scaled on June 21. The market reported a smashing success in the initial public offering of cement maker Carthage Cement. The $89 million share offering for 49.8% in the company’s stock was oversubscribed more than 13 times and the stock debuted on June 22 with a first-day change of 26.3% when compared with the issue price.

Casablanca SE  

Current year high: 12,457.59              Current year low: 9,997.56

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 12,055.36 Points        Period Change: -0.1%

The June 2010 match between bulls and bears on the Casablanca Stock Exchange was a draw. As the impact of the downturn in most global markets in late May caused the MASI to correct from record highs of almost 12,500 points, the optimists dominated on the pitch in the first eight sessions of the review period, but the bears came back in the second eight sessions for a flat net balance. Market cap leader Maroc Telecom advanced 4.7%, and leading bank Attijariwafa dropped 1.8%.  

Egypt CASE  

Current year high: 7,603.04                Current year low: 5,229.40

> Review period: Closed – June 23 at 6,319.00 Points                      Period Change: -3.5%

The highest volatility in North African markets marked the flow of trade on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the June 2010 review period. After a massive drop and sharp rebound between May 18 and 31 into the mid 6,500 range, the EGX 30 fell more than 300 points to June 10, recovered by almost exactly the same point score, and weakened again. Telecom Egypt managed a flat performance but Orascom Telecom lost 14.7% as analysts questioned its planned divestment from Algeria.

July 23, 2010 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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