• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
Banking

Lebanese banking sector takes stock of its priorities

by Nassib Ghobril December 10, 2009
written by Nassib Ghobril

The banking sector remained the backbone of the Lebanese economy in 2009. Bank assets are equivalent to 334 percent of gross domestic product and deposits are equivalent to 274 percent of GDP, among the highest such ratios in the world. The sector displayed its resilience to global financial shocks and domestic political instability, and proved it can finance the private sector while supporting the public sector’s needs at a time when governments around the world have been forced to bail out their banking systems. But, with the rapidly changing global and regional financial landscape, the sector is likely to face new challenges in 2010.

A spotlight on risk management

The credit crisis has revealed glaring gaps in risk management, as banks around the world learn that underestimating liquidity creates severe systemic risk. Commercial banks in Lebanon have a fiduciary responsibility to conserve capital, safeguard deposits and minimize depositors’ risk. In the current climate, most Lebanese banks have focused on increasing liquidity, minimizing risks and increasing quality assets. In the past, risk management at many commercial banks consisted primarily of reassuring large depositors that their money was safe during the political instability and security shockwaves that have characterized the Lebanese economy. Indeed, the structure of bank deposits is concentrated, as between 70 and 80 percent of deposits are held by 20 to 30 percent of depositors. Thus, reassuring large depositors that their money remained safe was the main risk management approach of banks. However, with the regional expansion of banks in recent years, there has been an evident focus on developing advanced risk management systems. This trend has accelerated since the global crisis erupted.

The crisis has clearly reflected the fact that the size of financial institutions is not the most relevant criteria for gauging security, as some of the largest global commercial and investment banks aggressively expanded their balance sheets at the expense of proper risk management, with disastrous results. The larger Lebanese banks are likely to focus increasingly on risk management, internal auditing and corporate governance and transparency, rather than on the aggressive expansion of the balance sheet.  Those who still favor size over more fundamental issues are likely to be more affected by regional developments due to their increased exposure and aggressive risk taking.

Regional expansion, under caution

Lebanese banks have embarked in recent years on a cross-border expansion strategy to take advantage of new markets and to diversify their assets and revenue base. Lebanese banks are currently present in more than 20 markets through about 70 branches, affiliates and sister companies, not only in the Middle East and North Africa, but also in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

The global crisis led banks to take a wait-and-see approach by consolidating their positions and assessing their exposure in the markets where they are already present. But with global and regional conditions stabilizing, and Lebanese banks emerging largely unscathed from the crisis, they continue to lend abroad. Most of them will follow a more cautious approach, while they resume their operational expansion in existing markets. However, regional expansion inevitably has its risks, as one Lebanese bank tested positive to exposure to the Saudi Arabian Saad and Algosaibi conglomerates that defaulted earlier this year. Also, the recent announcement by Dubai World that it is requesting a debt standstill on its obligations and that it will restructure its liabilities, in addition to pre-existing crises like the defaulting investment firms in Kuwait, reflect existing regional risks and are a reminder to Lebanese banks about the need to remain cautious. Furthermore, the slowdown in regional economic growth increases the risk of non-performing loans. Still, Lebanese banks have the liquidity, experience and skills to decide when and where to expand in 2010.

Deposit growth remains a double-edged sword

Early concerns about the impact of the global financial crisis on deposit inflows to the Lebanese banking sector turned out to be unfounded. Indeed, while the growth of deposits slowed down and displayed some volatility in the fourth quarter of 2008, there were no material deposit outflows from the system. The first nine months of 2009 saw unprecedented capital inflows to the sector, with private sector deposits growing by a monthly average of $1.5 billion in the first three quarters of the year and averaging a more impressive $1.8 billion in the third quarter of 2009. Indeed, private sector deposits have grown by 17.2 percent from the end of 2008 and by 21.6 percent year-on-year, with non-resident deposits rising by 40 percent year-on-year. The massive inflows are attributed to the resilience of the sector in the face of the crisis, but also to the interest rate differentials on dollars and Lebanese lira deposits at local banks compared to global rates. Furthermore, the relative political stability in the country since June 2008 encouraged depositors to convert their funds into Lebanese lira to take advantage of higher interest rates, leading to a marked decline in the dollarization rate of deposits from 77 percent at end-2007 to 66 percent at end-September of this year, a still elevated rate. Despite the slight reduction in deposit rates earlier this year, interest rates on deposits in Lebanon are unlikely to decline substantially until the structural imbalances represented by the high fiscal deficit and public debt are addressed, and until long term political stability is sustained. As such, banks are likely to continue to attract deposits, but since part of these deposits is speculative in nature, they will face the challenges of the high cost of funds as well as volatility and the risk of outflows from a potential revaluation of risks for the region as a whole. 

What goes up…

Banks have been faced with a high level of liquidity in both the national currency and in foreign currencies, with not enough outlets to place this liquidity since the start of the crisis. The certificates of deposits issued by the Banque du Liban (BDL) to absorb local currency excess liquidity and its measures to encourage lending in Lebanese lira have helped somewhat. But the sector’s cautious lending approach, fewer lending outlets abroad, record-low interest rates in global money markets, the decline in demand from the non-resident sector and the high cost of funds are likely to combine and affect the banks’ profits this year. To be sure, banks will continue to be profitable in 2009, but the growth rate of their profits will be slower than the 25 percent rise posted last year. Moreover, the profitability ratios are likely to stagnate, as the sector’s average return on assets reached 1 percent as of July 2009 relative to 1.1 percent in 2008, while the average return on equity was 13.9 percent in July on an annualized basis relative to 14 percent in 2008.

An optimistic outlook

The ratings on the long and short term foreign currency debt obligations of Lebanese commercial banks have long been constrained by the sovereign ceiling. Indeed, international rating agencies have argued that the banks’ exposure to the sovereign continues to keep their ratings at the sovereign level, even though rated banks are well managed, profitable, liquid and well capitalized. But recent trends and a closer analysis of the banks’ sovereign exposure warrant a different conclusion. The consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks shows that the banking sector’s exposure to foreign currency denominated sovereign bonds was at $11.7 billion at end-September, which accounts for less than 11 percent of the sector’s total assets. Further, the sector’s total exposure to the public debt in Lebanese lira and foreign currencies accounts for less than 25 percent of the sector’s assets, which is slightly lower than the banks’ lending to the private sector that represents 25.4 percent of the asset base. Rating agencies consider the banks’ reserve requirements at the central bank as part of the sovereign exposure. However, BDL places these reserve requirements in the global money markets, similar to what the banks do themselves to the 15 percent liquidity requirement on their foreign currency deposits. More importantly, the BDL has not utilized these reserves to maintain the stability of the currency and its reserves have reached the equivalent of 100 percent of GDP. So it is not clear why rating agencies continue to consider reserve requirements as part of the sovereign exposure. The share of foreign currency sovereign bonds to the sector’s assets is likely to decline further, depositors have proved to be resilient to domestic political shocks and external financial shocks, and the banks’ share of revenues from foreign operations is increasing as a share of total income. As such, it may be time for rating agencies to reconsider their ratings of Lebanese banks to a level above the sovereign, even though it is way too premature for any Lebanese bank to claim regional status.   

Nassib Ghobril is chief economist and head of economic research & analysis at the Byblos Bank Group. He recently received the World Lebanese League’s award for “Best Economist in Lebanon & the Diaspora for 2009”

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Banking

Lending an ear

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

Makram Sader Secretary general, The Association of Banks in Lebanon

We have good trends in terms of increases in our deposit base, in terms of increases in our credit portfolio, in terms of liquidity ratios and even in terms of profits. We hope these trends will continue in 2009. My opinion is that they will continue. It seems logical that these positive trends will continue during 2010 because with the current political stability in the country, due to the newly established government, we hope the level of activity will increase, and maybe we will even see the initiating of some big public projects. Any new activity, either public or private, usually translates into increased activity within the banking industry. I hope that we will have a higher volume of credit. It will be very good for us to continue this year’s poitive trend of a yearly 20 percent increase in deposits.

Marwan Barakat Head of research, Bank Audi

“The banking system…has been supporting the state”

While a large number of governments around the globe have intervened recently to support their banking systems — either in the form of liquidity facilities, emergency lending programs, capital injections or acquisition of toxic asset portfolios, or maybe a combination of all such support initiatives — the Lebanese banking system has been, on the contrary, supporting the State of Lebanon prior to, and in the aftermath of, the eruption of the global financial turmoil. As a matter of fact, the Lebanese banking system has almost doubled in size during the past five years, over a period characterized by erratic political and security developments. Its capacity to finance the government’s borrowing needs has been recently fostered by an outstanding resilience to the external crisis environment, with funding growing at an unprecedented pace within the context of massive capital inflows towards Lebanon’s financial system, encouraged by the domestic regulatory framework and the conservative practices of Lebanese banks themselves.

Within such an environment, I do not personally believe that the Lebanese banking sector will be looking to the new national unity government to support Lebanese banks in 2010, but rather to ensure a sound environment for its own public finances as a step on the road to a fiscal soft landing. It is always important to recall that the observed Lebanese banking resilience to crises is not equivalent to permanent financial immunity in a country that is still suffering from significant structural imbalances. To reinforce the Lebanese resilience to crises, drastic structural reforms need to take place by the Lebanese state in an attempt to ensure a soft-landing scenario for its own public finance conditions that remain shaky and are where the main vulnerability lies. It is then that we can comfortably say that Lebanon and its financial sector could be a unique model of immunity serving as a viable example to a large number of countries in the region, in the emerging countries’ arena and across the globe at large.

Francois-Pascal de Maricourt Chief executive officer, HSBC Lebanon

“Your first priority is to ensure that you have enough liquidity”

When you are working in an environment like Lebanon, where you have crises from time to time and where the local banks have proven to be resilient, your first priority is to ensure that you have enough liquidity. A bank doesn’t close because it has made a loss; a bank closes because it is short of liquidity. The top priority for a banker, and this is true across the world, is to ensure that your balance sheet is structured well enough so that you will not have a liquidity crisis. And this is even more prevalent since the beginning of the financial crisis. We saw some major institutions that had to be saved at the very last minute by some governments because they were short of cash. If I were the CEO of a [Lebanese] bank, clearly my priority would be to ensure that it has sufficient liquidity so that in the event of a crisis, it can meet all its commitments. When it comes to profitability, the profitability of local banks is relatively acceptable. Some of them are now able to get a return on liquidity in the region of 20 percent plus, which is quite good, and the profitability is something that you access over the length of a cycle. You can’t just look at the profitability in one year and say, this bank is profitable or not, as there are years when you make more investments than other years, and you have to remember that local banks are investing quite heavily in some markets.

Walid Raphael Deputy general manager, Banque Libano-Francaise

“When the crisis came at the end of 2008, the banking system had already been tried several times”

Here [in Lebanon] the system is extremely resilient, given the strong banking sector that has shown its ability to endure over 15 years of war, the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri — which was an earthquake in Lebanon — and the war in 2006. When the crisis came at the end of 2008, the banking system had already been tried several times and the banks’ confidence was extremely strong, so that what we have seen is contrary to what is going on outside of Lebanon. We have seen an inflow of money coming at the end of last year. This in fact has continued this year. The question that some analysts were asking last year was “Will we have the same level of remittances?” and in fact the remittances were not affected. We are expecting to have $7 billion in remittances this year, which is very close to the number we saw last year.

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Banking

Our cup runneth over

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

The reason behind this year’s success in banking and the mood of Lebanese bankers can be summed up in one word: confidence.

“If depositors lose confidence in their bank, they will lose confidence in all the banks in the country,” said Chairman of the Banking Control Commission Walid Alamuddin in a speech to the Union of Arab Banks at their yearly conference in Beirut in November.

Not only have depositors shown up in record numbers this year, but due to a seemingly irresistible interest rate spread, they have also converted their deposits into local currency at unprecedented rates — creating a challenge for bankers used to a highly dollarized balance sheet.

Overall deposits into Lebanese banks increased 21 percent in the first nine months of 2009 compared to the same period of 2008, totaling $92.2 billion, according to the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL). Lebanese lira (LL) deposits saw a 55.6 percent year-on-year increase by end-September.     

High deposit conversions have been heralded as proof that nationwide faith has been restored in the LL, as dollarization of deposits dropped to a nine-year low of 65.9 percent at the end of the third quarter, according to Bank Audi.         

“It is important because the Lebanese [lira] is regaining its role as a stock of value as a deposit currency,” said Marwan Barakat, head of research at Bank Audi.

But only time will tell whether these overwhelming conversions were truly a vote of confidence in the local currency from Lebanese depositors, or simply the product of a large spread between deposit rates in LL and United States dollars (USD).

At the start of the year, the average interest rate on LL deposits was 7.22 percent, while USD deposit rates averaged 3.31 percent. Dollar deposit interest rates have dropped steadily since the end of 2007, losing 153 basis points in 22 months. Lira deposit rates, however, did not follow this trend as strictly, losing just 46 basis points over that same period. This has created an interest rate spread of 378 basis points at end-September 2009: a significant increase from the 361 point spread between the two currencies in the same month in 2008.

The LL deposit rate has been dropping ever so slowly from 7.22 in January to 6.94 at the end of September, most likely because of market pressure and recommendations from the International Monetary Fund and the ABL, the latter of which actually recommended in October that a ceiling of 7 percent be placed on LL deposit rates. But the spread between LL and USD rates is still enticing, and it remains to be seen whether the Lebanese predilection for extremely gradual change will end up costing its banks.

IMF interest U-turn

Walid Raphael, deputy general manager at Banque Libano-Francaise (BLF), said that the slow drop in the LL deposit interest rate is likely due to interbank competition and an unwillingness to put profitability before growing customer bases.

“[It is] maybe because they are fighting for market share,” he said. “We might see a change and a stronger reduction in interest rates on deposits in Lebanese [lira] by next year. But you have to keep a spread between the dollar and LL to maintain the attractiveness of the LL.”

The IMF’s November 2009 recommendation is particularly noteworthy here, as it is a shift from their earlier position. Since there is a need for high liquidity in local currency, due to Lebanon’s high public debt, the IMF had said in an April 2009 public information notice that, “Given heightened near-term risks, directors agreed that there is little scope for lowering interest rates over the coming months.” 

Perhaps in light of the overwhelming deposit conversions and surprise excess of liquidity in local currency, the IMF changed its position in its November country report, stating, “In the near term, interest rates should be allowed to decline further, but at a gradual pace.”

Where the lira is lagging

The USD remains the preferred standard of deferred payment. Dollarization of loans has been holding strong at 85 percent for almost a decade, which presents a problem when the funding side of the balance sheet switches to local currency.

Private sector loans grew 11.4 percent by the end of the third quarter, growing by $2.8 billion, down from $4.4 billion in growth for the same period of 2008, notwithstanding this year’s high liquidity and corresponding flexibility. However, despite the steady dollarization rate of loans in Lebanon, LL lending accounted for 29 percent of the loan growth in 2009, compared to 12.3 percent lending in LL in 2008.

Most of this can be attributed to the central bank’s actions in July and September, lifting reserve requirements on 60 percent of lending categories in order to incentivize local currency lending and absorb some of the banks’ excess liquidity.

Before the release of these circulars, banks were required to keep 15 percent of their local currency in the central bank at zero percent interest, making lending in LL even more expensive. The change lifted this requirement to the tune of approximately 60 percent. This allowed banks to lower LL lending rates to around 5 percent interest; enough to offer some attractive new products in home loans, car loans, education loans, some industry-related loans and green initiative loans. The measures were almost immediately touted as successful, but lending continues to be relatively low.

The September 2009 spread of USD to LL average lending rates was the smallest it has been since December 2007, at 198 basis points, with the LL rate at 9.22 percent and the USD rate at 7.24 percent.

The central bank circulars allowed certain loans to drop to around 5 percent interest, which is where most of the LL lending has taken place. But, despite the uptick in local currency lending, BLF’s Raphael still believes that more needs to be done, including searching for new markets.

“The problem with Lebanese banks is that the size of their assests is three to four times the size of the economy,” he said. “So the banks are very liquid and we need to find good opportunities to lend. This is why we are growing out of Lebanon. This is why we are trying to find new markets.”

Alpha banks’ rankings as of end-September 2009 (in $millions)

Sources: Bankdata Financial Services Wll, Bank Audi’s research department

Narrowing options and dwindling returns

Treasury bills and certificates of deposit remain the primary methods of putting local currency liquidity to use; 85 to 90 percent of Lebanese liquidity is absorbed using these tools.

But the weighted average yield on LL treasury bills has been decreasing fairly steadily since the start of 2009. T-bills carried a 9.01 weighted average interest in January, which decreased by 22 basis points to 8.70 in September 2009.

Yet, despite these declining interest rates, monthly issuance for September 2009 reached its highest in nearly two years, with 2,289 bills issued over the month, marking a 58.6 percent increase on the same month of 2008.

This hike in the popularity of T-bills is no doubt due to the disappearing options to earn on local currency liquidity. Until July 2009, the central bank was offering 5-year certificates of deposit, which capped at a yield of 9.25. But, after issuing an equivalent $6 billion in certificates of deposit, this option was dropped by the central bank when the circulars lowering reserve requirements came out, in order to encourage lending.

“This should push banks to reduce interest rates on deposits, which was happening a bit, but not as much as it should,” said Raphael. “So right now banks are still paying high interest.”

Nowhere to go but down

The coming year for Lebanon will be all about the balancing act.

“We are not a charity organization, but we are not opportunistic. We are somewhere in between,” said Freddy Baz, chief financial officer and strategy director at Bank Audi.

In 2010, as international interest rates are predicted to stay low, industry experts say that Lebanon should follow suit. And Lebanese banks are set to lower interest rates even more: a move that may affect their precious liquidity.

“If these low levels of interest rates continue to prevail in 2010, our bankers will lower the domestic structure of interest rates to avoid losing money,” said Makram Sader, secretary general of the ABL. “Our bankers are managing the interest rate structure to maintain some spread between the domestic rates and the international rates. But we are seeing a gradual decrease in the interest rate and I expect, if the international rates stabilize where they are now, to see a lower differential.”

But again, Sader warned that this change would be gradual: “It is much more complex to manage a decrease of interest rates than it is to manage an increase.”

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Banking

The sum that never sets

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

With the brunt of the financial crisis bested by the end of 2008, all Lebanon had to fear was the aftershocks of everyone else’s financial earthquake.

Lebanese bankers dodged the bullet of the sub-prime fallout and, under strict regulation from the Central Bank of Lebanon, avoided the structured products and derivatives that melted balance sheets all over the globe. But, in January of 2009, the worry was that lowered wages and layoffs in the Gulf and Europe would hurt the remittances and capital inflows on which Lebanon’s banks depend.

“When we started the year, the whole world was speaking about the effect of the collapse of different investment banks and the collapse of the markets that happened at the end of 2008, and the effect they would have on the negative growth that was happening in the world,” said Saad Azhari, general manager of BLOM Bank. “In Lebanon there was talk about how many Lebanese were going to be coming back to Lebanon, how the remittances were going to be less compared to years before. The fears did not materialize.”

Capital inflows have been healthy and deposits surprisingly robust for the first nine months of 2009. Cash flowed into Lebanon seemingly unabated this year, despite the fears of bankers and economists. According to Bank Audi, capital inflows reached $14.38 billion for the first nine months of the year; a 25.9 percent year-on-year increase.

This saw total bank assets climb to $109.9 billion at the end of September, a 16.6 percent increase over the same period last year, according to the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL).

Many see this trend as a vote of confidence in Lebanese banking.

“The money that came was from Lebanese,” said Azhari. “Those Lebanese used to believe that if they put part of their money in the Gulf or in Europe or elsewhere, it was security for them…because Lebanon was unstable. Now those Lebanese saw that…Lebanese banks are very stable and resilient. [The banks] gained their confidence and they moved their money or they opened new accounts to put their money here.”

On top of capital inflows, the balance of payments’ surplus reached a record high of $4.84 billion for the first nine months, already higher than the full year 2008; a feat that Makram Sader, secretary general of the ABL said is not only due to the restrictive policies of the central bank.

“It is not only that we are under strict prudential rules on behalf the central bank and the banking control commission,” he said. “Lebanese banks have been conservative in nature, they are known for their conservatism and this is why they tend to maintain high liquidity. They don’t engage in excessive leverage. They are all…deposit-rich banks, where the ratio of deposits to total liabilities is 82 percent, which is one of the highest ratios in the world.”

Still on planet earth

Even with the remarkable performance of Lebanese banks this year and despite statements to the contrary from the industry’s top experts, the banks have seen minor effects from the crisis.

“Where it hit us was more at the level of operating conditions, than at the level of business growth,” said Freddie Baz, chief financial officer and strategy director at Bank Audi. “Because we are operating in a dollarized economy and we have significant foreign currency deposits, we had to keep at all times, by all means, an ample liquidity in foreign currency. This is a major business parameter.”

Lebanese banks also felt the devaluation of the dollar acutely at the beginning of 2009 and took action to counter its effects.

“We were hit by the drastic decrease in the dollar’s reference rates, which reached close to zero,” said Baz. “So we got an important hit on the yield of our primary liquidity in foreign currency. For the whole industry, I think we suffered a little bit less than $1 billion of forgone income this year, due to the drastic decrease in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which affected the yield on the primary liquidity of United States dollars deposited with corresponding foreign banks abroad.”

The banks faced this problem with cost-cutting measures, “which made us look similar to banks operating in the environments under stress, at a time when the Lebanese environment was doing well,” said Baz.

The dollar rallied somewhat, and the cost-cutting measures were successful enough to put the banks back on track for the rest of 2009. 

As a further effect of the crisis, Lebanese banks naturally saw a decrease in return ratios, with a 0.61 percent year-on-year decrease in returns on equity and a 0.07 percent decrease in returns on average assets, fitting with the global trend of narrowing returns due to the crisis.

Banks’ deposits and credits in LL billions

Source: Cental Bank of Lebanon, Bank Audi’s research department

Treasury bill yields

Sources: Bankdata Financial Services Wll, Bank Audi’s research department

Any growth is good growth

The detractors of shrinking returns and expensive liquidity led to only modest growth in profits for 2009, explained Walid Raphael, deputy general manager of Banque Libano-Francaise (BLF). 

“What is happening is that it’s much more difficult to grow the profits of a bank, and the reason behind it is the fact that we have attracted this liquidity; it costs a lot of money but it’s not easy to use it,” he explained. “Every dollar in profit that came into the balance sheet was nearly a loss because [it was replaced] by [interest paid on] deposits. The spread is a loss. This is why it was very difficult to maintain the same growth in profitability this year.”

Profits for Alpha banks were up by 9.2 percent for the first nine months of the year, reporting aggregate profits of $912.8 million: a definite decrease from the 44.6 percent growth reported in the first nine months of 2008.

Lebanon’s top five banks saw varying levels of profit growth this year ranging from 3.5 percent growth to 21.3 percent growth in net profits. Byblos Bank was the leader for the first nine months of 2009 with 21.34 percent growth in net profits, totaling $95.95 million. Bank Audi, the leader in the amount of net profit, saw a 17.8 percent growth, bringing the bank’s net profits to $212.75 million. BLOM Bank posted net profits of $205 million, a 3.5 percent year-on-year growth. BankMed reported 8.6 percent growth in profits amounting to $76.5 million, and Fransabank saw 12.5 percent growth for $74.8 million.

“In effect, the mere fact that Alpha banks attained positive growth in profitability in such turbulent financial times is yet another indicator that Lebanese banks have insulated themselves from the negative repercussions of the crisis,” said Bank Audi’s Lebanon Weekly monitor.

But the moderate growth in profits, despite healthy deposits, has raised questions as to the priorities of Lebanon’s bankers.

“I think banks have been focusing too much on growing their balance sheets and less on profitability. If they decided to look more at their profitability, they have the means to increase their spreads and make more money,” said Raphael.

According to Baz, this trend is the will of a socially conscious sector.

“We are bottom-line driven, but ultimately we are not driven only by profitability to the detriment of the intermediation function we have to ensure in our market, in order to promote economic growth that will improve standard of living and welfare,” he said.

Still, BLF’s Raphael believes that the instinct to encourage deposits and maintain liquidity ratios may be walked back due to international market pressure.

“I think the markets will push us to do something about it,” said Raphael. “If in the second half of 2010 you start seeing an increase of rates by the [US Federal Reserve], we will start making more money on our liquidity.”

With lessening returns and expensive deposits, non-interest income — meaning commission fees and capital markets income — is becoming an increasingly important contributor to bank profits.

This year, banks saw a 21.9 percent increase in non-interest income and just 6.4 percent growth in interest income, according to Bank Audi. The increase in non-interest income is the result of both an overall increase in banking activity and the physical growth of the banks.

At the end of September, Lebanese banks had a total of 873 branches, 40 of which opened in 2009. Employment in the banking sector increased by 8.8 percent since 2008. At end-September, Lebanon’s banks employed 19,842 people.

A new era

Despite the success of 2009, some of the industries’ leaders hesitate to make predictions for 2010.

“Making predictions in Lebanon is a nearly impossible task,” said Raphael. But this year, many bankers have felt the shift in both the consistency and international prowess of the Lebanese banking industry.

Though no one expects the landslide growth in capital inflows of 2009 to come around twice, there is confidence in the diaspora that remittances will be maintained next year, especially with the increasing likelihood of a recovery of Gulf economies.

An active expatriate community, regional expansion and solid assets, as well as international recognition for impressively weathering the global financial storm, have seen talks begin regarding a new global position for Lebanon’s banks.

“Lebanon is at the eve today to become what it never was: a real financial center,” said Baz. “[Even] in the early 1970s, when [Lebanon] used to be considered the Switzerland of the Middle East, it was only an important banking center. Lebanon was never a regional banking center.”

He further predicted that Lebanon could become a true “banking platform with an important capacity to attract foreign money and to redeploy this money into foreign uses. Beirut probably is getting today as close as it ever has to this definition of a real financial platform, a real financial center.”

As shown by the sly smiles on the faces of Lebanon’s top bankers at the Union of Arab Banks’ annual conference in Beirut in November, despite the worries of its Arab brothers, Lebanon is poised to wield it’s regained international reputation for prudence and reliability, and enter a new era for Lebanese Banks.

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Finance & Economy

MENA markets overview

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

Beirut SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 1,200.49  Current Year Low: 705.56

All things considered, the Beirut Stock Exchange outperformed its regional peers in 2009, when measured at the beginning of the year-end holiday season, which includes the Hajj pilgrimage, Christmas, and New Year.

The BSE index gained over 41% by its 2009 Independence Day weekend (November 20), a performance achieved otherwise only by the Tunindex of the Tunisian bourse.

But before speculating that their shared heritage from ancient Carthage and Berytus is an omen for the next conquest of global stock markets to be achieved by good Phoenician fortune, it is worth reviewing the BSE’s drivers of growth and assessing the Lebanese market’s necessary quests for the gains of 2009 to be meaningful for the real economy.

The best performer in Lebanon in 2009 was the real estate firm Solidere, with gains above 55% in both share classes.

Audi and BLOM, the two leading banks whose common shares together represent over 37% in market capitalization traded on the BSE, recorded common share price gains of 44.3% and 10.4% respectively.

Hence, banking and real estate remained the two legs of Lebanese equity trading. Common stock and share variations representing the two sectors comprise BSE market capitalization of about $12 billion at a ratio of about two-to-one.

Stocks from other sectors — only industrial and trading are categories found in BSE bulletins — account for not even 1% of market capitalization. For far too many years there has been no new blood from other sectors added to the exchange via initial public offerings.

On the other hand, in November 2009, the BSE had to delist one industrial stock, of ceramics tile maker Uniceramic, following the company’s declaration of bankruptcy in September 2009. It was the second manufacturer with a rich history in the industrial sector to forcibly exit from the Lebanese bourse since the BSE reopened in 1996, after pipe maker Eternit went defunct almost a decade earlier. 

But when new listings should have emerged and initial public offerings were accumulating on other equity markets in the region, the BSE moved from one pained politically induced slumber to the next. 

In all of 2007 and until May 2008, political paralysis stunted the prospects of new listings on the exchange. From mid-2008 through 2009, it was the global financial crisis that threw a spanner into the works.  

With 2010 on the doorsteps investors in the Middle East have been preparing for a new rise in IPO activity, and companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council are getting their due diligence done and readying prospectuses. In Damascus, the new Syrian bourse is anticipating a small but steady stream of stock market entrants. What will happen in Beirut?

The 2009 performance of the BSE was a testimony to great expectations from the business of politics. From May 1 until July 1, when the preparations for parliamentary elections and their successful execution cheered the moods, shares of Solidere rose 65%. Fadi Khalaf, secretary general of the Union of Arab Stock Exchanges and chairman of the BSE until August 31 2009, would not give any numerical predictions but reckoned that the stock undervalued at around $25 in both classes.

“Just look at the number of square meters owned by Solidere, the prices per square meter in the region and apply that to the Beirut Central District (BCD),” he says. “The price of the stock still has to catch up with the prices of real estate in the BCD.”  

The two-month period from September 10 to November 10 saw stocks fluctuate lower on days with news of political problems, but the BSE added over 17% in a positive climate of strong banking performance, record tourism growth, confirmation of good remittances, and generally hopeful politics.

“Investors on the BSE have experienced many political and military issues in Lebanon. At a certain time they started separating the political issues from the financial issues,” says Khalaf, although he concedes that this is not “100%” applicable.

The formation of a new Lebanese Cabinet after 19 weeks gestation brought on a withdrawal from the BSE’s year high reached on November 9. Since then, pundits have highlighted matters such as if the new Cabinet will have the required potency for reshaping economic policies.

Much now will depend on real, reliable steps in floating state-affiliated companies on the BSE, as well as on the infusion of new private sector companies with a measure of sector diversity. The Lebanese economy has been given a positive assessment and outlook for the near term, as far as that can be done.

However, for this to be amplified in the stock market, the BSE’s stock diversity and liquidity must increase. That may now be in the cards, with Lebanon’s central bank governor stating that the national carrier, Middle East Airlines, of which the Central Bank of Lebanon owns a 99.23% share, is planning to list on the BSE. The Lebanese chocolates manufacturer and retailer Patchi, as well as Naas Water have also expressed interest in listing on the exchange. “Listing on BSE is affected by the family companies and the absence of privatization and by prices of stock performance,” says Khalaf. “Every time we have good performance and a run in prices we are contacted by some companies to list.” 

The other big issue for 2010 and 2011 would be a change in alignment. While they all had an impact, oil prices, regional economics, or developed market share price trends were not consistent forces of primary influence on the BSE index movement over the past 13 years.

The question for the BSE is, will the bourse be able to decouple itself from its historic drivers — from its sluggish past, from fear of politics, from itself?

“With the turmoil we had, prices on the BSE consolidated even though they were not yet overpriced,” says Khalaf. “Consolidating at underpriced levels gives the markets steam and momentum. Thus the market is now more ready to see new moves and this is why, with stability and enough consolidation at attractive prices, it is a good time to go forward.”

Amman SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 2,968.77  Current Year Low: 2,454.48

Ten weeks of selling pressure in the summer of 2009 tarnished the otherwise bright market trend on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to a darker color. As the ASE general index nosedived from its year-high 2968.77 points on June 2 to its low of 2,454.48 points on August 19, the momentum of Jordanian stocks thereafter did not return to the positive. When compared with the start of 2009, the ASE index close of 2,573.37 points in the Nov 19 session represented a disappointing 6.71% drop.

Jordan’s banking sector continuously underperformed the market in the first 11 months of 2009 and was the biggest loser on the bourse by Nov 19, with a drop of 15% from the year’s first trading session. The sub-index for industrial stocks showed the widest swings, but in the end its 8.3% drop for the period was almost as close to the general index’s performance as that of the services index (-6.8%), which had shadowed the general index for much of the year. Insurance turned out to be a surprise upside wild card, closing the period 4.3% up, but has to be noted for its small share in ASE cumulative market cap. Arab Bank, the country’s strongest financial firm, saw a loss of 16.6% of its share price between the start of 2009 and Nov 19. Arab Potash, the heavyweight industrial mining scrip, dropped 4.6%, while Jordan Phosphate Mines and The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance also experienced double-digit price drops. Jordan Telecom Group was a large firm to show an uptrend in the review period, with a 7.7% gain. Jordan Emirates Insurance Company, a firm that was entirely restructured and recapitalized in 2009, somewhat theoretically came out as the best gainer, with a massive 585% share price increase.

Abu Dhabi SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 3,239.74  Current Year Low: 2,136.64

For much of 2009, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) appeared to roar handsomely, as its sibling in Dubai rocked. With a close at 2,924.26 points on Nov 19, the ADX general index gained 22.4% from the start of 2009, a solid third place in the Gulf Cooperation Council after the Saudi Stock Exchange and the Dubai Financial Market  (DFM) and indefinitely better than the ADX slide of over 48% in the previous year. But Nov 2009 was not a strong month for the United Arab Emirates’ exchanges; index levels for ADX and DFM dropped over 3% between the start of the month and Nov 19. After the Nov 25 announcement of Dubai World’s debt dilemma, however, the ADX was infected in what looked like an H1N1 attack — a virus with minimal impact in big, distant places but rapidly spreading among relatives with exaggerated fears. The ADX index closed at 2,668.23 on Nov 30, suffering a one-day fall of 8.3%, even greater than that of the DFM. The 2009 bottom on the ADX was recorded back on January 22, at 2,136.64 points. The year high of 3,239.74 was set on October 15. Large caps that were affected heavily by selling pressure at the end of the review period included real estate stocks Aldar and Sorouh, as well as ADX market cap leader Etisalat as well as the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and First Gulf Bank. For the first 11 months in 2009 First Gulf was the top gainer on the ADX with a share price improvement of 85%. NBAD gained 50.2%; Aldar Properties (+24.9%) and Etisalat (+2.7%) were also on the positive side by the Nov 30 close, albeit in a far more negative environment than in earlier months.

Dubai FM  (1 year)

Current Year High: 2,373.37  Current Year Low: 1,433.14

A hub of global attention in these challenging times for super-ambitious and somewhat burnt investment locales, the Dubai emirate of wonders tried something new at the end of Nov 2009 — how it is to run after taking the belt out of your pants and with your shoes tied together. The experiment of shocking investors by exhibiting the Dubai World debt dilemma in a most embarrassing manner (mostly due to the announcement’s timing) drove the Dubai World shares on Nasdaq Dubai down 15% in a single session and had a short-term erosion effect of around 10.1 billion Dirhams ($2.75 billion) on the market cap of the Dubai Financial Market, resulting in a DFM market cap readout of $41 billion on Nov 30. The market close at 1,940.36 points on Nov 30 was a 6.6% drop on the month and reduced the year-to-date increase to 18.45% for 2009. Less than two weeks earlier, the year-to-date increase had stood at over 30%. Of more serious concern, Dubai gambled away the trust of its participants and stakeholders, which until Nov 24, had been on a good track, thanks to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s most pronounced turnaround in stock fortunes when comparing 2009 with 2008. The DFM year low was an index reading of 1,433.14 points on February 5. The 2009 year high of 2,373.37 was reached on October 14. Gulfa Mineral Water, a firm with a $38 million market cap, was an upside outlier in share price developments with a 153% gain. Although hit hard with limit-down drops at the end of Nov, Emaar Properties gained 61% between the start of the year and Nov 30. The Emirates’ largest bank, NBD, climbed 65.2%.

Kuwait SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 8,966.00  Current Year Low: 6,391.50

Investors were sure to be worried at the Kuwait Stock Exchange’s (KSE) performance in the fourth quarter’s first half. The sharp slide of the index between October 7 and Nov 17 wiped out gains achieved in spring and took the KSE index back into negative territory, closing 13.2% lower at 6754.30 points onNov 19 when compared with the start of 2009. The year had started badly enough, with a 29% nosedive from the 12 month high at 8,966 on December 15, 2008, to the current 12 month low of 6491.50 on March 1, 2009.

Recovery seemed apparent in the following three months with a 31% index climb to early June, but the 8,000 points level was quickly lost again and the scales shifted increasingly to downside melancholy as time went by. Food was the most solid sector in the KSE annals this year, but could not sustain its intermediate gains of up to 50% and ended the review period only 16% higher. The industrial sector also had a positive close, up 6% year-to-date on Nov 19. Investments, real estate, insurance and banking all underperformed the general index by between 14% for investments and 2% for banking. More than 40 stocks showed double-digit share price increases during the review period, but the losers were greater in number. Real estate group Safat Global Holding fared the worst, suffering a 74% price weakening. The multi-line conglomerate Al Abraj Holding lost 72.5% and communications player Hits Telecom gave up 69%. Market cap leader Zain ended the review period with a 14.3% improved share price and top bank NBK ended 1.2% lower. 

Saudi Arabia SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 6,568.47  Current Year Low: 4,130.01

The Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) consolidated its regional importance through a leading positive performance between January 2009 and the religious high season of the Hajj pilgrimage. By the Nov 18 close, the TASI general index was up 31.6% for the year-to-date. The TASI’s year low was marked on March 9 with 4,130.01 points and the peak was reached on October 24 at 6,588.47. The main rally in 2009 lasted from March 10 until late May and took the index 47.2% higher to 6,100.85 points on May 23. At total turnover of $319 billion, or $1.4 billion a day, and a market cap of $328.5 billion at the close of Nov 18, the SSE was approaching the end of 2009 still quite far behind top performance years such as 2007, when it had ended with daily

average trade volume exceeding $2.6 billion and a year-end market cap of $515 billion.  However, the broadly positive performance of 2009 entailed all sectors, except for a

5% drop in the building and construction sub-index. The real estate sector managed a 5% gain; the banking sector advanced 19% and the important petrochemicals sub-index rose 55.4% — making it the second best performer after the maverick insurance

sector, where the speculative attractions of the many newly listed insurers lured investors into a buying mood, pushing the insurance sub-index up 86% by the Nov 18 close. Seven insurance firms topped the price performance charts with gains above 200%. More weightily, market cap leader SABIC gained 58%.

Muscat SM  (1 year)

Current Year High: 6,762.94  Current Year Low: 4,223.63

Performance of Gulf Cooperation Council stock exchanges in the penultimate month of 2009 was at best subdued; the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) closed the Nov 19 session at 6385.23 points, a measly 0.5% up on the month. Its 17.4% year-to-date gain, however, put the MSM into a solid middle position in annual performance among its neighbors. Throughout 2008, the MSM lost nearly 41% of its value under the impact of the global recession. The 2009 year low of 4223.63 points on January 21 and the year high of 6762.94 points on October 11 were 181 trading days apart. The MSM general index gained 60% during that period, which entailed only short periods of intermittent index drops. Looking at sector performances in 2009, the services and insurance index ended the review period 4.9% higher, but was a clear underperformer when compared with the MSM sub-indices for banking and industrial stocks. The banking index gained 42.3% and the industrial index recorded even a 67.8% increase. The spread between losing and winning stocks in 2009 was quite substantial but gainers outnumbered losers. After downward pressure in 2008 had pushed several large companies significantly lower, in 2009 National Bank of Oman (down 10.7%) and Omantel (down 16.5%) were still beset with negative price performance among the five largest companies by market cap. By contrast, shares of Bank Muscat gained 8.9% between the year’s first close and Nov 19. Oman’s major initial public offering in 2007, Galfar Engineering, gained 29%, closing on Nov 19 within 0.5% of its issue price. 

Bahrain SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 1,954.75  Current Year Low: 1,438.32

There was no magic in being small for the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2009. The negative sentiment that had driven the BSE general index 34% lower in 2008 carried on unabated until mid March of 2009. The drop in early 2009 amounted to 12%. After a short bout of springtime awakening, the overriding trend returned to unfavorable and the BSE close at 1443.35 points translated into a 20% loss for the year-to-date. The less than pretty performance picture is reinforced by the fact that the BSE’s 12-month high was in Nov of 2008, while the low for the year-to-date was recorded on Nov 18, 2009. After a shy rise in September, the index dropped 9.77% in the period from October 7 to Nov 19. The sector indices on the BSE revealed the worst performer to be the investments sector. It closed 31% lower on Nov 19 when compared with the start of the year. The other financial values, insurance and banking, also were deep in the doldrums with share price index losses of 18% and 15%, respectively. Industry was the brightest sector with a gain of 20%, followed by hotels and tourism, up 11%. Less than 10 companies achieved year-to-date share price gains, led by Bahrain Flour Mills with a 45% rise. Gulf Hotels Group, Al Salam Bank Bahrain, and contracting group Nass Corporation showed gains of near 20% each. The stocks of Global Investment House (GIH), Gulf Finance House (GFH) and Al Baraka Banking Group were the basement performers of the first 47 weeks in 2009. GIH lost 76.7%, followed by GFH at 53.7% and Al Baraka at 53.5%, noting that the latter recorded a 10% day-on-day rise at the very end of the period.

Doha SM (1 year)

Current Year High: 7,624.45  Current Year Low: 4,230.19

The Doha Securities Market (DSM) accomplished an overall modestly positive performance in the period from January 2009 to  Nov 19, closing at 7183.76 points with a year-to-date gain of 4.3%. Even as the DSM index experienced an early 2009 aftershock to the landslide of share prices that overwhelmed the market between June and Nov of 2008, the upward arrows proved themselves between March and October 2009. From the year low of 4,230.19 on March 4 to the year high of 7,624.45 points on October 6, the DSM benchmark index rose by just over 80%. Real estate and banking stocks contributed greatly to the increase in that period. The down and up of DSM sub-indices during the first 11 months of 2009 did not show great differences in direction of sectors, but the services and industrial indices were consistently outperforming the general index just as banking and insurance underperformed. By Nov 19, the upside margin versus the general index amounted to 6% for services and 7% for indices; juxtaposed by downside margins of 4% for banking and 12% for insurance. In a broadly balanced split between losing and gaining companies, the best performer in 2009 was Ezdan Real Estate with a 139% gain. The stock, the DSM’s number three by market cap at the end of the review period, had skyrocketed in

August and the first half of September. The other big names at the top of the market cap ranking (Industries Qatar, Qatar National Bank, and Qatar Telecom)  all closed in positive territory on Nov 19 for the year to date, respectively up 14%, 19%, and 37%. Down 39%, Qatar General Insurance and Reinsurance was top loser.

Tunis SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 4,194.27  Current Year Low: 2,836.64

No Middle Eastern bourse could keep up with the index gains of the best-performing emerging markets in 2009, but the ones that did improve more than their regional peers were two MENA dwarves — Tunisia and Lebanon. Each positioned in the shallowest part of the market cap pool, the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Beirut Stock Exchange accomplished index gains exceeding 40% year-to-date by Nov 20. The Tunindex closed at 4099.63 points, up 41.7% on the year. The bourse’s 12-month low was seen back in

December 2008 and the first trading session close of 2009 at 2,889.97, was the market’s year-to-date bottom. The peak came on October 21, at 4194.27 points. This was also a historic high, in light of the fact that the Tunindex had been rising not only in 2009 but also in 2008. The TSE was internationally noted for standing higher one year after the historic Lehman Brothers collapse than it did on the day of the crash. All sectors on the Tunisian bourse gained in 2009. Retail and consumer services came out on top, up by 70.1% and 56.9%, whereas consumer goods manufacturers and building and construction materials were the laggards, with gains merely in the 20% range. In line with the smooth uptrend of Tunisian equities, winners outnumbered losers in the 2009 review period by four-to-one. The only large scrip to move lower was Tunisair, dropping 9.8%. The size leaders on the TSE, the Poulina Group Holding industrial and trade conglomerate and the Banque de Tunisie advanced by 13.4% and 28.3%, respectively. Poulina, which had debuted on the exchange in an, in hindsight, unenviable moment in 2008, rebounded in spring 2009 and by Nov 20, recorded a 15% gain since its initial public offering.   

Casablanca SE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 11,729.86            Current Year Low: 9,405.86

The Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) in 2009 was mellow in the sense of soft performance numbers. When compared with the first trading close back in January, the general index of the CSE ended the Nov 19 session 2.3% down, at 10,338.46 points. The index, which bottomed this year at 9,405.86 on January 8, passed its high for 2009 at 11,729.86 points on June 17. Whereas the previous year had seen the Moroccan securities market take a small beating (by regional comparison), the index lost 24% between mid April and year-end 2008. Both optimism and volatility were noticeable in 2009 but concentrated in the early months of the year. In the second half of the review period, sideways and gradual downward movement were the main index directions. The total market cap on Nov 19, according to Zawya, was equal to $65.5 billion and could not measure up to the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) market cap of over $88 billion. This demonstrated the divergent market trends on Atlas and Nile, as the Moroccan bourse had in spring temporarily outshone the EGX as the second largest MENA bourse after Saudi Arabia. Believers in the growth potential of the CSE forecast a surge of listings, market activity and index values in coming years. Stock performance of the largest listed Moroccan companies in 2009 was in the lower half of market records when comparing their Nov 19 closing prices to those at the start if the year. The five largest companies by market cap all had share price losses, which ranged from 1.75% at Attijariwafa Bank to 10.4% at Maroc Telecom and 23.3% at real estate firm Compagnie Generale Immobiliere. The best upward movers were found in metal and manufacturing stocks. 

Egypt CASE  (1 year)

Current Year High: 7,249.55  Current Year Low: 3,389.31

With 47 performance weeks of 2009 in the bag, the more fortunate ones among Egyptian equity players should have felt much happier — or at least about 20 times more financially satisfied — than they had been around the same time in 2008. Where the Egyptian Stock Exchange’s (EGX) benchmark index had been down by two thirds in Nov 2008 and full-year 2008 had spelt disaster with a 57% negative price return since the start of the year, the 6,195 points close of the EGX 30 on Nov 19, 2009, represented a year-to-date gain of 34.8%. The market experienced its year low at 3389.31 points on February 5 and scaled its high for the past 11 months on October 26, at 7,249.55 points. However, with the end-of-Nov Dubai debacle of dumb communication and debt rescheduling, the EGX was the first MENA victim outside of the UAE, sliding 8% on Nov 30, on account of nervous contagion. Whereas tremors were hardly visible on the Tunisian and Moroccan bourses, the Dubai pull-down demonstrated that Egypt is a vulnerable market. The one-day Nov 30 anomaly sealed a month of Egyptian stock weakening, as the EGX 30 shed 19% between Oct 26 and Nov 30. Of the largest stocks in various sectors, overall market cap leader Orascom Construction Holding closed 62.6% up; Commercial International Bank climbed 36.5% and Talaat Moustafa Group achieved a gain of 97.3% (all by their Nov 30 close versus the start of 2009). Telecom Egypt saw a marginal drop of 0.3% and El Ezz Aldekhela Steel gave up 7.5%. Pronounced drops in late Nov contributed to make Orascom Telecommunications and El Sewedy

Cables end the first 11 months in 2009 down by 14% and 20%, respectively.

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Finance & Economy

Awaiting the thaw

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

Companies, companies, everywhere, and nay a share for sale. The ancient mariner could have rhymed to no end about primary markets in 2009 and it looks as if not a line will need to be added to the eulogy of initial public stock offerings (IPOs) in the Middle East in the last six weeks of the year.

Given that the period from November until New Year’s Day in 2009 embraces the two important religious observations of Eid al-Adha and Christmas, everything points to a slow season for investment activities.

Barring a dramatic turnaround in new-issues activity in December, companies looking to go public have shelved their aspirations until after the New Year. All of this translates into another wait for the investment banks that underwrite new offerings and the IPO market in general.

As the economy chilled in 2009, the number of companies that went public froze. The volume of new issues is down sharply from 2008. The number of IPOs in the region reached 13 year-to-date, with an estimated $2.2 billion raised — a drop of 82 percent compared to $12.45 billion in the same period of last year.

In the third quarter of 2009, regional markets raised around $850 million in four IPOs, compared to $1.2 billion in seven IPOs in the second quarter of 2009.

Saudi Arabia, which accounted for about 48 percent of the total IPOs year-to-date, had the largest IPO in the third quarter, when National Petrochemical Company (Petrochem) successfully raised $640 million in July, the region’s second largest offering in 2009.

The fact that Petrochem is a young investment company in a leading Saudi industry and does not expect its main project (Saudi Polymers Company) to start production for another two years, makes its IPO an unrestrained play on future growth.

The region’s largest IPO came out of Qatar when telecommunications operator Vodafone Qatar was able to raise $929.3 million in April.

After these encouraging developments in the second and third quarters, the fourth quarter of 2009 started with nothing more than a drizzle of three initial public offerings on the Saudi Stock Exchange that added around $52 million to the year’s tally.

For November, the sole market with new primary issues was Syria, where Al Baraka Bank Syria offered $35 million in shares.

Earlier hints of two November insurance IPOs, in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, remained unsubstantiated by November 20. And the year’s longest list in initial offerings is clearly that of companies — numbering at least 50 — that had previously announced plans for going public in 2009, but it can now be said, with almost certainty, that they will not offer subscriptions before the new year begins.

IPO performance (October 2008 — September 2009)

Most completed IPOs (third quarter 2009)

Source: Zawya

Share of deals by exchange in MENA (2009)

Share of deals by sector in MENA (2009)

Capital raised by exchange in MENA (2009)

Capital raised by sector in MENA (2009)

Source: Zawya

Glad to see you go

It is no secret that the regional IPO market had a slow start in 2009. The recession, investor skittishness and a challenging outlook for the Gulf Cooperation Council capital markets have decreased investor demand for new stock offerings.

Dubai, previously the region’s hottest and fasted growing economy, did not even witness one IPO in 2009. Analysts say this year will go down in history as the worst year for IPOs since the region’s first stock exchange opened its door for business.

Executives and bankers will be happy to put the year behind them. All indications show that investors will start spending again in 2010 if the opportunity is right.

Public offerings are expected to reemerge in the second quarter of 2010, but experts warn that investors will be especially cautious about putting money into unproven businesses when many blue-chip stocks are available at steep discounts.

“GCC investors are becoming more discerning, and demanding a robust offering with a good IPO story, growth momentum, and sensible pricing,” said the Chief Executive Officer of leading investment firm Gulf Capital, Karim El Solh, in November.

MENA IPOs by volume & number of deals (Jan-Sept 2009)

Source: Zawya

MENA & GCC IPO trends by quarter

Source: Zawya

MENA & GCC IPO activity

Jan-Sept 2009 versus Jan-Sept 2008 ($millions)

Source: Zawya

Signs of recovery

Regional capital markets had a mixed performance in 2009, but signs of a serious recovery can be seen everywhere. Experts are encouraged by new life in global markets and can also point to respectable performances of recently floated companies in the Middle East.

Six of the region’s eight newly listed stocks, which started trading in the second half of 2009, have achieved share price gains that were substantially above the gains of their respective benchmark indices for the same period.

Analysts point to the fact that subscription ratios in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been better than expected in many of the subscriptions undertaken in the past few months. The three Saudi insurance stocks that went public in the third quarter reported oversubscription demand, ranging from 7.5 to 11.6 times the available capital.

International investment banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Ernst & Young Middle East and others, see confidence returning to the MENA markets as well.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch raised its 2010 growth forecast for the GCC from 3.2 percent to 3.7 percent, reflecting a growing level of confidence that the region would emerge from the economic downturn faster and stronger than it had previously expected.

“Our research shows that primary equity issuance conditions in the Middle East have improved substantially since the beginning of this year and should improve further as volatility continues to normalize,” said Durk van der Zee, head of equity capital markets Middle East, at RBS.

This prediction, however, was made prior to the Dubai World (DW) debt standstill request that shook the region’s bourses, and in particular those of the UAE. RBS was also one of the European banks whose balance sheet was exposed to DW’s outstanding debt.

MENA advisors ranking (Jan-Sept 2009)

Source: Zawya

Top countries (Jan-Sept 2009)

Source: Zawya

IPO tsunami

Investors on the buying side are searching and waiting for IPOs from good clean companies, with a clean balance sheet, a record of transparency and good valuations.

According to data compiled by Regional Press Network (RPN), there are at least 150 IPOs scheduled in 2010, many of them planned for the first half of the year. This number is expected to double in the event that the impact of the global financial crisis on the region’s capital markets dissipates.

Bankers say when the IPO market comes back and the flow is more steady, it will be driven by best-in-class, larger companies.

Analysts who spoke to RPN say some key drivers that will propel the IPO market in 2010 are high oil prices, stabilization in the real estate sector, regulatory reforms and the fact that MENA equity markets are undervalued.

“When oil exceeds $65 per barrel, which is our average budget breakeven forecast for the GCC, these countries start saving,” said Turker Hamzaoglu, an analyst for Bank of America Merrill Lynch in London.

Family-owned companies are expected to be on the top of the tsunamis’ crest, converting into public companies at a faster rate than in the past, analyst said.

Abdulaziz al-Zamel, head of capital markets at Saudi Hollandi Capital said he expected to see a rise of family-owned businesses going public over the next three years.

“[Family-owned businesses] will come to the market for three key reasons – to source funds, to ensure business continuity and to bring some degree of professionalism to their structures,” said Zamel.

Busy IPO New Year

Experts agree that even though conditions have thawed over recent months, the real rebound is on hold until 2010 when a number of high-quality companies are expected to hit the market.

“The future outlook remains bright,” said Samer Shaheen, a research analyst at Bloomberg in Dubai. “Continued economic growth and high oil prices will fuel the liquidity necessary to support future offerings, and investors will be seeking investments in new sectors and in attractive, well priced IPOs.”

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Finance & Economy

Adjusting the Lebanese socio-economic debate: It is about growth, not debt

by Mazen Soueid December 10, 2009
written by Mazen Soueid

The size of Lebanon’s public debt — which at $48.5 billion amounts to 1.5 times the country’s gross domestic product, one of the highest debt to GDP ratios in the world — is a constant feature in the nation’s political and economic debates. It is blamed, rightly or wrongly, by the public, the politicians and even some economists for most if not all the socio-economic problems that Lebanon faces: youth unemployment, migration, immigration, the cost and reliability of power supply, high business costs, the lack of economic diversification such as low contributions from agriculture and manufacturing, and even red tape and corruption.

The word “unsustainable” has been used since 1996 to describe Lebanon’s debt dynamics; since then, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey and Iceland, to name a few, have all defaulted, while enjoying significantly better ratings and hence more “sustainable” debt dynamics, ex-ante, than this humble Mediterranean state that has been ravaged by civil war, invasions, assassinations and sectarian strife, all in its recent history.

But why is the debt level so central to the political, and even social debate of our nation? Japan has a debt to GDP ratio that is higher than Lebanon, and it is barely mentioned in the national socio-economic debate, let alone the political debate.

The debt is a liability inheritance that one generation leaves to another. It is a negative inheritance in the sense that future generations will have to pay more in terms of taxes to cover the debt. But Lebanon’s tax rates are low when compared to other countries. The Lebanese pay around 15 percent of their total income in taxes (this includes income tax, VAT, and social security contribution). This compares with a tax contribution of 26 percent in Jordan, 27 percent in Tunisia, 28 percent in Russia, and 44 percent in France. Of course, the return on these tax payments does not match the Lebanese citizen’s expectations, and he or she would probably be willing to pay more in return for universal health coverage, better education and, above all, law and order in the country. But reforms and progress on these fronts have been hindered, not by debt level but rather by the complexities and limitations of the political system. Even the modest economic reforms outlined in Paris III have not been implemented, which ironically would have allowed Lebanon to get still-pending grants from donors and reduce the debt.

The debt level would also be relevant when the cost of servicing it crowds out the private sector. But in Lebanon the total assets of banks are around three to four times the size of the economy. Lebanese banks have enough deposits to fund the public sector, the private sector and to maintain some of the best liquidity ratios in the world. In fact, loans to the private sector grew 16 percent in 2006, 15.8 percent in 2007, 18.6 percent in 2008 and now stand at $23 billion, or 70 percent of GDP — a very decent ratio for a country with an income level like Lebanon’s. By comparison, loans to the private sector are around 33 percent of GDP in Turkey, 41 percent of GDP in Russia, 47 percent of GDP in Egypt, 65 percent in Tunisia. At 70 percent, the ratio does not reflect much crowding out in Lebanon. 

Last but not least, a high debt level is usually worrisome when a significant portion of that debt is held by foreigners, leaving the country’s future prey for “barbarians at the gate.” Ask the Argentinians, the Uruguayans and many Africans about being at the mercy of foreign investors and they would tell you horror stories. But in Lebanon, most of the debt is held domestically. In fact, out of the $48.5 billion gross public debt outstanding, less than $6 billion is currently held by foreigners, and most of it to bilateral and multilateral donors rather than by international investors. Some people confuse external debt, which is the debt held by foreigners, and foreign currency debt, which is the debt denominated in foreign currency that could be held by either local or foreign investors. But on that account Lebanon also fares well. Its foreign currency debt has been slightly declining both nominally and as a percentage of total debt, and now stands at $21.3 billion — 40 percent of total debt — down from 50 percent of total debt only a couple of years ago. This is also less than the $25 billion in foreign currency reserves held by the Central Bank of Lebanon, not counting gold of course. 

How has the debt then emerged to be the centerpiece focus of the Lebanese public debate? My belief is that the debt issue was and remains a tool to politicize the economic debate, and use it to condemn a whole era of Lebanon’s recent history: an era that saw the rebuilding of the country, of its airport, ports, roads, schools and hospitals, an era that saw its re-emergence as a primary tourist destination and as a financial service provider for the region. This era has put Lebanon back on the map. Blaming the high debt for all our problems is a call to condemn this era and hold it responsible for what should actually be blamed on the shortcomings and limitations of our political system, and on the abnormalities that we have gotten used to by now, such as foreign interventions in local affairs, and the lack of ability by the state to impose law and order and exercise its sovereignty on its entire territory. It is also a way to distract attention from the need to push ahead with key reforms that could significantly increase the productivity of the economy. And many of us, sadly, fall for it.

Lebanon should reduce its debt, no question about it. High debt creates an unnecessary vulnerability, it scares foreign investors, and it keeps the sovereign rating low, imposing a floor on interest rates and a cap on the ability of the financial sector to develop and grow. But its effects on the Lebanese economy and on the wellbeing of society have been completely blown out of proportion. What really matter are growth, investment and job creation. Take the last three years for example: the economy has grown (in real terms) by 7.5 percent in 2007, 9 percent in 2008 and is on its way to achieve 7 percent growth in 2009.

These are rates that are not only unprecedented in Lebanon, but they are also among the highest in the world. They have also helped reduce the debt from 180 percent of GDP in 2006 to around 150 percent of GDP in 2009, at a time when debt to GDP ratios have increased in most countries due to the global financial crisis. And yet if you ask the Lebanese on the street, or even on a university campus, few if any know about these real economic growth rates, but they can all recite that the national debt is $50 billion.

Finally, here is a thought just for the sake of alternative analysis. Much of Taoism revolves around Yin and Yang. The belief that there is no absolute good or absolute evil and that there is actually a bit of both in everything. This may also apply to the Lebanese public debt. Not convinced? Ask yourself this question: what would a very liquid and sizeable Lebanese banking sector have done with all its accumulated liquidity over the last few years, beyond lending locally, if there was no indebted government to lend to?

The answer is simple: invest and lend abroad.

What would have been lost abroad in a financial crisis so massive that the government would have been forced to step in and bail out the banks, like most governments around the globe did? Now those governments have debt ratios of more than 100 percent of GDP and fiscal deficit ratios of 10 percent of GDP. These figures are now completely normal all over the world, especially in industrialized countries.

But these are also the figures we have in Lebanon. Except we also have an airport that is expected to have received 2 million tourists by the end of 2009, who in turn contributed to a 7 percent growth rate and kept almost all of us employed. Not a bad deal, after all.

Mazen M. Soueid is chief economist at BankMed and advisor to former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Finance & Economy

Expat largesse

by Executive Staff December 10, 2009
written by Executive Staff

During the first quarter of 2009, Lebanon braced itself for a steep fall in remittances. The logic held that the global financial crisis would severely affect remittance inflows from outside the country,  as Lebanese working abroad saw their own budgets tighten. The Lebanese government even prepared its 2009 budget proposal, which was never ratified, “on a very strict assumption of a 20 percent decrease in the level of remittances,” according to Lebanon’s Minister of Economics and Trade Mohammad Safadi.

It was a reasonable fear since, according to the International Monetary Fund, 70 percent of Lebanon’s remittance inflows are from the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States, both of which were badly exposed to the crisis.

A few months into 2009, however, a less gloomy picture emerged with the IMF predicting a drop in remittances of 12 to 15 percent. Today the picture has brightened further, with Safadi saying that the predicted decline “has not yet materialized,” and pointing out that Standard & Poor’s ratings agency, who had expressed concerns that a fall in remittances could hurt Lebanon’s ability to pay its debts, had actually improved Lebanon’s credit rating.

In fact, in November 2009 the World Bank released its updated figures predicting that Lebanon would only experience a 2.5 percent drop, from $7.18 billion to $7 billion in remittance inflows for the year as a whole.

Total remittances ($millions) 

Projecting in the dark

The numbers are even more significant considering Lebanon’s remittance to gross domestic product ratio has also dropped, from 24.8 percent of GDP, using official figures, to a projected 21.4 percent, according to data provided by the World Bank, the IMF and Bank Audi.

The decrease can be attributed to the IMF’s forecast that Lebanon’s GDP will grow by 7 percent to reach $32.7 billion by the end of 2009. It should be noted, however, that many debate the methodology used to calculate Lebanon’s GDP [see page 58]. The Economist Intelligence Unit, for instance, expects Lebanon’s GDP to grow at a rate of 5.1 percent to reach a total of $30.2 billion by the end of 2009, resulting in markedly different figures.

Nassib Ghobril, head of research and analysis at Byblos Bank, is quick to point out the inexact nature of such predictions. “[At this stage] they’re not even forecasts, they’re expectations,” he says. “It’s very difficult to put your finger on a forecast given the lack of regular data… there simply are no figures since the end of 2008, and that’s exactly where we need greater transparency from the authorities.”

Ghobril frequently bemoans this lack of information.

“There are no remittance figures from local authorities here,” he says. “In Jordan,  we have figures on remittances every month.”

Ghobril sees this lack of information as a major problem given how important remittances are to the economy, and he advocates that it be addressed immediately.

When contacted by Executive, the Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank, said that they publish remittance results quarterly on their website. However, as Executive went to press, no data for 2009 had been published.

Not yet a science

The significance of remittances to development and world capital flows only became a fashionable part of economic calculations in the last decade, so even the figures that are released are somewhat questionable. 

“The calculation of remittances is not a science yet,” says Ghobril. He points out that there are major methodological issues not yet settled. For example, the World Bank includes deposits (as opposed to transfers) of less than $10,000 made by expatriates into Lebanese banks in its calculations of remittances,

despite the fact that in many cases these expatriates may simply be taking advantage of Lebanese banks’ high interest rates to maximize their savings and not directly contributing to actual economic activity.

The decision to include these deposits was part of a shift in the World Bank’s method for calculating remittances in 2003.

That year the World Bank reported that Lebanon received around around $4.7 billion in remittances, nearly doubling the 2002 figure of $2.5 billion — a jump Ghobril asserts was more a result of the change in methodology than an actual increase.

There has not been major methodological change since then, however, meaning that the growth from $4.7 billion in 2004 to $7.18 billion last year can be regarded as an authentic increase. The IMF also recently suggested including remittances in Lebanon’s GDP, which would significantly improve its debt-to-GDP ratio.

Uncertain inflows

As around $1.4 billion per month continue to flow into Lebanon’s banking sector from abroad, many believe that remittances must be doing well. It is also possible though that, in these uncertain economic times, a significant amount of this money is arriving from investors who have turned to Lebanon’s trusted banking sector as a safehaven to stash their cash, rather than true remittances, which would be Lebanese sending money home to be spent.

Kamal Hamdan, economist and managing director of the Consultation and Research Institute, says that a significant though unknown part of this year’s figure can be attributed to the liquidation of fixed and non-fixed assets from non-resident Lebanese.

“You liquidate once and for all so I don’t know if this $7 billion is a sign of strength or rather an ultimatum,” says Hamdan. He expects, however, that remittances will

remain relatively steady in terms of their ratio to GDP “because a

decrease of a few percentage points is not enough to affect its weight with respect to GDP.”  

Another (and perhaps more meaningful) indicator that remittances can be expected to stay fairly stable is the lack of an influx of returning expatriates, tens of thousands of whom were predicted to return home as a result of the crisis — though in Hamdan’s view, the absence of repatriation figures constitutes “the worst example of the lack of accurate data.”

There was “no reversal of the brain drain phenomenon witnessed so far, despite the fact that local demand for skilled labor has been rising,” says Safadi. 

While this return of talented

expats would have presented positive opportunities, the fact that it hasn’t occurred also has a positive dynamic, as it means that those who have lost their jobs have likely taken up other employment, or moved from city to city or country to country seeking work in markets where wages are high and from which they can continue to send remittances.

“We didn’t see thousands of Lebanese returning here, so that means they’re still working somewhere,” says Ghobril. 

Perhaps the strongest indicator of the continued strength of remittances, however, is data coming from the remittance sending countries. Saudi central bank data estimates that total remittances — to all countries — from Saudi Arabia reached $15 billion in the first eight months of 2009, an increase of 12 percent compared to 2008.

While this growth, probably fueled by the kingdom’s massive development plan, is a slowdown from the 26.7 percent growth in remittances that took place between 2007 and 2008, it certainly paints a brighter picture than many predicted when the financial crisis first kicked off. 

Resilient but not immune

Other Gulf states have also dug into their remarkably deep pockets and ploughed ahead with their own long-term strategies for infrastructure development. This was reflected in the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook report for October 2009, which said that counter-cyclical government spending had helped protect economies in the Middle East from the worst effects of the global economic downturn.

Overall, according to the World Bank’s latest data, outward remittance flows from the Gulf have dropped only 3 percent this year relative to last year. Remittances from the Gulf to other countries in the Middle East have dropped from $34 billion to $32.2 billion, according to data from the World Bank, IMF and Bank Audi, and the IMF outlook report predicts that remittances will stabilize at $34 billion next year and grow to $36 billion in 2011.

However, there are negative signs as well. In Jordan, (where data on remittances is more readily available than in Lebanon) there has been a decline of 6 percent in remittance inflows, and Egypt, the biggest recipient of remittances in the region, has announced a decline of 8.8 percent.

There are reasons to believe that remittances from the US may have suffered a more serious decline, with remittances to Mexico having dropped 15 percent year-on-year in the year to August, as reported by The Wall Street Journal.

With the region expecting to have a better year in 2010 and the US officially out of a recession, there is reason to be optimistic.

However, as Ghobirl says: “There is no way not to be effected…The Lebanese economy has shown that it is insulated from the crisis but not isolated. It is resilient but not immune.”

Annual growth of workers’ remittance inflows to Lebanon

Source: Banque du Liban, World Bank, IMF, Bank Audi
December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Jordan’s journeymen

by Riad Al-Khouri December 10, 2009
written by Riad Al-Khouri

Migrant labor has become part of economic life in a globalizing Middle East, with countries increasingly dependent on workers hailing from across borders and often from outside the region. Yet, with unemployment buffeting many Arab economies, the issue of migrant laborers is becoming increasingly contentious.

The unemployment rate across the Middle East will rise to 11 percent this year, according to the International Labor Organization, and the typical reaction of governments in crises is to restrict the movement of labor to keep foreign workers out. However, other forces are also at work restricting labor flows into and out of the region as well as within it. In particular, the last few years have seen a general trend towards labor market regulation, made possible by more efficient computerized public sectors, and rendered necessary by government fears over internal security. As 2009 draws to a close, these trends have combined to impose more restrictions on guest workers.

Jordan is a case in point. The kingdom’s economy relies heavily on Egyptians and other foreign workers, and in some areas the presence of this imported labor is crucial (for example, with Egyptians working in agriculture, Pakistanis in garment production, as well as Indonesians and Sri Lankans in domestic service). In turn, workers remit much needed funds to their homelands. However, the influx of migrants is becoming subject to more serious Jordanian state scrutiny.

Jordan’s (and sending-countries’) attempts to regulate the kingdom’s migrant workers started before the global financial crisis, with a major catalyst for increased Jordanian state surveillance of foreigners being the triple-hotel bombing in Amman in November 2005 that killed some 60 people and injured more than 100. Yet the issue of migrant labor has clearly become more contentious over the past few months. Jordan’s jobless rate is now back up to 13 percent after having fallen in the past few years, further challenging the status of migrant workers and accelerating the trend towards more government control in this regard. In fact, the question of guest workers had been on the state agenda for over a decade, but only in 2007 did Jordan try more seriously to regulate entry of workers from outside the kingdom bilaterally, as opposed to previous steps taken on a unilateral basis towards foreign workers by Amman.

In other words, Jordan’s current policy is to enlist the aid of foreign governments to keep the flow of their nationals into the kingdom under control. To that end, two years ago Jordan signed memoranda with Egypt, Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively to regulate the entry of workers into the country. Under the agreement between Jordan and Egypt, the number of Egyptian laborers would be regulated and the sectors they can work in specified. Laborers coming into the kingdom from Egypt have to meet Jordanian requirements such as passing medical tests, holding certificates appropriate to their field of work and certifying that they have no criminal records.

This tightening up led to guest workers being deported for violating work permits and residency regulations. Some 318,000 non-Jordanian laborers held valid work permits by mid-2008, while that number had dropped to 304,000 by the end of last year, partly as a result of the expulsion of more than 10,000 migrant workers (most of them Egyptians).

Yet much work is still needed to organize the kingdom’s guest worker sector. The Jordanian government estimates that about 450,000 workers of different nationalities are currently employed in the kingdom (of whom around 300,000 are Arabs, mainly Egyptian) though only about two-thirds of these have work permits. Thus the process of legitimizing guest workers continues, and well more than 110,000 Egyptians have applied to work in Jordan in the two years since the Amman-Cairo labor agreement. (Under the memorandum of understanding, which was only finalized this year, Egypt is also required to keep a database of all laborers seeking employment in Jordan to be made accessible to all concerned parties.)

So far so good; however, news regarding guest workers coming to Jordan from other states is not as encouraging. For example, though agreements signed by Amman with Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively seek to regulate workers’ entry from those countries while also guaranteeing them decent working conditions, there continue to be problems with laborers from these and other South Asian nationalities. This has particularly been the case in Jordan’s garment production sector, which is contracting in the face of foreign competition, with foreign workers who produce the clothing often feeling the pinch in unpaid salaries. Despite this, Egyptian laborers, Jordan’s largest guest-worker contingent, are well on their way to being regularized — an important step to stabilize labor markets in these times of rising unemployment.

RIAD EL-KHOURI is the senior associate consultant at the William Davidson Institute of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and dean of the business school at the Lebanese French University in Erbil

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

New Turks with “Zero Problems”

by Peter Speetjens December 10, 2009
written by Peter Speetjens

One of the most striking regional developments of 2009 has been the reemergence of Turkey as a major player within the greater Middle East. Since its establishment in 1923, the country followed the credo of its founding father, Kemal Ataturk, and oriented its foreign policy westward, showing a cold shoulder to eastern neighbors.

Today, however, under the “divine guidance” of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ankara’s alignment is changing significantly. While mindful of not shutting the door on Europe or irking Washington, Ankara is increasingly looking east, which in 2009 produced a multitude of protocols and agreements with countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and even Armenia.

One of the main architects of Turkey’s shift in foreign policy is the AKP’s Ahmet Davutoglu, a political scientist and former professor of international relations, who served as a special adviser to Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Erdogan before being appointed as Turkey’s Foreign Minister last May. It is his book “Strategic Depth” that lies at the heart of Ankara’s change in worldview.

Davutoglu argues, first of all, that Turkey lies at the heart of three geographical regions and should formulate a foreign policy accordingly, including the establishment of strategic relations with the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia. Secondly, Ankara should pursue a policy of “Zero Problems” and “Maximum Engagement” with its neighbors, mainly by improving economic ties. Davutoglu’s views are part of a wider intellectual current known as “New Ottomanism” that aims to distinguish between the good, the bad and the ugly of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy.

 This new mode of thinking is a sharp departure from the Kemalist military doctrine, which for decades defined the Ottoman past in strictly negative terms, while it saw Turkey as a “lone wolf” surrounded by a “ring of fire.” Naturally, Turkey’s change in foreign policy has not been an overnight affair. Some academics argue that its roots were planted shortly after the end of the Cold War. Still, it is beyond doubt that the AKP accelerated and firmly implemented the new doctrine.

Take relations with Syria. Since the 1998 Adana Agreement ended the all too real threat of war between the two nations, ties have gradually grown stronger, which culminated this year in the remarkable decision to lift all mutual visa requirements and establish a high-level council to enhance trade and cooperation.

“Turkey is the gateway for Syria to Europe just as Syria is the gateway for Turkey to the Arab world,” Davutoglu explained.

In addition, Turkey signed a historic agreement with Armenia to reopen the borders and restore diplomatic ties. Having previously normalized ties with the regional Iraqi government in Kurdistan, Ankara and Baghdad in October agreed on no less than 48 memorandums of understanding in the fields of energy, trade, transport, water and agriculture. And on October 26, Erdogan met with his Iranian counterpart and “friend” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The two-day visit resulted in a flurry of agreements with the potential to propel bilateral trade from $11 billion to $30 billion.

Meanwhile, Turkish relations with Israel have soured since the latter’s 22-day onslaught on Gaza last winter. Turkey actively lobbied for an immediate ceasefire, while Erdogan became the “hero of Davos” after infamously marching off a stage he shared with Israeli President Shimon Perez during a World Economic Forum debate in January. In doing so, Erdogan and Turkey scored major points both at home and in the wider Middle East.

Still, although Turkey emphasizes that its “eastern face” does not come at the expense of its western one, its “Zero Problems” policy is likely to run into trouble sooner or later. First of all, notwithstanding its good intentions, Turkey should be cautious not to overplay its hand in a region where its Ottoman past remains a highly sensitive subject.

Secondly, criticizing Israel and improving ties with Iran will not go down well in most Western capitals. American diplomat Philip Gordon hinted as much on a recent visit to Ankara, saying there were “more points of disagreement than of agreement with Turkey.” Ankara’s “New Turks” wish to be friends with everyone, yet that may be impossible in a world where the enemy of my enemy is still my friend.

Finally there is the Turkish military, which has long seen itself as the guardian angel of Ataturk’s secular, pro-Western ideals and has a history of launching coup d’etats whenever it saw them threatened. It could do so again. Following the 2007 Ergenekon investigation, dozens of suspects, among them former generals, have been charged with attempting to bring down the government.

Regardless, no matter how events play out, one thing is certain: while long a spectator on the sideline, Turkey today is a regional player to be reckoned with.

PETER SPEETJENS is a Beirut-based journalist

December 10, 2009 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 438
  • 439
  • 440
  • 441
  • 442
  • …
  • 683

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

    • Facebook
    • Twitter
    • Instagram
    • Linkedin
    • Youtube
    Executive Magazine
    • ISSUES
      • Current Issue
      • Past issues
    • BUSINESS
    • ECONOMICS & POLICY
    • OPINION
    • SPECIAL REPORTS
    • EXECUTIVE TALKS
    • MOVEMENTS
      • Change the image
      • Cannes lions
      • Transparency & accountability
      • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
      • Say No to Corruption
      • The Lebanon media development initiative
      • LPSN Policy Asks
      • Advocating the preservation of deposits
    • JOIN US
      • Join our movement
      • Attend our events
      • Receive updates
      • Connect with us
    • DONATE