• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
Anti-corruptionExecutive MagazineMediaPartnershipUNDP

UNDP and Executive Magazine partner to advance dialogue on addressing corruption in Lebanon

by Executive Editors August 27, 2020
written by Executive Editors

Beirut, 20 August 2020 – The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Executive Magazine, Lebanon’s premier economic, financial, and business magazine, are today announcing a new partnership to support national dialogue on efforts to fight corruption in Lebanon through evidence-based analysis and actionable recommendations. The fight against corruption is a top national priority amid efforts to help Lebanon address its current economic crisis and accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development.

“This partnership comes at a very important moment. The devastating explosion at the Port of Beirut on August 4 has underlined the urgency to address transparency and accountability, now more than ever,” said Celine Moyroud, the UNDP resident representative in Lebanon. “Curbing corruption is of central importance to the response and recovery efforts. But beyond that, it is a cornerstone for broader governance reforms required in response to the country’s deepening economic and financial crisis.”

The first fruit of this partnership is a special report on anti-corruption in the July/August issue of Executive Magazine, published in PDF format online yesterday. Through a series of articles by national and international experts and activists, the special report discusses key anti-corruption themes that have been at the center of the national debate, echoed in the social protests of October 17, 2019. The report addresses asset recovery, access to information, specialized anti-corruption courts, and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy that was developed in a participatory manner and officially adopted on May 12, 2020.

“This special report provides a focused platform for raising public awareness and encouraging thematic debates on national anti-corruption priorities,” explained Yasser Akkaoui, editor-in-chief of Executive Magazine.  “We hope that the articles in this report, coupled with the expert roundtables and webinars that we will convene with UNDP very soon, will inform actionable recommendations to be included in the Economic Roadmap for Lebanon that we at Executive have been advancing since December 2018.”

In September, UNDP and Executive Magazine will convene a series of expert roundtables—or webinars in the current COVID-19 induced social distancing environment—with distinguished specialists to build on the issues discussed in the first special report and explore other pertinent thematic priorities, starting with transparency and accountability in international assistance. The outcomes of the roundtable series will guide the development of a second special report that is slated for publication in October 2020.

The new partnership comes as part of UNDP’s commitment to advance the implementation of Lebanon’s first-ever National Anti-Corruption Strategy to meet the calls for transparency and accountability that have been loudly reverberating in the Lebanese streets since the fourth quarter of last year.

In the aftermath of the Beirut Port explosion, UNDP prioritizes parallel action to ensure transparency and accountability in the first stage response, as it focuses its immediate support on restoring livelihoods and small businesses, debris management, and access to justice for impacted vulnerable groups, closely complementing urgent relief efforts provided by sister UN agencies.

The PDF version of the report is available below.

Executive Magazine’s July/August issue
August 27, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Beirut Port explosionEditorialOpinion

To you, our enemy

by Yasser Akkaoui August 20, 2020
written by Yasser Akkaoui

The massive destruction caused by criminal negligence on behalf of our politicians is impossible to assess. Innocent lives were lost. Property, seaport, livelihoods, schools, hospitals, homes, jobs, businesses, trade, dreams, and aspirations were totally destroyed. The impact of this deadly criminal act will reverberate for years to come. 

Beyond razing the wonderful cultural heritage from the Ottoman and the French era around the city’s port—the city’s lungs—the carcass of the silo reminds us of the lost aspiration we had in 1968 to turn our country into a regional hub of grain trade. Decades of your greed is making us beg for bread instead.

The streets were transformed to resemble the ugliness that you represent. After the Civil War you collectively sabotaged every effort to build this nation, to bring back its glory, and to achieve its potential. 

This Beirut looks like you. What you weren’t able to destroy during the Civil War, and what had been rebuilt since, you demolished with your incompetence and ignorance.  

People’s anger over corruption, mismanagement, and incompetence overthrew your corrupt and unfit government back in October and your assassination of Beirut overthrew your government now. 

This is the turning point for this country. It has to be, or all hope is lost. No more posturing or pretending or lying and manipulating, we don’t believe any of you, nor your idiotic rhetoric or deceiving doctrines. Disregard to human dignity is a crime and you will be held accountable. 

We did not grant you amnesty after the Civil War. You acquitted each other to get busy robbing the people, turning our rich nation into a bankrupt state. You sold our sovereignty, security, and peace for cheap to satisfy the greed of your patrons. You are traitors to this country.

You deserve to be tried like the criminals you are in international courts for the whole world to see, before the children, mothers, fathers, the people in mourning can begin to reconcile their hearts. 

We know the truth. You are the traitors.

Justice shall and will be served.  

Lebanon will prevail.

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Beirut Port explosionLeadersOpinion

FUCK OFF

by Executive Editors August 20, 2020
written by Executive Editors

Truthful words are not beautiful.

Beautiful words are not truthful.

Good men do not argue.

Those who argue are not good.

Those who know are not learned.

The learned do not know.

Lao Tzu

At this pivotal moment of Lebanon’s history, it would be counterproductive and even evil to mince words. It is, in the opinion of Executive editors, inescapable today to apply the old Chinese sage’s paradigm that truthful words are not beautiful. That is why, in our initial discussion for the cover image for this first post-blast issue of Executive, we agreed that the magazine would scream FUCK OFF. This message—which has been reassigned as the title message of this leader—is not personal, not targeting any individuals in high or low places. We are not talking to any person or about any human being. We are simply respectlessly addressing ourselves to the corrupted system of the old Lebanon’s clientilist reality and rentier economy. It is time for conscientious citizens and all who love this country to stand for something that is actually impossible to achieve by conventional reason and rational reckoning: a totally new system and social contract, a totally clean and productive economy, and an uncorrupted future.  

We have to come to terms with three catastrophes, each either outright man-made or causally linked to irresponsible human behavior, and each signifying horrible destruction of Lebanese lives and livelihoods. The first is the national economic and financial meltdown that has unfolded over the past year; the second is the local impact of the coronavirus threat, COVID-19 pandemic, and the historic global recession that surrounds it; the third, and until August 4 unimaginable catastrophe, is the Beirut Port explosion.   

Cognitive dissonance

As we observe our economic existences being reshaped by these three catastrophes, the mental reality of being Lebanese has been compounded into a state of cognitive dissonance. This means that on collective and individual levels, all denizens of this country are faced with having to reconcile new realities and actions with hugely discrepant concepts of their minds. As evidenced by frantic search for explanations of the blast—including the flotation of conspiracy theories, investigations of questionable cover stories, and debates among intellectuals—there is an existential need for all of us to solve contradictions between today’s reality and our long-held, sometimes century-old, cultural beliefs, good and bad living experiences of three decades and—some accurate, some flawed—accumulated perceptions.

In practical terms, the present need for strategizing for Lebanon’s societal future has been shaped as much by the country’s descent into sharply reduced productivity and sharply increased poverty as it has been informed by the inability of past and present administrations to implement structural reforms or even achieve decisive progress (or secure common ground) in 17 virtual negotiation sessions with the International Monetary Fund. In this magazine’s view, this creates a contradiction between the established wisdom—whereby rescue needs technical expertise and years of professional experience—and an impossibility to rely on the present known exponents of expertise and experience. We thus have to revise the entire system. For designing it and setting up this new system and social contract (including electoral and decentralization systems designs), we have no option but to trust in the young people that will live our future—meaning many unpolitical or anti-political minds in our universities, communities, and civil society with great ideas but with no or next to no years of experience.   

The second practical contradiction regards our micro- and macro- economic futures. For example, in a simple micro perception of the need for economic media and responsible journalism, we at Executive are determined to survive and contribute, as faithful media watchdog, our small share to the implementation of Lebanon’s economic future—even as we honestly do not always know how. We have invested our energy for over 20 years of covering this economy and its stakeholders to the best of this magazine’s and its team’s ability. Just to give one example, as one editor was cleaning broken glass and dirt out of his personal archive of Executive back issues after the Beirut Port explosion (thankfully, while several editors and team members saw their homes wrecked by the blast, no one in our team suffered any major injury), he came across an issue from July 2015 with two once again frighteningly relevant stories, one on the need to develop a national port management and maritime strategy despite deafening silence by Lebanese administrations with regard to this need, and the other on the dangers of the persistent parity regime on the Lebanese lira under the country’s long-standing monetary policies.

Our writers and editors are sad, angry, and extremely tired of trying to accurately describe economic and business realities while we all around us watch others—including some media that are very vocal about their rights—that distort and obfuscate facts and disregard professional ethics. Those of us, who are determined to remain in Beirut as long as whatever divine agency affords us this power, recognize that those members of the editorial team who have over the past two months determined to depart from Lebanon and who have successfully negotiated new opportunities outside of this country, have richly earned their upward career moves. Executive also acknowledges that one cannot blame any Lebanese who will use any available opportunity to look for a sustainable future beyond the confines of the land where the proponents of the old system have already—just over one week after the Beirut Port explosion—started playing their old devious games of grabbing for ever more power and refusal of responsibility. 

But the old political joke which circulated in East Germany in the late 1980s—that the last one to leave the country should switch off the lights—does not work in Lebanon. Other than the state that has to be built here, with immediate urgency, on new foundations, there is no polity and no other state for more than four million Lebanese. Executive is convinced that the stresses and mental recuperation needs of the Lebanese economic stakeholders, including us, put this country up for a mission impossible but we at this magazine believe against all understandable flight impulses and motivations to escape that all economic actors remaining in this country (a country where millions are deprived of the chance to seek for better futures anywhere but at home) have no choice but achieve this mission of restoring a viable economy under a real political equation in an equitable societal system by investing their every ounce of enthusiasm, professionalism, and entrepreneurial spirit.    

Lifetime fight

The third practical contradiction with relevance to the urgent need to elevate the Lebanese system to a higher level is the contradiction that you can’t defeat corruption but have to fight it anyway. This is the case whether the diagnosed corruption is from the start really intentional or a fateful systemic product of the Dunning-Kruger effect, whereby incompetent individuals cannot be cognizant of their incompetence (especially in a hierarchy with no or bounded meritocratic structures), in combination with the Peter principle whereby people in conventional hierarchies tend to rise to positions that reflect their achievement of incompetence. In looking at the historic trajectory of documented efforts of clipping corruption, one presumably can go back for over 45 centuries to the Sumerian city state of Lagash. Its ruler Urukagina—responsible for a legal code that protected the poor from undue pressures from the rich and powerful—is by present-day reading of his social innovations associated with reforms to fight corruption. There are no narratives of his corruption-fighting successes known to us but we as Executive editors are more than 99 percent confident in saying that the fight against corruption will not in the near future be crowned by a total victory (and that the validity of our special report on anti-corruption remains—if anything it has increased urgency).

This fight—which was the central focus of this pdf issue of Executive that was prepared during the month of July and that we bring you here as it was ready for publication in the first week of August 2020—is a necessary fight and one that deserves to be fought with full commitment and unconditional assumption of responsibility. To examine a commitment of fighting corruption in this country, it is not in the least necessary to go back and interpret codes that were hammered in stone over 45 centuries ago. It suffices to look back and ask about the fulfillment of a commitment made just over 45 months ago. Re-reading the inaugural address of President Michel Aoun in a destroyed Beirut apartment (a newspaper copy of his speech was another find from the recovery work after the blast), we were reminded that President Aoun on October 31, 2016 addressed Parliament by acknowledging that he was assuming “the responsibility of the highest position in the state.” Including national unity, and political and security priorities, he dedicated himself to these with view of “safeguarding the country as an oasis of peace, stability, and encounter,” elaborating furthermore that the successive and continual economic crises required a “transformational approach which begins with economic reform.”

In the urgent need of resolving the cognitive dissonances that were caused by the three catastrophes which Lebanon has suffered in the recent past, it must be asked what is needed today to implement the faith of the Lebanese in each other. Moreover, have the professed objectives and needed gains of the Lebanese been achieved as far as their trust in their state as protector and provider of rights? It is a question that every position holder and every responsibly minded resident of this country has to answer for themselves. 

While acknowledging the damaging potentials of self-interest and the futility of empty intellectual arguments when actions by good women and good men are Lebanon’s highest needs, Executive will conclude this contemplation in a second part—by taking a very brief look at four scenarios for conceptual futures.     

Four scenarios

By any sense of logic it would appear to be an extremely complex undertaking to map the possible trajectories and outcomes of the coronavirus dilemma. This is because this unprecedented global crisis in its first dimension has sparked severe negative outcomes on the levels of physical and mental health. Then, in its second dimension, it resulted in equally severe social and economic disruptions. Seven months after declaration of the pandemic, the perception just of this catastrophe alone is that the more humans learn about it, the less and less of what was assumed previously in the short history of the virus and pandemic can be presumed to be confirmed today.

By the same common sense, mapping the interactions of the three Lebanese catastrophes would constitute an even greater gamble. To give a simple example on the situation in Lebanon, the visual impression of people’s adherence to mask wearing and social distancing in the first ten days after the blast is that the sudden emergency and its aftermath of human suffering and new societal concerns has reduced the possible and practical amounts of worry power that citizens can dedicate to the coronavirus’ dangers (see story page 40). 

Notably, the rates of coronavirus infections have increased and Lebanon has been catapulted from its previous low count of daily new infections into more worrisome territory. However, the number of deaths in this country still is shown in international statistics in the very low range of less than two deaths per 100,000 population, much below the rates of around 50 per 100,000 in the US and Brazil or for the extreme outlier case of tiny San Marino with 124 deaths per 100,000 population. In the 2020 global coronavirus landscape, people are exposed heavily to incomplete and changing information. Given the very contradictory signals and their individual perceptions, some people in Lebanon will in their minds sensibly latch onto the seriousness and danger of the growing exposures to health risks (including COVID-19 risks and corollary risks for non-treatment of other illnesses in the overextended hospitalization system), while others—and especially those with daily economic survival needs—may latch onto contrarian positions. So how worried one must realistically be with regard to the COVID-19 threat in Lebanon is probably going to remain, for quite a long while, mostly a question of personal temper and disposition.   

First and worst scenario 

Correlating the possible impacts and outcomes of the economic crisis, the coronavirus crisis, and the historic Beirut Port explosion by parallel reasoning appears as another impossibility among this year’s many impossible Lebanese quests. Nonetheless, in very broad strokes it is from Executive’s perspective warranted to look at the economic future in terms of four possible outcomes—a worst-case scenario, an almost-as-bad scenario, a least-worst-case scenario, and a utopian best-case scenario.

With regard to the worst-case scenario, the signals of caution in need of adhering to are, first, the past of this country and, second, the fact that it can always become worse. Only weeks ago, voices might have quite convincingly reasoned that this country could not be falling into deeper troubles than those that it was in by the end of the second quarter of 2020. August 4 has proven all those voices to be painfully wrong. Thus it would be perilous to believe that we are today at the lowest rung of existential misery that is possible. 

The worst-case scenario for Lebanon from today’s perspective would be a next war, whether internal or external. The factors contributing to war risk for this country are unfortunately several, spanning from fears of historically aggressive non-state actors to the intransigence of belligerent neighbors and the arrogance and pressure mongering of distant powers. 

By desperate hope that wishes for a future of peace or at least non-war for this country and its surrounds, it will not come to that worst reality. However, if the experience of the last internal war in this country is any indicator, a war would be devastating for people and livelihoods overall and widen to the extreme the gap by which Lebanon is already trailing behind peer economies with profiles of highly trained human capital, cultural resources, and tourism potentials. But even more perversely, the war economy would have a few large-scale winners and even more small profiteers who would not pursue peace as long as they benefit from war.   

Second almost-as-bad scenario

An almost-as-bad scenario would be a failed-state of Lebanon that is settling, via some steps of a “most-worsened“ country, in what is now known as the fragile state index, into a lasting degree of severest fragility that cannot be distinguished from a de-facto failed-state (in the decade to 2020, Lebanon ranked as the world’s 40th to 45th most fragile state). In such an extreme state, the old dysfunctional system (the country’s most detrimental sub-ranking has consistently been in the factionalized elites sub-category that measures issues such as fragmented state institutions and gridlock among ruling elites) might linger as the zombie of perpetual doom and prevent any form of social organization. 

It seems likely, however, that Lebanon in such an organizational vacuum would still retain some of its financial markings of the past—such as inflows of family remittances from the diaspora as well as some very subdued tourism and other inbound money flows, including a relative increase of funds and human capital related to the international humanitarian economy. More detrimentally, some (falsely) indulgent and geopolitically self-interested benefactor/s might even show generous external support for Lebanon as a failed state in the Eastern Mediterranean. This means a player, with a much larger economy than Lebanon, might even support this country as one supports a vassall territory as an asset that can be deployed in geopolitical and regional power games. 

A Lebanese vasall could easily be sacrificed for greater interest or used as pawn in regional power conflicts, for example power conflicts surrounding Iran and the Gulf, or Egypt and North Africa. At the same time, whether by the suffocating effect of its stifling and chronic external debt or by its severely and lastingly curtailed economic productivity and vigor, Lebanon’s independent economy, mutual solidarity, and self-determination would be lost and any pretended sense of freedom gone. Dominated by a few satraps, the country would be descending into being a basket case of total inequality, impoverishment of the many, and lasting external dependency.  

Least-worst, perhaps

The third scenario would be that of dignified poverty and a small degree of freedom. Like the almost-as-bad scenario, this least-worst-case model could by the superficial observer be easily confused with the country’s existential status quo ante (before the three catastrophes) but its inner characteristics would differ greatly. The scenario might furthermore be evolving somewhat unpredictably, i. e. conceivably with some surprisingly productive synergies of developments realized by virtue of international influences after the three catastrophes. 

As per the conditionalities of currently offered international funds inflows on the implementation of reforms and more reforms (iterated since decades but externally enforced after August 2020), this scenario necessarily begins with reforms adopted and implemented by uncorrupted Lebanese—meaning the total-cleanup-now generation of new and untested representatives and aspiring leaders. Handheld by international expert advisors (with their own interests), they would create the constitutional and administrative core of a country whose willing allegiance to foreign interests is cemented for decades. 

Corruption would be controlled (even though no more eradicated than the flu). Politics and economy could be streamlined to comply with either the interests of the surveillance capitalist West or the data-controlled state capitalist East. Instead of being constantly disrupted by fragmented and contradictory local interests, Lebanon would be managed under coordinated interests of the geopolitical bloc that it becomes integrated in. The tradeoff, however, would dictate that it would lose its uniqueness of convivial chaos and gain the surety of dependence. This surety will fundamentally have to entail dependence on the geopolitical bloc’s dominant values but allow for collateral benefits owing to 21st century global economy elements of interdependence and mutual prosperity. Also on the historical balance sheet, Lebanon will lose all of its fake rentier economic gains of the past three decades and see its overall societal wealth greatly reduced but, going forward, could maintain and even develop a part of its economic and cultural specificity.

The utopian hope scenario of peace and prosperity 

Based on the assumption of a developmental and innovative capability of Lebanon even in a situation of dignified poverty (a relative poverty that would be dignified socially by rise of solidarity and economically by values of bootstrapping), a utopian scenario is justified in our view. Importantly, this astounding assertion has to be qualified by the notion that such a scenario of peace and prosperity, while absurd by design, would be sheer madness if presented as a comprehensive plan or coherent roadmap.  Any utopian scenario is only legitimate as a suggestion of inspirations situated in the sphere linking the absurd to the salvatory, inspirations some of which may trigger realization of micro-realities that can influence the least-worst case scenario referenced above. 

Without trying to detail any of them, Lebanon from 2020—yes, today—has an abundant potential to innovate and test economic and social solutions that can help make the future in this country (and hopefully elsewhere) more sustainable and livable. There is need for solutions in external transport, in domestic logistics and in internal public transport; need for solutions in reallocation of real estate (office and residential) for the enhancement of urban productivity; need for solutions in effective digital government and digital infrastructures of the private-sector economy; for industry, education, social security, and poverty alleviation; for channeling of savings into productive sectors, and for balancing of social capital (overused in wasta settings to the detriment of qualified individuals) and human capital. 

This reservoir of issues is just to name but the first line of items where every current need and unfulfilled want represents opportunities for multi-level entrepreneurial action, in form of policy improvement, macroeconomic integration, micro-economic innovation, and business creation. To sum it up, these potentials for Lebanese creativity are real and urgent but have two preconditions: a) that economic opportunities can be taken on basis of universal acceptance of several years of dignified poverty lying ahead and that opportunity taking has to be qualified by the expectation and willingness to satisfy the societal need for better sharing of economic and social burdens, and b) that the platform of a new system is implemented. 

As to the second precondition for economic restoration, there are no real tabula rasa precedents for systemic reinvention but there are rich precedents for both very beneficial and less successful practical transitions into new systems in the late 17th, 18th, and especially the 20th century beginning with the termination of World War II. In Lebanon, the path will in our view have to start with a systemic sweep that cleans out the old system. 

But on the human level, a beneficial transition will have improved chances if it is built upon the old guard’s assumption of moral responsibility for the Lebanon-internal attitudes and actions that built the conditions under which the three catastrophes have unfolded. Taking unconditional responsibility on the part of all entrenched and temporary leaders would set an example and contribute massively to resolution of the cognitive dissonance now ravaging the country. 

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
EntrepreneurshipLeadersOpinion

Toward building a more inclusive and resilient ecosystem

by Executive Editors August 20, 2020
written by Executive Editors

It is a time when Lebanon is constricted in boundaries like perhaps never before. Its physical land boundaries have long been—as once again recently demonstrated—marked by the contradiction of being repressively impermeable and permanently under threats, and at the same time too permeable and uncertain to offer the full protection of a territorial demarcation. Long before the political convulsions of the past 75 years, it was mainly, and sometimes only, the sea boundaries that promised the prospects that came to sustain the country—trade and migration.

But the real case for the existential constrictions on Lebanon today is raised by the country’s recently and haphazardly imposed financial and banking boundaries.

They seem to be inescapable necessities but at the same time are choking and distorting the regulated cross-border circulation of goods and services. This is as total a disruption as there can be for a country that has functioned for the last three decades as an importing country (partly by necessity and partly by political economy choice, however misguided and stupid this choice might appear in hindsight).

Even more, the new intangible boundaries mark a severe psychic disruption for a society that has perceived itself for a century as a nation defined by its history of trade, transnational commerce, and enterprise. In summary, the invisible but severe borders of late are critical restraints in two ways: first due to the simple fact that Lebanon is a trading economy, a small country with a high volume and high intensity of external economic relations as assessed relative to the size of its domestic market, and second because they threaten to suffocate the Lebanese entrepreneurial spirit, which has long been the envy of societies with superior natural but inferior mental resources.

Taking a precursory look at the state and prospects of Lebanese entrepreneurship in the middle of this national annus horribilis, Executive encountered compelling evidence that this crowd of innovators just as much as everyone else is exposed to the pain of the economic and political system’s boundless dysfunctionality. This is to say that a roundtable of tech ecosystem stakeholders at the launch event of the new incarnation of the UK Lebanon Tech Hub (see story) dedicated the first third of its discussion time to “bitching” about all that is beyond bad (even as a three-day convention might be called for to exhaust that topic).

But then, they moved on to discuss what they can do to improve things!

Entrepreneurs pursue opportunities with disregard for boundaries. This means they can move mountains. It is important to note, however, that they face a temptation to do this in contradictory ways: If entrepreneurs, tech or trade or any other sort, succeed impressively in pursuing business opportunities irrespective of the financial resources at their disposal and thus create wealth out of personal energy and very little else, they can become corrupted by their success to think that they can disregard not only business boundaries but also moral, legal, and environmental governance and social conventions. Being aware of this danger means, as several of our interviewees emphasized (see story), that Lebanese entrepreneurship in 2020 more than ever before mandates having a social message and relevance.

Combining the two above observations, it is, in the view of Executive editors, rational to see entrepreneurship, and specifically profitable and sustainable, homegrown entrepreneurship, as the proper focus of attention for many stakeholders in the Lebanese economy.

Legislators should remember to create frameworks of incorporation that will facilitate speedier and cheaper startup company registrations and especially provide a clear and well-supervised niche for social enterprises that dedicate themselves to the public good.

We call upon investors and financiers to pay attention to the needs of startups and the opportunities that supporting entrepreneurship with their investments can provide in financial and socioeconomic returns. We also urge investors to put their own interests on the backseat when negotiating deals with tech startups.

We request of banking regulators to decisively lower the barriers that in the past have strangulated many fintech hopes—because disruptive fintech companies can conceivably help in rebuilding financial trust and renewing the banking sector (probably more than any political commission), thus aiding this country’s migration to a digital banking future.

Lastly, we call upon the Lebanon’s internal and external observers of good will to view the entire economy as an entrepreneurship project, leave behind habits of complaint, abandon defeatism, and overcome incessant reiterative bitching that only acts as a barrier to the country’s already feeble chances. Let us just bet that the spirit of entrepreneurship can create Lebanon’s next annus mirabilis.

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Anti-corruptionOpinionSpecial Report

Special report on anti-corruption in Lebanon

by Executive Editors August 20, 2020
written by Executive Editors

Throughout June and July, the Executive team, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and experts both in and outside the country, was working on a special report on anti-corruption in Lebanon. 

It was to be the main focus of the magazine; we had a cover commissioned and executed perfectly by illustrator Sasha Haddad, that compared our politicians and the corruption in the country to the true virus that threatened the health of the nation. 

We were due to publish this special report in our July/August issue at the start of this month, but as we waited for the last stragglers to come through, the unthinkable happened. On August 4, an explosion at the port of Beirut ripped through the city, killing at least 180 people and wounding more than 6,000. More than a hundred thousand were left homeless, as the damage pushed out from the port in the form of a blast wave that shattered homes, hospitals, schools, and businesses in Karantina, Gemmayze, Mar Mikhael, Geitawi, and other areas of the city. It was an explosion of such magnitude that it was felt as far away as Cyprus. 

It took only seconds to destroy half the city and shatter the lives of those who lived here and those who care for them. Our own team was spared serious injury, but several of us who live close to the port saw our homes wrecked by the blast wave. In the days that followed, our focus was inward, on our own lives, as we cleared out the glass and the broken doors in a state of shock. 

The scale of the trauma, the destruction, even two weeks out, is still hard to comprehend. We can’t yet know its true impacts. 

But what we do know, is that the words written in these next pages, even though they were penned before this deadly and devastating explosion, retain every bit of their relevancy. Because this wasn’t an accident. This was gross criminal negligence. 

The corruption that has eaten at the core of life in this country was the same corruption that saw 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate sit, half in ripped bags, at the port for six years, as port authorities, the judiciary, and successive governments passed around responsibility and those with a duty of care did nothing to protect us.  

Corruption has killed and maimed so many of us, and broken the hearts of those who survived. 

Speaking to a Norweign foreign affairs magazine, Arkan el-Seblani, head of UNDP’s regional anti-corruption and integrity team in the Middle East and North Africa, and co-author of the first of the articles in this special report, said that it was not just poor control procedures at the port that resulted in this deadly blast, but that port operations are divided between many and often rival agencies, diluting responsibility between them. The port in this sense can be seen as a microcosm for successive Lebanese governments, and the ultimate example of a statist pattern of criminal negligence where responsibility was shared by all and so taken by none. 

As international donors bring in emergency aid, thoughts turn by necessity to long-term reconstruction needs. The risk for corruption to take hold is real. We need accountability on the ground to ensure there is no misuse of funds, and that those responsible for this disaster do not siphon the aid coming in to act as benefactors to their particular groups. 

Lebanon is in mourning, for those lost, for those left behind. There can be no more business as usual after this. This is the point where we say in collective voice: no more. No more evading responsibility. No more delaying reform. No more indignities foisted upon the people. 

It is our hope that the articles in this special anti-corruption report can help begin necessary conversations, on the anti-corruption movement in Lebanon, on access to information, on asset recovery (the legal framework, lessons from other states, legal tools, and specialized anti-corruption courts), and on judicial capacities.

Corruption is a virus that Lebanon has suffered from for far too long. 

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Anti-corruptionOpinionSpecial Report

Lebanon’s anti-corruption movement

by Arkan Seblani & Ghassan Moukheiber August 20, 2020
written by Arkan Seblani & Ghassan Moukheiber

Editor’s note: This piece was slightly modified after the Beirut Port explosion. It was, however, largely written prior to August 4 along with the other contributions to the anti-corruption special report.

There has not been a time in Lebanon when anti-corruption was a nationwide demand and a necessity for the preservation and development of the country as is the case today, especially in the aftermath of the calamitous Beirut Port explosion on August 4. The journey from denial to recognition to action has taken the country more than thirty years, but it is yet to materialize into concrete results that ordinary citizens feel in their daily lives. The milestones achieved so far, as limited as they may be, and lessons learned from previous experiences, offer valuable stepping stones for additional progress, only if stakeholders, including decision-makers, social activists, and international development partners are willing to stay the course and avoid the pitfalls of earlier endeavors.  

Breaking the vicious cycle  

Since the conclusion of the Taif Accord in 1989, successive Lebanese governments have not articulated and pursued a comprehensive plan to tackle corruption. Most of them did not even try. This does not come as a surprise, because corruption has become deeply intertwined with the foundations of the political establishment and indispensable for its survival. Adopting meaningful anti-corruption reforms meant nothing less than a total overhaul of the state’s modus operandi and a direct threat to the vast networks of vested interests created over the years.   

For nearly three decades, the country oscillated between outright denial of the problem and simplistic solutions that sought out quick fixes in security-based and judicial actions. Both viewpoints had their arguments. The first purported that tackling corruption head on is too problematic and that the technical modernization of public administration is the more suitable approach, while the second alleged that Lebanon has all the required laws on the books to ensure accountability and simply needs the political will to enforce them through the judiciary and oversight bodies. Needless to say, both approaches have repeatedly failed, with Lebanon consistently performing poorly on all related international indicators, such as the Global Integrity Report, the Global Competitiveness Index, the Open Budget Index, and governance indicators published by the World Bank.  

With many government officials, politicians on all sides, the media, and social activists still making the same mistakes (by adopting the approaches above and ignoring the systemic nature of the problem), the vicious cycles of expectations, failure, and disappointment will continue as politician after politician promises reform and accountability, and fails to deliver. It is increasingly evident that the country needs a different approach that addresses systemic problems with systemic solutions. The new approach will have to be more inclusive and comprehensive; be adapted to the complex national context, including public demands and political sensitivities; and be in line with successful practices from comparative experiences and relevant international standards, such the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) to which Lebanon became a state party in 2009.

The good news is that this new approach has been in the making for many years thanks to the cumulative efforts of various stakeholders that have continued their work despite frequent changes in government.   

Lebanese laws are not good enough 

A cornerstone of the new anti-corruption approach is to temper the commonly accepted paradigm, which blames the whole problem on the lack of law enforcement alone. In fact, a big part of that problem begins with major gaps in legislation itself. Those gaps create opportunities for corruption and coverups, including in areas such as public procurement, judicial organizations, conflict of interest management, the use of public spaces, and recruitment into civil service.  

Even Law 154/1999 law on illicit enrichment, which has often been championed by media campaigns and legal activists as a solution to fight impunity, is a major legislative gaffe. It offers the deceiving appearance of a legal anti-corruption instrument but could hardly hold any senior public official to account with its archaic system for asset declaration and flawed approach to criminalization and prosecution. 

Comparing existing Lebanese legislation to UNCAC provisions as well as other related international standards on judicial independence and supreme audit institutions, for example, demonstrates the critical need for thorough legislative reforms. It also unveils how this need is yet to be met despite repeated promises and declaration of political intents to fight corruption.  

Sobered by the realization that Lebanese laws suffer from major gaps that render aspirations to achieve transparency and accountability virtually obsolete, a small group of stakeholders embarked, as early as 2006, on what seemed to be the impossible feat of identifying and bridging those gaps. The group was composed of parliamentarians, organized as “Parliamentarians against Corruption,” civil society experts, specialized judges, and public officials, supported by comparative expertise provided through the United Nations and other international organizations.   

To the surprise of many, Parliament passed Law 28/2017 on access to information (see story). This was the first fruit of eleven years of hard work and savvy manoeuvring inside and outside Parliament. Soon after, Law 83/2018 on whistleblower protection was voted in, followed by Law 175/2020, which established the National Anti-Corruption Institution (NACI). The interesting observation is that these bills were adopted without explicit international pressure, compared to other important legal reforms that were adopted earlier (such as Law 44/2015 on combating money laundering and terrorism). They rather emanated from a nationally owned and driven process that was inclusive of key stakeholders, which shows that there is room in Lebanon for impactful reforms to be adopted without international pressure or interference. 

The challenge of bridging the legislative gap, however, is still far from over. Other than the importance of seeing through the full implementation of the adopted laws, it is important to note that many other bills that have been carefully developed over the years are still pending adoption, including the amendment of the infamous illicit enrichment law and the introduction of specialized provisions to facilitate asset recovery (see stories, on the legal framework, on lessons from other states, on special anti-corruption courts, and on legal tools). Also, there are bills that are being revised in Parliament without adequate participation from civil society, such as the one on judicial independence. This is in addition to bills that were adopted, but only after being amended in ways that voided them of their initial value, such as the amendment of the banking secrecy law.   

Good laws are not good enough

Another cornerstone of the new anti-corruption approach in Lebanon is to go beyond the purely legalistic approach. Even with good laws on the books, which is not yet the case in Lebanon as discussed above, the effort to ensure proper implementation requires a host of other specific interventions that should be inter-connected, achievable, and measurable.  

This is what the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2020-2025) offers. The document, which was officially adopted by the Council of Ministers on May 12, is cognizant of the importance of revamping the legal frameworks. However, it does not stop at that. It offers an integrated framework for action that recognizes the need for processes and initiatives, which also enhance institutional capacities to implement related laws, influence the behavior of individuals, and expand the anti-corruption agenda beyond generalities to the specifities of each sector, including health, customs, energy, and others.  

The strategy, which has been well-received by the international development community in Lebanon, was developed through an institutionalized interministerial and interagency process that was set up in 2011, surviving five governments and enabling the participation of more than one hundred public officials, social activists, and independent experts. It targets the achievement of seven outcomes with related details included such as key activities, timeframes, and responsible parties. The outcomes include completing and activating specialized legislation; enhancing the integrity of public officials; tackling corruption risks in public procurement; strengthening the independence and the capacity of the judiciary as well as those of oversight bodies including the Central Inspection, the Audit Bureau, and others; engaging with society including citizens, civil society organizations, educational institutions, and the media; and preventing corruption at the sector-specific level, from education and healthcare to energy and public services.

The ministerial-level anti-corruption committee, which oversaw the strategy’s development, was expanded under the current government to oversee implementation. It is still headed by the prime minister, but now includes 10 ministers instead of four. It will also continue to be supported by the technical anti-corruption committee, headed by the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, and inclusive of senior representatives of key ministries and concerned judicial, regulatory, oversight, and law enforcement bodies.  

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as other international partners, have committed to support implementation efforts, which were officially kickstarted in June with the establishment of specific task forces responsible for key priorities (e.g. operationalization of the NACI) and the organization of meetings with civil society and the international community to coordinate efforts and explore avenues for collaboration and mutual reinforcement.   

What about political will? 

Central to the success of the new anti-corruption approach, which has evolved over the years and is embodied in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, is strong and sustained political will. The latter manifests itself in many ways including but not limited to the quality of policies and laws adopted, the resources made available for their implementation, and the willingness of those in power to respect the rule of law.  

In 1999, when representatives of the then-budding Lebanese Transparency Association, including one of the authors, wanted to deposit the founding documents with the Ministry of Interior according to the law, they were rejected. The responsible civil servant in the Department of Political Affairs, Parties, and Associations at the time, explained that that there is no corruption in Lebanon, so there is no need to set up such an association, and that, in any case, this is not the business of civil society. This attitude, which is telling on its own, may have changed over the years, but not sufficiently. Senior government officials in 2020 still wonder why civil society is requesting and publishing information on public funds—in reference to the work of the Gherbal Initiative and other similar organizations under the access to information law (see story).  

Uncertainty about political will continues to loom over anti-corruption efforts in Lebanon, and subsequently impact the chances for the new approach to take root and succeed. So far, many of the milestones outlined above can be said to have been achieved under the radar, with minimal involvement from political players and the public opinion alike; but the way forward will have to be different. It will offer real tests for the new government that will be formed and for political will more broadly, but also for the public will that emerged in the aftermath of the uprising on October 17, 2019.

Moving forward 

In moving forward, it would be important to study factors that have enabled the progress achieved so far, despite political instability and relatively limited national and international support, and distil recommendations that may accelerate the pace of reform and guide future efforts for the remainder of what may be a long journey ahead. Among those, a few stand out: 

  • Invest time and effort in inclusive and specific reforms that tackle the many existing gaps in policies, procedures, and laws. 
  • Identify reform drivers in Parliament, government, the judiciary, and the public administrations, and establish appropriate formal and informal collaborative arrangements with them—alliances with people on the inside are indispensable. 
  • Engage with different stakeholder groups and non-governmental organizations and support them to enhance their technical capacity and build trust among them—a well-informed and tightly-knit demand side is key. 
  • Set up meaningful collaboration with international experts who have practical experience and understand the national context—benefit from those who have done it before.   
  • Anchor the anti-corruption reform discourse in UNCAC, relevant international standards as well as concrete practical experiences from comparable contexts—anti-corruption is no longer an internal matter, it is a global agenda. 
  • Reinforce the broadest possible ownership of every milestone achieved, and anchor it in formal and informal networks at the national and local levels—the more, the stronger. 
  • Capitalize on the platform created by the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and support its implementation and eventual development as needed—put promises to the test.   

It is very difficult, even impossible, to envision financial and economic recovery in Lebanon without the introduction of deep governance reforms, with anti-corruption being front and center, especially in the aftermath of the Beirut Port explosion. However, the effort against corruption will be ill-advised to fall back into the vicious cycle that has dominated this topic for the last thirty years. The new approach that has evolved, slowly but surely, offers a way out of this cycle and a way forward for Lebanon, and provides stakeholders with many lessons learned to sustain and increase the momentum for anti-corruption reforms that impact the lives of citizens and the future for new generations.

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Access to Information LawAnti-corruptionOpinionSpecial Report

Lebanon’s struggle for the right to information

by Celine Merhej & Assaad Thebian August 20, 2020
written by Celine Merhej & Assaad Thebian

In the three and a half years since Parliament passed Law 28/2017 on access to information (A2I) some progress has been made but there remain barriers to full implementation. Calls for greater transparency and accountability were a major component of the demands of the Lebanese who took to the streets in October last year, seen as key in the fight against and the prevention of corrupt practices. Improving on the currently opaque structure of the Lebanese state would act as a barrier to corruption and the A2I law, in theory, can be used as a supporting tool if the Lebanese want to hold their officials to account and help foster a more open culture within government institutions—if it is implemented in full and a proposed amendment that would weaken the law is prevented through continued stakeholder pressure. 

Implementation by decree?

Although adopting A2I was a milestone by itself, it cannot be called a full success until it is implemented and enforced by all public administrations—and progress on this front has been slow. One of the biggest barriers so far has been the lack of an implementation decree for A2I. Several administrations, championed by the Directorates General of the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, have insisted that the law is not applicable before the issuance of an implementation decree—a stance they have maintained despite three separate opinions issued by the Committee of Legislation and Consultation at the Ministry of Justice that have stated the law was applicable regardless. Very few administrative bodies, when challenged on this assumption, have relented and provided the information requested of them. 

It is also imperative to note that the government and the presidency who have refused to implement A2I, with the excuse that the law requires an implementation decree to come into effect, are those whose job it is to issue this decree—a continuation of a civil war era tradition that was intended as a way to facilitate, not limit, laws when Parliament was unable to convene—and who have failed in that duty for three and a half years. The message this sends is clear: Those responsible for issuing the decree have failed to do so while simultaneously insisting the law cannot be enforced without this decree, with the logical conclusion being that the desire to fully implement A2I is low. 

Mixed success

This reluctance to abide by A2I has not been universal, however. While some administrations still refuse to implement the law when approached, others, such as the Office of Minister of State for Administrative Development (OMSAR) and the Directorate General of the Ministry of Industry, have taken a proactive approach by publishing most of what is required by A2I—laws, regulations, ministerial decisions, annual reports, the administration’s yearly expenditures and revenues, and all expenses that exceed LL5 million—on their official websites. There seems to be a notable rift between those public administrations that are abiding by A2I and an old guard who continues to operate without implementing these legal measures, as if the law is being interpreted differently within the same state—that is, if the administration is even aware of the law to begin with. 

While monitoring the implementation of the law, our organization, the Gherbal Initiative, a non-profit that seeks to act as a bridge between citizens and public institutions, found that several administrations—as well as many Lebanese citizens—were unaware that the law even existed. Our most recent report on the commitment of Lebanese administrations to the provisions of A2I, released in September 2019, garnered responses from just 68 out of 133 contacted administrations, and of these, only 33 complied with requests to view their fiscal budgets. This was, however, an improvement on our initial report, released in September 2018, a year and a half after the law was first published, for which only 34 of the 133 admissions had responded, only 18 of which had an information officer as per the law—15 of whom were appointed at our request. Despite this slow initial implementation of the law, there were and are hopeful signals. Those 18 administrations who were responsive all did so within the legal deadline of 15 working days and showed no hesitation moving toward a more transparent environment.

Positive signals

These initial successes have been made due to the continuous pressure of stakeholders (civil society, lawyers, INGOs, and some public administrations such as OMSAR) over the past three and half years, amplified by the demands for transparency and accountability of Lebanese citizens in the October uprising. More recently, there have been further positive signals regarding anti-corruption measures in Lebanon with implications for A2I.

At the end of April, Parliament adopted an anti-corruption decree (published in the Official Gazette in May as Law 175/2020), which established the long-awaited National Anti-Corruption Institute (NACI). Also in May, the cabinet adopted the first National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Working groups will be formed in accordance with this strategy, with the first group specifically dedicated to the implementation of Law 175 by enforcing the national action plan developed by OMSAR in consultation with various civil society organizations working in this field and with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 

The NACI, which must be established within three months as stipulated by the new anti-corruption law (and at the time of writing was on track to be completed by end July), has implications for A2I as well as Law 83/2018 on whistleblower protection, Law 84/2018 on transparency in oil and gas, and Law 154/2009 against illicit enrichment. Regarding A2I, the NACI is supposed to receive complaints against non-complying entities, raise awareness among the public on the importance of this law, and monitor the law’s implementation. In its absence, the latter two roles have been left to civil society groups, while the first was adopted by the State Council, which issued a decision in December 2019 taking responsibility as the valid court to look into access to information disputes in the absence of the NACI. This June, there was a ministerial meeting aimed at accelerating the appointment of the six independent NACI members. 

Keeping up the pressure

Moving forward, A2I still faces many challenges that will require continued pressure from stakeholders to overcome. A new A2I law amendment has been submitted to the Parliament and is currently being discussed by the Legislative and Administrative Committee, this offers opportunity for improvements but also can be used to undermine the power of the law. 

The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), which has been among the civil society groups pushing for A2I and its implementation, submitted a legal review of A2I to lawmakers to positively influence the draft amendment of the law. Among its nine recommendations to improve A2I and ensure it complies with international standards was to amend the law so that administrations would no longer be able to unilaterally reject information requests, which can currently be done through the “misuse of the right” clause in article 1 of the A2I law. Instead, the proposed amendment would require a judgement from the NACI on whether the “misuse” clause is applicable in any given case. Another amendment suggested by the LTA is to change article 5 of the law, which currently prevents access through information requests to documents listed under that article, to instead mandate that if any of the listed documents are requested under A2I then the administration must apply a public interest test to them and release them if it falls in the public interest to do so—any disputes regarding what fell under the public interest would be settled by the NACI. 

Not all proposed changes are positive, however. A major challenge to the effectiveness of A2I is the insistence of several political powers to limit the law by amending it to include a need to establish a clear “capacity and interest” to use it. What is being proposed is that any requests for information could be blocked by administrations unless the person making the information request is able to establish their capacity—meaning those requesting information relating to a specific municipality or village would have to be a resident of, or originally be from, that village, or have work with the administration related to that area—and interest—meaning the data is necessary for their work. This proposed amendment would severely limit those able to use the law to a point that would render the law completely ineffectual.

Outside of the text of the law, other challenges to A2I’s full implementation can be attributed to the lack of online platforms or data collection tools, which public entities are stating as a reason for their inability to give proper responses or disseminate law-enforced public data. Once again, it is civil society groups that are stepping up to address the scarcity of available data. Public-space focused NGO Nahnoo has launched a municipal portal to ease information sharing, Democracy Reporting International has significantly raised awareness on the importance of A2I for sustainable local governance, Gherbal has built ten municipal websites in collaboration with UNDP to facilitate public data circulation and has launched an online portal (Ellira.org) that crunches, visualizes, and eases the search for public figures from the national budget to customs data. Several other projects such as ShinMimLam and Open Data Lebanon have also emerged in the last few months to help citizens reach public statistics, numbers, and figures, and put more combined pressure to aid Lebanon administrations’ transformation into digitally ready and transparent bodies.  

It has been slow progress from the state’s end, and there are still many obstacles and challenges ahead of the A2I law, but honest progress has been made through concrete steps taken by individuals and organizations. Ultimately, full implementation of the law requires political will among the government, MPs, political parties, and public servants to abide by drafted laws and, most importantly, to implement the decades-long promises of reform and accountability. Civil society has brought the law this far, we will not sit on the sidelines but will continue to monitor and pressure the government to ensure Lebanon will adapt to the new challenges that lie ahead. Access to information is a fundamental right, one that will help shape Lebanese political discourse and hold politicians and other persons in power accountable—it is a necessary step in the fight against corruption. 

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Anti-corruptionAsset RecoveryOpinionSpecial Report

How could asset recovery work for Lebanon?

by Carine Tohme August 20, 2020
written by Carine Tohme

Each year, developing countries lose between $20 to $40 billion due to bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. These criminal acts drain economic development initiatives, contribute to further impoverishment, and come with other societal costs, such as the negative impact on education and public health services. One way of combating these practices is through recovering assets siphoned from the public sector by public servants—elected, or nominated—and their accomplices. How does this process work, and could it work in the Lebanese context? 

An asset recovery process begins by collecting information and tracing the assets of the concerned persons with the first objective of determining whether the value of their assets is compatible with their regular income or not and then determining where these assets are located. This first phase could be as simple as looking at public records, such as the property register and the commercial registry in Lebanon, or could involve a more in-depth search that would require experts to use forensics to trace the assets, notably when they are hidden in complex structures in the country or abroad.

In addition to the public records in Lebanon, valuable sources of information can be reports and documentaries published by NGOs or journalists, information provided by whistleblowers to the soon to be formed National Anti-Corruption Institution (NACI), oversight public bodies such as the Central Inspection and the Audit Bureau, and, most importantly, a serious forensic audit of all public accounts. 

It is very important to highlight the importance of international cooperation in collecting information and tracing assets at this initial fact-finding stage. The Ministry of Finance, for instance, is vested with special powers to acquire tax-based information from foreign financial and fiscal entities and administrations by virtue of Law 55/2016 on the exchange of information for tax purposes (though these powers have not been used to date). Also, the Special Commission of Investigation (SIC) at the central bank can directly address all Lebanese and foreign authorities in order to ask for needed information and access details of investigations in other countries, by virtue of Law 44/2015 on combating money laundering and terrorism (it had similar powers under Law 318/2001 but these powers were improved upon). This phase of the asset recovery process must be strictly confidential. 

Once the needed information is collected and the assets traced and located, the initial fact-finding phase is followed by the four other phases of asset recovery—securing the assets, the court process, enforcement of judgements, and the return of assets (see box below)—as detailed in the asset recovery handbook of the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR). Notably, all phases of asset recovery involve international cooperation. 

Using tools at hand

Lebanon has all the needed legislative tools internally and internationally to seek and secure the return of assets, though some require improvement and all require the political will to implement. Thus far there has been no major case of asset recovery using any of the below cited laws, raising serious questions as to the levels of corruption in Lebanon and the lack of independence of the judiciary. 

From the outset, the 1943 Criminal Code outlaws bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, trading of influence, and abuse of function. Lebanon also has Law 154/1999 on illicit enrichment, updated once already in 2009. This law has loopholes that made its enforcement impossible (such as a bank warranty of LL25 million as a prerequisite to submit a complaint and the risk of a LL200 million fine and three months to one year imprisonment for the person who filed the complaint if the charges are dropped), and is currently subject to new amendments. Law 44/ 2015 on combatting money laundering and terrorism can also serve, along with the special powers given to the SIC by virtue of the law (detailed above), as a powerful legislative tool for asset recovery. 

Moreover, Lebanon has recently adopted a series of laws aiming at increasing transparency and preventing and fighting corruption: Law 55/2016 on the exchange of information for tax purposes (and its implementing decree 1022/2017), Law 60/2016 on tax residence, Law 75/2016 on bearer shares (shares that can be transferred anonymously), Law 28/2017 on access to information, Law 83/2018 on the protection of whistleblowers, Law 106/2018 on defining beneficial ownership, Law 175/2020 against corruption in the public sector (which also established the NACI), and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy approved by the Council of Ministers on May 12, 2020. It is worth noting that in addition to updates to the illicit enrichment law, amendments to the 1956 banking secrecy law is also being discussed in Parliament committees. 

These legislative measures, among others not listed above, have been adopted by Lebanon as part of the execution of the country’s obligations toward the international community, since Lebanon is party to the UN Convention against Corruption in addition to other international conventions relating to the international cooperation in tax matters, such as the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC) and the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) on automatic exchange of financial account information. 

Given all the above, the legislative tools that already exist within Lebanon and the agreements with other nations, why is asset recovery still challenging in the Lebanese context? 

Roadblocks ahead

In addition to the challenges inherent to asset recovery, Lebanon has demons of its own. The Lebanese judicial system is known for its lack of independence. This is one of the main obstacles to asset recovery in Lebanon. Lebanon’s General Prosecution, judicial police, investigative judges, and criminal judges have a primary role in investigating crimes of corruption and in conviction, confiscation, compensation, and cooperation with their peers abroad. The independence of the judiciary is a necessity to recover the international community’s trust in Lebanon and to begin an efficient asset recovery process.  

The other main obstacles inherent to the Lebanese environment are the absence of an effective national strategy for asset recovery, the constitutional immunities from prosecution afforded to the President of the Republic, the deputies and the ministers, and most importantly, the lack of will shown thus far by the Lebanese state with regard to asset recovery.  

Beyond these Lebanon specifics, a common obstacle faced by states seeking to launch the asset recovery process is funding. Asset recovery is a long and complex process that involves cross-border cooperation; therefore, it is very expensive. The funding issue is aggravated amid the current economic crisis in Lebanon, nevertheless, this is an obstacle that can be overcome, through, for example, creating a national fund for asset recovery that would auto-finance the process out of the asset recovered. A draft of an asset recovery bill is currently being discussed in a Parliament sub-committee, foreseeing the creation of such a fund. Others could also participate in funding the process of asset recovery, such as the Lebanese diaspora and the international community, but only if the process is promising and the government behind it has proven its commitment to the process. 

Haiti, Nigeria, Kenya, Ukraine, Brazil, among others, were able to recover assets with the support of foreign countries such as Switzerland. Yet, the four main elements that were present every time a recovery was successful were: a change in political regime, the political will translated into a reinforcement of anti-corruption legislation and bodies, the combination of formal and informal international co-operation tools, and finally settlements and plea agreements whereby corrupt officials would repatriate a substantial part of the stolen funds and would resign, in exchange of partial or a total amnesty. 

International conventions along with the legislative efforts of foreign countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland have made it more feasible to return assets through international cooperation. Yet so far, there has been no serious attempt by any Lebanese government, current or previous, to embark on asset recovery. Regardless of the challenges, asset recovery is a necessary step on the path to a more transparent, more accountable Lebanese state—one that will abide by practices that discourage rather than enable corruption.

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Anti-corruptionAsset RecoveryOpinionSpecial Report

How Lebanon can learn from other countries’ experiences with asset recovery

by Richard Messick August 20, 2020
written by Richard Messick

Recovering assets corrupt officials have stolen while in government service is a critical part of a government’s fight against corruption. First of all, it deters corruption. If those who would steal from the public while ostensibly serving it know they have little chance of keeping what they take, they will be less tempted to steal it in the first place. Second, a vigorous, forceful asset recovery effort demonstrates a government’s commitment to combating corruption and thus helps bolster citizens’ confidence in its officials.  

Lebanon is one of 187 nations that have ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The recovery of stolen assets is a “fundamental principle” of the convention, and states that parties are obliged to offer one another the “widest measure of cooperation” in the search for and confiscation of stolen assets. In 2007, the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime created the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative or StAR to help low- and medium-income countries with asset recovery.  StAR’s “Asset Recovery Watch Database,” the most authoritative source of information on nations’ efforts to recoup stolen assets, shows that from 1990 until today Lebanon has not yet initiated a single case to recover assets stolen by a corrupt public official.    

Steps in the right direction

The current government took an important step to curb corruption with passage of the anti-corruption law that was published in the Official Gazette early May. It should take a second, equally important one: the launch of a determined effort to recover assets officials of previous governments have stolen and hidden abroad.  

The way to begin is with the creation of an office within the newly created National Anti-Corruption Institution (NACI) devoted solely to locating and recovering stolen assets. A handful of professionals, no more than say five to begin, could be hired to focus solely on the recovery of stolen assets. The cost would be modest—salaries plus office support—when compared with the potential benefits. 

Member states of the European Union (EU) have been required to have a specialized asset recovery office for over a decade. Some of the larger asset returns since these offices were created are shown in the table below. In addition to these, two non-EU countries with asset recovery specialists, Switzerland and the United States, have between them returned in excess of $3 billion over the past decade plus. The StAR database shows in addition dozens of recoveries in the several hundred thousand dollar to $1 million range. Even one such recovery would more than pay the costs of operating a Lebanese asset recovery office. 

There are important advantages to centralizing responsibility for asset recovery. It is firstly a way to build expertise on a complex area of law and international finance. Asset recovery requires an in-depth knowledge of the asset recovery procedures in the UN Convention, the international legal principles governing receipt of information from other nations, methods for tracking cross-border financial flows, and forensic accounting techniques. Assigning responsibility for this work to a small, dedicated team of professionals is the surest way to build expertise in these disciplines.  

A dedicated asset recovery office also helps develop the personal relationships with counterparts in other nations. The European experience and elsewhere shows that such relationships are crucial. Key to almost every successful return has been information gleaned through informal channels: telephone calls, emails, and visits with police, prosecutors, or investigating magistrates in other states. Information about stolen assets can be quite sensitive, however, and will only be shared if these sources are sure they can trust it will be handled appropriately. As personnel in a Lebanese asset recovery office meet and interact with asset recovery specialists in other nations, a natural outgrowth should be the trust and confidence that facilitates information sharing.   

As relationships between Lebanese authorities and those in countries where assets may be hidden develop, authorities in these asset “holding states” will become more willing to devote time and effort to help recover the assets. A corrupt official who hides money in a foreign jurisdiction inevitably runs afoul of the jurisdiction’s anti-money laundering laws. In the best of circumstances, prosecutors in a holding state will, when alerted by colleagues in an asset recovery office, open a money laundering investigation. Most of the returns by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland were realized in this way. Working with personnel from the victim state, prosecutors in these countries used the confiscation procedures in their domestic anti-money laundering laws to seize and then return the assets.   

Mentorship from outside

The skills required for a successful asset recovery effort are not taught in school. Creation of a specialized asset recovery unit should be accompanied by a plan for training the lawyers, accountants, financial professionals, and other personnel that will staff it. StAR, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) all offer asset recovery training. An important complement to a training program is embedding an experienced asset recovery specialist in the new office, a mentor who can bring his or her expertise and contacts to bear on cases the office is pursuing. ICAR has a mentoring program and the U.S. Justice Department has also provided mentors.   

The training provided by StAR, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, and ICAR is usually delivered on-site, but in these days of the pandemic the courses have moved online. They are usually offered at no cost to the recipient country. At most, if participants must travel to another country the sponsoring government may be asked to pay their expenses. The mentoring programs run by ICAR and the U.S. Department of Justice are funded by their governments. The European Union, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other bi- and multilateral donors also support asset recovery training and mentoring programs.  

Between the hands-on assistance prosecutors in holding states can provide to locate and confiscate assets stolen from Lebanon and the training opportunities donor organizations provide, Lebanon need not spend scarce resources on the many law and accounting firms and private detective agencies that can be expected to “pitch” their services. These firms do indeed have a great deal of experience recovering assets siphoned from corporations by fraud, but they are expensive. Moreover, once a holding state’s authorities open a case, they have powers no private firm has to obtain information.  

Some private firms have offered to help countries recover assets on a no or low-cost basis by agreeing to work for a percentage of any amount recovered. A return of tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars means the firm will realize an enormous sum, far exceeding a reasonable fee for its work even accounting for the risk it takes that it will receive nothing if no assets are recovered. A Swiss law firm was paid $24 million, 4 percent of the $600 million Nigeria recovered from Switzerland, for little work, and a Nigerian firm with no international experience will receive 5 percent for any recovery on another case. The amount paid to the Swiss firm and the potential amount the Nigerian firm could receive have raised questions in Nigeria about the size of the fees and fuelled citizens’ suspicions that the process itself has been corrupted.    

The Lebanese government should create an asset recovery office and launch an asset recovery process without delay. With a strong commitment from it and assistance from the international community, there is no reason why assets stolen from the Lebanese people cannot be found and returned.   

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Anti-corruptionAsset RecoveryOpinionSpecial ReportSpecialized anti-corruption courts

Does Lebanon need a special anti-corruption court?

by Sofie A. Schuette August 20, 2020
written by Sofie A. Schuette

In June, Parliament’s Anti-Corruption Subcommittee began discussing the establishment of a special court on financial crimes. Its proposed jurisdiction ranges from counterfeit and forgery of money and documents to bribery and abuse of power by public officials on active and former duty. Such a scope of offenses would fall under what we at the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, a knowledge hub on corruption and anti-corruption policies worldwide, have called a “specialized anti-corruption court.”  

Over the last two decades, the number of countries that chose to have a special judicial body, division, or set of judges with a substantial or exclusive focus on corruption-related cases has grown. In a 2015 mapping exercise, U4 found around 20 existing anti-corruption courts and we know of at least five more that have been set up since. More countries, such as Armenia and now Lebanon are debating their establishment. 

Different degrees of institutional separation and specialization come with different costs and benefits. Anti-corruption courts are latecomers to a trend toward more judicial specialization, following special juvenile and family courts, or commercial courts, among others. A World Bank paper on developing specialized court services found that, as a rule of thumb, a greater degree of institutional separation will be more appropriate when the caseload is higher, when the need for efficiency is greater, and when the need for specialized expertise is more acute. 

In our research on anti-corruption courts, U4 found that the most common argument made for special anti-corruption courts is indeed the need for efficient resolution of corruption cases. Reformers want to signal to domestic and international audiences that their country is serious about anti-corruption efforts. In Indonesia and Ukraine, concerns about the integrity of the regular courts were the main reason for setting up special courts with distinct features to insulate them from malpractices and undue influence. In these two countries, anti-corruption court judges are selected from not only within the judiciary but also from among qualified non-career judges, such as law professors and other legal practitioners (accountants have been appointed in Indonesia, for example). In Ukraine, the selection process even includes a panel of international experts with the aim to render the selection process more independent. In Slovakia, concerns about the integrity of the judiciary led to the initial security screening of the candidates for the special court by the National Security Agency. This was later revoked, then extended to all judges by the Constitutional Court. This is an example of how special courts can pilot and lead on new standards for the whole judiciary.

Setting up a special system comes with costs and a new court may compete for resources needed for more general court reforms. Even the appointment of just a handful of specialized judges can constitute a substantial brain drain from the general court system if the pool of judges in a country is not large to begin with. Due to the limited baseline data available in the jurisdictions that have set up anti-corruption courts, it is impossible to make a scientifically sound assessment regarding any improved effectiveness and efficiency of the new courts. This is also because their performance cannot be seen in isolation as it depends on the quality of the evidence and charges brought forward by the  investigating and prosecuting bodies. 

When discussing whether to establish a specialized anti-corruption court, it is therefore critical to first carefully evaluate what problem specialization is meant to overcome. Is it something that can only be addressed through specialization, or are reforms to the general court system, law enforcement agencies, or the criminal procedure code, or a combination of these, a better alternative? 

Such thorough analysis should precede decisions on the institutional design of a specialized court. The models U4 studied range from individual judges with special certification to hear corruption cases, to special branches or divisions and separate, stand-alone units within the judicial hierarchy. There is no one correct approach or clear best practices that can be copied and pasted from one country to another, but there are some common, fundamental questions that reformers should keep in mind when elaborating the design of a specialised court (as detailed on U4’s website):  

  • Where to place the anti-corruption court in the judicial hierarchy, i.e. whether specialization should extend to the appeals level. 
  • How large the court should be—the number of judges.
  • The substantive scope of the anti-corruption court’s jurisdiction. 
  • The relationship between the specialized anti-corruption court and the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor—such as the country’s anti-corruption agency, if one exists. 

Reformers also need to consider whether to make any special provision for the selection, removal, or working conditions of the anti-corruption court judges, and adopt substantially different procedures for the anti-corruption courts compared to similar criminal cases in regular courts. Special procedures may be necessary if inadequate procedures in the general court system are part of the reason for specialization, and if those procedures cannot or should not be changed generally.  

All this needs to be well-thought through, because the high-profile defendants in large-scale corruption cases are typically well-resourced and their legal defense team will likely use their full legal arsenal and seek out any loopholes and legislative and regulatory lapses.

August 20, 2020 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 42
  • 43
  • 44
  • 45
  • 46
  • …
  • 685

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

[contact-form-7 id=”27812″ title=”FooterSubscription”]

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • Instagram
  • Linkedin
  • Youtube
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE