Outlook

To rise from rubble

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

The critical acceleration of Lebanon’s deeply entrenched housing crisis can be easily attributed to the degradation of the country’s building stock due to the Hezbollah – Israel war and Israeli invasion of 2024. One year after the escalation of Israel’s war against national territory and nine months on from the aggressive neighbor’s violent assertion of continual military dominance over the southern Lebanese lands in their self-defined interest zone, occupation has not ended, notwithstanding the highly touted October 2025 ceasefire agreement in occupied Gaza. From the perspective of national housing and livelihoods, enemy presence in Lebanon reigns on in continued destruction and hidden displacement.

What is documented from last year’s mayhem is that building stock was victimized in this conflict more than any other aspect of the Lebanese economy and livelihoods.  Some $14 billion worth of economic losses and damages were recorded in the aftermath of this latest confrontation. This aggregate devastation was the outcome of a period of three-month intense war that occurred last fall in the envelope of a 15-month conflict between October 8, 2023 and December 20 of 2024. Further damages and economic losses—not yet captured in detail—have since dragged on, occurring in the nine months of the year to date.

Of these 15 months of Lebanese losses and destruction, 51.5 percent were counted by the World Bank in the category of economic losses. On top of these $7.2 billion, the World Bank’s Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment for Lebanon (RDNA) estimates that, housing “is the most affected sector with damage costs amounting to US$4.6 billion, or 67 percent” of $6.8 billion in damages suffered by the Lebanese until the end of last year.

Moreover, reconstruction needs in the housing sector – representing $6.3 billion, or 57 percent of total conflict recovery costs of an estimated $11 billion that are required between 2025 and 2030 – are estimated to substantially exceed the $4.6 billion of damages and destruction inflicted on building stock.

Clarifying the reconstruction outlook

In assessing the heavy socioeconomic impact on the housing sector as well as the resulting needs, it is necessary to avoid a common misperception that property is wealth. Concentration of wealth in luxury properties and large real estate holdings certainly exists in Lebanon and is highly inequitable. But associating high levels of ownership of first residences in Lebanon with wealth, is incorrect. Thus, the property landscape attribute of distributed property ownership, which is actually comparatively widespread in society, cannot be equated with social resilience.

The gap between people’s home ownership and their perception of own economic wellbeing has widened since 2020. In a 2023 survey conducted by pollsters IPSOS on behalf of German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 70 percent of respondents in a representative sample indicated that they own their home (residential unit). Yet according to the survey, a majority – 58 percent of respondents (albeit with substantial regional differences) – describe their living conditions as “poor or very poor”, versus 35 percent considering them “average” and 7 percent who say their living conditions are “good or very good”.

Conducted shortly before the country was exposed to the shock of the October 7, 2023 events in neighboring Israel and without inquiring about expectations of new conflict shocks, the survey sought to map the impact of the then-ongoing economic and financial crisis on the socioeconomic and political landscape of Lebanon. Already months before escalating shocks of conflict started to shake the region, Lebanon’s socioeconomic situation was under such pressure that home ownership, even free of housing loan obligations, could not be regarded as viable store of value that is readily accessible via well-functioning property and mortgage markets. 

In the larger setting of the post-economic-meltdown, the post-war situation of fiscal insolvency and lingering political bankruptcy, of peak multidimensional poverty and galloping inequality, the socioeconomic situation of 2025-35 is not stable, even if the overall economy has started to be on a recovery track. The shouldering of reconstruction costs of devastated housing by private households – despite some governmental easing of duties for owners of affected properties and despite a few new lending schemes in real estate finance – will be prohibitive for many years.

An immobile status quo gets violently disrupted 

A second notable attribute of the Lebanese housing sector is a mixture of speculative pockets with overall stagnation. This dichotomy can be observed over the three decades since the end of the country’s internal war in 1992. The 70 percent rate of home ownership reported from the 2023 survey respondents, is actually congruent with the rate of owner-occupied housing units reported years earlier by researchers for the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS).

CAS surveys in 2007 and 2009 estimated the number of primary residences at 930,500, with a 2 to 1 split between apartments and single-family houses. According to the 2004 CAS census of buildings, 71 percent of units were owned by the people living in them. Moreover, a 2012 CAS paper on Population and Housing in Lebanon says, the country had slightly over 408,500 buildings, including single homes and multi-unit ones. In an indication of value-restricting factors, the age of the building stock was reported as high, with only 21 percent of units younger than 15 years at time of the research.

The 2025 RDNA estimates on the national housing stock of 1,650,000 units in 2024 is not easy to reconcile with CAS surveys or the correlated assumptions of national population and number of persons per household. One thing this could mean is that there is incongruity between damage estimates and reality: the destruction/damage count of 162,900 units is likely in the double-digit percent, not the 10 percent approximation of the World Bank.

The World Bank, echoing widespread lack of trust in state capacity to fund recovery, opines that more than two thirds of the rebuilding burden is expected to fall on private citizens (or, as others speculate, non-state actors and Arab donors), not on the state. In the RDNA lingo, “Given Lebanon’s predominantly private housing sector … it is estimated that around 70 percent of the infrastructure reconstruction needs (around US$ 4 billion) are expected to be privately financed. The remaining 30 percent (around US $2 billion) … are expected to be financed by the public sector to support the poorest and most vulnerable homeowners.”

How the most vulnerable home-owners will be defined and if they will enjoy the necessary political currency and unbiased administrative support for their plights, is probably a mere practical detail in the perspective of a macro-report. Given its repeated and always overburdening post-conflict reconstruction needs over almost four decades – in 1992, 97/8, 2006, and 2024/25 – the country has previously ventured into experiments from private sector investments into downtown Beirut to reliance on Arab and Western donors and acceptance of militia-controlled construction companies. What the Lebanese polity found out through these reconstruction and development ventures is that they unfailingly come with chains of expectations and obligations. They limit the polity from exercising true sovereignty and tie it to market logic and political logic of external powers.

Scenarios for escaping a perma-crisis of housing

The country faces simultaneous new challenges of rebuilding damaged or destroyed homes in half the governorates while also having to develop climate resilience in the highly urbanized nation. Failing to meet these challenges risks further exacerbation of the acute state of emergency and danger of the under-acknowledged housing perma-crisis.

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In an upside risk, however, developing climate resilience is seen by some as the last best chance for national action to improve urban habitats and find social living solutions. This historic opportunity is spurred on by the housing crisis’ intensity and the urgency of climate action in a country that, according to the Ministry of Environment, is much more a victim of climate problems than a proliferator.

When acknowledging that the Lebanese polity’s old “chaos-as-usual” approach to housing is not viable for anything, three development vectors vie for priority in housing the Lebanese population in dignity and with improved sustainability.

The first vector is civic initiatives, efforts of recovery and rebirth of heritage, including 20th century urban heritage. It is a consistent vector of post-conflict support as previously evidenced by determined responses to the reconstruction needs of neighborhoods hit by the 2020 Beirut Port Blast.

The vector has been noticeably active in 2025. In a pointillist impression from this summer, new projects for revitalizing Beirut’s Grand Theater and Mar Mikhael Station have been launched with civil society enthusiasm and international support by UNESCO and the Emirate of Sharjah in the former, and UNESCO and Italy in the latter project. Mediterranean neighbor country Italy moreover sponsored a September/October exhibition and series of discussions on urban renaissance projects, an initiative that Italian ambassador Fabrizio Marcelli claims was conceptualized last December, just after the end of large-scale hostilities in the 2024 war. 

Civil, non-profit, private, and municipal projects are currently in the process of offering positive impulses of living urbanity in Lebanon. But expecting their scope to change cityscapes beyond investments a few thousand to single-digit million dollars – small change when compared to investment amounts that large commercial developers and political developers like to throw around – is high-risk. It is a niche development vector that attracts young innovators and altruists.

The second development vector demanding national attention is the foreign investments and externally funded reconstruction and development vector. This ethically and politically ambiguous vector has been hotly debated in the post-war environment. Experiences with this model and concerns over vague new concepts that were proposed and rumors that were pushed in recent months, have caused immediate and multi-faceted backlash. Still, the possibility of new hare-brained investment schemes and political dependencies stands in the room.

Climate response as hope for urban rescue

 The third development vector is national ownership of the development process under integration into a global effort of tackling climate risk. This vector is a high minded sustainability scenario affiliated with the Nationally-Determined-Contributions (NDC) process devised under the Paris climate agreements of 2015. It serves two purposes: Lebanon can pursue sustainable and resilient urbanity by way of the country’s newest climate action policy package.    

The official launch of the climate action policy package for Lebanon was held, coincidentally, on the first anniversary of Israel’s escalation of attacks on Lebanon in the morning of September 23, in the regally chandeliered hall of the Grand Serail. Short, easily quotable bullet point lists and fact sheets were handed out before short official speeches in a Lebanese political gathering. The circulated handouts, printed promises for post-conflict recovery through climate action, trumpeted the country’s revised nationally determined contributions (NDC 3.0) as “practical tool for national recovery and hope”.

Climate crisis as hidden chance?
The multi-pronged challenge of making their building stock future proof for towering climate risk and the digital era is universal for nations with comparatively long histories of habitation and urban growth in the industrial age. This is demonstrated by the difficulties of meeting climate risk mitigation needs in prosperous EU countries.

In Lebanon, rehabilitation of urban water networks is mentioned in the Climate package prepared for the next Conference of Parties (COP) meeting that will convene this November in Belem, Brazil. It is in the package under the header of “building resilient cities,” prepared in conjunction with an updated set of Nationally Developed Contributions (NDC 3.0).  

NDC 3.0 stipulate the desire to achieve 22 percent reduction in Green House Gas (GHG) emissions by 2035 in an unconditional (nationally self-funded) scenario and 33 percent in a conditional one (meaning if climate action is supported by international aid). It further declares a target of reaching 20 to 35 percent of renewable energy by 2035.

The previous 2020 iteration of the same goals, which saw Lebanon submit its NDC 2.0 set admirably early, stipulated targets of 20 percent (unconditional) and 31 percent (conditional) for GHG reduction and 18 percent (unconditional) or 30 percent (conditional) in electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030.

According to the climate watch NDC tracker by US-based non-profit World Resources Institute, Lebanon’s NDC 3.0 are improved in terms of clarity and transparency as well as adaptation but do not represent a strengthening of 2030 targets.

The fact sheet of short-term targets includes upgrading drainage networks, restoring degraded ecosystems, and integrating climate risk assessment in the management of cities.

The willful intensity of its meeting’s opening presentations had proponents from involved agencies explaining the policy package by way of an 3.5 minute animation—catering to the attention span of local politicos, jaded journalists, and mundane stakeholders.

The fact sheets declared that prospective economic benefits of determined climate action would be positive for the economy and result in GDP growth by 2050 that could be 40 or 50 percent higher than in a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The printed declaration and fact sheet for Lebanon’s NDC3.0 and its short and long-term low emissions development strategy explicitly mentioned the imperative of developing climate-resilient cities.

A paltry $12.8 billion needs to be invested into climate resilience by 2035, according to the projections of the Ministry of Environment and UNDP. The provided information on finance sketched out well-known theoretical funding pathways and mentioned the Luxembourg-domiciled Lebanon Green Investment Facility (LGIF) that was announced in 2024 in collaboration with the Cedar Oxygen Fund.

The brief outline was, however, short on how and when the urgent transition to urban climate resilience would be legislated, financed, incentivized and implemented. The national plan included the short-term targeting of 2030 and long-term targeting of 2050 for aspirations such as reducing losses in the water system to the point of sustainable supply, 100 percent wastewater treatment and reuse by 2050, and 100 percent electrification of urban and rural public transport. 

Still, pushing for climate action points laudably to the needed aspiration of national sustainability. It is a conceptually viable alternative to a chaos-as-usual future of perma- and poly-crises in the crucial urbanity of Lebanon.

Whatever the cost that is not yet reconciled, whatever the political obstacles, whatever the external threats to Lebanese peace, the consequence of inaction today will be impossibly grim for the grandchildren of the current political leadership generation.

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Leaders

Houses of cards

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

No one could deny that the Lebanese inhabit a land after which many would-be military conquerors but also political expansionists and economic investors lust. There is ample evidence that this stretch of land on the Mediterranean coast must have been as highly attractive to the proverbial Roman legionnaires that have trodden here as to the deluded crusaders traversing it en route to what they saw as sacrificial conquest for the greater glory of Christendom.

Pioneering geneticists have found it fascinating to map the assemblage of the ancestries and identities of people who live today on this roughly 400 kilometers long stretch of Mediterranean lands spanning ancient Phoenician, Canaanite, and Philistine settlement areas.

Genetic logic would posit this historically hotly contested stretch of coast adorned by early urban cultures and city kingdoms as a habitat of coexistence, a collective model project of united nationalities and interactive economies. Instead, the Eastern Mediterranean coast has recently been once again brutally fragmented and claimed by multiple competing powers. In consequence, this densely populated, highly urbanized, war ravaged land with urban settlements whose living roots are among the deepest in the world, could become a route of tombs of urbanity.

Since two years, increasing numbers of scholars, media reports, activists and legal advocates have been describing the actions committed by Israel in the Gaza territory as “domicide” (domus: Latin for house), which is the deliberate and systemic destruction of homes. But I find myself having to wonder if another neo-Latin scholarly term from the late 20th century will become a byword for what is happening in Beirut: that term is urbicide (urbs: Latin for city).

A redefinition of urbicide – widened from a deliberate destruction of cities in conflicts – in light of Lebanese urban governance—could be adapted to describe a process of creeping dysfunctionality of the city as social and economic sphere.

The functional death of the city could arise from the congestive failure of urban productivity, or be caused by collapse of vital infrastructure such as water supply and drainage networks, or by organizational breakdown of informal and formal human social contracts on health, housing, education, etcetera.

 Unrestrained Anthropocene is the term I resort to for describing the insane period mankind brought upon itself since the mid-20th century that is currently shaping up into arenas of overlapping existential threats of “poly crises and perma crises” (see comment piece here).

Post-blast Beirut as a case study

This month, early in year five ABB (after the Beirut Blast), it is instructive (see story here and photo reportage here) to explore neighborhoods in port districts from Karantina to Gemmaizeh, Achrafieh, and the downtown (Beirut Central District or BCD). Karantina, as fated by old urban highway planning sins, exists in spatial isolation from the city and is the most insular and downtrodden quarter in the path of the Beirut Port Explosion.

While a much poorer quarter than others, the neighborhood also is a habitat of multi-communal diversity. Aside of street art, eye-catching murals installed post-blast on desolate walls, one of the things to see in the streets of Karantina are plaques in recognition of foreign donors that funded specific small urban rebuilding projects in the district. They adorn lamp poles, redesigned playgrounds, a new community center, and even a restored police station.

At the same time, however, Karantina shows next to no signs of vibrant economic activity of a sustainable nature (if one doesn’t count warehouses, parked trucks and speeding delivery scooters as sustainable). There is definitely no visible trace of a national strategy for urban recovery and no indication of state initiatives in terms of social housing or provision of spatial livelihood development incentives.

In the first-impression, the neighborhood looks incomparably better than in 2021 and also better that it did in the mid 2010s, with many improvements of public spaces owed to local initiatives with foreign funding. Yet one cannot overlook the dirt and garbage thrown carelessly into vacant lots, on curbs and around buildings. Accentuated by roadside presence of broken or abandoned cars, the economic fabric is one of narrow streets with interrupted sidewalks and broken pavement, where people tend to be sitting idle in front of sad looking stores of mostly marginal and informal economic activity.

Essential concerns derived from a small quarter

Well-intended micro-improvements of previously broken and dysfunctional spaces in Karantina cannot conceal that larger economic and social barriers – such as the lack of pedestrian access to adjacent parts of Beirut – are still the same as a decade ago. The five-years-ABB impression of a very sad district in this macro-social and neighborhood-business regard is just as limited, stressed and unexciting as five years BBB (before Beirut Blast).

Beirut’s fate lies in two paradigms of globalized capitalist civilization: the paradigm of urban productivity and the paradigm of the right to dignified housing. The paradigm of urban productivity affirms that economic growth happens in human agglomerations and collective productivity environments more organically than anywhere else. The right to dignified housing leaves no doubt that adequate dwelling is key to securing livelihoods in sustainable habitats under conditions of agglomeration. 

Satisfying both needs for a Lebanese community requires public intervention in the property sector as well as a well-funded housing strategy implemented by the state. Care of urban development cannot be allocated solely to civil society actors that are financially and ideologically supported by foreign development initiatives.

In an uncomfortable lesson from humble Karantina, self-inflicted urbicide is a danger that no nice ideas and donor-funded micro-projects will avert if Beirut continues down its current path. That is, if it continues to be a city where the powerful can achieve their interests without equitably contributing to the city’s productivity while the bulk of its economic body, the labor force and their families, gradually suffocates.

Why it matters

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal #11 (SDG11) is to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.” It affirms housing and sustainable urbanity not only as a human right but also as a goal on which the community of nations has agreed.

However, the non-achievement of SDG11 by the target line of 2030 is 99.9 percent certain, judging by the latest SDG “progress” report of June 2025. This, and the protracted failure (seemingly over 80 percent probability) of realizing the sustainable development goals and the ever-more pressing climate goals by 2050, are humongous moral failures. With the non-achievement of SDGs also comes an economic debt to the future, a debt whose severity is further exacerbated by climate debt.

In these past fifty years, the urban value-added has driven the global development story, solidifying in formation of more and more megacities on all populated continents. In the long history of the city, there can be no doubt of the construction of social walls that accompanied the societal wins of urban safety and freedom. The formation of slums for the precariat and of privileged ghettos for the very rich are part and parcel of the human experience of urban agglomeration.

Skills clustering, creation of new urban productivity, and belonging to a city of whose output, identity, and inclusiveness its people can be justifiably proud, is the upside of urban freedom. Smart belonging and urban freedom can even provide an antidote to the city’s anonymity and alienation – if there is prudent urban governance. This means today that a transparent process and communal consensus on housing strategies are socioeconomic imperatives in engineering the spatial aspects of the globally emerging digital society. 

The size of the urban pie

Demographic transitioning means the flattening of population curves, with impossible-to-predict nuances. Capitalism, with its essence of relentless mutation, is sure to change under the influence of human behaviors. What seems safe to anticipate for the remainder of this century is that more people than in any previous century will live on this planet and that urbanization is not going to radically reverse.

Enhanced urban productivity requires departure from exclusionary models of behavior and, hopefully, thinking. Practical regression of language barriers and geographic distance barriers to remote work will persist and become prominent, which means that more people have to work with more people who are not kin, not clan, and not national peers. Such a world cannot afford to remain steeped in racial phobias of the other.

When compared with the insane evil of deliberate domicide of the feared other, self-inflicted functional urbicide will never be as brutal, dehumanizing, and total. But even in a city with such deep, living heritage roots as Beirut, regression into a state of an economic backwater and zombie enterprise is a risk if no common-good orientation, mutuality of rights and obligations, or respect and sense of belonging show themselves. And practically, if no consensual taxation and submission of partisan financial interests to the common good is achieved, never mind the writing of another fanciful but not organically funded national housing strategy.         

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Real estate

Urban productivity in the digital era

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

Walking the warrens of old Beirut neighborhoods, driving along rural roads where one illogical turn follows the other, or traipsing past private and public white elephant real estate projects that testify to nothing but unproductive and vain ambitions, the discordant chaos of the country can make even a lifetime optimist doubt their beliefs. It appears inconceivable that this deep, dysfunctional by design, fiefdom system of Lebanon will make way for administrative structures that are not corruption prone, or a fiscal system that, by taxing profits and rentier incomes, prioritizes capturing an economically non-regressive share of economic gains. 

And yet, under an ethical and efficient Lebanese fiscal system that is restructured for a digital-era economy with high profits from automation (including AI) and urban productivity (including exports of services), one cannot but daringly envision a tax regime that captures and redistributes part of the economic gains that professionals and landlords obtain as windfalls – free rentier benefits – from their economic activities in the Beirut metropolitan area. If one wants to talk seriously about the national economic recovery.

The real estate ingredient in economic productivity 

Against the background of Lebanon’s economic strengths and weaknesses as documented over the long term, real estate – and especially productive urban real estate – can either be a key enabler or a devastating barrier in the economic recovery process. Producing competitive, exportable services of high quality is thought to require the population’s broad adherence to the rule of law as core public good in an economically complex society. For stakeholder groups invested in their society, clustering of the most creative and smartest workforce in productive urban Lebanese settings is therefore another precondition for competitive, exportable services to thrive. 

Combining the three stakeholder groups – (1) all economically active people upholding the rule of law, (2) creative and smart professionals, (3) proactive landlords that abide by principles of smart and sustainable property development and maintenance – makes a compelling ethical case for redistributive tax justice. In such a system, part of the economic gains harvested by urban landlords and professionals would be reallocated to all economic actors who sustain the “rule of law” core public good. 

Redesigning property taxes from the viewpoint of urban productivity also makes a strong case in manner of efficient taxation. Some economic gains accrued by landlords and professionals have to be siphoned off and invested into connectivity, hard infrastructures, etcetera, or redistributed by the state—but  under preservation of fair and attractive economic deserts for each of the two groups. In theory, such tax measures, which reallocate a slice of their economic gains, will not be detrimental to but rather supportive of landlords’ and professionals’ long-term economic interests.

However, today there are more urgent concerns in the real estate sector. These are two-pronged: the entrenchment of what the recent Bank Audi Real Estate sector report mentions as “challenging fundamentals” and the destruction that has been wrought on the country’s building stock in 2024. Due to those two prongs of dysfunctionality, the war being the more severe one, the property landscape across much if not most of the territory is scarred and unclear. 

The structural problems of the Lebanese property market include the current absence of housing loans by commercial banks, but also the high demand for affordable housing alongside significant urban building stock that is either vacant because of speculation or so dilapidated that it is unfit for habitation. Outdated regulations and old rent laws are factors in the conundrum. 

Demagogically supercharged misconceptions about social and economic realities in Lebanon, are not rare. Offering one interpretation of the structural problems in the economy and their repercussions on the national real estate landscape, Bank Audi points to weakness of rural job creation and a “continuous” increase in the urbanization rate. 

However, according to UN Habitat and the popular internet source World Population Review, Lebanon’s urbanization has been above global averages already since the 1950s or 60s. The urbanization rate, which has been noticeably flattening in the 20 years since 2005, stood at estimated 89.4 percent in 2023 (21st in the world) but its trajectory has been curtailed around the 90 percent urbanization rate bound, mirrored in an estimated slight contraction (-1.23 percent) in the 2020-25 time period. 

Box 

Urbanization – neither panacea nor symptom of doom

Whereas the urbanization rate, which on a global scale has increased from 34 percent in 1960 to 58 percent in 2024, can be a productivity-enhancing factor as well as a social and environmental detriment, it is a factor that cannot be avoided. Movement of people from rural to urban areas and population growth in Lebanon have made steady conversion of land to settled realms inevitable but, the trend has been poorly regulated and has not been steered into social and economic sustainability to date. 

There is uncertainty over the real building stock in Lebanon. Due to the many upheavals in the country in the past five decades, social factors driving urbanization and internal migrations within Lebanon as well as regional human cross-border movements actually seem to have been increasingly complex and difficult to assess. 

As a 2011 UN Habitat paper states, urbanization has been relentless from the 1960s onward and “urban expansion in Lebanon has been occurring without any guiding strategies or plans, merging the cities into single large agglomerations, threatening arable lands and biodiversity, creating transportation and traffic problems and increasing the challenge of infrastructure and services provision.” 

The crisis years of the 2020s have worsened this situation to the point that rural-urban development gaps are threatening Lebanon along with other consequences of the crisis and war-induced, growing inequality burden. 

End BOX

Another nuance to contemplate in the recent uptick on real estate trends on the supply side is changes in the geographic distribution of building permits issued in the first six months (H1) of 2025. Comparing the regional distribution of building permits in this period with the one of ten years ago, in H1 2015, there are several surprising drops and increases in the geographic distribution of these permits. The sharpest contraction in permit issuance was in North Lebanon, which includes the nation’s second metropolis, Tripoli. North Lebanon in ten-year comparison fell from the second to the last spot in percentage share of total (18.8 percent to 1.1 percent) building permits. The percentage share of building permits this year was a fraction of the North’s 20 percent share in habitation. On the other hand, increases in issuance shares were visible in the very three districts that last year bore the brunt of warfare: Nabatieh issuance increased from 8.7 to 11.4 percent, the Bekaa shot up from 8.4 to 12.1 percent, and South Lebanon more than doubled from 11.7 to 25.4 percent. 

Between the three latter regions (which most people will associate with a mix of rural and urban environments), plus North Lebanon, 50 percent of building permits in the first six months of this year are accounted for. The other 50 percent of building permits in the first six months of this year were reported from the least war-torn governorates, Beirut and Mount Lebanon. However, when comparing the 2015 and 2025 numbers, there was much less variation in parentage shares of permits. Mount Lebanon was unchanged in the position of region with most issued permits and Beirut, arguably the most urban governorate in Lebanon, saw a minor contraction of 0.3 percentage points. For these two regions, 2025 H1 issuance hovered, almost unchanged from 2015, at about 45 and 5 percent, respectively.

This begs the question, absent of more granular data of whether the 16.1 percent jump in issuance reflects a future net increase in housing stock. The ten-year variation in the value of property sales transactions between the first six months of 2015 and 2025 in Bank Audi’s real estate report showed that percentage-wise, variations between provinces were in the three to four percent range, or below. 

Moreover, the H1 2025 and H1 2024 numbers of 2,500 to 3,000 construction permits are pro rata still significantly below the 7,500 permits issued in full year 2022, a year which in itself was part of a multi-year trough for builders and developers. According to a Bank Byblos press statement from October 2020, future real estate demand recorded in the second quarter of that year reflected significant contractions not only in quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year home buying intent, but even represented a record low for all 13 years in which the lender produced a real estate demand index. In the last three-month period before the index was discontinued in summer of 2020, a mere 1.1 percent of Lebanese residents responded affirmatively if they planned to either buy or build a residential property in the coming six months. 

Shortly before the huge shock of the Beirut Port explosion, the demand signals already stood at less than 20 percent of the multi-year average measured starting in 2007, and was about 90 percent down from the peak expression of house acquisition plans over the period. According to a press statement, “6.4 percent of residents in Lebanon, on average, had plans to buy or build a residential unit in the country between July 2007 and June 2020, with this share peaking at nearly 15 percent in the second quarter of 2010”. 

Irrespective of the factors that drove upside blips in building permit issuance the first half of this year, property market vigor and sustainability in 2025 do not look convincing when compared to the heydays of post-conflict (i.e. during the decades from 1992 to 2012) housing construction in Lebanon, with peaks of over 12,000 annual permits early in the 2010s. 

Until they disappeared at the end of Banque du Liban’s calamitous attempt to steer the economy through years of government policy inaction, financing deals and housing loans propped up by central bank stimulus packages may have improved nominal GDP growth figures. However, in post-crisis analysis that can only underscore the importance of getting real estate policy right. Getting it right must start with adequate laws, corruption-resistant land registrations, and fair taxation up to the provision of incentives and securing of both property rights and obligations under an ethical and efficient framework. 

Judging from the poor state of the building stock and from the situation of property regulations and markets, the signals for future real estate supply may be up from last year, but the overall real estate landscape still leaves an abysmal impression.

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Real Estate

Once upon a time in real estate:

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

Once upon a time, in a tiny, almost mythical land tugged away from the rest of the world on the far eastern shore of the Middle Ocean, people were gifted a narrative of a resilient society where they are the sovereign. Many were happy as they heard their leaders promise that wishes would work with surety for all in the land. And the people were content because almost all had their little homes. Water could be scarce in the summer, and electricity even scarcer, but their homes were cozy and the weather was fine. A few had palaces. 

Those fairy tale times lasted for many cycles but one day a big explosion devastated parts of their capital city, not to mention many minds. The little country’s economy—already tanking–sunk badly and the people’s cherished money lost its value. Soon after, the country was overpowered by an especially vicious war that revealed the true depravity and depth of the people’s hostile neighbors’ anachronistic aggressiveness. Thus abruptly ended the time when citizens of the small land lived out their dream of owning homes, however humble, while aspiring investors could freely fulfill their desires for storing wealth in hospitable mansions and building lavish residential towers that made them richer although they added no real value to the country. The property market vanished. 

Or did real estate speculation not really end in the small land? In September of 2025, a new Lebanon Real Estate Sector report by the once-prominent local lender Bank Audi, offers a depiction of a gradually recovering property market. The report opens with saying that “demand for real estate [in the first six months of 2025] has recorded a noticeable improvement, returning to levels seen in 2022, albeit weighed down by challenging fundamentals.”

From a conventional economic advisory angle, it bears investigating if and why this statement – ant the entire report – comes with confusing undertones and hidden contradictions. But under a wider discourse on Lebanon’s economic recovery, property angles deserve to be discussed not only as store of value and space for speculation. The prudent approach to property from a macro-social perspective that considers both the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations and decades of e economic insights into urbanization, is that sustainable real estate developments are under-discussed, potential levers for uplifting social unity and economic productivity in a needed urban development framework. 

The flat market approach 

Bank Audi’s new report largely adheres to the pre-crisis property narrative that has been the focus of banks, sell-side real estate advisors, and business periodicals for 25 years or more. Replicating this well-known narrative, the report selectively covers demand trends from the angles of transaction numbers and transaction values, and then shifts to discussing current and future supply trends based on data on cement deliveries and building permit issuance. 

The paper concludes with a section that highlights property prices with traditional investor appeal in the downtown of Beirut and nearby districts. It adds an economic-political outlook that in its weighing – between an optimistic, a mid-range middling, and a disadvantageous scenario – favors the optimistic scenario. Under its benign assumptions – stable security with a lasting ceasefire and state “supremacy” over weapons for at least the next 12 months, comprehensive reconstruction efforts, an IMF agreement, and a financial gap resolution law – Lebanon would see GDP growth leap up across the 8 percent threshold. This growth would pull property prices up “by no less than 20 percent”, with a recovery of the housing loan sector acting as “considerable catalyst to the market”.

But is gradual market recovery the core story of real estate in 2025? Property cradles an ambiguous spot in the economic landscape of Lebanon. It is deeply rooted in the nation’s mentality as a store of value and as an investment proposition. Smart urbanity and productive real estate development, on the other hand, are needed for a return to economic vibrancy. Yet, these aspects of the real estate theme are underdeveloped. They have almost never featured in forefront of minds and market reports or led to sincere considerations of social equity and economic productivity. The latest lender report on the real estate market is an illustration of this incongruence. 

Admittedly, all three economic scenarios presented in the market outlook assessment of Bank Audi carry both upside and downside risks. By the bank’s perception, however, the property sector, under all possible scenarios, harbors value in the medium to long term. Moreover, while the report concedes that at time of its publication property prices in Lebanon were still subdued in comparison with the pre-crisis status quo, the analysts interpret this to imply a potential for “substantial capital gains” if and when “politico-economic conditions become fully supportive” of the traditional property value proposition and also cause “a potential noticeable price surge” in real estate. 

A score of open questions

What seems not to be covered under any of the bank’s three scenarios cited above, is actual economic modeling of the impact of sector-specific policies or measures. Such could, for example, be real estate development regulations and social housing development incentives by the Lebanese state. The current, imbalanced regulations on property and urban development, or absence of property tax reforms, are not assessed as impact factors in the middling or negative scenarios. Nor is there any projection on property market developments under the positive scenario if, in addition to national stability and macro-financial efforts, a public national housing strategy were devised and implemented, and urban planning improved. 

It is conceded in the Bank Audi report that the attractive, albeit risky, value proposition of local real estate over recent years has lately been reduced or, for upmarket real estate, already been eroded. But while explicitly acknowledging the need for a new property market approach that emphasizes diversification, improved quality, and increased affordability, the paper does not offer a strategic suggestion on how investment in Lebanese real estate could practically address these three worthy objectives. 

This leaves a bounty of questions. A perspective of two urban development advocates, published late last year by consultancy Badil on the housing crisis after three months of the recent war on Lebanon, argued vehemently for “immediate and sustained action to address short-term humanitarian needs and long-term structural deficiencies.” Does this imply that a new national strategy for housing and real estate by the Lebanese government is needed as cornerstone in the recovery? Or would the opposite be better: should developing a new, smart, and sustainable approach to our dysfunctional property management and development be left to entirely to commercial actors, with society de-facto betting on the learning ability of the private sector players and their agency?

It is obvious that the vulnerability of the Lebanese society to corruption, inefficiency, local and regional crises, and war has also grown to acute danger for its housing market and urban productivity. Shouldn’t the state thus be held to the duty of providing much more than, for example, unspecified incentives for creation of rural jobs? In more positive terms, might the 2025 inflection opportunity provide the golden chance for the government to consult with the business community and local academia to actually design a national strategy for social housing, urban productivity enhancement, and balanced development in this country? 

In the background of this question looms the lamentable fact that even since before independence, reiterative administrative and governmental plans on urban development and real estate organization have gone unimplemented or failed. Flaws in housing policies over the post-1992 decades according to the Badil comment include lack of public housing programs and failure of allocating vacant properties and state-owned urban plots to socially productive use. Additionally, the simultaneous oversupply and artificially high prices of housing units in the conurbation of Beirut point to a distorted market. 

Faced with the post-2024 environment of excessive social inequality and housing supply gaps as well as the country’s huge backlog in economic productivity, Lebanon call ill afford any continuation of the broken housing system. Shouldn’t therefore, a national real estate and environment strategy for protection and best practice be among the urgent priorities of 2025 for the current government? Shouldn’t best use of the country’s one proven natural asset – land – and the associated, man-made assets of urban heritage, be raised as grand themes of awareness building? If so, the society at large and powerful investors in particular can embrace the imperative of a regulatory and fiscal clean up of the property sector.

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Economics & PolicyEducationLast Word

No time to lose

by Atif Rafique
written by Atif Rafique

Investing in Lebanon’s education system is more urgent than ever, following years of compounding crises that caused a major deterioration in access to learning and forced many families to prioritize basic needs over education.

One in three children is out of school and out of learning; the most marginalized children lag behind their peers; and many teachers are not receiving the support they need.

Strengthening the education sector takes political will, courage and vision, but it will bring significant dividends, helping build a generation that is equipped to contribute to the country’s prosperity and stability.

Education and learning are central to Lebanon’s future. Every child, regardless of nationality, gender or legal status, must have access to a quality, inclusive education.

To achieve this, we need to put children and youth at the centre of reform efforts to improve the public school system, particularly for children who are currently out of school.

We need to ensure schools are building the foundational literacy, numeracy, and life and vocational skills needed for learning, for work and for life.

The Transition and Resilience Education Fund (TREF), an initiative of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education with multination sponsorship and implemented in coordination with UNICEF, is a tool for achieving these goals. Since 2022, TREF has aims to enhance the governance and efficiency of the education system, ultimately ensuring that more children are in school for longer and learning more.

Even during the darkest of times, during economic crisis and the deadly intensification of cross-border conflict in 2024, TREF’s achievements demonstrated that Lebanon has the capacity to deepen reforms on equity and inclusion, teaching and learning, governance and cost-efficiency.

Despite the progress achieved, there is still a severe, but not insurmountable, education and learning crisis. Addressing it will require:

  • Getting all children in school and learning.

We need to reach the estimated half a million children who are out of school and not learning. This involves helping children acquire the literacy and numeracy skills they need for learning, and easing their transition into formal education. It also means ensuring every school is inclusive, especially for children with special needs.

  • Setting a learning target and implementing evidence-based teaching and learning programmes.

We need to measure progress towards improving the education system’s performance. Setting a learning target that all of Lebanon’s children, teachers, schools and partners can support will help ensure success.

  • Defining a vision for Lebanon’s teachers.

Numerous teachers have sought better-paying jobs abroad as the economic crisis drastically reduced their salaries and worsened their living conditions. Teachers who have remained in Lebanon are a cornerstone of society; we must support and motivate them.  

  • Making the case for investment in Lebanon’s public school system.

By increasing its funding for schools and allocating support based on school needs, Lebanon can showcase its commitment to education for children, teachers and schools. Helping schools develop School Improvement Plans, annual budgets, and collect data on attendance and learning outcomes will motivate domestic and international partners to champion the benefits of Lebanon’s public schools for children and for the country’s future.

Failure to properly address Lebanon’s education crisis would have dire consequences, turning today’s children into a ‘lost generation’ with weak earning potential, increasing poverty and inequality, and reducing human capital – which could, in turn, lead to more instability.

In order to succeed, the government must continue to place education at the top of the political agenda and commit the public financing required, so that all children in Lebanon, no matter their circumstances, benefit from quality teaching and learning, imparted by motivated teachers.

UNICEF is determined to continue working with the government to promote quality, inclusive education, and urges all stakeholders to join efforts to bolster the education system.

The future of Lebanon’s children, and of the country itself, is at stake. Failure is not an option.

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Brand Voice

There Are Better Ways Than Burning Leaves

by Philip Morris Management Services
written by Philip Morris Management Services

Whether yours is a generously sized garden or a petite patio, tending to our outdoor spaces can provide us with some much-needed calm and tranquillity while balancing our busy schedules.

As any keen gardener knows, a verdant space that’s full of life starts from the ground up: good soil is the key to nurture your seedlings into a lush display of flowers and healthy leaves. Good soil contains a wealth of life, in fact, one gram (approximately a quarter of a tablespoon) of soil can contain up to 10 billion organisms.

In a truly beautiful cycle, decomposing matter from past plant life is what fuels the next season of growth. In a bid to be more sustainable, green-fingered folk swear by composting their organic kitchen and garden waste that helps them supercharge their gardens.

Composting is a conscious choice for a multitude of reasons. It’s beneficial for plants, but also for the wider environment. It helps reduce communal waste and in turn, contributes to reducing methane and carbon dioxide emissions from waste treatment. Additionally, soil that has been treated with compost needs less irrigation and no synthetic fertilizer.

Composting is also a far better option than burning leaves and garden waste. When we burn garden waste, we not only sacrifice the nutrient value but also create smoke. The smell is unpleasant for us and for our neighbours besides that burning any organic material produces many harmful and potentially harmful chemicals, whether it’s in the garden or elsewhere.

The best choice is always never to start or to quit cigarettes and nicotine altogether, but the reality is that many don’t. For those who would otherwise continue to smoke, smoke-free alternatives that don’t burn tobacco can significantly reduce harm by eliminating the burning process. These products are not risk-free and deliver nicotine, which is addictive, but they are a better choice than continued smoking.

Gardening is many things to many people. For some it’s about finding a sense of calm

in nature, for others it’s a chance to admire something they’ve grown on their own.

For any gardener who smokes, however, there are always better alternatives to burning.

You may not be aware, but this also applies to the burning of tobacco in cigarettes.

When a cigarette is lit, over 6000 chemicals are released, many of them considered by experts to be harmful. Inhaling these high levels of harmful chemicals with cigarette smoke is the primary cause of smoking-related diseases.

Avoiding burning is a better choice

· Burning garden waste is a missed opportunity to make use of the nutrients in compost, and creates harmful smoke.

· Composting is a good alternative to utilise organic garden and kitchen waste.

· Compost provides nutrients for plants in the coming seasons.

· Compost helps reduce communal waste that ends up in landfills.

Burning organic materials produces smoke

· A burning cigarette releases 1000s of chemicals, many are harmful.

· Never starting or quitting tobacco and nicotine products entirely is the best choice.

· The best choice for adult smokers is to quit entirely.

· For those who don’t quit, smoke-free alternatives that do not burn tobacco, whilst not risk free and addictive, represent a much better choice than continuing to smoke cigarettes.

For more information about smoke-free alternatives, please visit our website.

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CommentEconomics & Policy

Research in crisis:

by Paul Salem
written by Paul Salem

This is an adapted version of Keynote remarks delivered by Paul Salem on September 24 at the opening of a conference entitled Research in Conflict Settings, hosted by the American University of Beirut, and co-organized with Birzeit University and the Canadian international Development and Research Council.

There is little doubt that the contemporary Middle East is beset by multiple deep and cross-cutting crises.  And indeed, this conference is convened to examine how engaged researchers can forge a path out of this crisis-laden reality. But before delving into our region’s crises, and possible ways out, it is worth pausing to reflect on what we mean when we invoke the concept of ‘crisis’.

Some see crisis as rupture — the sudden interruption of normal life. But as Michel Foucault asked, what exactly is “normal,” and what injustices or exclusions might be hidden beneath it? For Antonio Gramsci, crisis was a time when “the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born” — an interregnum that is dangerous but also one that is full of potential. The Chinese word for crisis combines the characters for danger and opportunity — a reminder that crisis can be a turning point.

More recently, scholars and observers have described our global moment as one of polycrisis or even permacrisis — a convergence of political, economic, security, climatic, and digital shocks that feel less like temporary ruptures and more like a new normal. The danger of this framing is that it encourages resignation — the normalization of conflict and suffering. The challenge is to resist that temptation, to acknowledge the weight of crisis but also to search for a way forward.

The Middle East Today

Nowhere does the sense of polycrisis and permacrisis resonate more acutely than in the Middle East. The region is caught in overlapping geopolitical conflicts, fragile politics, uneven economies, contested social structures, unfinished cultural debates, and severe environmental stress.

Geopolitically, wars have become the new normal, displacing millions, toppling governments, and reshaping alliances between states and armed groups.  The most horrendous and heart rending is the killing and starvation of the Palestinian population of Gaza.

Politically, more than a century after the end of the Ottoman Empire, Arab states are still struggling to establish inclusive and accountable systems of governance. Monarchies remain relatively stable, but most of the revolutionary republics hardened into authoritarian rule. The few democracies have either backslid — as in Tunisia — or remain haunted by sectarianism and corruption, as in Iraq and Lebanon.  Other states have collapsed into state failure and civil war, like Yemen and Libya, and most recently and terribly, Sudan.

Economically, the inequalities are staggering. Gulf economies have harnessed energy wealth to diversify, invest, and increasingly innovate. By contrast, energy-poor states with large populations — Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia — have failed to deliver growth and jobs commensurate with their demographic and educational potential. The promise of the “youth bulge” has too often turned into a source of frustration and unrest. Despite favorable fundamentals, the Arab region has fallen far short of the economic performance of East Asia, where similar challenges were turned into engines of growth.

Socially, questions of public space, women’s rights, youth participation, and minority inclusion remain unresolved and contested. In some societies, space has opened for women and young people; in others, retrenchment and exclusion dominate.

Culturally, the Arab world is still wrestling with issues that have been on the table since the 19th-century Nahda: the relationship between religion and secularism, communal identity and individual rights, faith and reason. These debates remain unfinished, and their outcomes continue to shape politics and society.

Environmentally and technologically, the pressures are profound. Climate change and water scarcity are hitting the region earlier and harder than elsewhere, intensifying competition over resources and fueling migration. At the same time, digital transformation and artificial intelligence are reshaping economies and public spheres. These offer new opportunities for innovation and empowerment, but also new risks — disinformation, cyberwarfare, and technological exclusion.

Yet, despite the darkness, the region is not without sources of hope. Some economies are embracing transformation and finding paths toward diversification and modernity. Countries like Lebanon and Syria are presented with new openings to rebuild sovereignty, governance, and economic vitality. Across the region, brave actors in civil society, the private sector, and some public institutions are working to improve social and political conditions.

History offers perspective. Europe lay in ruins 80 years ago, East Asia 60 years ago. Today both are largely prosperous and peaceful. The only constant in history is change; the challenge is to bend it in a positive direction.

Engaged Research

One might ask, what can engaged researchers do in the face of such daunting realities? But we, like other active and engaged groups within our world, have an important role to play:      in engaging communities to identify agendas and priorities; in undertaking research that not only describes challenges but points to solutions and a way forward; in bringing the force of ideas to impact change in the real world.

For much of the twentieth century, research on crisis settings was largely extractive. Researchers would arrive, collect data, write reports, publish in journals, and move on. Communities under study often saw little benefit from this process. Today, that model is no longer acceptable. Communities in crisis need research that is not just about them, but also for them.

This means moving from passive observation to engaged scholarship. Researchers must become not just chroniclers of tragedy but contributors to recovery and transformation.

But this shift is not easy. It requires balancing scientific rigor with the urgency of action. We must still care about methodology, validity, peer review — but we must also be able to provide insights quickly enough to inform decision-making in real time.

It also requires breaking down silos. A crisis is rarely just a public health problem, or just an economic problem, or just a security problem. It is often all of these at once.  That means researchers must collaborate across disciplines — political scientists with public health experts, economists with sociologists, computer scientists with artists and anthropologists.

And crucially, we must work with communities, not just on them.  Participatory research approaches — co-creating knowledge with affected populations, sharing findings in ways that are accessible, and allowing communities to shape research priorities — are not just ethically sound, they are practically effective.  Research designed with communities in mind is more likely to produce insights that are actionable and relevant.

In the prism of action, we must also take seriously the challenge of moving research findings forward along the path of policy impact and policy making.  Engaged research without impact is of little worth to the communities it seeks to assist.

Looking Ahead

As we look ahead, we know that the polycrises the region is witnessing will not just cease, but will likely evolve and metastasize.   Climate change will reshape agriculture, migration, and conflict patterns. Digital transformation will bring new research tools — real-time data, predictive analytics — but also new risks: surveillance, disinformation, cyberwarfare. Automation will disrupt labor markets, creating new social challenges. Furthermore, regional and global geopolitics will continue to evolve.  Truly, while the old regional and global orders are dead, new ones have not yet emerged.  

While it is not possible, in this complex reality, to predict the future, the methods of strategic foresight can help us describe alternative scenarios for the future, that can serve as a macro guide to the engaged research community, and to all those committed to turning the wheel of history in a more positive direction.

One can imagine three broad scenarios. First, a positive scenario in which the region turns from war to peace, with a two-state solution in Palestine, an Iran that has pulled back from regional ambitions, and a region that has negotiated peace, security, and economic integration on a solid footing.   Within this positive scenario we can’t realistically imagine democracy and good governance breaking out throughout the region but can imagine steady progress in consolidating democracy where it exists; increasing representation and accountability in both monarchies and republics and seeing improvements in political and economic governance that bring wider and more inclusive prosperity.

A second scenario could be a very dark one, where conflict spreads, states collapse, and decades of fragile progress are undone. A middle scenario would be one resembling the pre-2023 status quo — semi-stability with festering crises alongside islands of prosperity.

These thumbnail sketches of possible futures are not presented to indicate any predictive capacity, but rather to indicate that the art and science of strategic foresight is a tool that we can all beneficially use, and to indicate that we have to imagine the outlines of a better future if we want to set our sights on trying to bring it about. 

A resolute determination

The Middle East today is defined not only by polycrisis and permacrisis, but also by resilience and potential. Its challenges are profound, but its future is not foreordained.

Citizens, policymakers, civil society, and researchers alike have roles to play. The more shoulders push against the wheel of history, the more likely it is to turn in a positive direction. The region has known many false dawns, but history teaches us that even prolonged periods of turmoil eventually give way to renewal and transformation. Europe rose from the devastation of two world wars; East Asia emerged from colonial subjugation and conflict to become a hub of prosperity. The Arab world is no less capable of such recovery.

What is required is both vision and persistence: the vision to imagine alternatives to endless conflict, and the persistence to pursue them despite setbacks. We must refuse the temptation of despair and the paralysis of resignation. If we can sketch out futures of just peace, inclusion, and prosperity — even in outline — we can orient policies, social movements, and scholarship toward those ends.

The Middle East’s story is still being written. The question is whether it will be a story of perpetual breakdown, or one of eventual breakthrough. That depends not only on states and leaders, but also on the countless individuals, communities, and institutions that continue to strive, resist, and rebuild. It is to their resilience, and to the possibility of a more peaceful, prosperous, and just region, that we must commit our efforts and our hope.

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Brand Voice

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SMOKE AND AEROSOL

by Philip Morris Management Services
written by Philip Morris Management Services

IT IS WIDELY KNOWN THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING IS HARMFUL, YET THERE ARE OVER ONE BILLION SMOKERS IN THE WORLD TODAY – A FIGURE THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION PREDICTS WILL REMAIN CONSTANT COME 2025!

If you hear the word aerosol, you might think of a can of deodorant, but it’s actually much more than that. Aerosol is the scientific, umbrella term for solid and liquid particles suspended in gas – such as a cloud.

Smoke is actually a type of aerosol that is generated during combustion, the scientific name for ‘burning.’ And while smoke is an aerosol, not all aerosols are smoke.

Smoke-free products, while not risk-free—are a better choice for adults who already smoke.

Science and technology have allowed the production of alternative products that don’t burn tobacco, therefore don’t produce smoke—they are in fact, smoke-free.

When scientifically substantiated and subject to appropriate quality and safety requirements, smoke-free products do not create smoke and therefore should not be a source of second-hand smoke or ash. The absence of smoke can significantly reduce the average levels of harmful chemicals compared to cigarettes. Whilst not risk-free and delivering nicotine which is addictive, this makes them a better alternative for adults to continued smoking.

THESE ARE THE FACTS BROUGHT TO YOU BY PHILIP MORRIS LEBANON.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SMOKE AND AEROSOL

What is Smoke?

Smoke is described as the result of combustion or burning.

 When a cigarette is lit, tobacco burns at temperatures up to 900∘C. This creates smoke which contains approximately 6,000 chemicals, with about 100 of them classified by public health authorities as harmful or potentially harmful.

If the temperature is reduced to a level where tobacco or nicotine-containing liquid is heated instead of being burned, the smoke is removed.

What is Aerosol?

 Aerosol is not associated with combustion. Smoke-free products, while not risk-free, have the potential to significantly reduce the average levels of harmful chemicals compared to cigarette smoke.

 Consumers typically use the term “vapor” to refer to the aerosol generated from heated tobacco products or other nicotine-containing products.

Quitting tobacco and nicotine altogether is the best choice for health. Existing tobacco control measures designed to discourage initiation and encourage cessation should continue.

However, despite these efforts, millions of people continue to smoke. Science-backed, smoke-free products can play a role in moving adults who would otherwise continue to smoke away from cigarettes. With the right regulatory encouragement and support from civil society, together we can deliver a smoke-free future more quickly than relying on traditional measures alone.

  1. https://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/surveillance/trends-tobacco-smoking-second-edition/en/
  2. This should be scientifically substantiated on a product-by-product basis.

THESE ARE THE FACTS. BROUGHT TO YOU BY PHILIP MORRIS LEBANON.

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Beirut Port explosion

Still Standing:

by dana helo
written by dana helo

On August 4, 2020, Beirut was torn apart. In the historic neighborhoods of Gemmayzeh and Mar Mikhael, life was not just interrupted; it was vaporized. This is an intimate look at the people who lived the nightmare, chose to stay, and are still trying to piece their world back together, five years on.

6:07pm, 4/08/2020

Hassan Hammoud was watering the plants outside his Gemmayzeh restaurant, Dar Beirut, when the explosion happened in a blink. “Everything was suddenly destroyed, and we could not understand.”

The first thing that came to Hammoud’s mind was to make sure he was alive. “I started feeling my whole body until I noticed blood coming out of my eye.”

Walking through Gemmayzeh and Ashrafieh, trying to find a hospital to treat his injury, Hammoud describes the scenes of killed and injured people on the streets as a nightmare seen only in horror movies. 

A few streets away, Rita Nassar was taking out the trash. “I flew and I screamed a lot, there was a lot of dust… I saw everything was destroyed.” Inside her art workshop, prayers continued to play on the radio.

For those who weren’t there, the return was a descent into a nightmare. Elias Mahfouz, whose supermarket in Karantina was obliterated, raced back from the north. “The destruction was awful… I could not access the shop. The entrance was closed, so I entered through a small hole.” His first thought was of his brother and father, who lived upstairs. Both were severely injured.

Photo: Hasan Shaaban

The immediate aftermath was a silent film of horror, dust-choked and bloodied. Patricia Bekhazi, who was in her family home with her mother and sister, described a city in shock: “In one moment, our house turned upside down. The windows and doors were fully destroyed,” she said.

Bekhazi rushed to her balcony in fear, trying to understand the nature of the catastrophe that had knocked down her house in seconds. “What I saw was terrifying. The whole area was shattered, dusty, and in full chaos.” Bekhazi and her mother had to wait for the next day to treat their injuries, as hospitals were either wrecked or unable to receive more casualties.

Bassam Gholam, a lawyer from Mar Mikhael whose family has lived there for 300 years, arrived at his mother’s house in Mar Mikhael at the time of the explosion. “I saw people killed in front of me… buildings that have fallen and gas cylinders that may explode at any time.”

Gholam was devastated to see the roof of his family’s house on the ground, with his mother and uncle injured.

The first responders: A people abandoned

In the vacuum left by an absent government, the first responders were neighbors, strangers, and a generation of young Lebanese who mobilized overnight.

Karantina supermarket owner Mahfouz, surrounded by the ruin of his life’s work, found salvation in them. “After three days, I gathered my employees… Groups of people holding cleaning detergents started coming to my shop to help. They offered support and saved me.”

“They came with brooms and buckets, with nylon sheets to cover shattered windows, and with a fierce, shared purpose.”

Bekhazi remembers them materializing from the dust. “People came to help remove the debris. We used to call them from the roads… They closed our windows with nylon until we fix them again.”

This was not aid from above; it was solidarity from the ground up. It was the only thing that worked. “In big disasters, the Lebanese help each other,” Gholam stated, a simple fact in a country where official institutions have so often failed.

Three days after the explosion, Hammoud visited his Gemmayze restaurant crying, feeling helpless, until passersby offered to help him clear the debris from his shop. “It’s amazing how people rushed to our support,” he said.  

The long, lonely road back to zero

The cleanup was the easy part. The rebuild was a marathon of despair fought against an economic collapse, a pandemic, and a currency in freefall.

For Mahfouz, the hardest moment was not the destruction, but the reconstruction. “I saw that all my efforts were gone. I was throwing the ice cream refrigerators, the air conditioners… How am I going to repeat this?”

With no electricity, Mahfouz lost his dairy business. His solution was solitary, back-breaking labor. “Then came solar energy. I brought the equipment myself to use in my shop. I did it myself to save money.” He found an online job outside Lebanon to get foreign currency that his own bank wouldn’t give him. “I started rising little by little,” he said, but his capital had vanished. “I could not fill more than one-third of the shop.”

The financial calculations became surreal. Hammoud’s restaurant sustained 100,000 U.S. dollars in damage. “I brought an architect, my friend, and told her I have 5,000 U.S. dollars to fix my shop.”

Hammoud began repairing his restaurant with what little cash he had, patching the kitchen and managing deliveries with only a few employees. Clients offered him small donations, NGOs provided support, and eventually the restaurant reopened.

With support from an NGO, Rita Nassar reopened her art space for children who were also affected by the explosion. She still walked cautiously through the streets, but the workshop had become her reason to keep going.

Bekhazi and her family gradually rebuilt their home, securing broken windows with nylon to endure winter nights and repairing walls as they could afford.

Gholam’s family had to wait months before they could restore and then return to their historic Mar Mikhael house with support from NGOs.

The new map of the city: nostalgia and fear

Rita Nassar expresses deep nostalgia and grief for her pre-blast neighborhood. “I do not like the new Gemmayzeh. I love the old one… You had old professions working in the street; it was beautiful here.” The blast accelerated a change she laments: pubs and Airbnb apartments replacing a community of artisans and multi-generational families.

Bassam Gholam looks out at a neighborhood emptied of its soul. “Only 10 percent of the people who lived here before the explosion returned.” A 2023 cluster-based survey by Beirut Urban Lab found that nearly 25 percent of residents in heavily impacted areas had not returned to their homes.

And of course, residual fears remain. Sudden noises, rattling glass, or the sound of planes overhead can trigger panic.
“I have some panic,” admits Hammoud. “Three years ago, the glass behind me started shaking, and we jumped.” Bekhazi doesn’t leave the area. “If I hear the sound of a plane, I get a panic attack. I cannot hear loud sounds.”

Healing and prolonged trauma

So, has Beirut healed? The answer from its residents is a unified, painful no.

“People did not heal. They will not heal properly,” says Mahfouz. “People remember it every day. Especially people who were injured or lost a relative. How can they forget?”

Bekhazi feels the pain sharpen with time. “Every year the pain gets worse… We just don’t like to nag, and nobody listens anyway.” For Gholam, the lack of accountability is the hardest to reckon with.

Yet, within this unresolved grief, a sense of defiance has become a means of recovery. For Hammoud, it is the love for his clients, who became family and then saviors. For Gholam, it is the weight of history in the stones of his family home, built in 1870. “This is the house of our grandparents,” he says.

Mahfouz, surrounded by the shelves he slowly refilled, sees his shop as a child. “It is very precious, just like a son of mine.” He knows another disaster would be the end, but he is still adding capital and hoping for the best.

Dana Helo is a Beirut- based journalist

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AnalysisEconomics & Policy

Ensnared in the social safety net:

by Jamile youssef
written by Jamile youssef

Lebanon’s End-of-Service Indemnity (EOSI) system—long presented as a pillar of worker protection—has become one of the most pressing and contentious legacies of the country’s economic collapse. Designed to provide employees with a lump-sum payment upon retirement, equal to their final salary multiplied by years of service, the scheme today is strained to the breaking point. With the Lebanese pound having lost over 98 percent of its value, decades of accumulated contributions have been reduced to a fraction of their worth. Employers are now expected to cover massive settlement shortfalls, threatening the survival of compliant businesses and raising questions about the future of social protection in Lebanon.

A defunded fund

The economic collapse of 2019–2020 was devastating for social protection. Contributions that once carried weight are almost completely diminished. “The contribution of employees, accumulating for their retirement phase, has lost its value. For instance, a previous contribution of 100,000 LBP now is worth 2,000 LBP.” says Sabine Hatem, Chief Economist at the Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan (IOF).

The International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Social Protection team echoes this concern in a written response provided to Executive: “Workers who cashed out their indemnities early in the crisis, received benefits that do not fairly match their career-long contributions. This steep drop in real value hinders EOSI core purpose, which is providing income security in old age.” The ILO team also highlights how the currency collapse demolished the NSSF assets as most of its holdings were in Lebanese pounds, primarily in the form of treasury bills and local deposits. Following the state’s eurobond default, their value now is roughly 20 percent of their nominal worth. While US dollar deposits are legally protected, they remain tied up under banking restrictions and are not fully accessible.

The state itself has been a chronic defaulter. By law, the government must pay NSSF contributions for their public sector employees, but unpaid dues have accumulated for years, and today their real value collapsed. According to a 2020 World Bank report titled ‘Lebanon Public Finance Review: Ponzi Finance?’, the government’s arrears to the NSSF reached around 8,000 billion LBP by 2019 (equivalent to 5.3 billion USD at the official pre-crisis rate). Today, even if the state moved to repay, the real value of these dues has eroded beyond recognition.

Punished for compliance?

The collapse of the Lebanese pound turned the EOSI system upside down and had a huge impact on employers. Employers that always declared salaries correctly, now struggle to cover massive EOSI shortfalls.

Below is a simplified example that uses basic regulations to illustrate what is happening with EOSI in Lebanon. Note that the NSSF has its own detailed formula.

  • Before the crisis, an employee earning 800 USD per month was officially declared as 1,200,000 LBP at the fixed exchange rate at that time of 1,507.5 LBP per one USD. The employer paid an 8.5 percent monthly NSSF contribution, equivalent to 102,000 LBP.
  • Today, the same salary must be declared at the new rate of 89,500 LBP. That means the monthly salary is registered as 71.6 million LBP.
  • If the employee has worked for 20 years, their EOSI is calculated as: 71.6 million LBP × 20 years = 1,432 million LBP.
  • Hence, all past contributions, at the old rate, now add up to almost nothing. If, for example, an employer worked 15 years before the crisis, the EOSI contribution for 15 years is 102,000 LBP x 15 years = 1,530,000 LBP
  • Employers are forced to cover the entire settlement gap, which in these cases is equal to 1,432 million – 1.53 million

The impact on Lebanon’s formal private sector has been severe. Employers who consistently declared salaries and paid contributions find themselves covering colossal gaps. Surprisingly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tell Executive that they feel threatened with impossible financial burdens due to their commitment to social justice. NGOs, key providers of social support and of jobs especially in the past five years, have long employed local staff for whom they consistently declared salaries and paid contributions. Unlike private businesses, NGOs do not generate profits and cannot reallocate donor funding to cover liabilities. “It’s not ethical for us to use donations meant for the most vulnerable, and for recovery and reconstruction, to pay for end-of-service liabilities that we had already contributed,” says Cedric Choukeir, Country Representative of Catholic Relief Services and a member of the steering committee for the Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF). LHIF, an informal and independent coordinating body comprised of 73 international NGOs working to address the needs of vulnerable individuals, families and communities throughout Lebanon, shared a statement with Executive on the precarious state of humanitarian work in Lebanon given the new EOSI burdens and significant decreases in foreign funding. With a 4,000 person staff, 88 percent of whom are Lebanese nationals, LHIF warns there is much at stake for employees as well as those they serve.

Choukeir explains that employers who contributed faithfully throughout an employee’s career are now forced to shoulder the cost of retroactive exchange rate losses. He recalls a case where the EOSI for a single employee reached 180,000 USD. “This isn’t about three years; we’re paying for 20,” he says, explaining that the new system is forcing companies to “pay twice.” In contrast to entities that under-declare salaries or avoid payments, law-abiding employers are carrying the largest burden. “We declare full salaries. We’re fully compliant. Yet we’re the ones punished the most,” Choukeir notes. Many organizations warn they may shut down if no solution is found, and some have even turned to legal action.

The ILO’s Social Protection team estimates that before the crisis, employers’ share of EOSI settlements averaged to about 20 percent of the total benefit. Today, the figure has surged to over 90 percent. Employers are now required to make large lump-sum payments for NSSF within a single fiscal year, straining liquidity and operational budgets.

Employees shortchanged

For many workers, the EOSI has become a source of frustration rather than security. The ILO social protection team warns that “Current EOSI values are insufficient to support a dignified life for retirees. The value of the accumulated contributions, which were not indexed to inflation has been almost completely lost”.

In the public sector, the problem is critical. Following the collapse, employees received new allowances for productivity and perseverance, yet these were never integrated into their official base salaries. As a result, indemnities are calculated only on outdated figures. “Although allowances have significantly boosted public sector real earnings, the state still declares the old base salary, which is very low. Since allowances are not part of the base salary, the calculated EOSI is minimal, even though workers earned more, thanks to these allowances,” says IOF’s Hatem. The situation is even more damaging given that public sector basic salaries continue without any adjustment for inflation. The end result is indemnities that barely cover a month’s living expenses.

The issue is not limited to the public sector. In the private sector, widespread under-declaration of salaries has long been a tactic to reduce contributions, leaving workers with EOSI settlements that reflect outdated figures rather than actual income. It has also deprived the NSSF of resources it desperately needs.

Reform on paper: Law 319

In December 2023, Parliament passed Law 319, a long-awaited reform designed to transform Lebanon’s outdated EOSI system into a modern, inflation-proof monthly pension model that aligns with international social security standards. The law introduces monthly pensions to replace one-off lump sum payouts, individual accounts for employees, a smaller NSSF governance board, and a structure that allows contributions to be invested for sustainability.

The ILO’s Social Protection team explained that the new law creates a hybrid pension model. It combines a Notional Defined Contributions component, where individual accounts are credited annually based on average wage growth and with a component that guarantees a minimum pension. At retirement, the notional balance is not paid out as a lump sum, instead it is converted into a monthly pension, taking into account life expectancy, cost-of-living adjustments, and survivors’ benefits.

In theory, the system is more resilient. As Hatem notes: “Moving from lump-sum payments to monthly indexed pension, protects the value of what retirees receive.” The ILO’s 2024 report on the new pension scheme simulates that after 2 to 7 years, depending on salary and years of services, cumulative pension payouts would surpass the lump-sum alternative.

Yet the reform is not without controversy. Employers face a sharp increase in contribution rates—from 8.5 percent today to as high as 17 or 18 percent. “It’s too heavy. If the contribution rate is too high, employers will stop declaring all employees, or will turn into contractual arrangements instead of full-time,” warns Ibrahim Muhanna of actuarial consultancy Muhanna & Co, predicting that such high rates will drive businesses into informality. “This is a good law for the employee, it acts more of a social welfare than social security, but it is very unfair to the employer.” Muhanna also criticizes the new law’s ‘one size fits all’ design. “The law acts like all employers are the same. But a hotel, a bank, and a school do not operate on the same economic cycle.”

Hatem emphasizes that first of all the government should see itself as an employer and plan accordingly: “The state must ask: How much will it cost us to pass this new law? If we need to go to an affordable solution, then we need to go to an affordable solution. If they cannot pay for that number of employees, maybe we should not have this number of employees in the public sector.”

The way forward

The introduction of Law 319 could mark a turning point for Lebanon’s social protection system, but only if it is implemented with fairness, transparency, and clear financial planning. Any reform must ensure financial sustainability, not just for today, but for decades to come. The ILO’s Social Protection team points out that Lebanon’s system is already marked by major gaps with only around 20 percent of the population enjoying some form of social protection and is far below the global average of 52.4 percent.

From a public finance perspective, reforms cannot be rushed or improvised. The country has shifted dramatically from the pre-2019 framework to today’s post-collapse economy and continues to face uncertainty. That means every decision must be evidence-based backed by solid data, and detailed studies.

Reform requires discipline and should be fiscally sustainable over the medium and long term. Furthermore, public institutions must stop the practice of not settling their dues to the NSSF. “Social protection is a stabilizer. If someday we are not able to fulfill these dues, it is very risky and threatens employees who have no other source of revenue,” says Hatem. Still, the new law is yet to be implemented as the required executive decrees are still pending.

Even before proceeding with the new law, businesses that are the backbone of the economy are facing impossible financial pressures. Employers cannot carry the burden alone. “We need a refinancing solution involving all stakeholders: NSSF, the state, and employers. No one should hold the burden alone. the problem is very big… It has to be an agreement of refinancing, where each part holds the burden,” says Hatem. Muhanna reinforces this point: “You cannot protect employees if you do not protect the employer, as they are the ones offering the jobs.”

Without a fair settlement for compliant employers, whether private sector companies or NGOs, the entire fledgling social security system could soon face another potentially fatal breakdown. Any solution must balance the interests and the benefit of all involved stakeholders: employees, businesses, government, and the NSSF.

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