• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
GCC

GCC offsets the West

by Executive Staff March 14, 2008
written by Executive Staff

The change happened slowly, over a period of months. Day by day, the stock of green-back American dollars in Sudan’s central bank has decreased. And day by day, the bank’s stock of multi-colored Euros increased. By the opening weeks of 2008, the Bank of Sudan had deliberately and determinedly set a course for a dollar-free economy by switching almost all of its foreign currency reserves into euros and a basket of other currencies. It was the latest and most dramatic manifestation of a growing economic separation between Africa’s largest country and the world’s largest superpower — a split caused by more than ten years of economic sanctions imposed by the US onto Sudan over reports of humanitarian atrocities, first during the country’s north-south civil war, and later during the Darfur conflict.

Euros fill the gap

At first glance, the American exit might look like an economic disaster – particularly since a number of European companies have also shown signs of limiting their involvement in Sudan, citing the risk of getting caught up in American sanctions.

But as every student of economics knows, international trade abhors a vacuum. When one major trading partner leaves the stage, another is bound to be waiting to take its place. In the currency markets, the gap left by the dollar was filled by the euro. In the commercial, financial and investment sectors, say analysts in Sudan, the gap left by American and increasingly European investors and companies is being more than made up for by companies based in China and, increasingly, the Middle East. “Investors are coming in from both China and the Middle East,” said one Khartoum analyst speaking on condition of anonymity. “Part of it is to do with the new flood of oil and part to do with the relative security that followed the end of the civil war in 2005.” But at least part of it is that they are coming in to take up the slack left by the West.” The trend is clear to see in the financial indicators published by the Bank of Sudan. In 2005, $299.2 million worth of Sudanese exports headed out to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and other states labeled as “Arab countries” by the bank’s statisticians. Just a year later, the figure had jumped to $444.2 million. And in the first three quarters of 2007 — the most up-to-date statistics available — $305.2 million worth of Sudanese exports had already headed out of the country’s ports and airports towards the Middle East.

Exports are only one small indicator. At the same time as a number of Western companies announced they were leaving sanction-hit Sudan  — including Rolls Royce, Hilton Hotels, Germany’s Siemens, Switzerland’s ABB and Canada’s CHC Helicopter — a host of Middle Eastern names have been arriving or boosting their existing involvement. Sudan was one of Africa’s top four recipients of Foreign Direct Investment in 2006, according to the UN’s World Investment Report of 2007. The country pulled in more than $3 billion, mainly through its telecoms and petroleum industries and the privatization of state-run companies, hardly any of it from the West. Again, large chunks of that foreign direct investment came directly from the Middle East.

The GCC steps in

The increased Middle Eastern involvement is obvious practically everywhere you look in Khartoum, the country’s economic powerhouse. The most obvious arrivals – thanks largely to their overwhelming marketing budgets – are the mobile telecoms giants of Kuwait-based Zain, which bought the then state-owned operator Mobitel, and Canar, an arm of the UAE’s Etisalat. But beyond the phone system, barely a week goes by without an announcement of another investment and another arrival. In February, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development said it was going to loan Sudan $59 million for a major dam and hydropower project on the River Nile — its second major investment in the scheme. Sudan’s delighted Minister of State for Transport, Roads and Bridges, Dr. Mabrouk Mubarak Saleem, said the cash injection was only the beginning when it came to Kuwaiti investment in Sudan.

A Kuwait Fund envoy is about to fly in to inspect a range of other potential road and transport projects. This is after the Sudanese minister for Transport and Roads made a visit to Kuwait in which he received audiences from, among others, the emir and ministers from Foreign Affairs, Finance and Electricity. US sanctions enforcers have noticed a strange pattern emerging after they started adding named state-owned companies to their list of black-listed Sudanese enterprises. “Immediately after the sanctions were announced, the Sudanese government took steps to sell off government assets that we had identified,” said Adam J. Szubin, head of the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Sudan was clearly trying to get targeted companies out of state control and as far away as possible from sanctions, Szubin added. And the people to whom Sudan tended to sell those state-owned assets came predominantly from the Middle East. In December, media reports suggested that the Dubai Islamic Bank unit, of the Bank of Khartoum, planned to buy smaller Sudanese rival Emirates and Sudan Bank. A month later, Sudan’s national bank told the Sudan Tribune that it might have to sell its 10% stake in the new merged company to make sure the new corporation was not targeted by the US.

In January 2007, Bahrain’s Al-Salam Bank said it had succeeded in snapping up a controlling stake in Sudan state-owned El-Nilein Industrial Development Bank, one of almost 100 companies specifically blacklisted by the U.S. Months before that Dubai-based Emaar Properties and Amlak Finance had also claimed they were after El Nilen shares. Whether or not OFAC was right in saying the sanctions had pushed Sudan into selling the stake, the sanctions certainly hadn’t made the sale any less attractive, said Shawgi Azmi, then director of the Sudanese National Company for Securities, a unit of government-owned Bank of Khartoum. “This deal proves that Gulf investments in Sudan are still pouring in despite the political situation and the pressure from the international community on the country,” he told reporters.

March 14, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Levant

Lifting the ban

by Peter Grimsditch March 7, 2008
written by Peter Grimsditch

One of the best-selling English-language books on Turkish politics is Turkey Unveiled by Nicola and Hugh Pope. Any updates may make them question the title. On February 9, Meclis (the Turkish parliament) voted through constitutional changes lifting the ban on wearing headscarves in public universities by 411 votes in the 550-seat house. To get the required two-thirds majority, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) controversially depended on the support of the ultranationalist National Action Party (MHP), the third largest group in parliament. What was in it for the MHP has not yet been revealed.

While opinion polls say the move is supported by more than 60% of the electorate, the headscarf has been a point of bitter contention between Islamists of all stripes, and ardent secularists, who include the influential army and the largest opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which traces its lineage back to Ataturk. For those in favor of lifting it, the ban was an elitist law which prevented the devout from going to public universities, entrenching the social and economic divisions that have been an (often unspoken) reality for much of Turkey’s modern history. For those that support the ban, there is an array of anxieties. Some fear that girls who prefer not to wear the headscarf will be subject to peer pressure to do so. Others worry that it may be a step down the road to blurring the absolute separation of mosque and state. There are even some who view it as the harbinger of restrictions on other behavior, such as drinking alcohol.

The headscarf ban is seen by many as a guarantor of the secularism of Turkey’s educational system.  Furthermore, the symbolism of headgear in Turkish history should not be underestimated. Founding father Kemal Ataturk famously banned the fez because of its Oriental connotations (giving European milliners the perfect chance to offload their unfashionable, unsold homburgs). Ironically, the fez had been introduced to Turkey to replace the turban by the modernizing Sultan Mahmud II.

Security is not threatened

However, the more ardent secularists may prefer not to mention the fact that the constitutional articles just repealed were not laid down by Ataturk at all, but by a military junta in 1982.

The day the vote to lift the ban passed there were no security incidence — and certainly none of the “chaos” predicted by a headline in Turkey’s best-selling newspaper, Hurriyet. Protests were vocal — but small — compared to the demonstrations held by secularists last year, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was reported to be considering contesting the presidency.

As Erdogan pointed out, with oblique reference to Hurriyet’s headline, while tensions are running high over the headscarf issue, compared to other moments in the republic’s history, the law has passed largely without disturbance.

Prophecies of a return to the street warfare and political killings that bedevilled periods of the 1970s were unlikely, given that the two groups involved this time — moderate and conservative Islamists on one side and secular, social-democratic middle-classes on the other — are less prone to violence than the far-right “Grey Wolves” and student radicals of 30 years ago.

Erdogan has repeatedly stressed the AKP’s commitment to secularism and pluralism. “Nobody will force anybody to cover [her head] in this country,” he said on February 17, 2008. “If such things happen, we will fight against this with all of our institutions.”

The somewhat muffled response to the actual passing of the amendments may indicate that the opposition has largely conceded defeat. The AKP’s economic record has robbed the CHP and others of the opportunity to attack its competence. The timing of the headscarf issue was no accident. More than that, and given public support for lifting the ban, the opposition risked looking more and more like an out-of-touch elite from the big Western cities. It must now look for other battles to fight, perhaps looking at where the AKP has had more limited success, such as in eliminating pockets of poverty in some areas, and moving forward on EU accession.

Even before its crushing defeat at the polls, there was a consensus forming that the CHP’s leader since 1992, Deniz Baykal, very briefly (four months) deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in the mid-1990s, should step aside. Some new blood (and new arguments) in the CHP could help it regain its pre-eminence, and recent events may hasten even the limpet-like Baykal’s departure.

Meanwhile the alliance over February’s Meclis vote and the recent military incursion into Iraq has taken the wind from the sails of the ultranationalists of the MHP, though the party will want its pound of flesh for supporting the AKP. The government, for the meanwhile, looks stronger.

Another reform — or change, depending on how it is viewed — the AKP is keen to push through is an overhaul of Turkey’s system of local government. Currently, the country is divided into 81 provinces, which are then subdivided into municipalities and city municipalities. The government proposes increasing the minimum size of a municipality, and giving more independence to provinces. The government would devolve control of education, healthcare and religious affairs to provincial level.

Istanbul’s administrative reform

Istanbul currently contains more than 70 local administrative units, making a complex mosaic, which, some say, leads to a somewhat inefficient method of government in a country which has only recently thrown off the slight that it is ungovernable. Thus the national government has drawn up plans to consolidate some of the districts, particularly those in which the population has changed considerably in recent years. While these plans appear to make administrative and democratic sense, some allege that they are designed to gerrymander Istanbul’s electoral districts in favor of the AKP in the run-up to the local elections.

Perhaps most controversial is the proposed division of the municipality of Kadikoy on the Asian side of the Bosphorus. Kadikoy is a bastion of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the second largest party in parliament, and renowned for its staunch secularism. It also has a large population of members of the Alevi sect of Islam. Alevis as a whole have been staunch opponents of the AKP, accusing the party of Sunni chauvinism and attempts to co-opt them into neutered community organizations.

Opponents of the Kadikoy split say that the government is trying to dilute the CHP’s effective vote by dividing it between AKP-dominated areas. Furthermore, there are fears about the proposed move of the central bank headquarters to the district from Ankara, which critics say will lead to the establishment of a financial district overwhelming the residential area. An unspoken concern for the CHP may also be that AKP voting bankers will move to Kadikoy and the surrounding suburbs. The proposed local government reforms have been almost drowned out of the news agenda by the headscarf issue, which is indicative of the symbolic importance of the latter in Turkish politics.

Another area that could be affected by these events is Turkey’s application to join the European Union. In 2007, progress slowed considerably. One of the main issues was the suspension of several “chapters” of negotiation over accession by the EU due to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports to ships registered in the Republic of Cyprus; the opposition of France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy, amongst others, has been another blow. There has also — indeed, consequently — been a significant weakening in the Turkish electorate’s support for accession; a majority are now opposed, according to most polls.

EU membership

Partly perhaps due to the symbolism of the headscarf question, the government has vocally restated its commitment to EU membership, with President Abdullah Gul declaring 2008 “the year of Europe,” a call echoed by some of the Cabinet.  “Turkey cannot turn back from the point we have reached in regard to civilization, modernization and Westernization,” said Meclis speaker Koksal Toptan, the second ranking official in Turkey’s state hierarchy and an AKP moderate. “There will be no change here. Turkey cannot give up on its target of membership of the European Union, which is part of its Westernization and modernization process,” he added.

There may be AKP internal politics at play here. There are rumors that Erdogan is losing enthusiasm for the European project. Gul, on the other hand, though previously seen by some as Erdogan-lite, is portrayed as staunchly pro-accession. Whether this is a sign of factions developing in the previously impressively united and disciplined AKP, or a case of “good cop, bad cop” is uncertain. But despite enthusiasm from Toptal and EU chief negotiator Ali Babacan, traction on European accession will be minimal without movement on Cyprus. Greek Cypriot voters unceremoniously turfed out the hardline President Tassos Papdopoulos in the first round of the presidential elections. That could have paved the way for a thaw in the iceberg dividing the two parts of the island. The accession to the Greek Cypriot post of the Communist Demetris Christofias after the second round of polls on February 24 could have eased the way to some progress, though he could scarcely be described as enthusiastic for reunification, despite his most recent words. Not wholly negative is perhaps a more fitting description. In any case, Erdogan may well have made the concept academic. Lifting the headscarf ban and under suspicion of trying to fix local administrative reform in his favor will hardly endear him to opponents of Turkish entry into the EU. The Turkish prime minister appears to have bigger domestic fish to fry and observers could be forgiven for thinking that his own enthusiasm for accession has sunk to the same level as that of the European Turkosceptics.

PETER GRIMSDITCH is editorial director at the Oxford Business Group.

March 7, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Levant

Opening up

by Executive Staff March 7, 2008
written by Executive Staff

With private finance still in its infancy in Syria, private equity has yet to get up and running, but the foundations are being laid for a sector that could be as hot as elsewhere in the region.

Spearheading the direction private equity could take in Syria are holding companies, which were introduced to the market over a decade ago by the likes of former Lebanese prime minister and businessman Rafik Hariri.

But it has only been in the past few years that holding companies have started coming into their own, spurred on by the economic reforms implemented since the death of Hafez al-Assad.

The de-regulation of the finance and banking sectors has been the most crucial change, creating a more competitive financial environment as well as prompting businesses to pull up their socks and adapt to the new climate.

“Holding Companies are a new concept entering the terminology here,” said Dr. Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment. “Businessmen are thinking of setting up holdings, but don’t know the benefits and what it’s all about.”

New Company Law

Indeed, holding companies were not mentioned in Syrian law until 2000, in Law No. 7, which allowed for special tax treatment, and the recently enacted New Company Law has a section on holding companies.

Two Syrian holding companies are at the forefront of this fledgling sector. Souria Holding was established by 24 investors in early 2007, with a capital of $80 million, and is behind the entry of international supermarket chain Spinneys into Syria.

The biggest venture, Cham Holding, was established with a starting capital of $360 million by 70 Syrian investors, with business moguls Nabil Kuzbari the president and Rami Makhlouf the vice-president. (How last month’s decision by the US Treasury Department to freeze Makhlouf’s assets in US financial institutions, as well as prohibiting US citizens and firms from engaging in any business contacts will impact on Cham Holding remains to be seen.)

With the management largely consisting of repatriated Syrians who have had professional experience in the Gulf and the West, the company’s mantra is to “lead the private sector into the new era,” said Bahaa Issa, British-Syrian head of communications.

Part of this involves — as always — the creation of a brand identity to put Syria back on the international business map.

“Our vision is to be at the head of the train of the new economy, and we want to position ourselves as the opportune delivery system for the Syrian economy,” said Issa.

Cham Holding is focusing on six industries, including: BENA, for hospitality and property development; the Cham Capital Group, for finance and banking, capital finance and insurance; SANA for energy and power generation; health and education; and a new private airline Cham was recently granted a license to operate, Pearl Airlines.

According to Issa, Cham Holding plans to “create 50,000 jobs in the next five years, which would indirectly create 600,000 job opportunities.”

Since its launch in 2006, Cham has entered into a raft of strategic partnerships and joint-ventures. In December, it inked a $5 million partnership with British-US company Gulfsands Petroleum, which works in the US, Syria and Iraq. Cham has a 65% controlling stake, with the aim of acquiring high-value energy projects in Syria, and possibly Iraq.

In addition, Cham has entered into a joint-venture with three Kuwaiti firms to tender for large utilities and other infrastructure contracts in Syria, and is reportedly in discussions with Siemens to establish a ‘clean-coal’ power station. Encompassing projects valued at over $1 billion, Cham is also behind the Hejaz Railway station shopping mall, which has yet to get off the ground despite the foundations being dug more than two years ago, reportedly due to resistance from heritage groups.

More than greenbacks

Cham is bringing more than greenbacks to Syria, acting as consultants to the government and striving to introduce corporate governance and regulatory compliance through its own example.

“Compared to Dubai the challenges are tremendous,” said Mohanad Moussly, chief Risk and Compliance Officer. “Here the government is working with the mindset that the public sector is the best provider of services to the public, and to go into critical areas of industry. This mindset is changing, but public sector employees are hesitant about change.”

Holding companies as well as private foreign banks in Syria are hopeful that the upcoming Damascus Stock Market — which was slated to open in the first quarter but looks more likely to start later in the year or early 2009 — will spur on greater de-regulation and attract further capital to Syria. That will also include the entry of private equity firms.

Currently, there are few firms capitalizing on the opening of Syria’s economy. The UAE’s SHUAA Partners, a private equity arm of SHUAA Capital, has however invested $100 million in Syria, to enter the mobile telecom sector.

“We want to invest more in Syria. We have $100 million to deploy in equity and more than just equity when you factor in leverage. We want to go into three markets in Syria:  telecoms, financial services, and real estate/hospitality,” said Jamil Brair, SHUAA Partner’s senior vice president.

For the time being, Syria has further to go before there is a more profound entry of venture capitalists, private equity firms and the like, but holding companies are giving an idea of the direction a more capitalist Syria will resemble.

March 7, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Levant

Aviation taking off

by Executive Staff March 7, 2008
written by Executive Staff

Fitting in to what appears to be the private sector’s modus operandi when investing in Syria in the wake of economic reform, private airlines are only this year taking to the skies, three years after the law had been amended. In 2005, Damascus allowed private investment in air transport for the first time in 60 years, during which the national carrier, Syrian Arab Airlines (SAA), enjoyed a monopoly.

But it has only been in the past six months that the private sector has started to capitalize on the liberalization of the market, with Damascus granting licenses to three private Syrian airlines, of which Sham Wings is the first to get underway with a charter flight to Sharm el-Sheikh in early February of this year.

This seemingly cautious approach to investing in Syria reflects the banking sector’s trajectory into the market, only setting up shop years after private banks were formally allowed into this formerly socialist economy. But the recent flurry of activity in aviation is indicative of the changes the economic reforms in Syria have brought about, with the time lag between the liberalization of the sector on paper and actual developments on the ground creating the conditions for a more viable aviation industry.

Rising tourism numbers

“The main reason for us to set up was the rise in tourists and Iraqis in Syria,” said Salim al-Sawda, technical director of Sham Wings Airlines, which was established by Iraqi and Syrian private investors.

In the past three years, investment in the tourism sector has surged from $400 million in 2004 to $2 billion in 2006, while the number of tourists visiting Syria has spiked from 2.5 million in 2005 to 3.1 million in 2006, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. And if Iraqis and Lebanese were to be included in the figures, the number of visitors would stand at 4.4 million in 2006, versus 3.4 million in 2005, a rise of 29%.

Indeed, with an estimated 1.4 million Iraqi refugees in Syria there is a ready market for air links between Damascus and Baghdad, which until February had been dominated by Iraqi Airways (IA). Now Sham Wings offers flights, directly competing with IA at $567 return (due to high insurance costs at the Iraqi end).

Sham Wings, the country’s first charter airline, has started with one aircraft, a 147-seater McDonnell Douglas MD-83 leased on an ACME basis from an Egyptian company, that way getting around the US ban on the Syrian aviation sector.

The airline plans to buy aircraft “one by one,” said Sawda, and is currently in discussions to by a European-made Folker-100 jet. “We have already increased our timetable, not only to Iraq, but also Sharm el-Sheikh and Alexandria, and we will open a new line to Istanbul, as well as to Ukraine and Belarus. Our destinations will be ones not covered by Syrian Airways.”

The airline, which plans to be profitable within the next two years, is to be joined this year by Syrian al-Nisr Airlines (The Eagle), established by Syrian private investors Al-Harith al-Assad and Mayyar Arnous, and by Pearl Airlines, which is backed by Syria’s Cham Holding. Both airlines have been granted international licenses but have made no statements on intended destinations.

Other licenses are also pending, for cargo, charter and non-charter airlines, said Flight Commander General Hazim al-Khadra, director general of the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority.

“The policy of Syria now is to open the market in the field of aviation. But there is no Open Skies Agreement, only to Bassil al-Assad Airport in Lattakia, as we cannot do it at Damascus International Airport (DIA) since we must have more than one national carrier that can compete with other airlines, let alone the capacity of the airport itself,” he said.

Airport expansion

With the number of tourists visiting Syria increasing by 20% in the past year, and foreign investment flooding in, the country’s airports are witnessing a turnaround, with a 10.5% increase in passengers to 3.485 million last year.

According to al-Khadra, “This is a result of the action plan drawn by our leader, Bashar al-Assad, towards the development and rehabilitation of modernizing Syria.”

As part of the country’s second five-year plan for the 2006-2010 period, some $3.75 billion is forecast for infrastructure developments in the transport sector. Much of this is earmarked for port and road development, but aviation is also getting a much needed boost.

In January, Malaysia’s Mahibbah Engineering won a $59 million construction contract at the DIA to rehabilitate and upgrade the passenger terminal building, roads, car parks and parking apron.

This is just the start of major projects to expand the ageing airport, said al-Khadra, with plans on the drawing board to increase DIA’s current capacity from 1.5 million to 3.5 million passengers a year. “With the next fifth action plan there will be another terminal, catering to 7-8 million passengers, maybe in the next five years.”

The number of international airports is also to be increased, from the current five — Damascus, Lattakia, Aleppo, Deir al-Zor and Qamishle — to eight, with Homs, Tadmur (Palmyra) and Al-Raqqa to get airports of their own.

Al-Khadra said bids and tenders to build and upgrade facilities would be open to international bidders, and there was potential for ground services at the airports to be privatized, pointing out that “This all depends on the development of the economic situation in Syria. Nowadays, Syria values investment from everywhere.”

The number of airlines operating out of Syria could also increase from the current 40 that fly out of Damascus, but that is all “related to the political situation in the region,” according to him. “For instance, European and American airlines are not allowed to operate out of Syria. This is a consequence of the US ban against Syria.”

The US ban on Syrian aviation is one of the biggest hurdles the sector faces, not only in terms of increasing flight destinations and enticing operators, but in particular for the national carrier. Under the 2003 Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA), Washington placed a ban on all US exports to Syria, a ban on US investment in the country, and a ban on Syrian flights to the US, among other regulations. Under such sanctions Syrian Airlines is unable to upgrade its ageing fleet of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, last added to over a decade ago when in 1996 the US granted a special waiver to the airline to purchase used Boeing aircraft from Kuwait and two Airbus A320s in 1998.

“It is a big problem because US aviation interferes with the aviation industry, the spare parts for commercial airlines in particular, which maintain the safety of passengers. And these passengers aren’t only Syrians, but also Europeans, Americans, Asians and so on,” said al-Khadra. “Even Airbus is included in this ban as they cannot sell Syria any Airbus aircraft or spare parts because the Americans are between 10-15% shareholders in these companies.”

The other option for SAA is to buy Russian aircraft, but he said they lacked the American-made Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), which is essential for air safety and a requirement for commercial aircraft by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Diversifying Syria’s air sector may therefore be the only way to get around the crippling US bans, for unless SAA gets spare parts, the airline could be permanently grounded — if planes don’t actually fall from the sky — as private Syrian airlines take to the skies.

March 7, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Egypt’s foreigners

by Norbert Schiller March 7, 2008
written by Norbert Schiller

For foreigners and the Egyptian aristocracy, the 1952 July Revolution marked the beginning of the end of their rule. Gone were the Muhammad Ali dynasty and the influence of the British, Italians, Greeks, French, Levantines, and Turks. Now there was a disgruntled military in charge and it was led by a young and charismatic officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser. His first order of business was to change the nature and make-up of the government, most notably changing the country from a monarchy to a republic. As a way of minimizing foreign opposition, he assured those concerned that their interests would not be touched. After purging the government, he turned to land reforms breaking apart feudal farms and distributing the land among landless peasants. Then, after successfully nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, his government turned to the industrial, financial and commercial sectors, forcing the vast majority of foreigners, who had believed that their interests were safe, to leave the country, many penniless. With the old-guard out of the way and the foreign influence gone, Nasser finally turned to the Eastern block for military assistance and backing.

Even though Nasser’s socialist reforms have been in place for the better part of the past 50 years, present-day Egypt is more like it was under the King, though not as chaotic and elitist; a trickle-down effect has in fact created a thriving Egyptian middle class. But the economic power stills lies with the Egyptian elite, albeit a different circle, and once again foreigners are allowed to settle, own businesses, buy property, and build a future. In fact, this past year Egypt was named by the International Financial Corporation, the World Bank’s financial arm, as the world’s top reformer. It achieved this by cutting the minimum time required to start a business, lowering fees for registering property, and relaxing bureaucracy for construction permits. Last year, Egypt also emerged as the number one recipient of direct foreign investment in Africa beating South Africa.

On a recent trip to Egypt, I visited the Red Sea resort town of El Gouna, one of the most exclusive resorts in the country. While admiring the Abu Tig Marina with all its multi-million dollar yachts, I ran into an elderly gentleman who was asking for directions to a particular shop. There was nothing unusual about his request except that the man, who was obviously European, addressed me in Arabic. At first I thought that he was short sighted, because I, too, look very European, and to avoid embarrassing him I responded in Arabic. He responded with a big smile, thanked me, and walked off in the direction where I had pointed.

I didn’t think much of the encounter until a few days later when I was invited to dinner by a friend who wanted to introduce me to a few Europeans who have made El Gouna their home. The group was small and included the Italian women who owned the restaurant where we were eating, two Italian sisters, an Italian man who was the manager of the local casino, and my Lebanese friend who runs the winery in El Gouna. The conversation started out in Italian, but because neither my friend nor I could follow, the group began to split with some switching to English and the others French except for the elder of the two sisters who continued on in Italian. When she finally realized that I didn’t understand a word she said she switched to Arabic which came naturally to her. I asked her if she spoke English or French and she said, “not very well.” I then told her the story about the elderly European man who also spoke to me in Arabic. She asked about where I had seen him and if he was wearing locally made sandals. I said: “Yes, he was wearing shibshibs and I met him in the Marina.” She started laughing so hard that everyone turned around to see what was going on.

Her younger sister then jumped in and in English explained to everyone that the elderly gentleman was none other than their father who had been born and raised in Egypt to Italian parents. After finishing his studies he started his own successful textile business in Cairo. “Everything was going well for him until 1961 when Nasser began nationalizing all foreign owned businesses. My father thought that he was immune and continued on with his business as if nothing was happening until one day, in 1964, our family business was nationalized and we were forced to leave the country.” With nowhere else to go, and very little money, the family moved to Italy. The eldest daughter had also been born and raised in Egypt learning both Arabic and Italian at the Italian school. The younger sister was born after they had already left Egypt. “Italy was always my home but my sister and especially my father were really never able to assimilate back in our ancestral country and my father always wished to one day return to Egypt.”

A few years ago the elder sister visited the Red Sea and was so charmed by El Gouna that she bought a home there. The younger sister followed, also fell in love with the place, and bought a home there also. Suddenly the father, whose wife had passed away, became very lonely without his daughters and insisted that they bring him back to Egypt. Thus, when he was already well into his 90s, his daughters brought him back to Egypt and bought him a small apartment. “My father never felt at home in Italy, he always wanted to come back to Egypt even if it is just to die.”

With foreign investment at an all time high, maybe this nonagenarian may be able to pick up where he left off and start another business in the land of his birth.

Norbert Schiller is a Dubai-based photo-journalist and writer.

March 7, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Editorial

Fighting words

by Yasser Akkaoui March 7, 2008
written by Yasser Akkaoui

This month’s Private Equity report represents not only a first for Executive in terms of size, content and execution, but I believe it has propelled the way regional business is reported to a new level. In essence, Executive has set a new benchmark.

We want the regional businessman — the chairman, the CEO, the fund manager, and the business owner — to see Executive as his magazine — the name after all is not a coincidence. We want Executive to be a magazine that monitors his/her business environment; that engages him/her on a personal level; that offers an open forum for discussion and encourages transparency in an increasingly transparent world. We will not so much judge as moderate.

The nature of communication has changed and so must the way we communicate. The media might remain the same but the methods of disseminating new data and telling the new business story must embrace the new dynamism that stretches from New York to Beijing via the increasingly important Middle Eastern gateway.

In this new and exciting era, awareness is high and business is changing, especially in the Gulf, where change is effected at a phenomenal rate. Yet the region is small and intimate and one of the deliberate aims of this and future special reports is to reflect this intimacy. To bring together the key players and accurately report how they perceive doing business in their own words; the new front line dispatches if you like. We want to be the magazine of record for those who shape business.

In doing this we have had to set new standards for ourselves. We must be extra diligent if we want to connect with the business community on its level. We can not rest on our laurels nor can we allow ourselves to just “get by”, month after month, as long as annual projections are satisfied. A good business will not operate like that and a business magazine that wants to maintain a keen edge cannot either. To truly report business it must abide by the same standards, and work under the same pressure as the people it reports.

Fighting words?

You bet.

March 7, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Syria moves ahead

by Riad Al-Khouri March 3, 2008
written by Riad Al-Khouri

Syria’s current economic performance is strong, as the country benefits from growth in exports and inflows of private investment, which helped the economy to grow at a rate of 6.2% in 2007, compared to 5.1% registered in 2006. American sanctions are not a major impediment to the Syrian economy. In fact, gradual globalization helps to push numerous US products in Syria, from fried chicken franchises to a major sugar refinery. Far from helping to achieve purported US regional goals, such as isolating the Iranians, the effect of American sanctions on Syria has been counterproductive, opening the door to greater influence on Damascus by regional powers — including Iran, itself seeking stronger Middle Eastern ties to counter America.

Tehran has thus partly filled the gap created by sanctions. Taking advantage of some economic possibilities; and new Syrian-Iranian economic joint ventures in Syria include among many others: an oil refinery (to be built in partnership with Venezuela), two factories to make Iran-designed family cars, and a plant to produce 1 million tons of cement annually and help meet the demands of Syria’s building boom. This is part of the Syrian strategy of improving relations with its neighbors. Cold-shouldered by America, and to some extent by Europe (the Syrian Euro-Med agreement has been initialed but not signed), Damascus has for the past few years looked to the region for economic and business collaboration.

In that respect, notable developments recently include a rapprochement with Jordan, as well as positively evolving links across much of the rest of Syria’s neighborhood. After a frosty period caused by the perception that Amman sided with the US and its other allies in the region against Syria, the visit to Damascus by Jordan’s King Abdullah in November has helped to improve relations between the two neighbors. The pace of co-ordination between the two countries has quickened since then. In among other spheres, movement of passengers and goods between the two countries is huge and growing. Coming south are Syrian and other goods destined for Jordanian factories and consumers (as well as to Saudi Arabia and neighboring economies) and large numbers of Syrian workers seeking employment in Jordan. Headed in the other direction are increasing numbers of Jordanian and GCC tourists. The vast majority of these people and goods cross the border by road, though a small number also travels between the two countries by air, with flights between Jordanian and Syrian cities increasing. At the same time, although the two countries had neglected their railways in recent years, over the past few months Jordan and Syria have agreed a new railway project to link the two countries.

From the east, Iraqis liked Damascus so much that up to 1.5 million of them are living there and in other Syrian cities, by far the largest number of Iraqi refugees accepted by any state in the region. Since most of these are neither poor nor uneducated, they are a source of increased business between the two countries over the longer term, though in the short run the refugees have strained Syrian production capacity in various sectors and pushed some prices up. Another factor linking the two countries is water, which along with Turkey they share through the Tigris-Euphrates system. Syria had to contend with drought recently, making even more significant the recent meeting (the first in many years) between Damascus, and Baghdad, along with Ankara, to talk about their shared river basin.

In the same vein, Syria asked the Turks in January to release more water from their dams on the Euphrates to build up supplies for irrigation. In November, Ankara also underlined its co-operation with Damascus in another sphere, when Syrian plans were unveiled, to import natural gas from Iran via a pipeline running through Turkey. Coupled with these and other infrastructural developments was the launching of numerous joint ventures between the two neighbors, as well as an increasing flow of people and goods across their borders.

Finally, regarding Lebanon, economic relations between Beirut and Damascus are far too important for the current crisis between the two neighbors to have a serious impact. The alternative for the Lebanese, to normal relations with Syria, is normalization with Israel, but the latter will not happen coercively, and on any case not before the former. Syria on the other hand cannot properly deal with the employment implications of its population growth without the safety valve of the Lebanese labor market absorbing hundreds of thousands of Syrian workers. In other words, the two countries need each other too much for rifts to continue long. Meanwhile, Syria continues to pursue a regional strategy, opening up to other countries of the Middle East.

Riad al Khouri is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Senior Fellow of the William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan.

 

March 3, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

A change in US Mideast policy?

by Claude Salhani March 3, 2008
written by Claude Salhani
 
To be able to say that there is a shift in US policy regarding Syria, one has first to assume that there was indeed a coherent policy on how to deal with Damascus in the first place. Yet for the most part Washington’s policy regarding regimes that the Bush administration disagreed with has been to: A) refuse to talk to them, and B) to berate them at every chance. Washington’s stance regarding Damascus was a typical example of such policy. Could that policy be changing so late in the game? Possibly. But then again, more likely not.

In his final State of the Union address President George W. Bush was quite forthright in his accusations aimed at Iran and its leaders. Bush issued a stern warning to the leadership in Tehran, warning them that the United States would not stand idly by, in view of what he deemed was, Tehran’s aggressive policy in the region.

The president devoted a sizeable portion of his address to the Middle East, particularly focusing on the situation in Iraq and on what he likes to call “the war on terror.” Bush stressed the importance of “confronting enemies abroad and advancing liberty in troubled regions of the world.” He spoke of witnessing “stirring moments in the history of liberty.” He spoke of images of liberty that have “inspired us,” such as Iraqis voting in free elections for the first time. He also spoke of “images that sobered us.” He referred to “[passenger] trains in London and Madrid ripped apart by bombs,” a bride in a blood-stained dress at a wedding party in the Jordanian capital, and people carrying coffins in Lebanon.

There was, in effect, nothing new to what should have been a landmark speech, his last, after two terms in the White House and two wars in the Middle East. This speech will, after all, be the one that historians will remember most and will in years to come be compared it to those of other presidents.

On second thought, however, there was indeed an important new element to the president’s speech; the novelty was not so much in what was said, but more in what was left out of the presidential address. If Bush continued to view Tehran as representing a clear and present danger to the security of the United States, repeating that all options remained on the table when it came to Iran, the president was conspicuously silent when it came to Syria.

In retrospect, this silence seems rather odd when compared to previous speeches summarizing the situation in the Middle East. Until now, members of the Bush administration had no qualms about accusing Damascus of interfering in the affairs of its neighbor to the west, as well as those of its neighbor to the east.

Could it be that Washington has decided to engage Damascus in dialogue rather than continue its previous policy of shunning those that it disagrees with? Besides the Iraqi imbroglio, which Washington says Damascus has been involved in, facilitating the transit of weapons and fighters through its territory. The Bush administration has also clashed with Damascus over the political tug of war in Lebanon, more recently over the question of the Lebanese presidency.

Is this sudden silence concerning Syria an indication that Washington and Damascus are talking to one another? If so, both sides have been very discrete and successful in maintaining a complete media blackout, a near impossibility in a city such as Washington.

Hiam Nawas, a political analyst in Washington, follows Syrian affairs with a keen interest. She believes that if we are to resolve the Lebanon issue, “engaging Syria is crucial.”

True words. But other than the president’s silence there is no other indication of a thawing of relations between Syria and the United States. Rather, all indications seem to hint at Damascus having “given up” on attempting to deal with the Bush administration, instead focusing on how to do business with the next administration, now less than a year away.

Indeed, if Washington has lacked a coherent policy on how to deal with Syria, on the other hand the policy applied by Damascus when dealing with an intransigent Washington has been quite simple: Wait until a new administration moves into the White House.

Not pressured by the same four-year electoral cycle under which US presidents operate, Syria’s rulers — as well as a number of other leaders around the world — have learned to retrench and sit out the remaining time left to an administration they disagree with. This has long been the strategy practiced by President Hafez al-Assad and it continues to be the method of choice of his son and successor, Bashar.

Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.

 

March 3, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Iran’s mutually assured destruction

by Paula Schmitt March 3, 2008
written by Paula Schmitt

Like a cheap war pamphlet prodding a very susceptible bully president, the weekly The Economist, had on its January 31 cover the question-headline “Has Iran won?

”The Economist has lost much of its respect and has ceased to be a sober reference (remember the cover just before the Iraqi invasion saying “Why war would be justified?”) but the magazine’s articles on Iran are important because they spill the beans on the reasons for an attack — a rationale that is as irrational as it can get. There are several fallacies in The Economist’s article, and I am using the piece precisely because it repeats the average, lowbrow arguments with which we have been swamped in the days leading to the IAEA report on Iran. Let us not belittle the importance of a biased press — while not giving us the truth, they dutifully authenticate and spell out the day’s agenda. If recent news articles are any indication, we are no more than months away from an attack on Iran. Now, I have little fondness for Islamic republics or any religious republic for that matter. And yes, I would rather live in a world without nuclear weapons. But in the current setup of weapons distribution, Iran is only doing what it politically should, and what it is legally entitled to.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most widely accepted arms control agreement in the world. According to the NPT, only five countries are entitled to own nuclear weapons: USA, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. It is no coincidence that these countries are the permanent members of the Security Council — they are the most capable of destroying the world, and thus keep it on a leash. What happens if one of the permanent members wants to attack another? That is prevented, or so one hopes, by the principle of MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction. Countries are deterred more efficiently, it seems, by the certainty of their destruction. This logic is laid clear by the chronology of weapons acquisition. Allegedly out of fear of Nazi Germany, America was the first country to develop a nuclear weapon, efficiently tested on the Japanese. The US was then made, ad hoc, the world’s police not based on its prudence and justice, but on its power — and willingness — to destroy. Yet fear breeds dread and four years later Russia started building its own nuclear arsenal, as a defense against a possible US attack. Three years later, fearing the proximity of Russia, the United Kingdom also chose to have nuclear weapons, then it was France and then China. It’s worth noticing that this logic is at the core of the very right to bear arms in the US: Citizens should have the means to defend themselves — even against their own government. If the monopoly of power was left in the hands of the state, citizens could be made hostage to an illegitimate ruler.

Now, if the US government can be seen as a potential threat even to its own people, it was therefore very naïve to imagine that in a multi-polar world all the rest of the non-nuclear countries would be fine with having five nuclear states dictating the rules. Hence, since the exclusive club of nuclear states was closed for membership, countries that wanted to go nuclear simply chose to not sign the treaty. To protect itself against China and Russia, India got its nukes. Pakistan felt threatened and started developing its own weapons program. Israel, which feels menaced by its neighbors, got its own nuclear warheads, also refusing to sign the NPT. Why, in this scenario, is Iran considered a rogue state, or, to borrow The Economist’s appalling words, should be made to “quake in its boots?” Here is where the whole story of nuclear proliferation gets even more sinister.

Iran is a subscriber to the NPT, and according to the IAEA, as of yet, has never failed to comply with the treaty itself. On the other hand, India, who did not sign the NPT, was rewarded by the American Congress with transfer of civilian nuclear material. The USA also mocks the NPT when it violates its first article by providing nuclear weapons to Belgium, Italy, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands, under the official excuse that those weapons are “under constant and complete custody and control” of the United States, being there only for storage. In fact, Iran started its nuclear program precisely when it was on good terms with America, under the shah’s government. Why is Iran now considered a bigger threat than Israel? What qualifies a state as ‘rogue’? Is it its ruler? Its people? Its rhetoric and pathetic rants? Shouldn’t a country’s actions, rather than words, determine its level of threat to the rest of the planet? Haven’t we learned that governments, even in supposed democratic states like the US, do not always represent their people, and sometimes are not even actually elected? How can one think America is the same America under Bush as it was under Jefferson, or under Carter, to find a more recent comparison?

Mohammed ElBaradei is doing a decent, technical and honest job at the IAEA, despite all the external pressure. A lawyer by formation, he has refused to skip due process and is sticking to the letter of the treaty. It is not his, or America’s job, to guess the ‘motivation’ of countries. Israel believes its soil belongs to the Jewish people, and that they have been chosen by God. This type of religious premise is as horrifying, though more dangerous, than India calling its first nuclear test the “Smiling Buddha” or Ahmadinejad denying the Holocaust — something more pathetic than harmful. In politics, words mean very little. Actions, on the other hand, mean a lot. It is the IAEA, not the US, which has the means, competence and independence to decide Iran’s nuclear future. America doesn’t have the legal mandate to decide, much less the moral right.

Paula Schmidtt is a correspondent for Radio France International and Rolling Stone Brazil.

March 3, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Lebanon’s tremors

by Nicholas Blanford March 3, 2008
written by Nicholas Blanford

The recent earth tremors felt in Lebanon served as a timely reminder of the volatility of the land mass on which Lebanon rests. The good news is that, unnerving though it is to experience an earthquake — even minor tremors such as those that shook Lebanon in February — they are a reassuring sign that the fault systems beneath are feet are moving as they should. Indeed, a prolonged absence of seismic activity in an earthquake zone is far more troubling, as it suggests that a fault is jammed. Pressure builds up and is eventually released in one convulsive and destructive shock.

Lebanon has a long history of major earthquakes, which have destroyed Beirut at least twice and helped shape Lebanon’s current coastline.

The country lies at the nexus of three continental plates: the African, the Arabian and the Eurasian. The African plate is heading south-west and the Arabian plate north-east at approximately two centimeters per year. The Dead Sea rift between the African and Arabian plates runs up the Red Sea, through the Gulf of Aqaba, along the Jordan valley and into Lebanon where it becomes known as the Yammouneh Fault following the western side of the Bekaa.

However, Lebanon’s dilemma does not center solely on this one major fault but on the dozens of others running throughout the country. As an example, Beirut has at least five recognized faults. One follows the Beirut River, another called the Town Center Fault begins at Normandy and heads through downtown, another fault is in Ras Beirut, and two faults follow the Beirut coastline and bisect just off Ras Beirut. Geologists believe that it is these last two faults that created the Beirut peninsula by forcing the sea bed above the surface of the sea.

Other than the direct action of shockwaves, earthquakes can also generate other phenomena such as tsunamis and soil liquefaction.

A tsunami is a wave generated by an earthquake the epicenter of which is located beneath the sea bed. They can travel at speeds of 750 km/h at a height of 30-40m and can deliver on average 100,000 tons of water per 1.5 sqm of coastline. According to two Jesuit priests, Fathers Plassard and Kogoj, who conducted an extensive survey of Lebanon’s seismic record in the 1960s, Lebanon’s coastline has been hit by tsunamis 14 times over the last 2,500 years.

Soil liquefaction occurs in areas of loose earth, such as sand or silt, which also contains a high water content. With repeated shaking the soil develops the consistency of water completely undermining foundations with the result that buildings can topple over in one piece like felled trees.

Many seismologists believe that earthquakes are cyclical, occurring at regular intervals throughout history. Given this information, as well as a detailed knowledge of the faults themselves, some believe that earthquakes can be loosely predicted over the long term.

Lebanon is fortunate in this regard, as earthquakes have been documented over the last 2,500 years. By contrast, the notorious San Andreas Fault in California has records extending back only 250 years.

If anyone is in any doubt as to the impact earthquakes can have on Lebanon, one only needs to consult these records: 525 BC — Tyre destroyed; AD 349 — most of Beirut destroyed; July 6, 551 — total destruction of Beirut, massive damage to Tripoli and Tyre, coastline altered, part of Ras Chekka falls into the sea; 1170 — destruction of Tripoli; October 30, 1759 — destruction at Quneitra and Safad, 2,000 dead; November 25, 1759 — Beirut and Damascus destroyed, more than 40,000 dead. The above are only the major earthquakes, more have been chronicled.

An earthquake of a similar magnitude to the one of November 1759 would today be a national catastrophe. One earthquake in Lebanon could cause as much damage in a few minutes as was sustained by 16 years of war.

Although earthquakes cannot be avoided, their impact can be mitigated through prior planning, specifically the enforcement of strict seismic building codes for new construction. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Lebanon’s buildings constructed over the past 40 years lack any seismic qualifications. The near ubiquitous design of a reinforced concrete frame filled in with cinder block walls offers little protection against an earthquake.

The difference between cities that have incorporated seismic building codes and those that have not is shown by comparing recent earthquakes. The 1994 Northridge earthquake in California, with a magnitude of 6.8, killed 33 people. Yet the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, with a magnitude of 6.6, killed 30,000 people. The 1995 earthquake at Kobe, Japan, had a magnitude of 7.3 and caused 4,600 casualties but the 1999 earthquake at Izmit in Turkey with a magnitude of 7.5 cost the lives of 45,000. California and Japan were prepared, Iran and Turkey were not.

When I last discussed the earthquake threat to Lebanon with an expert, I was told that Lebanon experiences a very strong quake exceeding a magnitude of seven approximately every 200 to 250 years. The last big earthquake was in 1759. Given that it is impossible to accurately predict the timing of earthquakes, the expert said that there was a 60-70% probability of a destructive earthquake occurring in Lebanon over the next 50 years. The bad news is that conversation took place 11 years ago.
 

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based journalist and author of “Killing Mr. Lebanon – The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East.”

 

March 3, 2008 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 542
  • 543
  • 544
  • 545
  • 546
  • …
  • 688

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

    • Facebook
    • Twitter
    • Instagram
    • Linkedin
    • Youtube
    Executive Magazine
    • ISSUES
      • Current Issue
      • Past issues
    • BUSINESS
    • ECONOMICS & POLICY
    • OPINION
    • SPECIAL REPORTS
    • EXECUTIVE TALKS
    • MOVEMENTS
      • Change the image
      • Cannes lions
      • Transparency & accountability
      • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
      • Say No to Corruption
      • The Lebanon media development initiative
      • LPSN Policy Asks
      • Advocating the preservation of deposits
    • JOIN US
      • Join our movement
      • Attend our events
      • Receive updates
      • Connect with us
    • DONATE