Despite the hesitation of the United Nations secretariat andthe warnings of the Lebanese opposition, the adoption of theInternational Tribunal under a Chapter 7 mandate appearsalmost certain.

The government and its supporters have stepped up efforts tohave the tribunal adopted under Chapter 7, believing thatonce it becomes a fait accompli it will break the politicaldeadlock with the opposition.

There is much uncertainty over the powers and legalparameters of the tribunal which has only helped exacerbatethe tensions surrounding its formation. Hizbullah says it isworried that the US—the main external driving force behindthe tribunal—will use it as a political weapon to settle oldscores, such as reopening “files” dating back to the suicidebombings and kidnappings of the 1980s. Those fears are notwholly without foundation. One senior Christian politiciantold me that was exactly what he hoped would happen once thetribunal is formed so as to undermine Hizbullah’s oppositionrole. Former Prime Minister Omar Karami has suggested thatthe tribunal’s powers be expanded to include the murder ofhis brother, Rashid. If Rashid Karami’s death is included,then there is no end to the number of assassinations,massacres and killings that could end up before thetribunal.

UN officials, however, have said that the tribunal willlimit its work to the series of murders, attempted murdersand bombings that began in October 2004.

International tribunals are a relatively recent phenomenonin international law, a result of greater cooperation amongglobal powers after the polarization of the Cold War came toan end. The first since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals in1945 and 1946 was the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in1993. Since then numerous ad hoc tribunals have been formedto deal with international war crimes such as those forSierra Leone, Cambodia and Rwanda among others. Critics ofthese tribunals claim they are politically motivated and aform of victor’s justice. Certainly, there can be littledoubt that Lebanon’s tribunal owes its imminent existence tothe exigencies of United States policy toward Syria ratherthan an impartial attempt to discover and prosecute thekillers of Rafik Hariri and his companions.

Much of the ambiguity surrounding the Lebanese version isthat it is a hybrid of several other international tribunalsrather than a direct copy and will be treading new legalground. For example, the tribunals for the former Yugoslaviaand Rwanda were adopted under Chapter 7 from the beginning.There were no local judges sitting on the tribunal andinternational law was adopted for both. The tribunal forSierra Leone included a token local presence and was heldin-country although international law was adopted again. Themixed Lebanese International Tribunal will have equalparticipation of local and foreign judges and will sit underLebanese law (with the exception of the death penalty).Unlike its Sierra Leonean counterpart, however, the Lebanesetribunal will not sit in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the original intention was to establish thetribunal under a bilateral treaty between Beirut and theUnited Nations. The recourse to Chapter 7 only arose whenthe passage of the treaty through parliament became blocked.

Nicolas Michel, the UN’s top legal adviser, has suggestedthat even if the Security Council approves the tribunalunder Chapter 7, it will not be put together until the UNcommission concludes its investigation. That statement wasintended to reassure critics of a Chapter 7 tribunal, buttheoretically the tribunal can begin operating as soon as itis approved by the Security Council, a location chosen andthe judges selected. For example, the tribunal could begintrials of the four generals presently languishing withoutcharge in Roumieh prison. They were detained nearly twoyears ago on the advice of Detlev Mehlis, the then head ofthe UN investigation commission. While, their detention waslegally permissible, their indefinite incarceration withoutcharge nor arraignment in a court of law is not.

In normal circumstances, there should be no need for thetribunal to have recourse to the raft of coercive measuresat the disposal of the UN Security Council under Chapter 7.Indictments issued by the tribunal are legally binding underinternational law irrespective of Chapter 7.

However, Chapter 7 could be applied if any party refused tohand over individuals indicted by the tribunal. AlthoughArticle 42 of Chapter 7 permits the use of military force toimplement Security Council decisions, the UN could opt forthe softer measures contained in Article 41 such as economicsanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Even ifthe Security Council was unable to forge a consensus onusing military force, the indicted persons would be unableto travel internationally and could face a freeze of theirinternational assets. However, the down side is that thewhole legal process could grind to a halt, the prosecutionspending, until those indicted are turned over or handthemselves in.

Such is the case with Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic whohave been under indictment by the tribunal for the formerYugoslavia since 1995. The Serbian authorities agreed toturn them over, but both men remain at large, apparently inSerbia, and their prosecution consequently pending.

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based reporter and author of Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri andits Impact on the Middle East.