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Business

Bank of Beirut: Going steady

by Thomas Schellen April 3, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Following a very satisfactory 2003 for the country’s major banks, the outlook for the sector in 2004 is guarded but not downcast, said Salim Sfeir, chairman and general manager of Bank of Beirut.

Each and every bank in the sector’s leading stratum could outdo their expectations on the results they realized in 2003, Sfeir told EXECUTIVE. “Talking about 2004 and 2005 is a big question, because markets are slightly down and political uncertainties are still high,” he said. “But nevertheless, our financial forecast for the end of the year is not pessimistic. We look forward to having a smooth year, financially speaking.” Similar to other alpha group banks – the institutions at the top of the national banking hierarchy, with assets of more than $1 billion apiece – Bank of Beirut can point to exponential growth in the reconstruction years, both in size and range of activities. Today ranked sixth by assets and seventh in terms of tier-one capital among Lebanon’s banks, its evolution and performance appears archetypical for the fortunes of the sector’s better-achieving agents.

Entering the 90s as a very small player, Bank of Beirut ventured onto an ambitious path of expansion after installing a new management in 1993. Four years later, it was Lebanon’s third bank to go public, and in 1998, a merger with Transorient Bank completed the foundation that enabled Bank of Beirut to scale the $1 billion assets hurdle. In 2002, the bank made further headlines by acquiring Beirut Riyad Bank in a second large merger move, which contributed to a 2002 increase in assets by over 58% and boosted the branch network to over 40 domestic outlets and a subsidiary in London. The bank also established an international banking unit in Cyprus, adding to its representative office in Dubai at the seat of its strategic shareholder, Emirates Bank International. In parallel, Bank of Beirut in 2002 and 2003 undertook a number of measures to increase its tier-one and tier-two capital, including issuance of $55 million in preferred shares. It enlarged its product and services portfolio through creating new funds, retail and bancassurance products along with installation of a call center and an electronic banking operation. Perhaps more tiring than anticipated, the acquisition of Beirut Riyad Bank and integration of its labor force and customer base “was not an easy meal to digest”, Sfeir concedes, even as he maintains that the bank mastered the merger “in an excellent way. I don’t think it could have been done in a better way.” The bank’s underlying message seems to say that their growth expectations are far from exhausted but under national economic conditions, the next development cycle could be some time away.

Bank of Beirut has, so far, navigated 2004 with care – a mood primarily reflective of what management regards as ‘politically generated’ constraints on local and regional affairs encumbering the investment climate. The bank is party to a widespread sentiment that – positive impact of Paris II notwithstanding – the Lebanese political decision makers still need to fulfill their duty of facilitating macro-economic conditions more conducive for attracting investments. The lack of action on the government’s part has led the banking industry in general, and Bank of Beirut in particular, to declare itself apolitical. This does not mean that the bank would wait for political improvements before continuing their quest to innovate. Recent new products include a competitively priced account with revolving credit for salaried employees and a new lira-denominated housing loan. The bank’s current emphasis on housing loans took off with a product designed especially for Lebanese expatriates, who sought to establish a personal property bridgehead in their home country. As the interest rate environment on the lira has improved and lira products are more feasible than before, lira loans are a logical new product that many banks would follow Bank of Beirut in devising, Sfeir said. “The lira loan is another product. We are not highlighting the lira but promoting higher usage since interest rates have fallen to levels making it mandatory to start planning in this direction.” Like a dollar-denominated domestic housing loan introduced last year, the lira loan offers regressive interest rates.

In continued pursuit of its strategy to offer funds products attractive to small and large investors, the bank last year collaborated with First National Bank (FNB) in the creation of two new funds, the Beirut Global Income Fund in July and the Beirut Lira Fund in October. “Small investors took part in the funds and saw high returns,” Sfeir said. “Investors are well informed today, and expect returns that are higher than what they can gain elsewhere. As long as we are providing those returns, we are reaching our target.” According to Sfeir, the funds collaboration between Bank of Beirut and FNB was to the mutual benefit of both institutions. Could this development indicate a stronger partnership in the making, or perhaps another merger prospect? Not in the current situation, where the law and regulations supporting bank merger activities with central bank soft loans haven’t been renewed. “There is no merger law now; it would be a waste of time to get excited,” he said. “With a merger law, it would be a new opportunity.”

Profitability before size and profit optimization at lowest possible risk levels make for two fundamentals in the Bank of Beirut strategy, translating into an unhurried pace in the bank’s continued ambition for an increased role in regional markets. Together with its partner, Emirates Bank, the institution has applied for a license to establish a presence in Syria. It is also approaching the Nigerian market through a rep office project in Lagos, and – for the longer term – contemplates its entry into Iraq. In Sfeir’s view, international expansion is no easy fix and offshore markets poise high risks for Lebanese banks that venture there. They have to calculate a high costs of funds based on the interest rates paid to depositors, and offshore clients accepting those rates would not be likely to be a model for creditworthiness. “Whoever is going to borrow at our own rates will be a risky partner, on whom we have no control,” Sfeir said, “and this I don’t recommend at all to my people.” He accepts only the top five banks in the country as a peer group for Bank of Beirut and sees the optimal size of the Lebanese banking sector as containing no more than 12 or 13 banks. But domestic size ranking was never a concern of the bank, Sfeir said. “We never looked at other parties, the market and colleagues. Our policy is to compete against ourselves. To be much better than we have been.” The bank has a young labor force – the average age is below 40-years-old – and Sfeir prioritizes in-house training and continued education over hiring new staff. The priorities for the current period in the Bank of Beirut evolution are “to maintain the quality of our service and products,” he continued, “and improve the quality of our people through adequate education programs. This will reflect on our results.” The executive admonishes the existence of unprofessional banking practices that extend even into the ranks of the alpha group – but nonetheless appears less concerned about sector-specific problems than about the performance of the public sector leadership. “Lebanese bankers are good bankers,” he said, “I didn’t say that the Lebanese politicians are good politicians.”

The one internal snag factor that Sfeir identified for his institution – which adopts the motto ‘banking beyond borders’ – would be, “shyness.” “Every time when we are shy, we fail.” Extending an invitation to everyone to get closer to Bank of Beirut, the tough talking banker shows a softer side. “We are opening our doors to accommodate the public with a big smiling heart.”

April 3, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Revolution in retail

by Michael Karam April 1, 2004
written by Michael Karam

Lebanon’s retail sector has finally shaken off the effects of the war as it moves towards a modern shopping culture. The good news is that a new generation of shopping malls is getting it right, offering a modern retail experience in an equally modern retail environment, catering to both local shoppers and tourists.

This modern culture has not had an easy birth, having emerged from the retail chaos of the immediate post war years. Then, the downtown, historically the capital’s retail core was still rubble and the ad hoc shopping districts that emerged during the conflict – Verdun, Zalka and Kaslik – still thrived in the absence of a genuine retail hub and modern malls. There were shopping centers of a sort, built with the money of returning exiles. This haphazard approach to retail was doomed to fail. The developments were badly run, ill-designed with small shops, fitted with low quality specifications and with little or no thought given to tenant mix. This and a once-thriving market of pirated goods (now happily on the wane) was not an auspicious start to a sector that has the potential to contribute to $3.6 billion or 20% of GDP.

However since 2000, the renaissance of the BCD, new malls –such as the ABC in Ashrafieh and Dunes – and the emergence of supermarket chains have all transformed the sector and the way we shop. This mini revolution has been helped by the fact that many Lebanese have lived and traveled abroad almost guaranteeing a target rich environment for the international brands. Today, as Lebanon continues to fall in line with international retailing trends it is witnessing larger developments, more car-borne shopping and longer opening hours. This is creating increased competition as retailers place greater emphasis on location, access, customer flow, tenant mix, climate control, service accessibility and parking. “The new malls will see a repositioning of the retail landscape, which is currently defined as the high-street,” explained Mark Morris-Jones of Cushman and Wakefield Healey and Baker’s associate office in Beirut. “Those malls that are properly conceived, managed and well-let will succeed.”

Beirut and its suburbs are dotted with promise. Six major retail developments in Dora, Dbayeh, Sin el Fil, the BCD and Verdun will add nearly 200,000m2 of net retail space. The five do not include the 100,000m2 Souks in the BCD, which has been delayed for four years and does not look like it will be built any time soon. However, local retailers believe that this increased supply will meet the demands of Lebanon’s retailers who insist on modern retail space. “The trouble is that today we just can’t find the right location for our premises,” said Admic chairman Michel Abchee. “The new projects are responding to this demand. If anyone is going to suffer it is the previous generation of retail developments.” It was a painful lesson to learn for those who poured their money into badly conceived projects. “We must remember that much of the retail space in the first phase was sold and, therefore, lack the management and direction of a modern mall where space is rented,” said Morris-Jones, who added that developers with the long-term view will be the eventual winner as they should see growth in sales, which will lead to rental growth and then capital growth.

One of the most adventurous new projects is the Metropolitan mall in Sin el Fil. While many analysts believe that the Habtoor Group is throwing good money after bad, but Morris-Jones believes its might just work. “It is a lot smaller than the other malls coming on stream. It has less than 14,000m2 with a lot of restaurants and coffee shops,” he said. Analysts believe that the new ADMIC mall at Dora will help Sin El Fil’s customer draw, as it will be the first genuine hypermarket in Lebanon and will change shopping patterns in Beirut’s northern suburbs.

Area’s that are expected to make a significant comeback include Hamra, a traditional retail area with a proper commercial street and a residential base woven into its fabric. Verdun should also survive as long as it responds to the new challenges presented by the malls. “We need to see retailers’ associations providing street furniture, parking and safety features that will enhance streets and allow them to compete,” said Morris-Jones.

The downtown’s retail dynamic, once so full of promise, has stuttered due to the delay of the Souks project. In 2001, the development was touted as the single most important development in the BCD and a catalyst for foreign direct investment. With roughly 52,000m2 of retail space – including a 15,000m2 dept store and a 7,000m2 supermarket – it was estimated at the time that the Souks could achieve revenues of $270 million in its first year. International retailers – including Les Galleries Lafayette, Harvey Nichols and Printemps – showed genuine interest in leasing the department store while Spinneys also showed an interest in the supermarket plot. Today, political squabbling has thrown Solidere’s original retail blueprint out the window. Allenby and Foch were designed for upmarket brands but have had to absorb those “high-street” labels originally earmarked for the Souks. When the Souks open for business, retail analysts believe that the high-end shops will head to the BCD. “The expectation is that the price point of products offered in the Souks will be some way above those elsewhere and will serve the higher end market segment,” said Morris-Jones. “This will be an extension of the current trend where we have already seen some of those high end retailers drifting in from a number of outside destinations. There will however be an impact on those retailers operating outside the BCD in that they will take with them a chunk of total sales and this will see a reduction in rental levels elsewhere.” But what is selling? Currently women’s wear and restaurants are the most popular retail outlets with home accessories, footwear, jewelry and men’s wear in close pursuit. “There are some outstanding homegrown retailers in Lebanon, such as GS, Patchi, Kababji, Crepaway, Red Shoe, Pointure, Aziz, Ghia Holdings, Maison du Café and any number of the jewelry retailers and some of the boutiques,” said Morris-Jones. “This includes branded franchises from overseas, as well as some home grown operators. Quality will always show through and as long as a full range of stock is carried, which the good retailers do.”

Of the branded concepts – most under franchises – there are the big regional operators such as Retail Group and Al Shaya. Virgin is also a good example of an operator going into and dominating a sector in a professional manner. Special mention must be made of the MaxiMa Group as they have taken brands to the region as a Lebanese company based in Lebanon.

The future is bright. Rental levels should come down and tighter contracts between tenants and mall owners should lead to a more professional performance by malls – including uniform opening hours etc. The Souks will eventually be the jewel in Lebanon’s retail crown and the final jigsaw in the BCD retail evolution, attracting tourists who will add shopping to their Lebanon agenda. Prices will drop, standards will rise and services will improve. Demand for leisure goods and fashion items will mean more international brands and bigger stores. Increased car borne shopping should lead to better facilities in malls in order to make the shopping experience more of a family day out and daycare and crèche facilities will become a must. There should be more specialist shops forcing out those who are unable to respond to the changes in the market and there will be a gradual move away from developing residential buildings with shops on the ground floor as retail hubs come into sharper focus. Finally, customer care service and better stock control will come about as a part of the sector’s natural evolutionary process. No longer will the Lebanese shopper be grateful for what is on offer. The shopper will have more of a choice and better redress.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A: Khalil Daoud, director LibanPost

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Why did the original LibanPost fold at the end of 2001?

The investors were upset at the slowness with which the agreement signed with the ministry of telecommunications was being implemented.

What was the state of the company when you took over?

There wasn’t a clear sense of direction. There wasn’t a clear vision.

What have you done since then?

We have improved quality, separated customer service and sales from distribution, renovated post offices and introduced a wide array of retail products – prepaid phone and internet cards, fuel coupons, newspapers magazines and maps, screensavers, stamps. We have also introduced a number of services, to make people’s lives easier. These include fax and photocopy facilities, as well as passport and residency renewal, military service postponement, and university degree certification services. We are trying to make LibanPost a serious intermediary between citizens and the various government departments, while making money along the way – because we are not a charity. We are a ‘front office’ for the government. Finally, we have invested in our 600 employees and in technology. We have invested about $1 million in computerizing the post offices. And recently, I received a telephone call from Fadi Abboud, head of the Lebanese Industrialists’ Association, asking me what we can do for Lebanon’s industrialists.

How serious are you about quality?

We are very serious about it. We have quality controllers who do nothing else all day long but ensure that the mail is delivered on time and that we don’t have issues with customers. We have a 24-hour National Control Center and a daily 9:30am meeting, during which we deal with any ‘incidents’ over the previous 24 hours. Any necessary amendments are made. We don’t hesitate to take drastic measures against our employees, if necessary.

What are your future plans?

In the near future we will be offering over-the-counter insurance products at our post offices – for cars, personal accident, things that are not complicated to sell and do not require medical exams. We just signed an agreement with the ministry of interior relating to the annual roadworthiness check, the renewal of drivers’ licenses, car registration etc. In addition, we plan to introduce two or three other services which should be announced soon. A few days ago, we established a new department within the company. It is responsible for printing, folding, and inserting into envelopes any publications. These are then immediately distributed. It is part of our plan to offer ‘complete solutions.’ We have reached an agreement with the ministry of telecommunications and the telephone company Ogero, under which we will print and distribute telephone bills. We hope this will prompt other utility companies and financial institutions, including insurance companies, to follow suit.

How much has LibanPost invested in these initiatives?

The printing and distribution initiative alone is worth $1 million. Along with the $1 million for the computerization initiative, that already makes $2 million in a year. That is significant. And it doesn’t include other things like digital map systems, which we are going to invest in. That is another couple of hundred thousand dollars.

What problems do you face?

Firstly, is very difficult to operate in a country that doesn’t have a proper addressing system. Secondly, many buildings do not have separate mailboxes for separate tenants. For LibanPost, this is catastrophic. The time wasted because of this is phenomenal. Mailmen have to knock on doors to deliver letters. Sometimes, it takes them 45 minutes to complete delivery to one building alone. Thirdly, not everyone knows of our services, and even if they do, they have to be induced to try them. We have an issue with the way we are communicating with the public and are in the process of addressing it.We can do better. We are finalizing a marketing and media program worth 2.5% of our projected turnover this year. I would like our media costs to one day reach 3%.

What is your projected turnover?

That’s not public information – several million dollars.

What were revenues for 2003?

They were 15% higher than for 2002, and revenues for 2002 were 12% higher than for 2001. And 2004 is planned to be 16% higher than 2003.

How about profits?

Our plan was to break even in 2004. We almost did that in 2003, so we’re slightly ahead of schedule. We now envisage a profit for 2004 – about 2.5% of revenues.

What influence does the government have?

All pricing is controlled by the government. We have some concerns about this. I understand that given the current economic environment the government wants to keep mail prices as low as possible. But from a private business perspective we don’t share those concerns. Also, LibanPost was supposed to be working in a monopolistic environment. Unfortunately, there are local Lebanese courier companies operating without licenses. They are competing with LibanPost in the profitable areas. It’s unfair.

Is there any theft of the contents of parcels opened by the authorities?

None at all.

April 1, 2004 1 comment
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Business

Making a meal of it

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Chateau Ksara

Chateau Ksara, Lebanon’s biggest and oldest winery (it has been making wine in the Bekaa since 1857) boasts a 35% market share, producing nearly two million bottles each year with revenues of around $6.5 million.

Managing director, Charles Ghostine has just returned from Pro Wein, the premiere German wine fair held every year in Düsseldorf. Ksara is an energetic exhibitor on the international stage, regularly attending the major wine fairs in London, Bordeaux, and Verona as well as Düsseldorf. “We need to be there. If we don’t show up it might send the wrong message to the market,” said Ghostine. “We don’t go expecting to take big orders. We go show our face,” he explained.

Much has been said lately about the potential of Lebanese wine: that it can compete with the very best of the New World producers and that it should position itself as a boutique product. While other producers may be tempted to hit the volume market, Ksara will not skimp on the final product. The winery harvests nearly 2000 tons of grapes from its 300 hectares, an average of nearly seven tons of grapes per hectare (Chateau Ksara, the winery’s flagship wine, is made from the oldest vines, which yield just five tons per hectare). “Some wine regions will obtain yields of as much as 14 tons per hectare,” said Ghostine. “We will not do this.” Although Lebanon’s wine sector has enjoyed significant growth in recent years, until the mid-90s it was a market dominated by a triumvirate of Chateaux Musar, Ksara and Kefraya. Since then, old names – Nakad and Tourelles – are mounting a comeback, while a handful of newcomers, notably Massaya, Wardy, and Clos St Thomas, have made their presence felt with exciting and affordable new wines in eye catching bottles. This increased supply and variety coincided nicely with a change in tastes. The Lebanese have been drinking more wine and local consumption is increasing by around 10% each year. For the record, the Lebanese consumed three million bottles in 2003. Of that number, roughly 1.2 million were imported – 89% from France. This mini-revolution forced Ksara to defend its position in the local market. “The challenge for us was to maintain our market share,” said Ghostine. “In the early 90s, we were producing 1.2 million bottles now we are hitting 1.8 million.”

Brand loyalty among local drinkers has Ksara in good stead and, despite increased competition, it has been able to meet the increased demand and can claim a 35% market share. With Kefraya not far behind in second place, many new labels have been forced to penetrate overseas markets. Much of this success lies in the performance of one wine: the Reserve de Couvent, Ksara’s mid-priced red, which is still a massive performer among local drinkers. “In the restaurants, the Reserve is king,” said Ghostine. “It offers the best quality to price ratio. It is the backbone of the company and we are pushing it very hard both here and abroad, where we send 60% of the 530,000 bottles of Reserve we make each year.”

Ksara exports 49% of its wine, mainly to France, which takes around 250,000 bottles. (Lebanon exported 1.8 million bottles in 2003, roughly 30% of total production). In 2003, Ksara appointed Hallgarten, the specialist fine wine company, to be its UK agent and Verbruggen to distribute in Belgium.

Finally, the company has invested $200,000 to enhance its hospitality profile at its Bekaa winery. Ghostine explained that, despite being one of the early advocates of a structured wine tourism program, the Ksara board made a decision not to go for a full-out F&B operation like those at Massaya and Kefraya. “We receive around 40,000 guests a year, who visit our famous caves and tour the winery,” he explained. “Now we will be offering cheeses and other snacks with our wines, but we are first and foremost wine makers.”
 

K-Sun

Fruit juice and fresh-cut produce manufacturer K-Sun is an example of a firm that has restructured production and creation of new market segments. But even with adherence to innovative practices in agro-industry, the company is expecting real profitability out of its $2 million factory only from exports. “The Lebanese market is not big enough for such investments,” said general manager Mazen Kassem. “We couldn’t recoup our investments from the Lebanese market, and never thought we would.” The export revenue should begin to flow this year, as K-Sun recently reached an agreement to deliver packaged fruit juice to France beginning this month. K-Sun first brought their fresh juice to market in late 1996, seeking to dominate the domestic market’s premium segment with 65 juices and a mix of varieties. Turnover of the product line in its first month was precisely $83. A first challenge was changing consumer habits, as people in Lebanon thought fresh juice was something they squeezed at home. “It took time to educate consumers,” said Kassem. The project took off as a sideline of a larger business growing fruits and vegetables, which the Kassem family had been running for some 50 years. When they decided to launch K-Sun, the initial business plan entailed a nationwide retail network of 18 shops in a vertically integrated operation from grower to home consumer. A central aim was to eliminate middlemen from their trade in fruits and vegetables. The value-added products, juice and fresh-cuts, emerged as an afterthought. In terms of product lines, market realities led K-Sun onto a different path of making most their revenue from juices –mostly orange juice and lemonade – and supplying first and foremost hospitality enterprises. At more than $1 million annually, fresh juice accounts for 50% to 55% of K-Sun turnover, according to Kassem, and the firm is the leading supplier to restaurants, hotels and delivery food specialists. A company-owned store in Hamra is the base for K-Sun’s distribution network, which relies on a modest fleet of one truck and several delivery vehicles.

The evolution of K-Sun was not simple, mostly because of shrinking purchase power and growing competition. Some competitors introduced pasteurized juices roughly at the same time as K-Sun, which also had to contend with the increasing domestic manufacture of reconstituted juices as well as juice drinks and watery nectars. One (now defunct) competing product used K-Sun look-alike bottles and although they were trademark protected, seeking legal recourse would have been lengthy and costly. Additional hurdles included inflexible customs practices and nitpicking officials, not to mention the absence of government support. Despite the obstacles, K-Sun in 2001 obtained a new factory and a high-tech machine that allows non-thermal processing of fruit juices at a capacity of 15,000 liters per day. This equipment treats foodstuffs with ultra-high pressure, which is proven to eliminate pathogens and foliage organisms without the side effects of pasteurization. As a result, K-Sun juices increased their guaranteed shelf life from five to 21 days. The company also expanded into the manufacture of fresh-cut foods, marketing popular salads and vegetables in ready-to-eat portions.

Although K-Sun built their factory to European standards and with exports in mind, Kassem said entering Europe “hasn’t been easy.” The firm encountered difficulties ranging from acquiring a distributor to finding transportation. No air carrier offers refrigerated flights from Beirut to Paris, for instance, so K-Sun took to routing their first deliveries to France through Luxembourg. With a foot in the French market, K-Sun hopes for profitable times. At 80,000 liters per month, the target for the first year agreement means a tripling of current production, Kassem said. The company aims to reach further European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany. K-Sun is also in the process of implementing distribution of its juices to the Gulf, and the company eyes growth of its fresh-cut lines in the domestic market (including manufacture for private labels) and in exports to regional markets, such as Cyprus and Jordan.

Dairiday

Mohamad Gandour, president of Gandour’s The Dairy, established his company in the mid-nineties when he decided to revive an ancestral farm and make it the cornerstone of a dairy enterprise. He began in 1996 by transforming the farm into a dairy operation and acquiring over 200 high-yield Holstein milk cows. In 1997, Gandour established a modern, two-block long, dairy factory in the industrial area of Kfarchima. Networks for milk collection from the corporate farm and independent subcontractors, and distribution of fresh milk and cheese products were set up. By May 1998, Gandour dairy products – fresh milk, cheeses, and fermented products – poured into the market under the brand name Dairiday.

The company allocated $600,000 over the first two years to develop the Dairiday brand identity. All in all, investments amounted to over $7 million, which the company could finance to less than one third with a government-subsidized loan. The remainder was sourced from private equity and high-interest commercial loans, Gandour told EXECUTIVE.

Since its debut, the Dairiday brand has been fighting battles brought on by recession and insufficient regulations. In the milk market, consumer habits, lack of knowledge and above all, price barriers have kept the share of fresh milk down. “I thought that every family of four would consume at least one liter of milk per day,” Gandour said, “and perhaps they do, but it is powdered milk.” The powdered competition retails at a third to a quarter of the price of fresh milk. With all their production capacities, The Dairy’s fresh milk has thus been forced to compete for a sliver of the market “that is 5% to 8% of total consumption in liquid milk in Lebanon.” In cheeses and fermented products, the company has to hold their ground against unlicensed operators who, said Gandour, have “no overheads, no distribution costs, and no marketing costs.” From 1998, he was involved in persistent appeals to the ministry of economy and trade and its consumer protection unit, to oblige Lebanese producers of LABAN, LABNEH, cheeses and related goods to comply with standards on packaging and food safety. “Nothing has been done,” said the entrepreneur. The problem of unsanitary conditions in predominantly unlicensed bulk production of fermented dairy goods was brought to public attention last year by agricultural minister Ali Hassan Khalil. Instead of helping, the official outrage only pushed Dairiday sales down by 13% to 14% over two months, which forced The Dairy to run TV advertisements, reassuring their customers that their product is trustworthy. In spite of the verbal commotion, the unlicensed operators are populating the market as they did before, maintained Gandour, and enforcement of regulations never happened. The problems, which Gandour shares with his licensed competitors, have one common denominator: consumer education. Campaigns promoting the health benefits of fresh milk and the importance of food quality and food safety are amiss in Lebanon. If licensed milk producers would collaborate in their efforts, they could stage such campaigns to increase awareness. Another option would be public sector participation in such campaigns. However, Gandour is more optimistic about the possibility of achieving the former. Without strong prospects for short-term improvements, The Dairy has turned to a marketing partnership with the region’s largest dairy manufacturer, Saudi-based Almarai. Under their agreement, the Lebanese company has added Almarai UHT milk to its portfolio and will also begin distributing Almarai cheeses. In the longer term, The Dairy aims to also partner in production terms with the Saudi company, for local distribution under their brand.

With an upswing in sales, the struggling dairy company could be amortized within two to three years. But for now, Gandour is looking for viable markets outside Lebanon, with Syria being the only lucrative option. “We hope that one day, Syrian consumers will have access to Lebanese milk.”

Shuman

Horrific stories that often come out about Lebanon’s slaughterhouses do not usually give the meat and poultry industry in Lebanon a good name. Producers often have to work doubly hard convincing consumers their animals are fed healthy food and not just dried up carcasses. So far, three poultry companies have managed to carve their brands in the consumer consciousness: Hawa chicken, Tanmia and Shuman. Forty-nine-year-old Shuman chicken is no newcomer to the poultry market, which has flourished the past decade after the government slapped a near-ban on fresh poultry imports in the mid-1990s to protect the industry. “Poultry prices have been dropping ever since the government imposed the ban,” said Nabil Shuman, who has taken over the business of selling chicken from his deceased father. “This is a perfect study of how a government can protect an industry, that later develops, experiences a price decline and attracts investments.”

Today, Lebanon slaughters about 60 million chickens per year, the bulk of these are raised on farms owned by the three biggest chicken companies. “In the 1950’s, we were producing 20 chickens a day, now we are producing 5,000,” said Shuman. “Back then, there was only one supermarket and only one restaurant was buying packaged fresh chicken.”

Shuman also credits his company with pioneering the packaging of chickens. “We were the first company to process ready-to-cook chicken breasts. In 1995, we were the first to manufacture chicken nuggets and breaded products in Lebanon.”

In order to remain an effective player in the market, Shuman explained their use of a vertical integration strategy. “We control everything from A to Z: we own our farms and slaughterhouses, breed our own chickens, have our own distribution networks and own processing plants for chicken nuggets. This allows us to control quality of the end-product.”

For this reason, Shuman chickens are pricier than their rivals and quite less spread. But the company has been able to compete in the market following the entry of other big companies by maintaining its own niche. “We only have 5% of the $130 million poultry market in Lebanon,” said Shuman. “But we have 75% of the branded chicken in self-service sections in supermarkets.”

Unlike Tanmia and Hawa chicken, Shuman’s operations are not widespread. Tanmia’s processed products and Hawa chicken’s outlets dot nearly every main area in Beirut. “We have managed to remain profitable because we chose to take a niche and develop it,” said Shuman. “In normal periods, people may tend to buy any fresh chicken, but when there is a crisis in the poultry industry they head for brands like ours.”

Despite declining chicken prices, Shuman expects his company to sell 1.6 million chickens in 2004, raking in some $5.5 million in revenue, with sales increasing by 20% a year. The company is maintaining a bullish approach to the poultry industry, mostly because of Lebanon’s flourishing supermarket outlets and the sophistication of the Lebanese consumer’s brand consciousness. “The purchasing power is not going to stay like this and it will improve in three to five years. With the development of the supermarkets, consumer habits will change.”

For now, Shuman chicken will try to reach its sales goals by importing technology, which is needed to cut production costs and help raise capacity. “Production costs in Lebanon are high and the only way to cut them down is to continually upgrade our technology,” said Shuman. “The $150 million in investments that were spent over the past decade in this sector have mainly gone into lowering costs.”
 

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Negative growth

by Dania Saadi April 1, 2004
written by Dania Saadi

Lebanon’s agricultural sector has seen better days. Between 1979 and 1981, the labor force of the agricultural sector accounted for 14% of the total labor force, based on the figures of the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). This dwindled to 3% by 2001. In 1961, Lebanon’s Gross National Agricultural Production stood at LL300 million ($900 million, $1= three pounds), according to statistics compiled by the Lebanese Center for Agricultural Research and Studies. Four decades later, this figure has hardly budged, settling in 2002 at LL1.5 trillion ($1 billion).

“Up until, 1918, Lebanon used to provide the French city of Lyon, with half of its silk threads,” said Riad Saade, the center’s director. “In 1936, the French region of Roquefort used to import half of the raw cheese processed in the caves (bearing its name) from Lebanon.”

The decline in Lebanon’s agricultural output took place during the civil war, but it has been exacerbated in peacetime. The loss of agricultural land to the haphazard construction boom of the 1990’s, competition in the key export markets in the Arab World and the government’s focus on investments put the agricultural sector on the back burner. There have been half-hearted attempts, by successive governments to rehabilitate the sector but the only visible evidence of government backing are random subsides dished out at various times to farmers.

In 2001, the farmers raised an outcry and some replanted illicit crops to protest government inaction toward their plight, which left them trampling surplus produce on the streets. The government responded by allocating LL50 billion ($33 million) for an export subsidy program dubbed Export Plus, which gave farmers cash for exporting quality goods to markets around the world.

In 2004, the government and parliament is scrambling again to save the agricultural sector by extending new subsidies to apples and partially re-instating subsidies to sugar beet farmers to appease would-be voters in a decisive election year.

“Unfortunately, successive Lebanese governments have looked at the agriculture sector from a social rather than a socio-economic point of view,” said Raphael Debbane, head of the agricultural committee of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Lebanon. “Tobacco subsidies are pure social help whereby the government buys the crops and throws it away because it cannot sell them on the world market on account of their poor quality. Now they have renewed sugar subsidies in a non-professional way and the main reason for that is socio-political.”

Against this government backing to the agriculture sector, the private sector is finding it harder to compete in the local and international markets, where subsidies are given to farmers on a different basis. “If the subsidies are stopped in developing countries, farmers will suffer but they will survive,” said Imad Bsat, owner of B-fresh agricultural company. “If Export Plus ends, nobody will enforce standards and the sector will collapse.”

IDAL helps farmers sell their quality goods, but it does not tell them what type of crops to plant or what kind of crops are wanted by consumers in world markets. “Technically, Export Plus is a success but economically it is a big failure,” said Saade. “The problem is not money. Export Plus is only one ring in a chain. Other rings are needed.”

The other rings of the chain start with orienting farmers on what to plant according to market demands and what types of products to export. The next chain consists of extending technology to farmers to improve their crops and introduce new varieties through government backed research and financial credit. The final chain is marketing, which is what IDAL handles now, said Saade.

“Under Export Plus, farmers exported some 350,000 tons in 2003, which is equivalent to the amount of citrus Lebanon used to export in the 1970’s and 1980’s,” said Bsat. His family used to own Safa Citrus, one of the country’s largest fruit exporters that shut down in the 1990’s. “The government is spending millions of dollars on subsidizing crops when it should be using this money to fund research and help farmers develop new varieties,” said Bsat.

Agricultural engineers say Lebanon’s farmers are unable to adapt to the new agricultural modes, which rely extensively on technology and marketing. “It is a vicious cycle,” said Debbane. “Lebanese farmers have to get know-how and expertise from outside, which means importing technology at a cost. But if you don’t have money, consequently you have no money to invest in new varieties.”
 

The odds are stacked against the farmers’ development. Their production costs are significantly higher than their neighboring countries. They once had a monopoly over the Arab markets, but their rising costs and competition from cheaper produce have forced them to lose their edge in their prime markets. Neighboring Arab countries are swamping the Lebanese market with cheap produce while closing their doors to Lebanese produce, which have been hurt by badly negotiated agricultural agreements. Farmers often cite the agreements with Syria, Jordan and Egypt as disastrous and some are even calling for the suspension of Lebanon’s membership to the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement, which is due to enter into force in 2005.

“All hell is going to break loose once GAFTA is implemented,” said Bsat, who develops his own varieties of fruits and sells them to supermarkets. “We are already facing stiff competition from their produce now and it will only become harder to sell our produce once the markets open further under GAFTA and the World Trade Organization.”

Waddah Fakhri, head of the Southern Farmers’ Association, wants the government to suspend Lebanon’s membership in GAFTA until farmers are ready to compete with goods from the Arab World. “The government has negotiated trade agreements without consulting farmers, who bear higher production costs than neighboring countries and lack the standards needed to export,” said Waddah.

One sector that is set to suffer from the government’s negotiating blunders is the flower industry. Under Lebanon’s Association Agreement with the European Union, tariffs on flowers were fixed at 30% and are set to go down further once Lebanon’s five-year grace period for lowering tariffs on European imports is over. The whole problem started when the government in 2000 slashed tariffs on flowers from 105% to 30% while it was negotiating with the EU. Following lobbying by Lebanon’s flower growers, the government agreed to raise it again to 70%, but it was too late; the Europeans had agreed on 30% and were sticking to it.

“Our sector suffers from government apathy and inconsistent policies toward the agriculture sector,” said Rania Younes, the owner of several nurseries in Lebanon. “Lebanon has human resources and the know-how to compete. We do not need mass agricultural areas to export. We can plant specialized products from small pieces of land.”

Besides the European Agreement, Lebanon’s flower sector is already suffering from a special agreement with Saudi Arabia, which is exporting flowers to Lebanon at minimal tariffs, she added. With only a few good trade agreements, Lebanese farmers require marketing cash to venture into new markets. Outside Export Plus, there is hardly any cash for marketing. “With a 0.4% budget out of the total government budget there is not much we can do,” said Louis Lahoud, director general at the agricultural ministry. “But we are working on a development plan for the agricultural sector to which the government has allocated LL5 billion ($3.3 million).”

Agriculturists agree that the government should start to control the sector by regulating standards and resolving the pricing anarchy in the domestic market that drove agriculturalists to seek price stability of supermarkets, despite stiff competition. “If we are able to regulate standards and prices in the domestic market, it would be much easier to do the same for our exports,” said Bsat.

Agriculturalists also want the ministry of agriculture to direct farmers to plant crops that could be used by the industrial sector. “A potentially successful road for developing the Lebanese agriculture sector is agro-industry,” said Debbane. “The government can develop Export Plus into a scheme inclusive of the agro-industry and a scheme for renewing orchards to introduce new varieties.”

According to Debbane, donors, who have pooled millions of dollars into agricultural projects that were doomed for failure due to political intervention or government inaction, need to divert the funds to the private sector. “Donors helping Lebanon develop its agriculture sector should pass this money to the private sector because the institutions of the Lebanese government have proved to be inefficient.”

THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE

Farmers and agricultural engineers point to the example of Israel, a country whose agricultural space and climate is similar but less diverse than Lebanon, but whose export potential has been propelled by staunch government backing. Similar to Lebanon, Israel’s agricultural land was being eaten away by a construction boom, declining number of farmers and a strain on its limited water resources, which had to be used to irrigate extensive desert land that Lebanon does not have. That did not stop the Israeli government from forging ahead in the 1990’s with an aggressive marketing campaign and research.


“When Israeli farmers wanted to introduce a new variety of grapes into England, the government spent $1 to $2 million on the marketing campaign,” said agricultural engineer Imad Bsat. Israel in the 1960’s was primarily known for the famous Jaffa oranges, but in the 1990’s its agricultural landscape changed. Instead of planting just citrus products, the Israeli government heavily invested into research, prodding its traditional farmers in the kibbutzes to adopt new agricultural products.

Currently, Israel’s exports around $200 million a year in flowers – a third of its fresh agricultural exports – an amount equivalent to Lebanon’s annual agro-industrial exports. “Each day an El Al plane leaves Tel Aviv and lands in Holland, the world’s flower market, carrying fresh flowers,” said economist Riad Saade. “Flowers are an example of a high-value added industry that can be easily developed in Lebanon.”

Lebanon’s flower exports in 2003 were around $300,000, based on customs figures. According to the Israeli government, it provides nearly 40% of Europe’s off-season fruit and vegetable market, and ranks second only to Holland in European flower sales. Israel’s fresh and processed agricultural exports stood at $1 billion in 2002. Nearly 60% of its exports were fresh produce, mainly headed to Europe, based on the figures of the Israeli ministry of agriculture. Israel does not only export agricultural produce, its also exports around $1 billion in agricultural technology each year.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Lending a hand to farmers

by Thomas Schellen April 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Abi Habib: `Our loans are convenient, because they are cheap… and long term`

In making agriculture more sustainable in recent years, the availability of financing options has seen some important improvements. The number of loans to the agro sector has mushroomed in the last two years, especially through loans granted under the Kafalat loan guarantee program.

Lebanese farmers and small agricultural enterprises commonly encountered problems in accessing loans at commercial banks, whose focus of business would rarely include agriculture and whose branch networks were concentrated away from rural areas. Agriculturalists on their part were often reluctant to seek bank loans, which carried high interest charges and requirements to post land as collateral, a stipulation which the small land owners and family farmers viewed as running contrary to their traditions.

This placed agriculturalists in a situation where sponsored programs were most appropriate to their needs. One type of such finance vehicle is micro finance, which fundamentally aims at enabling poor people to realize their potential for economic productivity. The tool to achieve this is provision of micro credits with strict repayment discipline, modeled after a development concept popularized over the last two decades through the collateral-free lending activities of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Over 20 foreign and domestic NGOs have involved themselves since the mid 1990s in managing the provision of such loans to Lebanese individuals and small enterprises, in many instances with an emphasis on serving specific communities or geographic regions.

An UNDP country survey from 1997 found that the concept encountered a notable amount of skepticism at that time, but a 2002 paper for a World Bank development debate drew a more promising picture on the potential of micro finance for Lebanon. Presently, accumulated NGO-driven micro lending activities with a ceiling of $5,000 per loan are estimated to stand at a level of around $30 million. As charities, micro finance NGOs are dependent on donor contributions. Except for micro lending initiatives within general lending by commercial banks, the activity is yet to be regulated, making it difficult to analyze the overall scope, distribution and performance. “Some of the NGOs have become more productive, others less,” said economist Joey Ghaleb, who co-authored the 2002 paper.

Experts said that new dynamics would enter this realm and boost the micro finance volume when the central bank implements a planned framework, under which banks will be allowed to utilize a portion of their statutory reserves for advancing funds to micro lending. For the time being, the Kafalat program remains the best non-commercial loan. Kafalat is the loan guarantee corporation whose shareholders are the National Institute for the Guarantee of Deposits and 50 commercial banks. The company was established in 1999 and its portfolio of loan guarantees has seen a tremendous increase from mid 2002, to reach a total amount of $199.2 million at the end of February 2004. With 1,355 loans, agriculture accounted for almost half of all guarantees awarded.

“Our loans are convenient, because they are cheap and more importantly, they are long-term,” said Kafalat chairman, Khater Abi Habib. Loans benefiting from the scheme, under which Kafalat guarantees 75% of principal and interest up to a ceiling of $200,000, can go a long way to help farmers restructure their activities, or enter new activities on land that had been under-exploited.

As it does not stipulate a minimum loan amount, the scheme could also be accessible to clients whose needs are in the range of micro finance. Kafalat as a rule processes loan guarantee requests within three weeks. A characteristic of the program suited to the needs of small businesses, and farmers in particular, is the low reliance on real estate collateral. “With the presence of our guarantees,” Abi Habib said, “it has not become totally easy but much easier.”

While not designed to finance major agro-industrial projects, the scheme allows the infusion of larger amounts into agro-industry through the nation’s industrial lending program. “I saw a number of agro-industrial concerns financed by central bank-subsidized loans creating sure markets for agriculturalists as suppliers of raw materials,” said Abi Habib, “and those agriculturalists are in turn being financed by banks on basis of the strength of the purchase contracts given to them by agro-industrialists, plus the strength of market developments and guarantees given by Kafalat.”

As medium-term facilities, the low-interest seven-year loans with a one-year grace period are suited to the needs of most agriculturalists. One sub sector of agriculture to which the parameters of Kafalat loan guarantees are less well suited, however, is tree farming. To start operation of an orchard, a farmer needs finance facilities that are repayable over 12 to 15 years, with a three-year grace period. For this, Kafalat guarantees are inadequate and a source of long-term funding would be needed, with possible sponsors including Lebanon’s usual partners in lending and aid programs, such as the World Bank, EU and their affiliated finance institutions.

The loan guarantee company is engaged in continuous efforts to inform its client base of existing or potential small and medium entrepreneurs. “The best marketing is for us to be in the midst of our potential users,” said Abi Habib, “the north is our weakest market, and that’s why the largest portion of our visits and activities is now to the north.”

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A Samih Barbir

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Lebanon’s Investment Development Authority, IDAL, figures twofold in the task of promoting the national agriculture and agro-industry sectors. Under the 2001 investment law 360, the agency offers incentives to investments into strategic sectors of the economy, including agriculture and agro-industry. For the past three years, the IDAL mandate also extended to supporting agricultural exports through the Export Plus program offering farmers transportation subsidies and quality certification for produce. In February 2004, IDAL and the nation’s agro-industrialists signed a collaboration for an Agro Market Access Program (Agromap). EXECUTIVE talked to IDAL chairman and managing director, Samih Barbir, about the agency’s achievements and plans in relation to the agro sector.

Where does IDAL set its priorities in supporting agriculture and agro-industry?

In Lebanon, we don’t have large volumes in agricultural production. Therefore, our main priority is quality. The successful experience of Export Plus of having two international firms implementing quality control has proven to be a very important factor in marketing Lebanese agricultural products abroad.

When you discuss Export Plus as a success story, where are the highlights, and what are the areas still in need for development?

The level of success is simply the fact that we witnessed an increase in our exports. In the first year, it was a big increase of 15%, in the second year, 5%, and last year, it was stabilizing. But one has to look at it in a different way. Before the launch of Export Plus, we were on a downward slope. Exports were dropping and the whole sector was suffering a lot, due to many problems. Maintaining a stable level of approximately 360,000 tons in exports per year is a success in itself. We experienced some additional difficulties, such as some bad weather hitting Lebanon over the last two years, the devaluation of the currency in Turkey and the war in Iraq, all of which affected our export markets.

In your statistics, 99% of agricultural exports went to GCC countries, plus Syria and Jordan. What can IDAL do to improve agro exports across other markets?

The GCC are the natural market. The Iraqi market is a new one that we are trying to enter right now. But our main objective is to enter European markets. We are doing a lot of contact work with all the embassies here, especially Eastern European ones. As a first target, we are trying to enter those countries that have the least obstacles.

Your 2003 report states that about 5% of agricultural products destined for exports to Arab countries were rejected in quality inspections. Would the same quality requirements apply to produce destined for Europe?

Exports to Europe would have to meet higher and different quality requirements. They have some very strict controls on pesticide residues and other issues that are not required by Arab countries. That is why we have to inform those farmers prior to starting to control their products.

On the other side of the coin, IDAL has the mission to draw in investments. How is this progressing as far as attracting agricultural investors?

We offer the same incentives to projects in all the sectors listed in the [Investment Development] law, as are tourism, ICT, agro-industry, industry in general and agriculture. The only difference is that agricultural projects have the lowest minimum investment requirements to qualify for incentives.

How have agricultural and agro-industry projects fared in terms of attracting investors?

We have two agro-industry projects that are being processed under the one-stop-shop service. The law is still relatively new and the incentives are new. It takes some time to let people know about it. We are planning to do a campaign by the middle of this year, to promote those incentives. But definitely, compared to tourism, it is still very shy.

Can you name an amount for the value of one of those two projects, to give an idea of the magnitude?

The project that has progressed further is for $4.3 million. Don’t expect to get big figures in this industry.

How much funding for agricultural export promotion do you have at your disposal?

The Export Plus program was approved for LL100 billion spread over the four years, 2001 to 2004.

How much have you dispersed to date?

A bit less than LL30 billion each year. We can handle the program until the end of this year. We might need some more [funding] but there is no problem in that. Theoretically, it should be covered.

Under the new Agromap project, you are sponsoring participation of Lebanese exhibitors in trade shows in Beirut, Paris, and New York. How does this interlace with the promotion of agricultural exports under Export Plus, where you described the strongest markets and prospects as being in the Gulf and Eastern Europe?

With Agromap, we are targeting a different sector, agro-industry, and are promoting Lebanese agro-industry products. We are doing this as a pilot project in 2004 and I wanted to reach the Arab, European and North American markets, to see what the impact would be. We will evaluate each event right afterwards and depending on those three events, we could consider going into another round with a bigger budget in 2005.

Did you allocate equally to each fair, Horeca in Beirut, the Fancy Food Show in New York, and Sial in Paris?

Between the US and France, there will be equal space. Lebanon will be bigger. Here, much more people will come because they do not have the transportation issue. Horeca also accounts for biggest amount in the budget.

How was the response from the industry?

The first results are very good. For Horeca, we have about 35 industrialists and for the Fancy Food Show about 15. We are over-subscribed but I wouldn’t call that a problem. We will have the luxury to choose the best products to represent Lebanon abroad.

What will you provide to the companies that qualify for participation?

We will have a Lebanese pavilion, and we will cover 100% of the rent and the stand decorations. Exhibitors will have to cover their transportation and other costs.
 

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Moneyed marriage

by Tony Hchaime April 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

Following the failed merger talks between Banque Audi and Banque Libano-Francaise in 2002, few anticipated the announcement of last month’s $159 million merger acquisition of Banque Audi and Banque Saradar. Moreover, such a merger differs significantly from the type of consolidation sought by the central bank, namely a consolidation of the smaller, less efficient, banks in the country. Nevertheless, the announcement of the Audi-Saradar merger took the market by surprise at first, only to make significant sense as details of the transaction began to trickle down to the market.

The deal ($100 million in cash and $59 million in shares), will lead to the creation of the largest banking group in the country and have significant implications on a number of levels related to the banks themselves, the banking sector locally and regionally, and Lebanon’s economy.

Banks in Lebanon have been facing a growingly competitive domestic environment over the past few years, not to mention the significant difficulties such banks are facing when attempting to venture into Arab markets. Lebanese banks lack the scale, efficiencies, and branding to establish a strong presence on the turf of banks like Saudi American Bank, National Bank of Kuwait and Arab Bank, among others. In that regard, the sheer scale of the combined Audi-Saradar entity provides the group with the cornerstone upon which to build a regional platform. With total combined assets in excess of $9 billion ($12 billion including fiduciary deposits, security accounts, and assets under management), the group begins to close the gap with the likes of Arab Bank, whose assets at year-end 2003 reached almost $24 billion.

There are also a number of financial, human, and commercial synergies that underline the drivers of the transaction. Both banks achieved significant growth rates over the past few years, with Banque Audi’s total asset and deposit growth reaching 38% and 42% respectively in 2003. In parallel, Banque Saradar’s total assets and deposits increased by 11% and 13% respectively over the same period. With such growth rates achieved individually, the now combined entity is likely to generate additional growth, and further widen the gap with other leading banks in the country.

Prior to the merger, Banque Audi benefited from a strong grip on the retail commercial banking market in Lebanon, gaining significant ground on retail-oriented competitors, including large banks, such as Byblos and Bank of Beirut, in addition to medium-sized retail banks, such as Al Mawarid. Saradar, on the other hand, benefited from a strong grip on the private banking and investment banking market in Lebanon, while lacking the retail aspect of commercial banking. With the consolidation of both banks into one entity, they have successfully created one banking corporation that can provide the full range of services, targeting both retail consumers and those seeking personalized private banking services. In that regard, the new entity might introduce a new competitive spirit to a sector in which few banks can efficiently provide a full range of financial services. However, customers of smaller banks in Lebanon typically favor such small-sized institutions because they offer a more personalized banking approach. As such, they would be less at risk than larger institutions – with the latter perhaps seeking to engage in M&A activities – seeking complimenting banks to merge with, in an effort to ward off any erosion of their market shares.

On the commercial front, both banks’ commercial strategies highly compliment each other. Banque Audi is highly aggressive on retail banking, dishing out new products for end consumers almost on a monthly basis, coupled with a range of insurance services through its Libano-Arabe subsidiary. Banque Saradar is more private banking oriented, with efforts to target the high-income high-net-worth individuals and groups in Lebanon and abroad. In that regard, the banks compliment each other in such a way as to target the totality of the market, from the low-income retail customer to the high-net-worth Lebanese and Arab individuals.

Moreover, both banks’ organization and personnel structures are highly synergistic, sharing many similarities in their overall culture and management approach. Such synergies were emphasized by Raymond Audi’s statement that “[the] two banks share the same values within an overall corporate culture based on integrity, transparency, innovation and quality.”

As per the terms of the merger, the Saradar shareholders will receive shares amounting to about 9% of the combined entity. As such, the new merged bank will benefit from a strong shareholder base, combining prominent Lebanese shareholders with well-connected high profile Gulf-based shareholders. In that regard, Banque Audi has historically sought to acquire certain institutions to benefit from their well-established regional shareholders, as was the case with the acquisition of Lebanon Invest.


It should be clearly outlined, however, that the Audi-Saradar merger is not limited to the banks themselves, as it has significant implications on the banking sector in Lebanon, the region, and the Lebanese economy.

The primary implications are certainly on Banks Audi and Saradar themselves. However, such implications are likely to coincide with the factors that drove the banks to merge in the first place. As such, the implications are likely to be mostly of a positive nature, capitalizing on the synergies between the banks. The combined efforts of Audi and Saradar are likely to further boost growth in deposits, loans, and overall assets, and are thus likely to further reinforce their position as the largest banking group in Lebanon.

Now we should see other big banks such as BLOM look at alternative routes to preserve its position in the Lebanese and regional market. Industry experts indicate that a drastic strategic change, although perhaps necessary, may not fit as well within BLOM’s culture. In fact, despite its scale, BLOM remains a “family-business,” much less institutionalized than Audi and Saradar. At Audi, the bank’s management consists of a team of professionals from various backgrounds, which have no major shareholdings in the bank. At BLOM, the bank’s management is tightly in the hands of Saad Azhari, vice chairman, and son of the bank’s founder and major shareholders. In this regard, BLOM may be less willing to open up its capital to other institutions or investors. Nevertheless, certain market developments that may endanger the bank’s position in the market may finally drive the Azharis to succumb to pressures and engage in the M&A route.

The word on the street is that the Audi-Saradar merger is the necessary trigger to the much-awaited wave of consolidation in the Lebanese banking sector. Essentially, this would be true if the proper drivers behind the transaction are clearly communicated to the market as incentives for others to follow suit. Moreover, the synergies between Audi and Saradar may not be so evident to other banking institutions in the country. Nevertheless, many banks in Lebanon realize the eventual necessity of consolidation, as they face the competitive risks brought forward by local and regional large-scale banks. In that regard, they are also heavily supported by the central bank, which is favoring consolidation in an effort to reduce the fragmentation in the sector and improve efficiencies. It is likely, however, that other banks will closely watch Audi’s ability to successfully consolidate its operations with Saradar as a precedent to taking any such actions themselves.

It was clearly articulated by the chairmen of both Audi and Saradar that combining the two entities significantly enhances their chances of successfully expanding regionally. This would certainly make sense given the necessities required to establish a presence in Arab markets. The GCC banking environment is highly competitive, requiring aggressive marketing, scale, advanced IT systems, a full range of banking and financial services, professionalism and efficiencies. While some Lebanese banks may achieve some of these characteristics, none actually benefit from the combination of such parameters, certainly not to the scale required by sophisticated Arab investors. Eventually, however, Lebanese banks will have to make some defensive move to defend even their local market shares, as the large-scale Arab banks have been somewhat successful in venturing in the Lebanese market, and many have been able to carve themselves a significant market share locally.

On a more general note, the Lebanese economy stands to be greatly affected by such a consolidation in the sector. In the short-term, the economy may be ill-affected by the higher degree of unemployment that typically results from consolidations. On a longer term basis, larger, stronger and more efficient financial institutions offering a full range of financial services, up to international standards, may allow the country to regain its role as a regional financial hub – a role taken away by Bahrain and Dubai.
Tony Hchaime is an investment banker at the Middle-East Capital group (MECG).

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Sphere of influence

by Michael Young April 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

In mid-February, the London-based daily Al-Hayat published an Arabic version of a US working paper that was to be presented to the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, from June 8 to 10. The paper, which was prepared “for G-8 Sherpas,” or senior advisors, outlined what the Americans have called the Greater Middle East Partnership (GME). The aim of the US is to see the GME project adopted by the wider G8, so that it can act as a basis to help “forge a long-term partnership with the Greater Middle East’s reform leaders and launch a coordinated response to promote political, economic, and social reform in the region.” In mid-March,New York Times reported that the document would not be presented the Sea Island summit after all. However, a senior US official privately noted this was incorrect, and that what may change is the way the document’s ideas are proposed: rather than be submitted unilaterally as G8 policy, it may be presented, more diplomatically, as a response to Arab requests. The three broad guidelines of future G8 action, according to the document, are the promotion of democracy and good governance, the building of a knowledge society, and the expansion of economic opportunities.

In early March, in the run-up to Arab League summit in Tunis at the end of the month, there was considerable criticism directed against GME in the Arab world. Arab states were divided into three groups on how to respond to the initiative, with one group supporting a dialogue on it, a second advocating caution, and a third calling for outright rejection for what was deemed meddling in Arab affairs. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, for example, declared: “We should not give others the opportunity to map out our future, define our course, or work on reforming us. We must take the initiative ourselves.” Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa of Bahrain noted that “imposition of any foreign view point separately is not in the interests of countries of the region.”

In a commentary in the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly, Egyptian commentator Mohamed Sid-Ahmad spoke for many Arabs when he noted that affirmation of a “greater Middle East,” by expanding the geographical boundaries of the region, “dilutes the importance of the Palestinian problem and demotes it from its central position on the political stage of the Middle East to a marginal position as just one of several ‘hot’ issues plaguing a much wider region.”

However, even a cursory reading of the US working paper shows it to be a remarkably satisfying wish list of reform for the region, with many of its principles already being applied through bilateral programs. Nor were the framers intimidated by the unilateralist preferences dominating in some quarters in Washington. Aside from relying heavily on the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2002, which was written exclusively by Arabs, the document emphasized that “genuine reform in the GME must be driven internally” through the civil societies of the region. In other words, the G-8, if the GME project is agreed, has the potential to be a hybrid Marshall Plan and Helsinki process for the Middle East. So, why is there such animosity toward it in the Arab world and Iran? The easy answer is that no leader wants the West to advance social, political and economic processes that will undeniably erode their own power. As the halting reform efforts in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria have proven, change is only acceptable when it can ensure, or enhance, the authority of existing regimes. From the perspective of most Arab populations, however, bona fide reform must imply a possible change of leadership. Another fear in the region, as Sid-Ahmad suggested, is that GME would simply detract from the centrality of the Palestinian problem. While no one would quibble with the necessity to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the insistence on using it as a benchmark to judge GME carries with it a high price tag. For one thing, Middle East reform must not be held hostage to a conflict most states in the region cannot control; for another, true regional reform would, one assumes, positively affect the behavior of Israelis and Palestinians as much as it would that of surrounding states.

However, there is a more fundamental reason for the regional animosity to GME, and it comes from the two very different philosophies defining state-to-state relations – one prevailing in the Middle East, the other in the West. In the past decade or so, the concept of state sovereignty has been recast in the West, so that states can no longer hide behind it to shield their more harmful policies. Whether due to humanitarian intervention, international efforts to curtail war crimes, regional cooperation projects, or the expanded role of the UN, state boundaries are eroding at breakneck speed. Even American neo-conservatives are, above all else, enemies of sovereignty as a barrier to the dissemination of Western, or indeed American, values.

This is alien to the Middle East, where brutish regimes have always received a free ride (including from the US) on the grounds that outsiders had no right to interfere in their affairs. What emerged was a conspiracy of silence, as all were complicit in the nasty order of things. However, GME – much like the Euro-Med partnership agreements or the US Middle East Partnership Initiative – is a reaffirmation that what is bad for the Middle East can also, ultimately, be bad for the rest of the world. That was the message of September 11, and the inability of the region to fully gauge the importance of that day is why so many have trouble understanding the importance of GME, as well as the West’s commitment to regional reform.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Q&A: Freddie Baz

by Executive Staff April 1, 2004
written by Executive Staff

How long were the two banks involved in negotiations before signing the agreement to form a single group?

The two banks have had a long proactive relationship. Every now and then we sat together on the managerial level and assessed the situation of the banking industry in Lebanon and the consolidation process. In this favorable environment, more direct talks started two to three months ago but as one issue among several in our meetings. After negotiations started in serious, the whole process didn’t take more than one month.

Then it was a smooth procedure?

It was a very smooth procedure. The two parties are really open minded and not driven by any subjective considerations, which normally present an important obstacle for merger operations. There was never any ego dimension. Issues came up in a healthy way and never generated emotional attitudes or structural obstacles.

Will you form a group of banks or a single bank?

When Banque Audi becomes the sole shareholder of Saradar, Saradar shareholders will change part of their shares into Audi shares, and therefore will become shareholders of Banque Audi. We call the new entity that is emerging, the Audi-Saradar group, which, however, is not a legal concept. From an accounting standpoint, Banque Audi is the holding company where all the accounts of all the subsidiaries will be consolidated.

Under perspective of management culture and operational environment, would you describe the deal more as a merger or more as an acquisition?

In a merger, one institution absorbs another institution, which is not the case here. Both banks are keeping their legal status. As Banque Audi is paying partly in cash and partly in new Audi shares to be issued exclusively to Saradar shareholders, you can consider the cash configuration as an acquisition and the share configuration as a merger. But the spirit of the negotiations was the most important element, and the spirit was the spirit of a rapprochement of two banking groups into one mega group, which is Audi-Saradar. It is really a rapprochement between two banks, creating huge synergies at different levels: human, managerial, franchises, commercial, financial and so forth.

Is the absence of the merger law going to affect the process?

The scheme that I was describing by definition does not get any benefits from the merger law. Even if the law were in place, we would not have been granted any soft loan, because both entities are still operating and no license will be given back to the central bank.

Was size ever a consideration in the discussions?

Size has never been a target for us. Banque Audi’s target has always been to be among the best banks in Lebanon, not the biggest bank of Lebanon. However, when you reach the high quality level, which we believe we have reached over the last three years, your customer base obviously expands, and size follows.

Is your key strategic aim domestic or regional?

Both are related. You cannot expand beyond your national boundaries if you haven’t reached a mass in the domestic market. It is surprising that a country like Lebanon, which has developed its banking industry to 3.5 times the level of GDP, couldn’t build private entities with a size that would allow them to compete with regional banks. If two, three or four major banking groups in Lebanon materialize, and if each of those banks have a size similar to the top two or three in some countries in the region, we have a lot of chances to gain market shares in those markets.

Will financial firm Lebanon Invest be taken out of the market?

Who said that? By definition, if a merger or acquisition results in having three of four insurance companies or investment companies, the healthiest solution is to consolidate internally. But for the time being I cannot say that we have decided to liquidate this or merge that. Without going more into specifics, I can say we are in the process of reassessing all subsidiaries in order to generate the highest financial synergies.

But is it correct to say that Saradar Investment House will be absorbed into Audi Investment Bank?

If you believe in internal consolidation, by definition you have to consider it internally. For the time being there are no schemes at all for any of those entities. Starting with the signatures under the merger-acquisition agreement, we are becoming one entity. In each single entity, the best people have to manage the business, and in each subsidiary, the best people will get the responsibilities warranted by their expertise. I do not comment on these issues now because the steering committee has been assigned. It will assess the real values in each business. There are no preset positions.

How long do you estimate the steering committee to have to work on these assessments?

The committee’s role is to ensure the rapprochement’s best and optimal conditions to assure the interests of the new shareholders, which represent the old shareholders of both entities. It is a matter of not just assessing material things. In view of our size, it should take a minimum of two months or perhaps three.

In any merger, people in the involved companies have concerns over their jobs. Did you discuss any redundancies?

No. Since these entities will operate under their actual status, there is definitely room for all the people working for the group. The business synergies resulting from the rapprochement will probably create need for further jobs in the group.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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