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Business

Q&A: Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil

by Executive Contributor May 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

The General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF) is the umbrella organization for the insurance industry in Arab countries. Based in Cairo, Egypt, GAIF biannually convenes the regional sector’s landmark conferences. This year, the event is taking place in Beirut from May 10 to 12, and prepared by a committee chaired by Abraham Matossian, president of the Lebanese insurance association, ACAL. The Secretary General of GAIF, Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil, gave EXECUTIVE an interview explaining the role and positions of the Federation.


How many companies are members in the GAIF?

A: The Federation is an international Arab body, comprising 237 insurance and reinsurance companies, associations and national insurance unions. GAIF essentially aims to support relations among Arab insurance bodies and markets in order to promote cooperation among them and coordinate their various activities, with the aims of protecting member interests and developing the insurance sector in the Arab region.

By what methods are you pursuing those aims?

A: We concentrate our activities on four areas and main objectives. These areas are a) achieving economic integration among insurance markets in Arab countries; b) developing the insurance sector in the Arab region; c) supporting and developing business opportunities and activities of Federation members; and d) enhancing cooperation between the Federation and other Arab and international organizations and bodies. For each of these areas, we have identified a set of measures that we view as instrumental in furthering our aims.

Could you give us some examples of specific activities?

A: In seeking to achieve economic integration among Arab insurance markets, our activities include examining insurance legislations and systems in Arab countries, cooperation with Federation members in establishment of joint insurance companies, as well as cooperation in matters that could promote investment policies in insurance and reinsurance. We also strive to promote the Arab insurance market as a unified entity on the international scene. For developing our region’s insurance sector and dealing with the issues pertaining to Arab insurance activities, we are, among other things, engaged in forming both permanent and temporary expert technical committees and in establishing service and GAIF-affiliated consultancy centers that offer members technical, legal, and investment consultancy.

You are also committed to the education of Human Resources in the region?

A: Yes. We regard it as important to improve the technical and educational levels of employees in Arab insurance markets by exchanging expertise and information. To this end, we support the establishment of specialized insurance centers and institutes, along with the implementation of training programs and the organization of insurance conferences and seminars.

What role does Arabicizing of insurance language play in your efforts to integrate the sector?

A: Human and general resources available in Arab insurance markets must be employed to the greatest benefit. Arabicizing the insurance language means creating a unified terminology in Arabic and setting unified templates for insurance contracts, reinsurance agreements and other documents. This would help greatly to coordinate work among insurance companies in Arab countries.

How does GAIF contribute to the creation of new business opportunities for member companies?

A: Possibilities in this area begin with the publication of magazines and books that contribute to spreading awareness and integrated scientific thought in the insurance community and range to provision of arbitration and conflict mediation services for members. Conducting studies on the sector’s problems, collection and dissemination of statistics and information and regular expert meetings also are tools in developing the environment for new business growth for Federation members.

And what do you do to further the cooperation between GAIF and other Arab and international bodies?

A: We participate in international conferences and seminars related to insurance where we also coordinate the presence of Federation members by organizing exhibition involvement and stands. We extend a standing invitation to Arab organizations and bodies that are interested in insurance to attend our Federation’s conferences.

GAIF members will hold their 25th general conference this month in Beirut. Do you expect the event to mark a turning point for Arab insurance companies?

A: Beirut is preparing to host the 25th GAIF conference under the theme of “Arab Insurance: A Future Outlook.” We hope the conference will issue resolutions and recommendations that can be applied and would positively reflect on the Arab insurance sector.

What is the GAIF position on the role of insurance in developing Arab societies?

A: The Arab insurance industry plays an important role in supporting our national economies by providing insurance protection to individuals and institutions. This industry is also a main pillar of society as it gathers capital collected from insurance premiums and invests that capital in various economic areas, which reflects positively on the socio-economic level.

 

Mr. Khalil graciously granted this interview to EXECUTIVE via electronic transmission in Arabic, from which editorial staff extracted the English translation.
 

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Enjoying a life plan

by Thomas Schellen May 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Toward the end of last month, insurance managers from the Middle East and North Africa crowded onto the website of Saudi Arabia’s Monetary Agency (SAMA) to download the final version of the kingdom’s new insurance law. Many an executive surrounded himself during the following days with the new Lebanese insurance draft law and the Saudi law.

Years in the making, the Saudi law defines a new insurance regime that provides sector companies with a window to a potential boom in what is currently the region’s most interesting insurance market, with a per capita expenditure of merely $46 in 2002 and an insurance penetration of 0.35%. According to statistics published by Middle Eastern ratings agency i.e., this makes Saudi Arabia the lowest ranking oil economy in terms of insurance penetration.

The law’s announcement also points to an issue at the heart of the Arab world’s insurance industry concerns: the disparate regulatory environment. Observers and industry members widely agree that regulations have been, and still often are, either insufficient or damaging to insurance development – the latter occurring mostly in countries where protectionism eliminated competition on government projects. A paper analyzing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) for the Middle East insurance sector in the year 2000 by then vice-chairman of Arab Reinsurance and Insurance Group (ARIG), Ali Al Bahar, stated “laws governing the insurance industry across the Middle East are not uniform. This hinders cross border activity.” He went on to note that the practice of protected markets “hindered many companies from enhancing their products and services.” Self-defeating underwriting practices in some ruinously over-competitive markets, under capitalization of many insurers, one-sided portfolios and lack of internal transparency were other weaknesses listed in Bahar’s paper, juxtaposed by a smaller number of strengths, including the absence of natural disasters, high returns on shareholder equity, and wide availability of products. Promoting harmonization of regional insurance laws is one of the core aims of the General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF), said the secretary general, Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil, in remarks to EXECUTIVE outlining the Federation’s principles and policies. In Khalil’s views on regional industry concerns, the era of economic globalization created new challenges to Arab insurers by opening these “promising markets to international companies, which made giant companies flock toward them.” As a result, established companies in Arab countries faced the challenge of “confronting weak insurance awareness comprehensively by unifying efforts among institutions.” Khalil named insurance education in schools and insurance promotion through the media as desirable means to increase awareness but specifically called upon governments to aid the sector by reducing taxes on insurance and offer incentives for policy buyers.

In context of larger demographic and cultural changes, societal provisions for retirement plans and pension funds are issues of monumental dimension in the Arab world. According to recently published research by Lebanese financial firm Saradar Investhouse, the share of life insurance premiums out of total premiums is remarkably low in nearly all Arab countries. Ranging from 31% in Egypt down to 4% in Saudi Arabia and 1% in Syria, life insurance ratios are in stark contrast to developed markets, where life insurance and wealth creation through insurance products dominate. Also in global averages for developed and developing countries, life premiums outweigh general insurance, said the report.

Executives from Arab insurance companies point to a number of reasons for the Middle East’s low acceptance rate of life products. Throughout most of the period following the eruption of their national wealth (which in some countries coincided with their independence), oil economies in the Gulf region provided their citizens with extensive free welfare assistance. In a few countries, selling of life policies was simply outlawed. Population growth and experiences of economic and cultural transformation have begun directing these societies towards appreciation of the tools that life insurance offers. However, communal and religious identities in Arab countries run strong, and carry an element of rejection to life insurance on account of dual factors. On the one hand, many Muslims abstain from buying standard life insurance products because risk concepts and investment structures of conventional plans are forbidden under the Islamic legal canon. On the other hand, the notion of ‘life insurance’ also carries emotional messages that can be interpreted as attempts to outwit the creator and deny the sole divine authority over life and death.

Arab advocates of the benefits of life insurance thus have been emphasizing that the real character of a life plan lies in financial safeguarding of people’s loved ones and in preparing for the future. And in course of the overall trend to evolve Islamic finance, insurance companies in Muslim countries are working towards a stronger presence of TAKAFUL insurance, that is insurance where policies and investment methods are in compliance with SHARI’A rules, satisfying both Islamic religious and secular supervisory standards.

Insurers involved in TAKAFUL, including subsidiaries of global financial player HSBC, speak of a great potential. However, provider experiences do not yet suggest that sales growth of either Islamic or conventional life policies would suffice to meet the region’s needs for wide spread wealth creation and building of pensions. “Some insurance and reinsurance companies are building experience with TAKAFUL, but it is yet premature to pass judgment on the feasibility and relevance of these concepts,” opined the deputy general manager of regional reinsurance firm Arab Re, Tayseer Treky. Given the youth-heavy demographic structures of the large and populous Arab countries – from Algeria and Egypt to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as smaller countries such as Lebanon – in conjunction with severely underpowered public sector social nets, planning for ageing populations appears as a need that will only increase in importance and urgency for decades to come.

In relation to this massive socioeconomic issue, concerns over intra-regional reinsurance capacities may be of lesser long-term consequence, but they have been weighing on the minds of Arab insurers for many years, and attracted a massive increase in attention after global reinsurance markets began to harden four years ago – and more so in the aftermath of September 11. Numerous Arab insurance companies felt hard pressed by the sudden drop in reinsurance availability, and industry members renewed calls for strengthening regional reinsurance pools. For the region’s reinsurance providers, the development offered a welcome opportunity. Nonetheless, managers do not dream of replacing the international firms in the market. “We do not look to international reinsurers as a threat. Reinsurance is international per se,” said Treky.

All deliberations of economics and business concerns in the Arab world are void without paying reference to regional security and political issues. Every Middle Eastern war, from 1948 until the 2003 Iraq invasion, dented the economic stance of the insurance industry to at least some extent. The abrupt decline of the Lebanese standing as the region’s avant-garde location for insurers after 1975 and the downturn of the Iraqi market after 1990 were both directly conflict-caused. And fundamentally, the regional insurance outlook will not be completely positive in the absence of peace.

Future prospects of individual markets with the greatest development potential thus are subject to the two key influences of political stability and improvement and liberalization of regulatory regimes. Iraq shows the strongest current promise of a yet to be realized huge peace dividend for insurance operators. Saudi Arabia is the encouraging example of market opening and regulation for the day, Libya is also en course, Syria another candidate for opening up. Countries that have a history of a strong private sector insurance market and countries that have successfully established and implemented advanced insurance legislation have the best prospects to serve as centers for Arab insurance development. Bahrain, where authorities adopted ambitious aims of establishing a major financial hub, is the noted example for the latter scenario, Lebanon the indisputable representative of the former. Veterans of the Lebanese insurance industry do not tire to declare that the Human Resources, experience and expertise concentrated in this country create a fertile ground suited like no other country in the region for fulfilling the role of insurance center. In view of the benefits of multi-polar structures and respectful competition, the Middle Eastern insurance industry would be extremely well served if these two and eventually additional countries were to evolve into centers of insurance excellence. Sound domestic markets with healthy, well-governed companies and exemplary supervisory regimes are required as ingredients for achieving such functionality for either country. In the opinion of Abraham Matossian, president of Lebanon’s insurance association, ACAL, and head of the event’s preparatory committee, the 25th GAIF conference represents a good omen for developing Lebanon’s role in the Arab insurance world. ”This is not one of many conferences,” he said. “More than 1000 participants have registered, which is an unprecedented number. Our topic is the future of Arab insurance. The fact that the GAIF is convening here this time is unusual because the conference never before assembled twice in the same country within a twelve-year period, and what further adds to its importance is the fact that this is the Federation’s silver jubilee conference.”

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Heineken shakes up the beer market

by Michael Karam May 1, 2004
written by Michael Karam

When Heineken bought Almaza at the end of 2002, the acquisition, “represented a further strengthening of Heineken’s position in growing beer markets thus creating a better balance between the activities of Heineken in mature and in developing markets. It also offers a strong base from which to export to surrounding countries.” Two year’s later the Dutch multi-national has not taken its eye off the ball and at the end of March of this year, another, crucial piece of the jigsaw fell into place when Brasserie Almaza bought local rival Laziza, giving Almaza and Heineken the brand portfolio to realize their regional ambitions.
“Two years on, we are on track with our vision of making Lebanon a credible sourcing hub for the Middle East,” explained Almaza managing director, Jean-Marc Landriau, sitting in his office at the company’s famous Dora brewery. Laziza had struggled to establish itself on the local market since being revived by Joe Khawam, grandson of the founder, in 2000.

 

The brand, which was brewed in Holland but marketed as a Lebanese beer, suffered from what Landriau describes as an “ambiguity of positioning.” It came in three “flavors”: Lite, Regular and Strong. However, few understood the Lite concept; the Strong version was a shade too expensive and the Regular was in no position to dislodge the mighty Almaza. “Laziza lacked the finances to market itself efficiently,” shrugged Landriau.

Before the Laziza buyout, Heineken’s Lebanese stable included Almaza, Amstel and Desperado, a beer and tequila RTD (ready to drink) beverage. Later this year, it will launch a new beer, Rex, to compete in the growing “strong beer” segment. It was a portfolio designed to compete in all niches of the local market but it had limited export punch. Although Almaza was exporting to Syria and certain on-trade outlets in Europe, the US and Canada, where it is styled as an ethnic specialty, the brewery’s sights were firmly set on the lucrative GGC markets.

Almaza was aware that 75% of Laziza’s sales were from its non-alcoholic beers, which had, given its limited resources, performed credibly in a local market, where sales were buoyed by Lebanon’s modest tourism boom and the increasing number of teetotal Arabs who wanted something fun to drink.
Buying Laziza meant not only a acquiring a high-profile brand but also an export platform to the Gulf. Now, Almaza wants to export Laziza to Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the mouthwatering Saudi Arabia market, where 60 million liters of non-alcoholic beer are drunk every year and where it will pitch for a 10% share of the local market, so far dominated by European non-alcoholic beers.

“Laziza is indeed our key brand for export in the Middle East region,” said Landriau. “We want to develop volume in the region. In 2002, Almaza was exporting 2% to the region. Today, we are exporting 25% of volume and by 2008, I hope to be exporting 40%.”

Landriau’s dream is to export more beer than Lebanon imports. Such ambitions will not come cheap. More exports means greater production. “We will have to invest, if we are to increase capacity by 10% every year,” said Landriau, who was painfully reluctant to be pinned down on the specifics of Heineken’s spending or its market share in Lebanon: “We need to protect ourselves from our competitors.”

He did however reveal that the Dutch company had spent euro 35 million “so far.” The tab includes the acquisition of both Almaza (rumored to have been bought for $24 million) and Laziza and new equipment. Landriau said there are plans to build a new brewery.

Until the Laziza purchase, Almaza and its stablemate Amstel controlled 60% of Lebanon’s $40 million beer market. The Laziza acquisition should increase that figure to 70%, while it is hoped that the new Rex will make a dent in the strong beer segment, which currents claim a 10% overall market share.

There have been casualties. Devotees of Laziza Strong will be sad to learn that their tipple is being discontinued to make way for Rex, at 8% the same strength as Laziza Strong but sold in a bigger, brasher can. The idea is to position Rex to compete with the popular and affordable EFS, Atlas and the daunting Everest. Many of these beers are the strength of white wine but cost as little as LL 1,000 a tin. EFS from Turkey, is the best-selling strong beer in Lebanon with a 9% share of the overall local beer market.

According to Landriau, strong beers have made a surprisingly successful impact in the local market. “The Lebanese consumer generally looks at price rather than strength. With these [strong] beers they get value for their money. This is in direct contradiction with global trends where stronger beer is usually more expensive.”

Also struck off the team sheet was Laziza Lite. Almaza felt the Lite option was too subtle a choice for Lebanon’s beer drinker. “It was difficult for the customer to define,” said Landriau. “Markets are either dominated by Lites (like the US) or non-alcoholic beer (like Spain). In Lebanon, this segment is definitely non-alcoholic and the Lite was squeezed out.”

The decision to axe Laziza Lite highlights the importance of clear brand segmentation. Almaza (and no doubt its illustrious parent company) is confident that each beverage has a distinct enough identity to hold its own in the local market. Heineken needs no introduction. It is the most visible beer on the planet. Almaza is secure as the local favorite (positioned, for those who care about such things, at a respectable 4.1% alcohol). Amstel, with its slightly more international profile is what Landriau calls “an upper-mainstream brand” and sells for around 10% to 15% more. Laziza (the regular beer) is priced slightly below Almaza with marginally higher alcohol content (4.7%) and a “sharper taste.” Rex represents the strong beer class. It is, said Landriau euphemistically, “an attractive price proposal.”

Almaza retained J. Walter Thompson to create a marketing campaign that will send one very clear message. “In terms of overall communication, Almaza is alcoholic and Laziza is non alcoholic,” explained Landriau, re-emphasizing the importance placed on Laziza’s non-alcoholic, multi-flavored beer portfolio.

Landriau has not failed to notice the rise of the Alco pop or RTD (ready-to-drink) alcoholic beverages such as Bacardi Breezer and Smirnoff Ice. The two have become a global craze and spawned in their wake an army of similar, often more-affordable, concoctions (including Kassatly Chtaura’s Buzz, which is also set to launch a non-alcoholic product this summer). RTDs pose a formidable threat to the beer market, especially during the heady summer months. In Lebanon, the RTD market is worth $3 million and growing by 15% annually.

“Yes, of course they have taken volume from the beer market but we have reacted with Desperado,” said Landriau, pointing to a golden brown bottle of beer and tequila. Heineken also owns Murphy’s Irish stout, which is gaining global popularity on the back of the Irish pub phenomenon. Landriau is confident that both brands will buttress any assault on Almaza’s share of the market.

For the record, Lebanon consumes five liters of beer per capita. This is greater than Egypt (one liter) but less than Tunisia (nine liters). To put things in perspective, the French consume 40 liters per capita per annum while the Czechs virtually bath in the stuff, consuming an impressive 160.7 liters per person. “Lebanon is an underdeveloped market that we are looking to exploit,” remarked a no-doubt upbeat Landriau.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

2004 national budget

by Tony Hchaime May 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

There was much debate and not a little bad feeling, but in the end Parliament, after a three-day marathon debate, approved the 2004 state draft budget on April 7, with a vote of 65-31 and one abstention. It was a more realistic budget to the one originally set for 2003, probably due to the government’s failure to even come close to achieving the previous year’s budget targets. Nevertheless, despite the new budget’s “more realistic” terms, many remain skeptical of the government’s ability to meet its targets.

The overall budget deficit is forecast to drop to 32.5% of expenditures in 2004. This compares well to the 42.3% of 2002, and could be achieved given that the deficit during the first eight months of 2003 peaked at 38.0%. It also remains more realistic than the 26% target originally set for the year 2003. As such, the total deficit is expected to level off at LL3,300 billion, compared to LL 2,525 billion for the draft law of 2003, and LL2,695 of the first eight months of the year. The deficit target results from total expenditures of LL9,250 billion, and revenues of LL6,400 billion, in addition to net treasury expenditures of LL450 billion. However, according to the ministry of finance, the 2004 draft budget does not account for the potential impact of any reforms outlined in the 2003 budget law, reforms that were meant to increase the productivity of the public sector, reduce its costs, and enhance its efficiency on the economy and its profit on citizens.

Elsewhere, total government expenditures under the new budget are expected to amount of LL9,250 billion, almost 8% above the 2003 draft law, and only 1.3% below those actually incurred in 2002. Unlike the case with the 2003 draft budget, the government currently acknowledges the fact that little cost cutting can be implemented given the budget’s existing cost structure. Non-debt servicing expenditures are expected to reach LL4,950 billion, almost 8% above those earmarked for 2003, while debt-servicing costs are expected to amount to LL 4,300 billion, also 8% above the 2003 estimates. On the other hand, debt servicing accounts for a staggering 47% of total expenditures, at LL4,300 billion in 2004. According to the ministry of finance, the debt servicing remains high due to the fact that some older, higher interest bearing obligations have yet to mature and result in a higher overall cost. A more significant reduction in such costs is expected to materialize in 2005 and 2006, as the older loans mature, and the impacts of lower-interest obligations, and the non-interest bearing funds injected into the treasury, are felt. Nevertheless, the ministry of finance has estimated that the proceeds of privatization and securitization, should such plans be implemented, would effectively reduce expenditures by LL400 billion, or 4.3%.

Admittedly, LL7,700 billion, or 84% of total expenditures, are seemingly fixed costs, with little or no room for further cost-cutting. In that regard, personnel wages account for 37% of total expenditures. With such costs including wages and salaries, related benefits, pensions, and end of service indemnities, they inherently lack flexibility. This leaves the government with potentially manageable expenditures of only 16% of the total spending. However, given that the items making up these expenditures have been subjected to several previous reduction attempts, it has become apparent that realizing any significant reduction on this level will be difficult in the absence of certain structural reforms.
 

While most ministries will benefit from higher funding in 2004, compared to the 2003 draft law, some have benefited from some substantial increases. The presidency of the council of ministers, for example, was allocated an additional LL118 billion, mostly to the benefit of the Council of the South and the Central Fund for the Displaced. The ministry of public works and transport and the ministry of public health benefited from additions of LL62 billion and LL44 billion respectively.

It is worth noting, however, and perhaps on a more negative note, that no additional allocation was provided to social expenditures in the 2004 budget. Total social expenditures are expected to remain unchanged compared to the 2003 budget law, at LL2,291 billion, with the majority going to pensions and end of service indemnities. Government revenues originally expected to be reaped in 2003 return, mostly unchanged, in 2004, the budget of which was drafted on the basis of not introducing any additional taxes, or amending existing ones. While the ministry of finance has repeatedly expressed its concerns regarding the Treasury’s liquidity position, and the resulting necessity in increasing Value Added Tax (VAT) from 10% to 12%, such an increase has not been taken into consideration in the new budget, and no plans for its imminent implementation are in the pipeline, according to ministry officials.

Total revenues are expected to amount to LL6,400 billion in 2004, almost unchanged from the 2003 budget. Tax revenues are expected to reach LL4,645 billion, compared to LL4,726 in the 2003 budget law. The drop is mainly due to a drop in tariffs on trade and international exchange, resulting mostly from a reduction in custom duties. Nevertheless, around LL100 billion in additional VAT revenues are expected to result from improvements in tax collection, and the reduction of the threshold of businesses eligible for VAT.

While many praised the “more rational” numbers included in the 2004 budget, it remains to be seen if such numbers are actually achievable, given the current economic, socio-political, and security conditions. The budget does appear to not take into consideration the substantial benefits (in excess of LL400 billion) that might result from the implementation of privatization and securitization plans. As such, any benefits from such progress will be a welcome bonus over and above the numbers reported in the budget.

On the expenditure side, and excluding debt servicing, total expenditures for the first eight months of 2003 reached LL2,672 billion, compared to a full-year budget for 2004 of LL4,950 billion. As such, and accounting for the LL350 billion additional expenditures earmarked for 2004, the government may be able to keep spending within the assigned range. Certain unforeseen events should be factored in, as they might adversely impact expenditures. Following the announcement of the results of the cellular license management tender in April, both MTC and Detecon have indicated plans to expand and upgrade the country’s cellular network. While no concrete plans have yet been presented in that regard, such expansions are likely to necessitate substantial capital investments, which are to be fall on the shoulders of the Ministry of Telecommunication.

The numerous problems facing the government with upgrading and running the port of Beirut bear substantial costs. While the burdens resulting from problems with the unions have not been quantified, they may significantly impact costs. Nevertheless, the government is seemingly working on a plan to auction off the management of the port operations to a private-sector third party, but such plans have yet to materialize.

Moreover, and while many officials have proclaimed to transform Lebanon into the health and medical center for the region, the country’s medical infrastructure is, by international standards, mediocre, according to industry experts, and is beginning to lag behind others in the region (such as the UAE and Kuwait). If the government is serious enough to undertake a transformation in the health industry to achieve its aim of repositioning the country as the regional medical center, it will again need to undertake substantial investments in that regard, and run the risk of overstretching the budget.

Finally, it remains to be seen, however, how the government’s efforts to meet the set budget for 2004 will react to the outcomes of the municipal elections in May, and the presidential elections in August.

On the one hand, the Hariri bloc is leading a massive campaign, especially in the Greater Beirut area. Historically, the Hariri bloc, represented by Rafik Hariri and minister of finance Fouad Siniora, has favored economic growth, over other economic issues. While some proclaimed that such strategies have resulted in the massive debt burden on the country, Siniora’s latest comments maintain that stimulating growth in the economy is likely the optimal solution to the growing debt burden. Moreover, the minister clearly stated that a successful effort in curbing the debt would necessitate some “unpopular” privatization steps and cutting in expenditures.

Such strategies do not agree well with the Lahoud bloc, which has thrown its presidential weight behind halting the privatization process due to its “unfavorable national aspect.”

With the elections looming, the outcome is likely to dictate the government’s fiscal and monetary policies in the future. A win for the Hariri will likely result in more spending, growth, and serious efforts to implement privatization plans in the shortest timeframe possible. A win by Lahoud would delay privatization until “more favorable conditions” arise, and curb expenditures in an effort to reduce the deficit.

In that sense, the fate of the budget, the economy, and ultimately the welfare of the Lebanese people hangs in the balance during the second half of the year, and is ultimately in the hands of those, foreign or domestic, that will determine the outcomes of the elections.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Qatar’s many faces

by Michael Young May 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

As the Middle East continues to be buffeted by the winds of reform, both real and fictitious, one country seems have learned how to play the game of professed reform to better control its content: Qatar.

In the last decade, the emirate, the world’s third largest producer of natural gas (after having invested heavily in the sector in the mid-1990s), has been portrayed as an Arab proponent of free minds and markets. However, Qatar’s politics have, in fact, been far more complex, and interesting. Like a latter-day Venice, the emirate has blended pragmatic amorality in its foreign affairs with an ability to play all sides in order to ensure its own prosperity, security and regime survivability.

In April, the architect of Qatar’s political transformation, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, hosted an international conference on democracy and free trade in Doha. Though the level of participation was less prominent than the initial list of invitees suggested, though there were fewer top American representatives than promised, the gathering did serve the emir’s purpose, namely to substantiate talk overseas of his assumed liberalism. In that sense, it allowed Qatar to represent itself, yet again, as an exception in a region grappling with reformist winds of change, the very same that virtually blew down the Arab summit that was scheduled to be held in Tunis in April.

While Emir Hamad is indeed more enlightened than many of his fellow Arab leaders, he does remain an absolute monarch. Qatar’s policies are very much the ones he defines, in collaboration with, among others, his influential foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani. And one of the emir’s most potent weapons has been his ability to develop a façade of free expression.

His crown jewel in that regard is Al-Jazeera, the satellite station that virtually no one in the Middle East can afford to be indifferent toward. Love it or hate it, Al-Jazeera is both Emir Hamad’s weapon and shield: he uses it to hit out at his enemies, most prominently Saudi Arabia (which has long regarded the freethinking emir as an unruly menace), but also to protect himself against the Arab nationalists and Islamists who delight in the station’s political line and what they consider its independence. “Independence” is a relative concept, however, in that Al-Jazeera is financed largely by Emir Hamad himself. At the Doha conference, one participant suggested that if the station was so popular, why didn’t it seek funding through commercials, like any private television station? The man was politely ignored. However, his query went to the very heart of the matter with regard to the station’s politics: to what extent is Al-Jazeera really separate from the emir’s interests?

In fact, Emir Hamad’s relationship with Al-Jazeera is a subtle one. By muzzling the station, his defenders suggest, he would merely undermine emerging Qatari pluralism and score another point for intolerance in the Middle East. Indeed, but it is equally true that by sponsoring the demagogical Arab nationalism or Islamism of Al-Jazeera, the emir also buys cover on his political left for hosting the huge American military base at Al-Udeid, from where American power in the Gulf is projected.

America offers Qatar what no one else will: security, permitting the emirate to export its natural gas without fear; but also a margin of maneuver vis-à-vis the emirate’s Gulf partners and the larger Arab states, so that Qatar has repeatedly taken on a prominence surpassing its diminutive size in both inter-Arab and inter-Islamic politics. It is to buttress its rapport with Washington that Qatar has also maintained ties – albeit ambiguous ones – with Israel. Yet, ever versatile, it was AGAINST Washington that Qatar stood before the Iraq war (even as it hosted U.S. Central Command), when it sought to avoid a conflict by intervening with the Iraqis after an Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Doha in March 2003.

On other matters too, particularly Qatar’s relations with militant Islam (Qatari mosques follow Wahhabi teachings and the emir’s murky relations with Al-Qaeda have been the subject of considerable speculation), the cornerstone of Emir Hamad’s maneuverability has been his wearing the mask of openness. Democracy and a devotion to free markets, even when peddled by an un-elected ruler for life whose movement on democracy has been slow (if palpable), can go a long way to building up international goodwill. It has also allowed Emir Hamad to stand in the camp of the reformers, when some might question his authority to so brazenly do so. But Qatar remains blissfully indifferent to the contradictions on which its politics and stability rest. Security and profits are its mantra, and to preserve this, any and all fighting techniques are permitted – scratching and biting included.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Safe from harm?

by Faysal Badran May 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

Is Lebanon a genuine emerging economy? If so, how has the country been able to escape unscathed through the domino-like collapse of new entrants into the global financial architecture. After the implosion of several Asian “tiger” economies and the more recent Russian debt crisis, it seemed that the Lebanese bubble would burst. The common reflections on Lebanon as a potential ground were driven by fears over the fiscal imbalance and the stagnating macro economy. The emerging economies are in a sense the periphery in the global financial structure, and as the “hot” money (mainly composed of hedge funds and short term punters) flowed from the center to the periphery, many of the emerging countries witnessed a period of over investment. The excess inflows within a weak regulatory environment exposed certain vulnerabilities that highlighted a divide between both monetary and real factors. Once the short-term money flows reversed, the countries were left to pick up the pieces of fickle foreign hot money. The once revered Asian tiger countries eventually trumped their ability to siphon in short-term money.

Why has Lebanon been unaffected by all these global crises? After all, the fall in emerging markets is a stark reminder that economic reality, however masked by monetary factors, do come back to bite. It is important to note that during the period of euphoria, there is usually almost blind optimism and confidence in the countries’ ability to embark on reforms and policies that woo investments. The boom in Russia and South East Asia illustrates the wide held belief, strengthened by extensive research, that the economies’ fortunes will follow – a sort of “if you build it they will come” approach.

Lebanon stayed immune during these crises – from the Tequila Hangover that characterized the Mexican Peso collapse in the early to mid 90s, to the Asian, Russian, Brazilian blow-ups of the 1997 to 2002 period. The pessimists felt that the Lebanese miracle would unwind, and FOREX stability at the very least, would be in jeopardy. In fact, because Lebanon lacked the international sponsorship from an investment flow perspective, it would experience a more severe downfall. Marwan Barakat, head of research at Banque Audi, described in a recent presentation the crises factors that tend to precipitate problems as economic fundamentals, market factors, financial characteristics, and contagion variables. In Lebanon’s case, one would think that with the economy in the doldrums, the wake up call would be sharp. It is, however, on the other three fronts that Lebanon’s resilience was most prominent. Despite a costly monetary policy geared toward exchange rate stability and illiquid markets, it seems that the social benefit from maintaining the pound outweighed the risks. It also appears that the illiquidity of markets, seen in Barakat’s presentation as an element of vulnerability in other economies’ boom period, was a redeeming factor in Lebanon’s case, especially as most of the financial market transactions focused on local holders of debt and equity. The hot money never bothered with Lebanon, and this illiquidity, though a hallmark of a closed economy, contained the damage and banks rushed into lucrative but short-term Lebanese sovereign bonds. It also appears that the strength of the banking system was a pillar in this resilience. How much longer this can last with Basle II on the way is another issue. Contagion (the collapse of a nation with a large trade position that impacts directly on its trading partners) was never an issue in Lebanon as its role in trade and finance remains limited. The lack of statistics often distorts proper analyses of the situation. For instance, who knows what the real unemployment rate is? How often can one count on reliable monetary aggregate numbers, and what is the real level of consumption? As opposed to typical emerging markets, Lebanon has relied more on consumption than on investment, and while this provides temporary relief, for the economy to grow, real investment is crucial. This resilience is a rear view image of how Lebanon fared in comparison to other emerging markets. Simply put, Lebanon has not blown up perhaps because it has remained insular and closed, and relied on Lebanese and “patient” Arab money for its capital markets. But the resilience raises an important concern: the underreporting of non-performing loans. As this issue pertains to risks in China, Japan, and some of the South American economies, one cannot help but wonder how it may affect Lebanon. Non-performing loans to total loans in Lebanon are at a staggering 20%, according to Audi research figures. The policy lesson, according to Barakat, is that “banks and regulatory authorities should monitor sovereign exposure and find alternative sources of uses so as to avoid a strong correlation between sovereign and banking risks.”

Lebanon has weathered several global crises through a mix of luck and ephemeral variables. The key to maintaining the delicate balance is building confidence, which can be built only through public sector and political reform. As long as the current caretakers continue to place political bickering, personal careers, and confessional issues ahead of the economic and fiscal imperatives, the resilience of Lebanon will be an underutilized element. It is hopeful that unlike its emerging markets counterparts, Lebanon will not need an economic implosion to trigger change in the political and institutional modus vivendi. If, as Barakat put it, “credible policy response is crucial in the emerging economies’ ability to withstand shocks,” one wonders how the investing world feels about the future of a country where no clear economic plan is discernible and where any calls for “economic planning” is met with disdain.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Audi merger sets the stage

by Nicolas Photiades May 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

The merger of Banque Audi and Banque Saradar was the best thing to happen to the Lebanese banking sector for many years and the biggest merger/acquisition since the Byblos-Banque Beyrouth pour le Commerce and Bank of Beirut-Beirut Riyad Bank deals in 1995 and 2001, respectively. Although the banking sector has been consolidating for the last ten years, albeit at a slow pace, this consolidation has mainly been characterized by acquisitions of weak smaller banks by larger institutions.

The Audi-Saradar merger, on the other hand, has produced the first really institutionalized banking group in Lebanon with very little control by one single family and the widespread dilution of responsibilities and decisions among a complementary and relatively efficient management team. With such an institutionalization of ownership, the Audi-Saradar venture is likely to have positive developments on the overall competitive environment in Lebanon. It is also expected to influence other banking groups to improve corporate governance, as well as underwriting skills and risk management. Not only will the capitalization of the new venture be improved as a result of the combination of the two equity bases, but other banks are also likely to feel the peer pressure and step up their efforts to increase shareholders’ equity as well. There will also be improved banking products available to customers, reduced related party exposure as a result of family ownership dilution, increased financial flexibility and importance vis-à-vis the regulator and enhanced shareholder value. All of which will enable the new bank to meet Basel II requirements more easily and eventually offer greater support to the Lebanese domestic economy.

But it is what it may do for the cause of corporate governance that is most interesting. Lebanese banks desperately need to move away from family ownership towards a wider distribution of share ownership among passive and strategic investors or shareholders. Although some banks (such as Audi-Saradar and Bank of Beirut) have already followed the institutionalization path, a large number still remains in the hands of families and family ownership throughout the world has proved to have flaws. These include the lack of adequate resources to assist a bank in times of need and the unwillingness to dilute ownership to support growth. When families are present in management, there is the risk of credit and personnel decisions not being based on merit. Business decisions are often made purely for political or social reasons rather than economic ones, whilst the risk of connected lending is high and affects the image and creditworthiness of the bank (many Lebanese banks still claim though that they prefer to lend to companies they control, since they know them better).

To be fair to some family-owned banks, many family shareholders have already demonstrated their financial support to the business by taking minimal dividends (this was a Central Bank rule during the war years) or increasing the bank’s capital. Many families have also opted for a sale or a merger when they realized that they did not have the means to inject further capital and that they were better off joining hands with larger, better-equipped banks (such as the acquisition of Crédit Commercial du Moyen Orient by Banque Audi in 1996).

Family ownership in the Arab world has a different meaning than in other regions such as Europe or North America. Arab individual owners are often very wealthy in their own right and are more than able to support their business interests. Indeed, in Lebanon, the Central Bank considers family ownership to be a positive factor as it guarantees the conservatism of each individual bank and the heavy involvement of families in the daily management of the local banks has been a major factor behind the survival of most banks during the civil war period.

But this policy has its limitations. It can give rise to serious corporate governance and succession issues, and many banks, particularly smaller ones (below the top fifteen) are still run by forceful managers/shareholders (often carrying the two contradictory and conflicting titles of general manager AND chairman), who constrain or hinder the future development of their banks and add considerable stress on the already fragile and often weak financial structure.

It would be worth noting that many larger banks (as demonstrated by the recent Audi-Saradar venture) have been busy addressing corporate governance issues by taking significant steps towards institutionalization of management decision-making. The larger banks have been proactive in this area, as reflected by the setting up at various institutions of committees and executive management teams responsible for operational and financial (but rarely for strategic) decisions on a daily basis. The Central Bank, through its Banking Control Commission (BCC) has also been busy guiding the banks in their efforts to dilute the influence of particular senior managers or shareholders influence in managing the bank.

Today, the viability of many banks in Lebanon is in doubt. Those banks that still swim against the tide of consolidation typically have a very narrow franchise base, lack the necessary technological sophistication and operational capabilities that would lead to growth and long-term profitability. Most of these banks are vulnerable to the volatile external environment and would not be able to defend their franchises in the long-run. The forthcoming Basel II regulations, which are due to be forced upon banks all over the world, will put the final nail in the coffin, as they require a significant upgrade of risk management capabilities and a change of banking culture along Western European and North American ones, which are focused on credit and other risks.

While the Audi-Saradar merger will hopefully accelerate the pace of the consolidation process within Lebanon’s banking sector, the recent decreases in interest rates on government debt securities and the squeezing of margins should also change the thinking of many bankers, as they realize that organic growth is now increasingly difficult to achieve. The changing interest rate environment is likely to push all banks to become real lending banks, more focused on risk management, greater corporate governance, and on developing a strong credit culture within each institution. Greater consolidation of the banking sector in Lebanon would result in a more efficient banking system that is less vulnerable to shocks in the economy.

A sound and dynamic banking system is key to the future prosperity of the Lebanese economy. In order to achieve this higher level of creditworthiness, Lebanese bankers need to strike a balance between risk taking – financing economic growth – and prudent investment of national savings (deposits). Success in the key areas of risk and capital management, cost control and product diversification and distribution, will distinguish the healthy and profitable banks from the rest. However, given the current skepticism among some bankers, the sector may sadly still need a certain number of high profile collapses or failures to highlight to the rest of the sector the importance of robust risk management and rigorous corporate governance. Banque Audi and Banque Saradar have spectacularly shown the way to the banking sector. Emulation should now follow, while the wait for peer failures should not be an option for most banks.

Nicolas Photiades is an independent financial adviser on financing, capital optimization, and strategy.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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The Buzz

Developing cultural fluency

by Tommy Weir May 1, 2004
written by Tommy Weir

When you look at a full moon, what do you see? An old man’s face? A piece of cheese? A rabbit pounding rice? That’s right, in Japan this is a very common belief about the image of the moon. So, the next time you gaze at the stars and add this image to your repertoire, it is a sign that you are becoming culturally fluent.

What is cultural fluency?

Culture is usually defined as a complex mixture of societal norms that include: knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, habits and many other learned patterns of behavior. Fluency is typically linked with the complex understanding of a language and all of its intricate meanings. Cultural fluency, then, is having the capacity to embrace and flow within many various cultural environments, and the ability to utilize diversity for understanding and growth.

Developing cultural fluency is essential for any global leader. As more and more organizations expand across national borders, leaders will need to widen their views on competition and national behaviors. To survive in the worldwide business environment, we will need to pay just as much attention to differences as similarities, and be willing to accept a wide number of business methods. On many occasions, we have heard managers complain about diverse working environments. One leader even claimed that “one of the most difficult challenges we [as a company] face is working in a culturally diverse business environment.” The point is to recognize that diversity can be an advantage if understood and managed properly. The advantages of utilizing diversity include:

· competitive new product development

· expanded acceptance of new ideas

· ability to recognize new perspectives

· more comprehensive communication skills

· an increase in the ability to cooperate.

Effective global managers assume difference until similarity is proven instead of assuming similarity until difference is proven. In the end, bridging cultural gaps is about communication and building relationships beyond the safety zone of similarity. Developing a diverse list of business contacts that you can rely on for information and ideas is essential.

One important component of cultural fluency is that you must limit your own cultural blind spots. In many cases, what we perceive to be the “right way” may just be a habit. Questioning our own cultural baggage is paramount because it allows us to add new information to a limited vocabulary. Some important tips to consider when experiencing different business cultures include:

· Don’t make assumptions about a person based on where they come from. · Understand that cultures change and are dynamic. Business practices you experienced in China in the early 90’s are very different today. · Try not to take things personally if someone from a different cultural does something that you consider “rude.” This was evident during a conference in the UK, where businesspeople from the Middle East, Europe, and the Asian Pacific were in attendance. A tense moment erupted when a colleague from the Gulf wrote his phone number on a business card from a potential Japanese business partner. For the Japanese, writing on a business card is tantamount to committing a serious crime because they view them as an extension of the person giving the card and expect they be handled with care.

Finding common starting points are also important and can make a big difference in the impression that you set for yourself and your company. Below are three basic issues, however, there are many more.

Low- and high-context communication

In low-context communication, most of the message will be explicit and named in words, while in high-context communication, the message will be implicit and will rely on the context surrounding it. High-context cultures will rely on physical setting, shared beliefs, norms and values to extend understanding. Non-verbal cues are very important, and messages will not be spelled out. Cultures from the South and East tend towards the high-context category, whereas cultures from the West are considered to be mostly low-context. A classic example of the confusion is the experience of a German businessman who came to Lebanon (a high-context setting) for an important meeting. He was told to go to the company’s office that was 200 meters west of Cola. When he asked a shop person what Cola was he was told it was the Coca Cola plant. When he called his prospective Lebanese business partner from Choueifat, the Lebanese businessman explained that the office was 200 meters from the old Coca Cola plant, which was now a busy roundabout in Beirut. The Lebanese residents had a contextual understanding of the term and this was very different from the low-context specific directions the German expected.

Role identity (individual and group)

This starting point relates to the ways that we think of ourselves as part of our department, company and even family. Men and women raised in the Eastern and Southern hemispheres are taught that being a part of a circle of relations is of essential importance. They are rewarded for obedience, cooperation, respect for elders and abiding by family traditions and values. People from the West will most likely have an individualist starting point. Meaning that they see the person as independent, self-directed and autonomous. Children raised in this type of culture are rewarded for personal initiative, achievement and taking responsibility for personal choices and development. Individualist starting point

-achievement is linked to personal goal setting and action.

-accountability rests ultimately with the individual and he/she must make decisions accordingly.

-people are understood to have equality of opportunity and are able to make their own independent personal choices.

Group starting point

-maintaining harmony and group solidarity is important, and one person’s decision should not interrupt that.

-choices and decisions are made in consultation with many overlapping layers of interests and people.

-people’s decisions reflect on their group membership, and he/she is held accountable to the group.

-people accept hierarchy and direction from those they deem to be of a higher status.

Time

Of all the sources of miscommunication in the global business environment, this must be the one that causes the most problems. In the Western mind, time is quantitative, measured, and utilizing it productively is of strategic importance. Phrases like “time is money” and “time is of the essence” are commonly heard in North American and European cities. In the Eastern and Southern hemispheres, time is more elastic and feels somewhat unlimited, which makes keeping fixed appointments seem almost impossible. Several years back, a North American businessman experienced this firsthand in Brazi when he set a seminar for 7:30 PM. Everything seemed to be fine until 7:30 PM came and no one showed up. The team thought this was a complete failure. But after one and half hours, nearly 700 people showed. For the most part, people will take precedence over the schedule.

Whether your work is global or local, the reference points and behaviors involved in developing cultural fluency are similar: listen and ask questions for verification, understand that the other person’s view and starting point may be very different from yours, and accept the limitations of your on view and method of working.

Be the Best!

Tommy Crumrine and Christine Weir are from the Beirut-based CrumrineWeir, the global leadership experts.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Real Estate

Market trends

by Anthony Mills May 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

While new, high-end residential developments continue to define the current residential market, the bulk of Lebanon’s residential real estate sector is marked by illiquidity and inflexible prices because of many owners’ reluctance to sell and an unwillingness to accept professional valuations.

However, a drop in interest rates, prompting investors – notably, Gulf Arabs and Lebanese expats – to turn their attention to real estate, has offset many of these hidebound attitudes. This trend is not only reflected in the heightened development activity along the West Beirut and Solidere seafront, where multi-million dollar apartments are selling well, but in areas hitherto unfancied by foreign Arab nationals, such as Ashrafieh and Gemaizeh. The “local” market is characterized by affordable new build at $500 per m2 plus “old” properties that can be refurbished at the tenants’ leisure. But it is the latter sector that brokers often find difficulties in achieving sales when faced with the ingrown Lebanese unwillingness to acknowledge the need for cash. Brokers also complain that potential vendors are susceptible to the ill-informed views of real estate “amateurs” who assure them their property is worth more than the broker has quoted. “We tell people what the real value of their property is. They either like it, or they don’t like it. That’s their problem, not ours,” stated Joe C. Kanaan, president of Sodeco Gestion real estate consultants. Raja Makarem of RAMCO real estate consultants, said: “The Lebanese always overvalue their property. The greatest difficulty is convincing them of its real value. They treat property as a matter of honor. That’s why they don’t like to say that they want to sell. This makes the property more difficult to market.”

But how do local buyers choose where they live? Do they, like their counterparts in the West, use the usual criteria – proximity to schools, shops, etc? “They don’t think that way,” said Patrick Geammal, chairman and managing director of Ascot real estate brokers. “They think more about area and who is going to be their neighbor, about the reputation of the building they are going to live in (directly linked to who lives in it) than where they are going to send their kids to school – they don’t give a damn about that.” Other brokers underline the value attached to a sea view. The Lebanese often choose a residence close to that of their parents and usually remain in areas with which they identify religiously, although brokers say that at the upper end of the market – often characterized by educated, well-traveled Lebanese – this is changing. The Solidere district is cited as an example of residential sectarian blending. “I see some movement from West Beirut to Ashrafieh, to Gemaizeh,” said Karim Ibrahim, managing partner of the development firm Constructa. “But, I don’t see it the other way around,” he added, “I don’t see anyone from Ashrafieh buying an apartment in Hamra.” In general, Ashrafieh remains predominantly Christian, while West Beirut continues to be associated with Muslims. In another development, brokers say they are witnessing many Lebanese from the northern suburbs, such as Kaslik and Jounieh, choosing to buy in Beirut. If this turns out to be more than a mere blip on the graph, it will be a welcome reversal, as many residents of the Kesrwan region have been reluctant to return to or move to a capital many still associate with the war.

But it’s the foreign money that is today driving the market. According to Geammal, 60% to 70% of current apartment purchases in the Solidere district can be attributed to Gulf Arabs. In Ain Mreisseh, Verdun and Ramlet al-Baida, the figure drops to 40%, but demand still exceeds supply in the most popular, high-end neighborhoods, brokers say. And while most Lebanese view real estate as a life investment, Gulf Arabs see their Lebanese homes as more of a commodity, an attitude that may breathe some dynamism into the local residential market. Elsewhere, Gulf nationals are seeking to buy beyond their traditional areas. Although they have yet to populate the Christian Kesrwan area and the Metn in the same way they have in the Mount Lebanon resorts of Bhamdoun and Aley, more and more Gulf Arabs are choosing to live in Ashrafieh and Gemaizeh, where they are attracted by lower prices. They now account for 10% to 15% of sales in these neighborhoods.

According to Kanaan, such Gulf buyers want to distance themselves from other, more typical GCC nationals. “They are not like the Gulf Arabs who come to Lebanon only to smoke NARGILEHS and drink sodas downtown. These guys appreciate a more refined lifestyle. They integrate. Of course, if someone arrives in Ashrafieh with four wives veiled from head to foot and an army of Sri Lankan maids, people will not appreciate it.” Brokers admit that many Lebanese buyers of upscale apartments in Ashrafieh now ask them if any Arabs live in the building. “We tell them yes but that they are not like the rest,” quipped one broker with a shrug. “They don’t want to be sharing buildings with most of Riyadh.”

Many residents, and of course developers, welcome the inflow of Gulf money. Brokers say it is good for the market. “It’s fantastic,” said Makarem. “I am very happy to see it. It’s very healthy. It proves we’ve got over the war effect.” But he added: “I wish we could see more Christians buying houses in West Beirut.”

Some professionals contend that biased brokers are hindering the trend by not showing Gulf Arab buyers apartments in Christian neighborhoods, and playing down the attributes of these districts. “They are very badly advised,” said Geammal. “Brokers try to convince them that people of their religion should live in Ramlet al-Baida, not in Ashrafieh. But there are opportunities today in Ashrafieh, Saife and Gemmaizeh that they are not being shown.”

Finally, Brokers are divided as to whether there is a market for studio and one-bedroom apartments. “I don’t see any one- or even two-bedroom projects, especially in Beirut,” observed Ibrahim. “It’s a losing business.” Lebanese buyers, notably husbands-to-be under cultural pressure to own a home before marrying, feel they have to buy a large apartment straightaway. But many prospective husbands don’t have the funds. Marriages are postponed as a result, and the effect on a real estate sector, which clearly cannot satisfy all needs, is negative. Some real estate insiders, though, maintain that there is room in the market for high-end one-bedroom apartments, which would serve, among others, the university-enrolled sons and daughters of wealthy Lebanese as well as affluent professionals, who, for one reason or another, would like a ‘pied-a-terre’ beyond the confines of their family home. “For the moment, one-bedroom apartments are associated with low-cost, undistinguished housing. A good building, in a good area, especially Solidere, with all the amenities, would generate a lot of demand,” stated Makarem.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Hamra in waiting

by Peter Speetjens May 1, 2004
written by Peter Speetjens

SLOW MOVERS? Some shop owners say the project has taken far too long

Despite experiencing a drop in sales revenues of up to 40%, Hamra retailers are confident that the on-going construction work and facelift will eventually help Hamra become a thriving retail area, serving Ras Beirut’s middle-market catchment.

After nearly one year of road works, the rehabilitation of Hamra Street is nearly complete. Roads have been asphalted and paved, pavements widened, trees planted and the colorful overhead jungle of electricity wires has been buried underground. The renovation effort is part of a $12 million project to rehabilitate five major streets in Beirut (including Corniche al Nahr, Monot Street and Barbour) and paid for by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Rehabilitation. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) had earlier appointed Dar al Handasah Nazih Taleb & Partners to design a new Street.

However, while most shopkeepers praise efforts to upgrade what was once Lebanon’s main shopping boulevard, a few claim that the project has taken too long to complete, resulting in a loss of revenues of between 15% and 40%.

“Of course we have had less customers,” said Hala Shaftary, store manager of Librarie Antoine. “For months Hamra was hardly accessible. On days when they were working in front of the shop, we hardly saw any customers. But I think we suffered less than others, as we have a lot of regular clients.” According to Librarie Antoine’s general sales manager, Emile Tyan, the 40-year-old Hamra store is the best performing of the chain’s ten outlets. He estimated a loss in sales of 15%. Elsewhere, Mohamed Bushnak, manager of Starbucks Hamra, the American coffee chain’s first branch to open in Lebanon, estimated a loss of up to 20%, blaming the lack of parking.

Ghassan Mahfouz, managing owner of Marilou Women’s Wear, estimated his losses to be some 35%. However, he did not to place all the blame for bad sales figures at the government’s doorstep. “Business has been going down since 1997, ” he shrugged. “Business was good until then,” he said, “then it went down by some 20% a year. We are in a recession and the middle class is suffering.” Some retailers are less forgiving. Most volatile among Hamra’s retailers is Georges Moujaess, who founded Roi Des Frites in 1967. The snack bar is one of the most famous fast food outlets on Hamra and is normally open till the early hours of the morning. The construction work forced Moujaess to a hang a banner reading “The King is off due to works,” in front of his closed facade for the two months he was forced to close. The closure cost him $60,000, while overall business has been hit by the lack of pedestrian traffic.

Moujaess blamed the contractors for the delay, claiming they worked slowly to earn more money and that the whole project had been flawed from the start. “They dug up the road twice. First they did the sewage and water and then they closed it. The next month they opened it again to fix the electricity.”

Aynan Bassam, secretary of the Hamra Traders Association (HTA) sympathizes but does not agree with all the complaints. He estimated the average losses of Hamra’s shopkeepers not to exceed 15%, while according to him the project has been largely executed according to plan. Currently, most of Hamra Street is open again to traffic and heavy works are only taking place in front of Hamra Cinema. The project will be completed when the Fransabank building is reached.

“The project started on May 12 and is due to be finished on June 31, which it will be,” said Bassam, who owns Al Bassam, a 650m2 ladies fashion and lingerie store in the heart of Hamra. “The contractor gave us a choice,” Bassam said. “Either to execute the works fast, which would mean the area would remain closed for several months or to do it in stages. We chose the latter.”

The main work was carried out to replace 2,000m of Hamra’s 50-year-old drainage and sewage system, which was dealing with waste and rainwater with one 6-inch pipe, which, in heavy winter rain, would flood, creating a terrible stench. Now, two wider and separate pipes take care of the effluents. The project is in anticipation of the completion of the wastewater treatment plants being built in Ouzai and Dora. The South for Construction’s project manager, Rabiah Dejhaim, said traffic would return to normal by the end of June and admitted that work may have seemed to drag on, but said this was due to special seasonal requests. “It was the HTA and others who asked us not to work during Christmas and the February shopping festival,” he said. “That’s why we closed and opened the street again, and had to ask for an extra $2 million for the total of five streets.”

Still the reality is that business suffered and it wasn’t just the shops. Crowne Plaza’s Sales Manager Ziad Bassila estimated a 30% lower occupancy rate, which increased when the heavy machines reached the hotel entrance. Najib Nasser, manager of the Plaza Hotel, said: “we suffered like anyone else, as for three months we hardly had any customers.” He was nonetheless realistic about the situation. “I don’t like to point fingers,” he said. “Hamra Street is much better now. Let’s hope it will only get better in the future.”

It should. Before the war, Hamra was everything Beirut stood for. It was not just the city’s high-end shopping street, but also a place to go out and have fun. Hamra boasted no less than ten cinemas, and a string of cafes and clubs. Those who have cited the demise of the Modca Café (rented to the Vero Moda chain for $20,000 a month) as the final nail in Hamra’s cultural coffin have missed the point. The street is prime retail with rents that have still to reflect its potential. Bassam, who can remember the so-called good old days, is convinced Hamra will get back on its feet. To him, the rehabilitation of Hamra Street is but a first step. His dream is to see it turned into a pedestrian zone.

The retail experts point to the thorny issue of old rents as a factor that held up Hamra’s post-war development. “The biggest problem facing Hamra after the war was the large number of displaced people who lived in the many empty buildings,” said Raja Makarem, managing partner of Ramco Real Estate Advisers. “This gave the area a shabby, insecure feel.”

Today, the squatters have mostly left and Makarem believes that Hamra has all it takes to become a genuine highstreet and the retail backbone of the area. Crucially, he does not see either Verdun, downtown or the rise of shopping mall culture as a major threat.

According to Makarem, Hamra is affordable. Today, the average rent for new retail space is between $500-$600 per m2 a year. At Hamra’s more affordable poles, rent is even cheaper, with shops at the Sadat Street junction offered for a mere $300 per m2 a year. And it has a social fabric. “Someone coming from the mountains to Beirut will not feel comfortable in downtown, where he can’t even pay for a coffee,” said Makarem, who lives in Hamra. “Hamra is the only place that still has the fabric of old Beirut, a place where rich and poor, Christians and Muslims can meet. What used to be downtown before the war will become Hamra: the melting pot of Lebanon.”

Cliché or not, he has a point. It is a target rich environment, serving the area’s relatively affluent community, a significant percentage of whom work in or attend the Lebanese American University, the American University of Beirut and the Law Faculty of the Lebanese University. It is also close to the beach and the Downtown.

Hamra measures some 2 km2, hosting 1,000 retail outlets, 500 companies, two main hospitals, several smaller ones, 450 private clinics, 65 banks and 24 hotels, among which are the Commodore Le Meridiene, Crown Plaza and the nearby Gefinor Rotana. It has a population of 20,000 and this does not include the 13,000 students and 22,000 employees. The area has an estimated 100,000 visitors a day.

“I’ve got high hopes for Hamra,” said Makarem. “With the new city center and Verdun both targeting the upper segments of the market, Hamra is giving a chance to reposition in the middle market segment. This would entail a gradual upgrade of the street’s merchandising, and this is exactly what seems to be happening after an initial shift to the lower end of the market with the likes of Eldorado, Akil and Big Bros.”

Innovation has helped. Hamra’s cinemas although beautiful, remain unrestored since the 1970s and are not in touch with modern cinema-going trends, which dictate a ‘more screens for less seats’ policy. Today, following a $2 million renovation, the old Eldorado cinema earns its owners an annual rent of $250,000, as a 4-storey budget “department store” and one of the street’s best performers. However, the trend is mainly heading up-market and in 2003, many new outlets such as Vero Moda, Jack & Jones, Dunkin Donuts, La Senza and Librarie Orientale have opened in Hamra Street. However, apart from the Crowne Plaza much of the Taj Tower’s 5,000 m2 retail remains unoccupied.

“Of course, we have been affected by the works,” said Taj Tower owner Omar Ramadan, who is asking for an average of $625 per m2 a year for his new shops. “But we’re also in the process of refurbishing the building, as we separate the entrances of hotel and mall. Now that the street is finished we hope things will get better.”

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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