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LeadersOpinion

A cautious revival

by Executive Editors July 3, 2017
written by Executive Editors

For the first time since the onset of the war in Syria, there is finally positive news coming from Lebanon’s hospitality sector.

The election of a president and the formation of a government in late 2016, and the lack of major security incidents in Greater Beirut since the second half of 2015, have given Lebanon the stability it needs to be seen as a safe destination once again.

This has had an almost immediate impact on the hospitality sector. Instead of lamenting dwindling tourist numbers and empty hotel rooms, the five star hoteliers interviewed by Executive were only too happy to talk about increased revenues and high occupancy rates (see article page 30). This trend is expected to continue through summer 2017, despite the recent crisis in relations between Qatar and the other GCC countries.

The tourism sector sorely needs a good season. If expectations hold up and summer 2017 is a success, the industry will breathe a collective sigh of relief.

However, the experience of the last five years should not be forgotten in the excitement over one good season. We have seen already what an over-reliance on one segment of the tourism market can do.

Lebanon previously built its tourism strategy on the conventional luxury model, catering mainly to Gulf nationals with a preference for high-end dining and clubbing, executive suites and shopping sprees. When that market began to dry up in 2012, it dragged the Lebanese tourism industry with it.

It took almost three years for the Lebanese hospitality sector to get over the shock of losing this luxury tourism market. Slowly but surely, the industry pulled itself to its feet, dusted itself off, and started assessing ways to revive the sector.

As a tourist destination, Lebanon has much to offer beyond wining and dining in the capital. With the absence of Gulf nationals, the main consumers of this luxury tourism, alternative options were scrutinized and developed at a national level.

Aided by social media accounts such as Live Love Lebanon, and propelled largely by the local market, rural tourism flourished, and staycations in guesthouses became more popular (see article page 50). In 2015, the Ministry of Tourism adopted a national rural tourism strategy in partnership with USAID.

Religious and cultural tourism have also been further developed, beginning  with the placement of our Lady of Mantra on the International Religious Tourism Map. In May 2017, a $328,000 grant from the Italian Cooperation Office helped to further promote religious tourism through the creation of a coffee table book that maps out of all the religious tourism sites in Lebanon (see article page 40).

These are solid initiatives with the potential to diversify Lebanese tourism and attract new markets. It would be a shame to let them languish in the summer heat simply because we have not learnt our lesson from the past five years.

We should keep these initiatives in mind and continue to work on strategies to develop them, while welcoming what the upcoming season will bring in terms of conventional tourism. Only by working continuously to diversify Lebanon’s tourism portfolio can we hope to achieve a sustainable and economically profitable hospitality sector — one which can withstand whatever is thrown its way. 

July 3, 2017 0 comments
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Cover storyElectoral reform

Visualizing the voting process

by Matt Nash & Ahmad Barclay June 29, 2017
written by Matt Nash & Ahmad Barclay

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June 29, 2017 2 comments
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Cover storyElectoral reform

At long last…

by Matt Nash June 29, 2017
written by Matt Nash

While some of the terminology is the same, in 2018 Lebanon will have an electoral system unlike anything it has ever seen. The new electoral law, approved by Parliament in June, features changes to electoral districts and introduces two new components: proportional representation (PR) and preferential voting. It is certainly more complicated than the electoral systems used in the past, but Executive has prepared a guide to help readers understand both how to cast ballots and how their votes will be counted.

New districts

For administrative purposes, Lebanon is divided into governorates (mohafazat) and districts (kadat). Traditionally, each administrative district has also been an electoral district. In 2009, there were only a few exceptions (Baalbek and Hermel were merged into one electoral district, as were Miniyeh-Danniyeh, West Bekaa-Rashaya, and Marjayoun-Hasbaya).

In 2018, the electoral map will not be drastically different. While the previous 26 electoral districts have been reduced to just 15, the number and sectarian division of seats remains largely unchanged. This means that those electoral districts that have been combined retain the number of seats and the divisions they had in 2009. For example, Bcharre, Batroun, Koura, and Zgharta combined become one electoral district with 10 seats, seven Maronite; three Greek Orthodox. Six of the 2009 electoral districts reappear unchanged.

Beirut underwent the biggest makeover. The city was divided into three electoral districts in 2009. In 2018, it will be two electoral districts. The district known in 2009 as Beirut 2 is gone, with the Medawr neighborhood (see map) now merged with 2009’s Beirut 1 (Ashrafieh, Saifi, Rmeil). The Port (Marfaa) and Bachoura neighborhoods are now part of the remainder of the city in 2018’s new Beirut 2. The city’s upcoming electoral division quite nearly mirrors the so-called “green line” of the civil war. The former Beirut 2’s two Armenian Orthodox seats went to Beirut 1, as did the evangelical seat representing Beirut 3 in 2009. Beirut 2’s one Sunni and one Shiite seats each remain in 2018’s Beirut 2.

The lists

In past Lebanese elections, political parties would strike alliances to form lists of candidates in an electoral district. However, there were no pre-printed ballots at voting stations. What this means is voters either entered the polling stations with party-printed lists to place in their voting envelopes, lists they wrote at home (i.e., creating their own lists by choosing their favorite candidates among the competing lists) or nothing, using the blank pieces of paper and pens in the voting booth to handwrite a list of their chosen candidates. The electoral list was a marketing concept, not a legal requirement. Candidates were free to register and run in a constituency even if they were not part of a list, and voters could mix and match among the lists. However, election results proved that most voters opted to choose entire lists. Many argue that this often led to unfair results as a result of close elections (i.e., a list that garnered 51 percent of the votes saw all of its candidates elected, while candidates who attracted 49 percent of voters got nothing).   

Under the new law, lists will be legally set in stone (meaning no more mixing and matching and no more individual candidates), and voters will be handed pre-printed ballots by electoral officials when they enter a polling station. There is no limit for the number of lists that can run in an electoral district, however, there are some rules. Lists can be either complete or incomplete, meaning if an electoral district has 10 seats, the list can either have 10 candidates (a complete list) or fewer (an incomplete list). An incomplete list, however, cannot be a one-person show. Any incomplete list must have at least three candidates or more, up to a minimum of 40 percent of the seats in an electoral district, and — in electoral units comprised of more than one administrative district — one candidate from each kada.

[pullquote] There is no limit for the number of lists that can run in an electoral district, however, there are rules [/pullquote]

Proportional representation

The new electoral law also introduces proportional representation, an attempt to better represent voters. Tallying the votes and determining how many seats each list will receive is a three-part process. First, all votes cast in an electoral district are counted and then divided by the number of seats to reach an “electoral quotient” (i.e., 100,000 votes cast in a 10-seat electoral district means 10,000 votes is the electoral quotient). Second, the number of votes for each list will be measured against the quotient, and lists below the quotient will be disqualified (in our example, even a list with 9,999 votes wouldn’t make the cut). Third, once lists below the quotient are disqualified, the votes from those lists are subtracted from the overall total of ballots cast and the quotient re-tabulated with seats then distributed to the lists based on the new quotient (see sample ballot).

When allocating seats based on the quotient, the math typically won’t produce “round” numbers (i.e., a list will be allocated 3.567 seats, for example). To handle remainders, lists are first allocated their whole number of seats and the list or lists with the largest remainders get any remaining seats (in a 10-seat district, imagine List 1 gets 4.921 seats; List 2 gets 3.896 seats and List 3 gets 1.895 seats, the final allocation will be: List 1: five seats; List 2: four seats and List 3: one seat).

[pullquote] Voting systems vary across the world, and there’s no absolute best practice [/pullquote]

Voting systems vary across the world, and there’s no absolute best practice for determining an electoral quotient (or threshold) in a PR voting system. In some countries that use party list systems, a percentage of total votes cast is used (i.e., any list with more than X percent of the vote gets at least one seat, with more popular lists getting more seats). This percentage can be high — 10 or 20 percent — which disfavors parties/candidates with limited popularity. It can also be low — 5 percent — to favor the inclusion of less popular parties/candidates. Lebanon’s chosen method of calculation results in varied threshold percentages across the country (i.e., seat distribution is not well-aligned with population distribution, at least according to the imperfect lists of registered voters, meaning that some electoral districts have “more” seats than others based on the comparative populations — see chart).

Preferential votes

The new law also introduces preferential voting, meaning voters can choose their favorite candidate on the list they vote for (provided the candidate is running in the cada where the voter is registered). It’s as if voters get to as vote twice, first for a full list of candidates representing the entire district and second for a specific candidate representing the cada in which the voter is registered. For example, the new electoral district of Batroun-Bcharre-Koura-Zgharta has 10 seats, so the district will see lists with between 4 and 10 candidates. Once a voter has chosen a list representing the entire district, he or she then chooses a favorite candidate from his or her cada (i.e., voters registered in Koura can only cast a preferential vote for candidates running in Koura).

Once all lists passing the threshold have been identified and allocated their number of seats, the job of actually filling the seats comes down to the preferential votes. This, again, involves some math. To seat candidates, they are ranked in order of their popularity (calculated by dividing the number of preferential votes received by the total votes cast in each administrative district (kada), not the wider electoral district). Candidates are then ranked based on these percentages and allocated seats. Because seats are still allocated to religious communities, this does not necessarily mean that the most popular candidates on a list will actually get elected (see sample ballot). If there were no seat allocations for religious communities, the strongest candidates on each list allocated seats would win. Community allocations complicate that, however. Imagine a constituency with two Sunni seats and three lists. List 1 received the most total votes and has the most popular Sunni overall (i.e., the Sunni with the most preferential votes from his or her kada). List 2 received the second-most total votes, and one of its Sunni candidates received the second-most preferential votes. List 3, meanwhile, received the least number of votes, yet the list’s most popular candidate is a Sunni (i.e., one of the list’s Sunni candidates received more preferential votes than any other candidate on list 3). List 3’s star Sunni is guaranteed to lose because the two more popular Sunnis will get the seats first, and all other Sunni candidates will be disqualified once the two Sunni seats are filled.     

An uphill climb

Civil society organizations have long called for proportional representation as a means to wrest some power from the country’s established political parties. This law certainly gives newcomers a better chance at getting elected than all previous electoral laws. However, it arguably is written in a way to decrease that chance as much as possible (see leader). While this law is unlikely to result in drastic changes to the parties and interests filling the seats of Parliament, it offers those hoping to challenge, the establishment a fighting chance.

This article was amended on July 3rd.

June 29, 2017 0 comments
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Cover storyElectoral reformLeadersOpinion

A law is born

by Executive Editors June 29, 2017
written by Executive Editors

Since appointing the National Commission on Parliamentary Electoral Law (the Fouad Boutros Commission) in 2005, Lebanese politicians have been “working” on an electoral law that employs proportional representation (PR), a system that allocates seats in Parliament based on the percentage of votes a candidate list receives. PR is more representative than a majoritarian or first-past-the-post voting system. In all past Lebanese elections, the list with the most votes won all the seats on offer, with their opponents getting nothing (even if a competing list received 49 percent of the vote). PR gives voice to that 49 percent and increases the chance for independent candidates to actually get elected. However, it undeniably threatens the established power structure. No surprise then, that after 13 years of studying how to best adopt a PR system for Lebanon, the law unveiled in mid-June introduces PR, but at the same time does its utmost to preserve the interests of the entrenched politico-communal establishment.

First and foremost, for PR to be truly effective, electoral districts must be large. The Lebanese Association for the Democratization of Elections (LADE) set a criteria of 20 seats per electoral district as an ideal standard in any new law. While Executive does not necessarily endorse 20 as a magic number, the laws of math do agree that larger districts lead to more plurality in a PR system than smaller districts. The law agreed last month comes nowhere close to the LADE proposal. While the 26 electoral districts used in the 2009 election have been reduced to 15, the largest of the new electoral districts has 13 seats and the smallest a mere five. Only six of the districts have 10 or more seats and six of the districts have seven or fewer seats.

Additionally, the threshold for a list to receive seats is not only different across the country, in most instances it is far too high for non-establishment candidates to actually stand a chance. A list needs 20 percent of the vote to qualify for a seat in the Saida-Jezzine electoral district. In all but four of 15 electoral districts, the threshold for a seat is 10 percent of the vote or higher. It is for the pundits to debate which political parties benefit most as a result of this uneven playing field, but fairness and equality are clear losers.

The work starts now

For all its flaws, however, this is the law we have to work with. Politicians gave themselves 11 months to crunch numbers and find the best strategies to cling to power. They’ve even legally allowed lists and individual candidates to spend millions of dollars per district on electioneering such as flying voters in from abroad (arguably unnecessary when expatriates are also given the right to vote in their country of residence).

The  coming campaign will be long (it’s clearly already started). It will no doubt be very dirty. There will be no shortage of sectarian rhetoric and fear mongering. While Lebanon might not have to fear online meddling and fake news peddling by Russian hackers aimed at influencing the election, there will be deliberate distortions of fact, attempts at voter manipulation, and outright lies — all homegrown and apart from the interference of well-known foreign meddlers which have tried to manipulate every election of the past 25 years.

[pullquote] For all its flaws, however, this is the law we have to work with [/pullquote]

For two decades Executive has been reporting on and analyzing the economic pulse in this country. There’s no denying that Lebanon is much improved compared to 20 years ago. However, the pace of that improvement has been woefully slow, and far too many promises remain unkept (affordable housing, 24-hour electricity and fast internet, to name a few). The upcoming parliamentary elections offer an opportunity to reverse this momentum, and individual voters have an important role to play in achieving that goal.

While this magazine’s archives are filled with evidence that the country has been very badly mismanaged, it is not our place to suggest for whom readers vote. What we demand, however, is that they think critically. Democratic politics the world over have arguably become (or at least heavily gravitated toward) beauty contests filled with meaningless sound bites. Promises without detailed action plans.

In the articles that follow, we offer a detailed explanation of the new electoral law to help readers understand a somewhat confusing system. Our goal is to inform, and we promise to do our best to hold candidates’ feet to the fire in the coming 10 months. We’ll ask tough questions and won’t be afraid to identify bullshit as such when we smell it. We challenge our readers to do the same whenever and wherever they encounter candidates trying to woo them. Even if this law does not result in a massive shakeup of the parties represented in Parliament, the more we can all steer the discussion over the next few months toward practical ways to improve this country and away from emptiness and vitriol, the better the chance we can build a stronger Lebanon post-election regardless of who wins.

June 29, 2017 0 comments
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BankingSpecial Report

Undogmatic thinking

by Thomas Schellen June 23, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

It is not every day that a world-renowned economist touches down on Lebanese soil, but it should not surprise that such a formidable economist could deliver a presentation less than 24 hours after arriving in Beirut for the first time in his life. It might be expected that he would start with an exercise in affinity, by saying nice things about this country’s welcoming people and surprising allure. But, it was refreshing to meet an acclaimed economist who not only confesses to being no specialist on the local economy (only a fool would claim to understand the jungle that passes as Lebanon’s economy), but who has real expertise on the issues that matter in developing countries. Executive sat down with Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto Polar on the sidelines of an event organized by Banque BEMO at the Ecole Supérieure des Affaires.

E   What brings you to Beirut?

What brought me to Beirut was the invitation by Mr. [Riad] Obegi, and the fact that he told me, ‘Based on your kind of thinking, I’ve got a product that you’ve probably never heard of before, and that is my invention [see box page 56]. Why don’t you come and learn more about it, and at the same time, expose yourself [to the situation in Lebanon]?’ I said fine, and that’s what brought me here.

E  Lebanon is a very small country and there’s often a dichotomy between the local reality and the data and perspectives put forward by popular international economists, who only come for one or two short visits. I understand that you have done more than precursory research on Middle Eastern economies. Have you done any work on Lebanon?

Nothing.

E   So it’s virgin territory for you?

That’s one way of putting it. Total ignorance territory.

E   Knowing what one doesn’t know is a fortunate state of being. You have conducted extensive research  on the informal economy in developing countries, such as your native Peru. The informal economy in Lebanon is a very important part of the national equilibrium. How would it help to integrate into the formal economy a sector that’s barely recorded or taxed?

The advantage could be that you could do many things with your resources. You could work within a large-scale economy. Large-scale is [what was] behind the industrial revolution, and the advantage of this comes if you want to specialize and make combinations [such as products with multiple inputs or components]. Everything around us is the result of a combination, and if you’re in an economy where it’s clear what transactions can be made — because they are governed by laws — you can make much more complex products and fetch more surplus value. [People in the informal economy] aren’t taxed [on their incomes], but in my experience — in a measure that is confirmed in each country — they pay much more than the people who pay taxes.

E   How?

Many taxes are consumption taxes and not on income. Then, you have to pay direct bribes, and this is an irregular [cost] as opposed to a tax, which is set by law. The second thing is, of course, the humbling effect of a father telling his son, ‘We’ll go out and pay some little bribes. That’s the way life is, son.’ This is a very corrupting atmosphere. The other part is bribes that don’t look like bribes, like the amount of untruthful friendships that you keep up just to make sure that you are in touch with everybody. There are many ways of measuring this. For example, in a country like Peru, you have provincial industries, but 90 percent of the managers live in Lima, and not next to their factories, where they could help by supervising. This is true in practically every country that we have been to because it’s much more important to be close to [the] people in power, and make sure the law provides an advantage for you, than to actually supervise your factory. The idea about the formal economy is that it brings you all the advantages that you receive from the ability to have proof of your assets — to guarantee your credit or to pledge them against investments.

E    Financial inclusion and inequality are buzzwords of our time. What could banks contribute to achieving inclusion and overcoming inequality in a country with a very potent banking industry, like Lebanon?

They could do all sorts of things. The question is how many of them have the initiative of someone like Mr. Obegi and try to do something. In places like the United States, the banks haven’t done innovation. It’s been other forms of financing. I’m not sure that banks are in a position [to be innovative] because they tend to be conservative. If they do [participate in the financing of projects], they are in business, and if they don’t, they can be replaced, which is happening in many parts of the world.

E   In Lebanon, there is currently a debate over the validity of juxtaposing capital markets versus debt markets, because most of financing of the public sector and private sector economy is still done via banks and debt markets. Could an increase in capital market activity in a country be beneficial to the economy or would it make no difference?

What you mean by debt and capital markets is investments or loans that don’t come through banking. First of all, I believe in competition. I believe that taking initiatives [in new forms of finance] like Mr. Obegi’s is good, but if they don’t come from banking, they have to come from someplace else. If [this competition to banks] is not there, you have a huge black market with interest rates that go through the ceiling under the fictitious motive of getting to micro credit, which is extremely exploitative. I don’t believe in monopolies of any sort.

E   In one of your works, The Mystery Of Capital, you wrote that ‘The bell jar makes capitalism a private club open only to a privileged few and enrages the billions standing on the outside and looking in.’ Has your assessment changed in any way since you made this statement at the end of the last century?

Unfortunately, I don’t think so. The countries I’ve worked in may be a little more democratic, but [the development] has been too slow to stop terrorism and to stop feelings of inequality, frustration, learned helplessness, whatever you want to call it. My calculation is that people who are outside the bell jar make up 5 billion of the world’s 7.5 billion. When I talk of the 5 billion, I’m not talking about people like me, who can take whatever they want and combine it. The people who can combine things [into economic products] are only 2.5 billion. The other 5 billion are looking in from the outside and are angry like hell. To me, that was part of the [catalyst for] Arab Spring and all terrorist wars.

E   Proponents of contemporary capitalism say that to have 2.5 out of 7.5 billion included in the capitalist model is better than 1,500 or even 150 years ago, when only one out of every 100 people was included. As British economist Joan Robinson famously said in the 1960s, ‘The only thing worse than being exploited by capitalism is not being exploited by capitalism.’

I agree. I absolutely agree. Everything seems to indicate that between the time of Jesus Christ and just after the end of WWII we grew less than between the 1950s and today. The question is what’s politically viable, and we suddenly find that people voted in the United States either for Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders, who both said they want to stop globalization. I’m not criticizing the 2.5 billion. What I’m saying is that maybe we’ve arrived at a moment where the system might not hold unless you give some kind of outlook to the 5 billion who aren’t seeing the light. They’re starting to act up all over the place and go to the right or left [extreme] to topple the system. If that can be done is another story; the fact is that people are genuinely unhappy. The fact is that there is a rising mood on the left and the right against globalization. Let’s call it de-globalization. [In facing this trend], I think it’s a good idea to make the system much more inclusive.

E   We’ve just seen the renewed assertion of an alliance during President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, which resulted in very large bilateral agreements. Do such collaborations between a key country in the Islamic realm and the United States, under a president considered by many to be anti-Islamic, mean that globalization is back on track, and we don’t need to worry anymore about anti-globalization politics in the US? 

I don’t have a view on what the significance of Mr. Trump’s visit is, among other things because we still have yet to find out if it will be a consistent [policy] over time. He seems to be a man who’s finding out that the world isn’t exactly the way he thought, as a result of which he’s improvising solutions at the moment. Some people would say what a practical politician he is, but I don’t think that we can actually see what’s really going to be the outcome of the new proposal because there is nothing in the background of Mr. Trump that you could’ve said would lead to this trip to Saudi Arabia. Obviously his government, or he himself, is still in the learning process, and we don’t have enough evidence to say whether this will look consistent and good. What is obvious is that he’s changing the game, and if his [previous] idea was to isolate the United States, he’s now getting the United States involved in a new war.

E   Are we heading into dangerous times in the global economic and political situation, or are we still proceeding in moderately risky scenarios as we have over the past few years?

In terms of dangers, I think the dangers started way before. I think that we’ve been in dangerous times since the West decided to intervene in Afghanistan [in 2001] in the way it did, since we went into Iraq [in 2003], and since [the financial crisis in] 2008.

E   This recalls sentiments voiced by other economists, who have been warning for some years now that we aren’t in a stable situation.

Yes, we’re off the charts now. That’s quite clear.

E    Do you see yourself in any specific school as an economist, such as behavioral economics, development economics, post-Keynesianism, or what have been called the saltwater (coastal) and freshwater (Chicago) schools in the United States? Do you identify with any of those?

No. At a certain moment of course in Peru, when I saw that people were working in the market, and the law was against the market, my position became very pro-market [with regards to] the countries I worked in. But, if I were a European or an American citizen, I wouldn’t necessarily take that view. [On the other hand], I can’t subscribe to the views of those who classify themselves as liberal in the European sense, or libertarian in the American sense. They assume in everything they talk about — on how to do markets, how you deal with bilateral trade, etc. — that the institutional revolution which occurred in Europe and in North America has also taken place in my part of the world. That’s a wrong perception. If they were [proposing] a system that is built on law and good contracts, copyrights and respect etc., why do they not think of those measures when it comes to a developing country? I don’t agree. I understand the compassion that the left has very strongly, but I don’t like their idea that the solution isn’t the market but the government. I think this is completely off-track. I find it difficult to fall into any specific classification.

E   Would you agree then to be called an undogmatic economist? You’re being hailed as a global influencer in economic thinking, so would that be an undogmatic version of economics? 

I like the word and am flattered. I’m flattered because I just haven’t found one place where to find the whole thing. If you look at The Mystery of Capital, my last chapter is called ‘The Ghost of Marx’ because I don’t think he’s exhausted.

E   In the philosophical or the economic sense?

In the philosophical sense, first of all because he has something over libertarians. By tendency, libertarians ignore the class phenomenon, and I don’t think you can see the big picture without classes. And the classes vary. The philosophical thinking of a great philosopher is helpful, but you have to avoid being captured by the last book you read. And you have to do what happens in revolutionary moments, which was said by the man who invented modern medicine in Britain, Thomas Sydenham, that ‘there is a moment when you have to close your books and open your eyes.’

June 23, 2017 0 comments
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BankingSpecial Report

Banking on reason

by Thomas Schellen June 20, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

Pushing loans onto consumers has become the fashion among financial service providers — a fashion hardly more concerned with reason and logic than proposing the existence of prefabricated tears and holes around the knees of a new pair of jeans. But, while the latter insanity is only a serious detriment if you want to use your jeans for actual work, like laying bricks on a patio, the former can be ruinous for consumers, as banks push products that carry added risk by catering to advertising-induced, exaggerated, or otherwise non-existential needs. These products are nonetheless well embedded in the profit-seeking culture of contemporary consumerism, in Lebanon as elsewhere. But one Lebanese bank ­— specifically one that can claim to be rooted most deeply in the territory’s history, even before the founding of the Republic — is pursuing a path less trodden.

BSL Bank, which in various earlier phases of its history carried names from Ottoman Imperial Bank to Banque de Syrie et du Liban, has made waves in the market since the beginning of this year. It began by offering the unthinkable: a housing loan with an annual interest burden of practically zero percent. In spring, it followed with a personal loan that proposes an annual percentage rate (APR) of 10.62 percent. APR — which reflects real interest charges and other costs of a loan and is mandated by the central bank to appear in loan advertisements — is not an intuitive concept that lends itself to back-of-the-napkin computation by consumers, but it is easy to compare APRs under the simple rule that lower is better.

By this comparison, most personal loans in Lebanon have, in recent years, been priced at four or more percentage points above BSL’s new offering. According to BSL General Manager Elias Alouf, customers are not eligible for the loan if they are a foreigner (as per every bank in the country) or have too few zeros on their monthly paycheck (the floor for loan qualification is a monthly income equivalent to $2000 or $2,500 for the self-employed). Neither will the loan be approved if the cash is to be blown on a cruise, lavish celebration, high-priced image-boosting car, or some other conspicuous consumption extravaganza. 

At first, this array of lending conditions brings to mind a quote by 20th century American comedian Bob Hope, who famously said that “a bank was a place that will lend you money if you can prove that you don’t need it.” But, Alouf describes the BSL’s approach as a matter of practical prudence — the risks of a low earner defaulting on a loan are exponential when compared with mid-income families, he says. He portrays BSL as balanced between “agile and disciplined,” claiming that this is the bank’s strength. “Being simultaneously agile and disciplined makes a bank flexible and enables it to promote its products and services rapidly, but at the same time we will never forget the basics of banking,” he elaborates. This identity matrix appears to be topped off by classical societal principles, and perhaps, a dose of some patronizing behavior. “We really are orientating the bank toward helping the Lebanese to stay in Lebanon, buy their houses, and create their own business,” he explains.

Next, he lowers his voice to a conspiratorial whisper and apologizes in advance for uttering the “e” word. “Excuse me, this is ethical,” he says when explaining how BSL will not push its customers into borrowing for purposes of conspicuous consumption, leisure, or even the financing of big family events such as weddings and christenings. “These are things that should not be financed by banks. Bank financing is for necessities. For us, everything that is leisure, travel, etc., is not a necessity,” he says.

In his view, people should save if they want to go on a vacation, rather than overburden themselves with debt that can turn a two-week holiday into a years long commitment to loan installments. According to BSL, self-financing such enjoyments is the correct path and it will therefore always inquire of loan applicants their objectives for borrowing before deciding whether to approve the loan.

To entertain such a strategy, a lender has to be selective as well as self-restrictive, and operate on principles that at times are likely to get in the way of maximizing profit. “We don’t want to only be a profit-oriented bank,” Alouf says. “We want to contribute and help people as much as we can. When you look at the basic needs of the population, they need to buy a home, they may need a personal loan to renovate their apartment, they need to educate [their] children, insure retirement and that’s it. I will not finance a lifestyle.”

He acknowledges that this can be viewed as an attempt to change the mentality of Lebanon’s loan-happy consumers, but emphasizes that BSL does not aspire to move behavioral mountains in an instant. “We are a mid-sized bank, not one of the top banks, and we are not going to tell you that we are going to change the mentality of consumers. [But] people will always make comparisons, and they will see a bank that is not [goading] them to take loans, but instead is advising them in certain cases not to take a loan. It will have impact on the consumers, trust me. But not to a very large extent. It is a snowball effect,” he says.

[pullquote] Bank financing is for necessities. For us, everything that is leisure, travel, etc., is not a necessity [/pullquote]

Besides seeking to distinguish their lending through new retail products, Alouf and Youmna el-Khoury, business manager and head of marketing at BSL, tell Executive that the bank is preparing to roll out new digital strategies and new card services by the end of this year. “Consumers are overloaded with products and promises from everywhere. At the end of the day, if you don’t want to fight [over customers] with other banks, you need to find an innovative product for it to be accepted. By year end, BSL wants to be on par with all major banks in its product offerings,” Alouf says.

Khoury, who has banking in her blood as a member of BSL’s main shareholding family, joined the bank’s management team, at the same time as Alouf in June 2016. According to her, BSL is devoting new efforts into building both customer and employee relationships, in a process she estimates will take around three years. “We are starting today, in 2017, to acquire new clients, and we are also building on our relationships with our existing clients. We are also doing a lot of internal work to communicate with our employees and create this relationship because the best advocates of our brand are our client base and our employees,” she says.

As part of the bank’s digitization strategy, last year BSL began to invest substantially in its e-banking systems and online presence, commissioning an international provider for the development of a website that is scheduled to go live soon. Khoury envisions BSL as an interactive bank where physical branches function as digital banking nodes in which electronic knowledge of the consumer is stored. “I see it as the future where people would go into the branch — I’m not talking about eliminating the branch — and it would be a smart branch, [though] not in the sense of an automated branch as you see it today in some banks in Lebanon. When a customer steps in, the employees at the smart branch would know exactly who this customer is, if they have a loan and a need for a new car,” she explains.

Alouf admits that customers will not migrate to BSL if the bank only provides the same offerings as its many competitors in the Lebanese market. Besides rolling out a digital banking strategy and preparing new products on both the lending and savings side, he therefore aims to emphasize BSL’s historical competitive advantage: it was the first banking provider to arrive in some regions of Lebanon 70 years ago. This rootedness shows in BSL’s emphasis on what Alouf calls, “basic banking.” This stands in contrast to the recent growth strategies of some other expansionary banking franchises in the Lebanese market, which have more of a background in wealth and asset management or investment banking. Alouf concedes that BSL might consider adding asset management to its offerings later on, but plans today are to grow into the retail area on the asset and liability side. Relying on his more than 20 years of experience working with strategy, compliance, and international expansion projects at two large groups, Byblos Bank and Bank of Beirut, Alouf says that BSL is planning to pursue its growth domestically and organically, at least for the time being.

[pullquote] When a customer steps in, the employees at the smart branch would know exactly who this customer is, if they have a loan and a need for a new car [/pullquote]

In its approach to the business segment, BSL is targeting the commercial middle market of established traders and manufacturers with financing needs of up to $1 million. It aims to serve these clients within its fundamental philosophy of prioritizing the client’s best interest as understood by the bank, even if this means advising a client engrossed with the good performance of his or her business against taking a loan for expansion. “In some cases, expansion carries a danger of reducing profit instead of increasing it, and a banker who notices that a commercial client is heading in such direction has to advise a customer against taking a loan to expand,” notes Alouf.

For the branch network, BSL applies a similar approach of deliberate moderation. Arguing that the current network of 18 branches is sufficient for a proximity banking approach in Lebanon, Alouf wants to expand the bank’s workforce from a current staff of 298 to about 325. He says he will make additional hires in the medium-term only if necessitated by employee departures or substantial increases in client numbers, but is not looking to increase the network by adding new branches in the next one to two years.

According to Alouf, the bank’s performance has advanced in terms of profitability, which before 2016 was below targets and trailed behind sector averages, but has seen notable growth beginning last year and a full-year profit growth of 7 percent in 2016. However, he adds that it was only at this level because exceptional gains had been recorded in 2015. “If you remove this exceptional component from profits and compare 2015 and 2016, we had more than 60 percent increase in operating income but on the bottom line it was a 7 percent increase,” he says.

The bank seeks to expand operational profitability and has had good responses to its new housing finance and personal loan offerings, he says, and expects growth this year to be “in the high double digits,” and to achieve core profitability ratios that are on par with Lebanese Alpha banks. While BSL has a high share of independents on its board (seven out of nine board members), the bank, according to Alouf, does not currently plan to go public.

June 20, 2017 0 comments
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BankingSpecial Report

Better direction for Lebanese banks

by Thomas Schellen June 19, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

Finding yourself immersed among a gaggle of high-profile Lebanese bankers at a conference or social get-together can be a mildly frightening experience. When almost everyone in your vision is a banker or economist, what do you say to soften this phalanx of professionals? Which is the best buzzword to break the ice? The answer, personally tested in a meeting last month, is “corporate governance.” 

Dropping the term on the sidelines of a non-governance-related event at the Institute for Finance and Governance at the Ecole Superieure des Affaires (ESA) sparked an immediate conversation with a local banking consultant, who shared his experiences working in the provision of corporate governance (CG).

In the words of the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation, CG is “the structures and processes by which companies are directed and controlled.” Good corporate governance is important because it helps companies to operate more efficiently, mitigate risk, improve access to capital, be more accountable, and have the tools to respond to stakeholder concerns.

“Exchanges get involved in good governance work via the listing requirements they specify in order for companies to issue shares on their markets. The general idea is to protect shareholders against the information disadvantage they suffer, to be sure that management is always mindful of their best interests,” said Thomas Krantz, an activist and former chief executive of the World Federation of Exchanges. He offered this perspective on the importance of corporate governance in the context of securities exchange during a speech in late April at the American University of Beirut. The event was sponsored by the Beirut-based specialized consulting firm Capital Concept — a company chaired by Yasser Akkaoui, who is also general manager of Newsmedia, the publisher of Executive.

At the same event, five Lebanese banks signed on to a document called the Investors for Governance and Integrity (IGI) declaration. Per the declaration, they acknowledged their duty to act in the best long-term interest of their beneficiaries, stating, “We believe that corporate governance issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios,” and declaring good CG to be an essential factor “in mitigating financial risks and protecting shareholders’ rights.” With the signatures of the five new banks, the number of IGI signatories has doubled to ten, comprising seven local banks, two investment funds/firms and one regional association that represents 27 private equity firms. 

Rising standards 

Discussion of corporate governance has been on the rise in Lebanon. For several years before the April event, improved CG was trail blazed by some of the few banks listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange, along with eager consultants and the central bank. Adding to the sense that this is a timely and important issue for Lebanese banks was the arrival of corporate governance training for bank board members instigated last year by the central bank and accolades for a Lebanese bank’s CG in a London-based magazine. 

Moreover, recent ratings of Beirut Stock Exchange-listed companies show marked improvement in CG scores. The Governance and Integrity Ratings (GIR), issued by Capital Concept, saw ratings for six of ten listed stocks improve compared with a ratings exercise done two years ago. Except for marginal improvement by cement manufacturer Holcim, all the listed companies with an improved rating were banks. Three advanced by leaps and bounds (though the prior scores of all three were in the insufficient or outright failed range) and two others improved within their grade or by one notch. Of the four listed companies which did not, or barely, improved in the ratings, one is a bank, one a real estate developer ,and two are categorized as manufacturers or traders. 

Banks BLC, BEMO, and Bank of Beirut (BoB) saw the strongest improvement. As the top gainers, BoB and BEMO each jumped 50 points. BoB moved from a grade of F to a B-, and BEMO from a D- to B+ on the grade scale, which entails a total of five grades and 12 sub-grades. The third best improvement belonged to BLC, which added 31 points to its score and moved from an F to a C grade. Small gains from higher bases were achieved by Byblos Bank (three points, unchanged C+ grade) and BLOM Bank, which had an 11 point improvement and rose from a B+ to an A- grade, the highest of all listed companies. Two other listed companies of importance, Solidere and Bank Audi, seem not to have sought any improvement in their GIR scores. Bank Audi, given a B- grade under Capital Concept’s GIR methodology in 2015, received a minimally improved score and unchaged grade in 2017, and Solidere’s ranking, a D+, was likewise unchanged.

While the short history of the GIR ratings exercise does not constitute sufficient material to talk about trends or confirm sustainable increases in the corporate governance of Lebanese banks, it is notable that the average scores of banks shot up from less than 40 to 63 points, an increase of over 60 percent, to qualify for a B- grade.

Committing to better CG

The IGI signatories include publicly traded as well as unlisted banks. In the latter group are, in order of their signing, First National Bank, Jammal Trust Bank, BBAC Bank, Al-Mawarid Bank and FFA Private Bank. The listed signatories are BLOM and BEMO, the former having been the first bank to sign the IGI declaration and the latter a signatory from April 2017.

BLOM Bank issued a written statement about its CG commitments to Executive last month, just prior to the announcement of the 2017 GIR ratings by Capital Concept’s Akkaoui. In it, the bank said that it “continues to build on its strong corporate governance foundations.” CG measures mentioned in its statement included an update of its Corporate Governance Code in 2016 and several independent board members attending a training session on “Board Level Corporate Governance in Banks,” conducted in fall 2016 at ESA by Nestor Associates, a London-based CG consultancy. The training was held at the initiative of Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank. BLOM added that more executive and independent board members are scheduled to attend similar training in 2017.

In a further note of interest for Lebanese CG practices, a London-based online publication and magazine called Ethical Boardroom declared its 2017 corporate governance winners for the Middle East in eight industry categories last month. Besides seven companies based in the Gulf region — the likes of SABIC, ZAIN, DP World and ALBA were among the winners — the awards contest declared one Lebanese bank to be the regional corporate governance champ in the financial services category: Bank Audi.

Independent and partisan sources both tell Executive that the process of organizing CG training for the board members of Lebanese banks was, and possibly still is, not without its opaque moments. At the same time it seems undeniable that CG standards at Lebanese banks — and, hopefully at other privately held or listed companies — are moving forward.

As CG advocate Krantz emphasized at the close of his Beirut speech, even regulated public markets are human endeavors, and as such are vulnerable to poor or improper behavior. “We simple humans need guidance in the form of regulation,” he said — which in a moderately better world is exactly what corporate governance is all about.

June 19, 2017 0 comments
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BankingSanctionsSpecial Report

Changes from abroad

by Jeremy Arbid June 17, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

“Part II of this legislation is coming”, US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce said in his opening statement at a committee hearing entitled “Attacking Hezbollah’s Financial Network: Policy Options.” The United States alleges the Party of God is a global crime syndicate and has designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The hearing, held June 8, comes on the heels of Lebanese media speculation that the United States was already drafting new legislation intended to strangle Hezbollah’s finances, rumors local government and banking officials downplayed Executive reported in the June print issue.

According to its annual report, Lebanon’s financial intelligence unit, the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) at the central bank, received 470 cases related to money laundering or terrorism financing in 2016. This was only a small uptick in referred cases from 2015, despite Lebanese banks’ compliance last year with the United States’ Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA) and new local regulations.

Local media outlets have been reporting since mid-April that the United States was close to expanding its legislative efforts to target Hezbollah’s finances, a rumor that the Secretary General of the SIC, Abdul Hafiz Mansour, says has been blown out of proportion. But while new legislation or amendments to HIFPA remain at the draft stage, media speculation alone has caused a spike of uncertainty and forced a rush to Washington by Lebanese officials in an effort to water down any expansion of regulations.

In an interview with Executive, Mansour dispelled rumors of new legislation and discussed compliance with international anti-money laundering standards, correspondent relations between local banks and their American partners, and the possibility for consolidation in the Lebanese banking sector due to the ever-rising costs of compliance.

E   There is much speculation in the Lebanese press about new legislation in the United States targeting Hezbollah’s finances. Executive reached out to spokespeople at the Treasury Department, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the US Embassy in Lebanon … silence. This appears to be news that came exclusively from Lebanese sources. What insight can you share — is the United States drafting a new law, or is this an issue that has been blown out of proportion?

There were two teams that went to the United States recently: the Association of Lebanese Banks and the parliamentarians. Both arrived at the same point — there was nothing new. [On May 23] MP Yassin Jaber told al-Joumhouria that there was no new legislation, neither final nor at a serious stage of drafting. Mainly, the media was [reporting] the news as if it were a fact that the United States was expanding the radius of its sanctions, or targeting individuals or parties, while actually there was nothing.

We’re of the opinion that this doesn’t need to be addressed, as there is still nothing concrete, and until there is, I don’t think we should encourage the rumors that are circulating.

E   In an interview last year, you told Executive that Lebanon’s banks met anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing requirements. This includes the international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United States’ HIFPA. Has anything changed on that legal front?

Nothing has changed. Actually no new regulations, neither nationally nor internationally, have come into the picture this year. We’re continuing with the same regulations in force and doing the normal procedures to make sure all financial institutions are implementing the Lebanese regulations that were issued and complying with international standards to protect the interests of all.

We’re always following up on any new developments and requirements, and we’re passing the necessary regulations and enforcing them as needed. We believe we’re doing all it takes to be in compliance to protect the Lebanese banking sector, Lebanese individuals, and [the] national interest at large. This has been the stated policy all along, and I think that nobody contests that  the country’s interests come first. All our efforts and compliance enforcement fall under this banner.

[pullquote] Mansour dispelled rumors of new US anti-Hezbollah legislation [/pullquote]

E   There is a central bank regulation requiring each branch of a commercial bank to have a compliance officer. Are banks fully in compliance by hiring specifically for that role or are they assigning those duties to another employee?

The regulation doesn’t go to that extent. The banks either appoint someone from within the branch to do the job or they assign a new person or staff member to perform the duties. But this is a very advanced kind of arrangement that we have imposed, and it’s a very important step to make sure that with the clients there is always someone watching and making sure the procedures are applied. Of course, there are other layers within the banks, such as the central compliance office and internal audit, as well as external audit and the SIC, that all have different procedures of ensuring compliance. I think our system is quite rigorous in this regard.

E   Last year, when the United States implemented its HIFPA legislation, there was a wave of de-risking, with local banks closing accounts. Is there a concern today, with rumors of new American legislation, that there might be more de-risking?

The central bank has a regulation that requires banks to notify the SIC before closing an account along with the justifying reasons. We want to make sure that an action taken by a bank is proper and ensures the rights of its customers. I’m not worried that this is happening because if so [we would’ve heard about it]. We didn’t receive an exceptionally large number of [notifications of] accounts to be closed for whatever reason. It’s just business as usual. There is conscientiousness from everybody because of the rumors, but it has not culminated in to something like de-risking actions.

[pullquote] We believe we’re doing all it takes to be in compliance to protect the Lebanese banking sector, Lebanese individuals, and the national interest at large [/pullquote]

E   Last fall, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a survey of banks in the region. With regards to the closure of correspondent relations with American or European banks, the primary reason given was that there was a lack of profitability.

Yes, this was the principal cause, not de-risking Lebanon because of HIFPA. But de-risking is taking place in many areas of the world because of low compliance practices, weak regulations [and] weak jurisdictions that don’t have the right rules, regulations, and enforcement in place. Correspondent banks don’t like to expose themselves, so they de-risk countries, clients or classes of clients. This isn’t something limited to Lebanon.

So, when the IMF is referring to this practice, yes it’s an observed practice in many countries, and some of the reasons could be economic. Other reasons could be for compliance purposes, [whereby] the correspondent banks are visiting their corresponding banks in the countries in which they operate, and they are doing their own due diligence, examination and assessment of the compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regimes in a certain jurisdiction. And, if they are not satisfied, they might consider it as a source of trouble and would start pulling out, or de-risking such businesses from their portfolios.

E   Do you foresee this becoming an issue for the smaller banks in Lebanon?

For economic reasons maybe, but smaller banks that are keen on maintaining a relationship might ask their correspondent banks why they want to stop the relationship. However good the procedures in the country and at the bank, sometimes a relationship cannot be maintained because of low profitability. These smaller banks – -— because they are keen on having direct correspondence banking relationships — are negotiating with [correspondent] banks to determine the minimum fees they need to generate from an account in order to maintain the relationship. Some are negotiating and paying that minimum to maintain the relationship, this happened last year and in the years before. But, for those smaller banks that do not want to do that either, they’ll solve their transactions through the bigger banks.

E   So small local banks can work through larger ones?

Yes, they can always do that, but then the large banks will be required to perform the due diligence, otherwise it would amount to nesting of a noncompliant relationship — a small bank would open an account with a larger bank, and the latter would be processing the transaction. The correspondent bank wouldn’t know that the transactions are for a third-party bank. It’s the responsibility of the larger local bank to do the due diligence and make sure the transactions are complying as if they are its own transactions and perform enhanced diligence to make sure everything falls into place.

[pullquote] The smaller banks may find it advantageous sometimes to merge with one another [/pullquote]

E   Have the investments in IT solutions and Human Resources that were required in order to satisfy compliance requirements created pressure?

Banks need to have the necessary IT systems and procedures, and they need to have qualified staff to do the job. So yes, this definitely is an added cost that wasn’t part of the formula before.

E   Lower profitability in correspondent relations, combined with higher costs of compliance – do you think that might encourage consolidation?

There are merits to consolidation and that’s an added reason to consolidate. The smaller banks may find it advantageous sometimes to merge with one another, and the compliance requirements are an added reason. Because compliance is not a small cost of operation in any bank. You can see that the compliance function — the compliance staff and officers — at some of the larger banks, four or five years back, numbered less than 10, and now it has multiplied, perhaps many fold; that suggests to you the costs associated with compliance. The smaller banks, because there is a minimum of what needs to be done, may find the cost disadvantageous, but they can’t avoid it. So, that’s another reason that could push them to consolidate.

June 17, 2017 0 comments
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BankingSanctionsSpecial Report

A balancing act

by Jeremy Arbid June 16, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

“Part II of this legislation is coming”, US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce said in his opening statement at a committee hearing entitled “Attacking Hezbollah’s Financial Network: Policy Options.” The United States alleges the Party of God is a global crime syndicate and has designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The hearing, held June 8, comes on the heels of Lebanese media speculation that the United States was already drafting new legislation intended to strangle Hezbollah’s finances, rumors local government and banking officials downplayed Executive reported in the June print issue.

After weeks of media speculation, in May Lebanese officials moved to downplay the possibility that new American legislation would expand the scope of sanctions targeting Hezbollah’s finances. Rumors circulating in the Lebanese press since mid-April alleged that the US Congress was quickly drafting a new law that would tighten the noose on Hezbollah and its affiliates’ ability to use banks.

According to multiple sources from the Lebanese banking community, and from statements and media reports following trips to Washington by MPs and the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL), at the moment any talk of legislation is just that — talk. American officials, however, remain mum.

True or not?

While media reports may have jumped the gun on the prospect of imminent new legislation, there is no denying that there is a draft bill circling through the corridors of Washington D.C.

A senior official at Lebanon’s central bank told Executive that there “is a draft bill, and we all have copies of this draft. That is serious. What is not true is names. There are parties: Hezbollah, Amal and associates yes, but no names. There is no bill yet, but there is a draft of the bill.”

Returning from their trip to the United States, the ABL confirmed the existence of a draft bill and their opposition to it. In meetings with US officials from Congress, the State Department, the Treasury and the National Security Council, the ABL “made observations on the text of the proposed law and on the negative effects that may ensue and join Lebanon and banking activities in it. The delegation insisted that the current legislation in force is sufficient, thus eliminating the need for any new provisions that may leave inappropriate interpretations,” according to a May 22  press release.

The ABL has lobbied US officials and its American banking counterparts for years. According to disclosure documents compiled by opensecrets.org, a research group tracking money in US politics, from 2013 through April 2017 the ABL spent just over $3 million lobbying US officials on Lebanese banking concerns, including $1.8 million attempting to water down last year’s Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA).

Lebanon’s Parliament dispatched its own delegation to Washington in mid-May. “Everyone is speaking in Lebanon as if there is a new US sanctions law targeting Lebanon that has been issued, and this is a big fallacy because it has not happened yet,” MP Yassin Jaber told al Joumhouria on May 23. According to Jaber, there was a committee in Congress drafting a bill, the draft was leaked, and the result was an explosion of rumors that reverberated through the Lebanese press. (Jaber did not respond to multiple requests for comment).

Abdul Hafiz Mansour, secretary general of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) at the central bank, downplayed the possibility that the Americans will introduce new legislation targeting Hezbollah’s finances. He says local media “was [reporting] the news as if it were a fact that the United States was expanding the radius of its sanctions, or targeting individuals or parties.” Mansour dispelled these reports as unsubstantiated, though he did acknowledge that US authorities were discussing new legislation (or amending HIFPA), with the addendum that these talks had not yet reached serious levels.

[pullquote] The mere talk of further sanctions has shaken faith in Lebanese banks [/pullquote]

Confidence in the toilet

The attempt by Lebanese officials to downplay the threat of new legislation is understandable. The mere talk of further sanctions has shaken faith in Lebanese banks, and local officials say any new legislation would crush confidence in the banking system, disrupting the country’s economy in the process.

Around 100 individuals and entities were sanctioned by the United States following the April 2016 implementation of HIFPA. The SIC, which acts as Lebanon’s financial intelligence unit (FIU), would not disclose the aggregate number of accounts that were closed, citing banking secrecy. But a senior international monetary official told Executive in December that the legislation probably had little effect on Hezbollah’s finances but had a large impact on confidence in the banking sector.

Regarding media reports about new American legislation, the head of compliance at one of Lebanon’s Alpha banks said that if the rumors of new sanctions  were true, the “impact would not be good, because we are talking about psychological effects.”

And the senior official at Lebanon’s central bank told Executive that a consequence of a new law could be de-risking, a unilateral severing of banking relations. “That’s the worst, the de-risking potential. And what really scares me is banks and central banks chickening out. When you’re hit with sanction after sanction they begin to ask, ‘Why should we do business with Lebanese banks?’”

Mansour told Executive a similar story, that following last year’s local implementation of HIFPA the number of accounts that local banks closed was not significant, but confidence was affected, adding that rumors of fresh legislation have reminded the banking community of this uncertainty. “There is conscientiousness from everybody because of the rumors, but it has not culminated into something like de-risking actions.”

AML framework fine, but…

Confidence in Lebanon’s banking system is a delicate thing. Mansour describes Lebanon’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) framework as robust, and says that local banks are in full compliance with international standards, foreign legislation and national regulations.

However, to outside observers, it might be hard to recognize the integrity of Lebanon’s financial system and the rules that govern it. To them the core may be intact, but the rest of the apple looks rotten.

According to the 2016 Basel AML Index, compiled by the Basel Institute of Governance at the University of Basel, Lebanon is not doing so well when considering its AML/CTF rules in concert with its perceived corruption rating and the weakness of its judiciary. The Basel Index ranks Lebanon as second worst in the Middle East, behind only Iran, and 28th worst out of all 149 countries. The index measures “AML/CFT systems combined with structural and functional vulnerabilities, such as high rates of perceived corruption, weak judicial systems and inadequate financial sector standards.” Though it also states that, “it is important however to note that the fact that these countries are placed higher in the risk-rating category does not necessarily mean that they can automatically be considered as attractive destinations for money launderers. It only means that the country has a heightened vulnerability to money laundering due to shortcomings in their AML systems as assessed by international standards.”

To tackle these gaps, Lebanon created a ministerial portfolio to target corruption ­— but it is unclear what its objectives are or what, if anything, has been accomplished so far. The country is consistently perceived as corrupt, according to global watchdog Transparency International, and in early 2017 the International Commission of Jurists called on Lebanon to extensively reform its judiciary to ensure its full independence, concluding, “Measures must be taken to ensure that the judiciary is not subject to any form of undue influence by political actors and confessional communities, and that it is able to fulfill its responsibility to uphold the rule of law.”

[pullquote] There is not yet a clear strategy emanating from the White House with regards to Middle East policy [/pullquote]

What is US policy?

Stateside, talk of new legislation is seemingly less about money laundering concerns and more about politics. HIFPA is a continuation of the United States’ war on terrorism, an American policy that dates back to the Bush administration. Its passage was a consequence of the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran and the lifting of sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Those opposing the Iran deal feared the removal of sanctions would allow Iran to float more money and aid to Hezbollah and other proxies in the region.

The United States might be honing its pursuit of Hezbollah’s finances, after last year’s HIFPA law seemingly had little practical effect. According to SIC’s 2016 annual report, Lebanon’s FIU received 470 cases related to money laundering or terrorism financing, 107 of which were referred by foreign sources. This was only a small uptick in referred cases from 2015, despite Lebanese banks’ compliance last year with HIFPA and additional local regulations.

But Ibrahim Warde, an expert on terrorism financing at Tufts University, points out that there is not yet a clear strategy from the White House with regards to Middle East policy. “There’s a great deal of confusion within the administration, but one must also contend with Trump’s impulsive instincts,” Warde wrote to Executive in an email. The future of American policy may have been partially revealed during Trump’s visit to the region in mid-May. In a speech in Riyadh, the US president praised Gulf countries for “blocking funders from using their countries as a financial base for terror and for designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.”

In justifying the HIFPA legislation, the Americans alleged that Hezbollah is a key player in global narcotics trafficking and money laundering networks, charges that Hezbollah vehemently denied. According to the US State Department’s 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Lebanon is among 65 nations considered a “jurisdiction of primary concern” for money laundering and financial crimes. In explaining this designation, the department noted, “Lebanon faces money laundering and terrorism financing challenges. Domestically, there is a black market for cigarettes, cars, counterfeit consumer goods, pirated software, CDs and DVDs.” However, the report notes that “the sale of these goods does not generate significant proceeds that are laundered through the formal banking system,” adding, “the domestic illicit narcotics trade is not a principal source of laundered proceeds.”

What the Americans might be attempting to do is influence Hezbollah by leveraging the banking sector. “This is the spirit of HIFPA and this is what [the Americans] want, but the outcome of this is very debatable. Regarding the effects of the sanctions imposed by the US on Hezbollah, some say they haven’t been affected, but that it’s affecting poor people of the [Shia] community. It may be putting pressure on some in the party to change their behavior,” says the commercial bank compliance chief.

Out on a wire

The recent reappointment of Riad Salameh as governor of the central bank might boost Lebanon’s ability to negotiate or head off proposed American legislation. But as the Trump administration’s Middle East policy evolves, particularly its effort to isolate Iran, Salameh alone cannot save Lebanon. Hezbollah has acted unilaterally in Syria’s civil war while the official stance of the Lebanese government continues to be one of disassociation. And along Lebanon’s southern border, Hezbollah continues to possess the means to threaten Israel.

There does seem to have been an acceptance on the Americans’ part that they should not disrupt the Lebanese economy by cutting off local banks from the global financial system. And the banking community’s message to US lawmakers, when related to Hezbollah, seems to be that if you cut off Lebanese banks, you give the country to Hezbollah and Iran. But there are different tactics at play. The United States is applying the bullying strategy: Do as we say, or else. Lebanon’s part is to roll over like a good little doggy: We know you don’t mean what you say, you’re nice and we’re nice so don’t confront us. But the notion that the Americans are not contemplating something serious is hard to buy, and the worry with Trump is that he seems willing to push the envelope further than previous administrations, and in unpredictable ways.

Where does that leave Lebanon? The banking system is the pillar of the economy, and so it begs the question of Lebanon’s political class: Is blowing up the country’s banking sector worth the price of resistance?

June 16, 2017 0 comments
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BankingProductivitySpecial Report

Look to the numbers

by Thomas Schellen June 14, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

In June 2017, there will be unprecedented room for emotion in banking. Lebanese financial markets could express a wide array of feelings — a mix of relief (at the stability of personnel), exasperation (at the inertia of political processes), doubt (in the ability of the body politic to ever deliver needed laws) and fear (over the impact of American hatred and global economic developments).

Reassurance comes from the numbers. According to a Bankdata review of top-tier bank performance issued at the end of May, banks with deposits of over $2 billion (Alpha group banks) saw “moderate activity growth” in the first quarter of 2017. Their consolidated assets increased 0.9 percent on the quarter and 7.5 percent on the year to $218.8 billion, with larger domestic than foreign activity growth.

Growth of consolidated deposits in Alpha banks likewise increased in quarterly and annual terms, at respective rates of 0.8 percent and 5.4 percent. Growth trajectories of domestic and foreign deposits diverged more than in the category of assets, Bankdata says, at a contraction of 1.3 percent in entities abroad versus a 1.2 percent expansion of domestic deposits (ironically attributed mainly to deposits in foreign currencies, which increased four times faster than deposits denominated in Lebanese Lira), resulting in increased dollarization. “Domestic FX deposit growth should be read in conjunction with double-digit growth in financial inflows, turning the deficit in the balance of payments to a net surplus,” Bankdata says.

[pullquote] Growth of consolidated deposits in Alpha banks likewise increased in quarterly and annual terms, at respective rates of 0.8 percent and 5.4 percent [/pullquote]

With the arrival of the IFRS 9 rules still over six months away, both this new internationally-rated accounting methodology and the Basel III standards have already been internalized and mentally incorporated by Lebanese banks, some bankers opined in conversations with Executive. This leaves time for Alpha banks to proceed with business as usual, nurturing high liquidity (the ratio of primary liquid assets to deposits was at 37.1 percent at end-March), albeit juxtaposed with less-than stellar developments in loan portfolios. According to Bankdata, loans to the private sector retreated by 0.7 percent in the first quarter, but doubtful loan ratios stayed cool. Collective provisions rose to a record 1.6 percent of the Alpha banks’ net loan portfolio, which the consultancy attributes to banks’ compliance with the central bank’s Intermediary Circular No 446.      

Profit announcements came from BLOM Bank, whose general manager claimed top of the class with first-quarter profits of $112 million, edging perennial rival Bank Audi’s reported $110 million. On the whole, the year-on-year net profit growth of Alpha banks in the first quarter was reported as a “modest 1.7 percent.” Return on average assets dropped to 0.95 percent at end-March 2017, from 1 percent a year earlier, and the return on average equity declined from 11.07 percent to 10.14 percent, according to Bankdata, which interpreted the return ratio developments as indications of “the persistently tough operating conditions of Lebanese banks in Lebanon and in various foreign markets of presence, pressurizing both their yields and their efficiency metrics within the context of persistently low spreads and interest margins at large.

(Click on image to view full table)

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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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