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Hospitality & TourismHotels Overview

Lebanon’s five star hotels diversifying markets and offerings

by Nabila Rahhal December 18, 2018
written by Nabila Rahhal

Lebanon has not given its five star hoteliers many reasons to smile over the past seven years. Political tension and instability has kept away the country’s traditional market feeders, GCC nationals, since 2011.

Meanwhile, regional political and socioeconomic crises have taken their toll on Lebanese expats in the Gulf and in parts of Africa, generally reducing the length of their stay and their spending power while they are in the country. Locally the situation is not much better, with Lebanon’s residents less willing to spend on lavish meals in hotel restaurants or on city staycations.

It is a testimony to humankind’s adaptive nature and the Lebanese people’s well-honed resilience that these hoteliers have not only kept their good natured smiles despite the challenges, but have also persevered in cultivating and growing the markets that continued to visit Lebanon, as well as exploring and developing new ones.

The past year

Most hoteliers saw 2018 as a continuation of 2017 in terms of occupancy: not great, but not bad either.

For Gefinor Rotana, 2017 and 2018 were almost the same in terms of business growth. According to the hotel’s general manager, Gilbert Zeait, this was because the last two months of 2017—when then-Prime Minister Hariri announced and subsequently withdrew his resignation—put a damper on that year’s otherwise positive performance. Meanwhile, the first four months of 2018 saw cancellations and a drop in business in the aftermath of the rescinded resignation before things picked up again. “Summer 2018 was very good for us. Room rates were lower than in the golden years, such as 2010, but in terms of occupancy during the summer, I would say it was above 80 percent,” Zeait says.

The Smallville Hotel in Badaro also reports almost the same occupancy in 2017 and 2018, according to Michel Boulad, its director of sales and marketing. “Summer of 2017 was almost a record year for the hotel. However, summer 2018 was not as good for Smallville, mainly because the GCC nationals did not come as much as last year during the Adha holidays. The end of year 2017 was rather weak following the Hariri incident, but this year, and judging by our December bookings, we are anticipating much better performance,” Boulad explains.

For some hotels, 2018 was a better year than 2017. Nadia Madi, director of sales and marketing at Kempinski Summerland Hotel & Resort, says 2018 saw a 20 to 30 percent increase in occupancy from 2017, and the hotel expects to close the year at 65 percent overall occupancy—a good rate in her opinion, given that they are a summer resort and business is usually slower in winter. “Since we opened in summer 2016, 2017 was a relatively new year for us. So in 2018, we became more established, and people started knowing us more, whether in the local market or through the Kempinski chain,” she says.

Georges Ojeil, the general manager of Le Gray, says 2018 was the second best year in the hotel’s history, since its opening in 2009. He attributes this to a “synergetic team and a quality focused strategy,” whereby the hotel invested a lot of time and money in training and communicating with its employees, while at the same time not compromising on quality customer experience. The hotel’s expansion—which added two floors of rooms, a new lobby, and, most importantly, conference rooms and a ballroom—was also a major driver in the year’s exceptional performance. “The extension supported our financial growth because we managed to penetrate different markets. We closed October on 85.5 percent occupancy and November on 80 percent. Although January was shaky, the year picked up considerably afterwards,” Ojeil says.

The cluster director of sales and marketing at the Phoenicia Hotel, Tracey Bolton, says the hotel has had a 5 percent increase in occupancy from 2017 and will close the year at 60 percent occupancy (according to its performance as of mid-November), which she says is exceptional for a hotel of their size (446 rooms). Meanwhile, Rami Sayess, the regional vice president and general manager of the Four Seasons, says 2017 was a record year for their hotel, and that, despite this year’s drop in occupancy, 2018 is exceeding the expectations they had at the start of the year when the country was more unstable politically. 

As such, Lebanon’s five star hotels have managed to maintain almost consistent occupancy—at a positive percentage—despite the tough times.

Here no more

GCC nationals were Lebanon’s main tourism market for such a long time that the hotel industry became complacent, relying too heavily on this steady stream of guests rather than having to invest energy or resources to fill up the country’s hotels.

Today, this is no longer the case, as most hoteliers admit that the numbers of holidaying GCC nationals are in steady decline (see figures page 116). Rotana’s Zeait explains that this demographic used to account for 95 percent of the hotel’s targeted guests—now they make up only 10 percent. The drop in GCC nationals has also negatively impacted the average length of stay at the hotel, he says. “Even during peak holiday seasons, and although hotels in Lebanon become fully booked then, it is for a shorter period of time than before. That long duration of stays was when we had high numbers of tourists from the Gulf who would stay for at least a week, and up to five weeks sometimes.”

Worryingly, Gulf tourists remain the main market feeders of the Four Seasons, Kempinski, and Phoenicia—although the three establishments confirm that they are staying in lower numbers compared to 2010 and previous years.

Phoenicia’s Bolton explains that although the GCC is still a main market for the hotel, it is not the big spenders that are coming. “Thirty-five percent of our business is GCC, but they are not staying in the presidential suites as they used to before,” she says.

Speaking for Kempinski, Madi says they have seen a slight increase in GCC nationals this year, while Ojeil says Le Gray has witnessed an increase in Kuwaiti and Qatari nationals.

  

Beyond the Gulf

By now, the hotel industry has largely accepted that GCC nationals will no longer be the chief drivers of their business and so have invested all their efforts on strengthening the other markets visiting Lebanon, even if these markets are shy in numbers so far.

European tourists, which have always represented a small market for Lebanese hotels, have been increasing over the last few years, according to the hoteliers Executive interviewed for this article. They attribute this rise to their own efforts and to Visit Lebanon (a B2B meeting space that targets specific destinations for familiarization trips, which provides all the practical information that those working abroad in the leisure industry would need to arrange trips to Lebanon, organised by the Ministry of Tourism and participating hospitality stakeholders). Other stakeholders can also play their part. Bolton says that the number of Spanish tourists to Lebanon is starting to grow, a consequence of Lebanon’s flagship carrier, Middle East Airlines, establishing a direct flight to Madrid in June 2018. “The key going forward is we have to tackle these markets and maximize exposure to drive business,” she says.

Lebanese expats—typically first generation immigrants who left Lebanon for career purposes—have also been mentioned as a growth market by hoteliers with whom Executive spoke. “This year we saw many Lebanese living in the region coming to Lebanon for a vacation, but also on business trips. They enjoy staying in the resort as a destination for a vacation, and so we had a promotion for Lebanese expats, providing them with special prices to encourage them to stay with us,” Madi says.

Among neighboring Arab countries, Iraqis, Egyptians, and Jordanians are mentioned as frequent hotel guests, while Zeait says that Syrian guests have been on the rise at the Gefinor Rotana. “We have a lot of Syrians using hotels, especially when they are living outside the region and come back to visit their relatives in Syria—they land in Beirut and stay here for some time,” he says.

Various recent efforts have been targeting the Lebanese diaspora—ranging from the Lebanese Diaspora Energy conference, organized by the foreign ministry, to the Visit Lebanon meetings—and these efforts have paid off in the hotel industry. “We at the Phoenicia Hotel have seen a nice growth of the diaspora market especially over the summer season—these are mainly [Lebanese] from Brazil, Australia, and Canada. It is the young diaspora that is coming back, and they are looking to reconnect with their history. And because it’s the younger generation, they are staying in hotels and not in the villages where their extended family is—to them, part of connecting with their family and heritage is exploring Lebanon, so they make the hotel their base and go out from here,” Bolton says.

Ojeil says Le Gray has its eyes on the diaspora market as well. “Latin America is a new market we are targeting, and to a certain extent it is fueled by the Lebanese diaspora. We start with them, but they bring others from their countries with them, or go back and tell them of their trip, which motivates them to come here,” he says. 

Looking for something new

Not content with just developing existing markets, Lebanon’s hoteliers are also aggressively targeting new markets, having learned the dangers of putting all their eggs in one basket. “When we knew last year that the GCC market was not coming back as before, and that their confidence had not been restored in Lebanon as expected, we went after new markets,” says the Four Seasons’ Sayess, giving the examples of South America, in particular Colombia, as well as Mexico and Australia. In July, he says, the hotel’s highest number of visitors was from Australia.

Hotels are keen to diversify their guest base. “We at Smallville are looking to expand in new markets such as Russia or Latin America. There is a lot to explore, and so we need to steer away from the traditional feeder markets and to focus on new markets. This is already something we are doing, and we are seeing results, but we have to maintain our efforts,” Boulad says.

He goes on to explain that the hotel has been participating in international exhibitions to  explore new markets. At home, the hotel is partnering up with local travel agents who are targeting new markets such as China or Russia.

In fact, several hoteliers spoke of the Russian and Chinese markets, and it seems serious efforts are being made to attract these tourists to Lebanon. “I would love to explore the Chinese and Russian markets—both of which are very important—but we have to sort out the visa issue as it is not easy for them to get visas,” Sayess says. “We need to catch their interest in Lebanon, since they already go to Dubai, Paris, and Egypt, which means we need to go to the countries and talk to tour operators there. For example, we at Four Seasons welcomed a group of 12 Chinese tour operators here to explore Lebanon, as well as a Russian group, which was arranged through the Syndicate of Hotel Owners in Lebanon.” 

Meanwhile, Rotana’s Zeait says both Armenia and Turkey are interesting markets due to their proximity to Lebanon. The potential is certainly there but what is needed, hoteliers tell Executive, is sustained work from all stakeholders to promote Lebanon as a destination to tourists who may need a small push before they book that ticket.

While hoteliers are doing their part in promoting Lebanon and attracting new tourism markets to it, there is a lot more that needs to be done—by all stakeholders—before the country will be ready for a higher level of tourism, necessitating a strategy.

 

Work work work

While GCC nationals mainly frequented Lebanon for leisure, today’s hotel guests—for the most part—hail from the corporate world, according to the hoteliers with whom Executive spoke. “The perception around the area is that the leisure groups are still nervous to come because they are hesitant because of the political situation, so that still needs a lot of work. Whereas a corporate group will come because they need to do business here,” Phoenicia’s Bolton says.

Both Kempinski’s and Le Gray’s expansions of their corporate facilities have allowed them to target new markets and achieve growth. “The majority of the business in the pipeline is corporate business with a little leisure, especially in the summer,” Ojeil says. “The conference and events facilities allowed us to penetrate the MICE market so we have more residential seminars and more events, training, and conferences happening in house, and this is driving more revenue.”

Still, this has not prevented hotels from going after business from both leisure and corporate travelers, playing up their facilities to attract both. For Boulad, Smallville’s location on Badaro Street—minutes away from the French Embassy (one of their main clients, he says), as well as major universities, the new business hub of Sin El Fil, Badaro’s pubs, and the national museum—makes them ideally placed to capture both corporate and leisure business.

Zeait also speaks of Gefinor Rotana’s location as being attractive for both businesspeople—surrounded as it is by major hospitals and universities—and those seeking a good time in nearby Zaitunay Bay or Hamra. “We are positioning ourselves as a business-leisure hotel,” he says. “This is healthy because leisure alone gives you seasonal traffic—and is mainly the business of beach resorts—while the volume of business bookings decreases during holiday times such as the summer or mid to end of December.”

Madi says Kempinski reached 100 percent occupancy at times during the summer, which is normal for a beach resort. During winter, she says, they market the fact that they can offer corporate guests leisure facilities typically found in resorts, such as multiple restaurants, a huge spa, and a marina.

Eyes on Syria

As 2019 approaches, Lebanon’s hotel industry is looking toward the future, and hoteliers say they will continue to develop the new markets they have been working on in 2018. At the same time, they have their eyes open to new possibilities and, at the moment, the potential narrowing of the war in Syria is a very interesting prospect—the impact of which is already tangible, to some extent. “We see potential for Phoenicia Hotel in that a lot of companies—from construction to consultancy companies—will be making their base here,” Bolton says. “When they opened the shipping lines, for example, we immediately saw an impact on our business from shipping companies and freight companies. We are waiting in anticipation because we think it will bring a tremendous boost for our economy.”

Ojeil says Le Gray has also felt the impact of Syria’s impending reconstruction. “We are already sensing increased demand from business people coming to Lebanon for a few days for events related to the reconstruction of Syria. They take 14 rooms for a meeting or conference and stay for a few days. It is happening regularly. If we manage to grab our share of this business, it will be very positive for Lebanon,” he says.

Whether it is business from Syria’s imminent reconstruction or from one of the far flung markets that Lebanon’s hoteliers have been tirelessly developing, or even from markets closer to home finally making a comeback, this country’s hotel industry is prepared to welcome it all, having passed through the fiercest tests.

December 18, 2018 0 comments
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BusinessInfographics

Infographics

by Ahmad Barclay & Thomas Schellen December 18, 2018
written by Ahmad Barclay & Thomas Schellen
December 18, 2018 0 comments
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Banking & InsuranceQ&A

Q&A with Freddie Baz, chief strategist and board member of Bank Audi

by Thomas Schellen December 18, 2018
written by Thomas Schellen

Lebanese banks are the life raft of the national economy. While this raft is astoundingly large in comparison to the real economy, with banking sector assets surpassing the real economy by a factor of four, the existential role and solidity of banking make it the focus of attention in national economic and policy debates. Many reports and studies, and an exponential number of rumors, have increasingly questioned if and how the Lebanese banking sector can keep functioning so well. Executive sat down with Freddie Baz, chief strategist and member of the board of Lebanon’s largest bank, Bank Audi, to see how the economy looks from the top of the banking industry.    

E   Do I understand correctly that you believe the perspectives presented in many of the alarming economic reports that have been circulated in Lebanon in recent months have somehow been tainted—flavored, for example, by ulterior motives or even by ignorance?

The background of our discussion today is the plethora of economic reports in the media in the past two years that were filled with warnings, some of which had zero substance. People do not know how to look at things in relative terms. The Lebanese economy is facing major macro-imbalances. Nobody is disputing this. But for those imbalances to translate into a hard landing for the economy, there has to be a causality between the problem and the hard landing. We have seen reports alleging the [imminent breakdown] of the Lebanese economy. However, while these reports [offer a] more or less fair diagnosis of the situation, things start to diverge when some ignorant economist [starts] saying that we are heading [toward an] imminent hard landing. Some others, who know that there are strong implicit buffers in existence, are even more alarmist in their tone of analysis, because it might be in their interest to see the collapse of the economy happen.

E   What is your view? Is Lebanon’s economy in danger of imminent meltdown?

No. What does it mean to have more pain? One does not kill [a] patient in order to [cure] him. What I am telling you is that I technically agree with most diagnoses regarding the problems of the Lebanese economy. Where I diverge from the analysts that are honest and not technically ignorant, is in saying no—those problems, in the case of Lebanon, will not necessarily translate into the same hard landing we observed elsewhere. This is because we have a financial dimension in Lebanon that is far above the economic dimension, with four times the GDP in bank assets.

Despite all you read and hear, we are still having gross financial inflows. In the first eight months of 2018, inflows amounted to $10.5 billion. We pay a small premium on those USD denominated funds, obviously, but as long as the magnitude of inflows is far above the absorption capacity of the economy, a part of them ends up in the accounts of the central bank for the purpose of getting [banks] a higher yield on liquidity. We already pay a premium, and so we want to reduce negative carry.

Thus, when you look at Lebanon’s history, the last several years have seen BDL [Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank] foreign assets as [a] percentage of the local currency money supply in ranges above 70 and 80 percent—81.9 percent today. This [percentage ratio] is where you have evidence for the risk of a collapse in the local currency. I am talking about 18 years during which the central bank’s foreign assets have represented 80 percent of the money supply in local currency; this is a technical buffer.

I am not saying that there is resilience despite all those distorted risk profiles and debt ratios [in Lebanon], but what we are trying to explain is that there are technical buffers that [stand against] the conceptual translation of macroeconomic imbalances into a correction of the currency. This auto-correction mechanism of markets to restore equilibrium does not work in Lebanon or would take much more time [to unfold].

E   The World Bank’s latest Lebanon Economic Report, published this October, said “global market conditions have become a more important determinant of Lebanese Eurobonds’ risk/return profile,” and seemed to suggest that Lebanon’s financial sector today is more strongly correlated with factors that influence other emerging markets. Is that a point of concern?

There is no such correlation. Otherwise the correction [of the currency] would have happened years ago. [In the 2000s] we went through two years when debt to GDP was at 186 percent. When you look at peer groups in the global economy, the foreign reserves at the central bank [in these countries] represent, on average, 35 percent of the money supply in local currency. We are at 80 percent, so you see how this is about technical buffers.

[However, viewing Lebanon] on a standalone base, I am not at all happy about [the country’s] risk profile, and I believe that it needs to be adjusted very quickly. I know that we can sustain [such a risk profile] because of the specificities that I mentioned just before, but our capacity to sustain such risks has, over the years, created a huge laxity among our decision makers.

E   Are political Lebanon and economic Lebanon like two different planets?

First of all, I don’t believe that we have decision makers in [either realm]. This is unfortunate. If we take the current situation, the talent that we have is not represented in either field. If we talk about the commitments of CEDRE, for $11 billion, out of which $800-$900 million are to be grants, which translates into an average cost of these commitments for borrowing at market rates that is very acceptable to Lebanon. Especially since those funds, as per the [Capital Investment Plan] presented by the government, would cover major infrastructural bottlenecks as priority, which, once adjusted, cannot but improve the overall efficiency and competitiveness of the Lebanese private sector. [But] look how this issue is dealt with politically and economically. Still, I do not believe that it is a situation of harakiri.

E   Do you then fully believe that the banking sector is healthy and the monetary sector remains buffered in 2018 while the real economy is not doing well? Where, then, would the problem of our political economy figure into this picture?

If I want to be a bit more nuanced, I will say that the banks still enjoy a good standing but that one cannot say that banks are doing well. You cannot do well in a depressed and weak environment. But again, we have good standing, which is measured by the large size of the banking sector in comparison to the size of the economy. If the banking sector were smaller in size, any setback in the economy would translate into a more material [impact]. [Notwithstanding] the fact that [banks] have lent too much to the domestic private sector.

E   How high is the ratio of lending to the private sector today? The Lebanese Economic Monitor (LEM) mentioned that BDL-subsidized lending via banks created strong credit flows to the private sector between 2012 and mid-2018, saying that “by June 2018, the stock of outstanding credit to the resident private sector reached 99 percent of GDP,” and 130 percent to the resident and non-resident private sector. 

[The ratio] is 105 percent loans to GDP all in all, for the resident and non-resident private sector. But still, a ratio of 100 percent of loans to the private sector is too high. However, let’s talk about the situation in US dollars, because this is the real firepower of Lebanese banks. I believe, based on tables I prepared two or three weeks ago, that we have lent $40 billion.

At the end of August 2018, domestic deposits of Lebanese banks stood at $119 billion. Banks have provided loans to the private sector of $40 billion and have outstanding Eurobonds of $16.5 billion. This means that we have lent to the public and private sectors in Lebanon $56.5 billion out of $119 billion, which in turn means that we have $71 billion of operating surplus, which is placed with the central bank and with correspondent banks abroad. This is a huge amount. I am amazed when people point to our decreased deposit growth rate and ask what if banks are no longer capable of financing [the public and private sectors]—but our operating surplus today represents 1.26 times GDP. When people look at liquidity in terms of flows, we have decreasing trends in deposit growth, but this is on the background of an operating surplus of $71 billion.

E   Turning to the regional landscape and specifically to the exposure of two large banks, Bank Audi and BankMed, to the risk in the Turkish lira, the LEM said in October: “Any significant erosion of the capital base for the Lebanese banking groups” behind Turkish banks Odeabank, in the case of Bank Audi, and Turkland Bank, under BankMed, “will likely require intervention by the Lebanese central bank”—referring to the need for recapitalization by BDL. What is your response?

These are basic conceptual analyses. All banks have recovery resolution plans as per [Banking Control Commission] regulations. The central bank has intervened to provide liquidity, not to provide capital, because the main risk is liquidity, not capital. In response to this remark [on the possibility of capital adequacy issues at Turkish units of Lebanese banks], at the end of September, Odea had the highest [capital adequacy] ratio in the whole Turkish banking sector.

We did a stress test [using Basel III methodologies] that showed that we can sustain an exchange rate of 12.5 Turkish lira to one US dollar for our [Capital Equity Tier One (CET 1)] to fall below the 7.5 percent minimum requirement in Turkey. Even at the consolidated level, since the article that you are referring to said that the groups could be impacted because of Turkey, our stress tests show that in order to fall below minimum 10 percent CET 1, the Turkish lira should be above 10 TRY to one USD.  This [LEM comment on the Turkish exposure of Lebanese banks] is a conceptual theoretical report made by analysts sitting in a room somewhere and having very little interaction with what is happening on the ground. How can you make such a statement without picking up the phone and talking to someone at BankMed and Bank Audi to get info? Say what you want, but at least get information, listen, and educate yourself.

E   They did not call you?

Zero [calls].

E   So in summary, how do you see the Lebanese banking sector’s development in 2018 as compared with the rest of the economy?

It is not about trends. It is about performance. This is different. I do not see any major weakness, but I see that we can do more and achieve more, in terms of turnover and results of operations for the banking sector.

E   How about Bank Audi?

We have released our results, and there is some paradox in achieving such important results. I mean, when you achieve a 20 percent year-on-year [increase in net profit after tax before accounting for results of discontinued operations in the 2017 income statement] for the first nine months in your main markets, under the current operating conditions in these markets, people say: “What is this?” But when you go into details, you see that we launched, almost two years ago across the group, a performance management strategy. Turkey was the trigger [for implementing this].

This strategy aims at derisking, deleveraging, and rebalancing our balance sheets in our main markets from foreign currency exposures to local currency. This has translated into an important overall decrease in our risk-weighted assets and has been triggering the improvement in our capital adequacy ratios, but not to the detriment of our bottom lines. In our rebalancing, we let go of opportunistic big tickets from depositors, which were highly priced and not stable. We are trying to replace them with more granular customers, and we also did not renew many of our maturing loans to non-core or non-prime relationships in terms of providing the group with ancillary business. This has translated into reducing our size in Turkey—the size of Odea—from close to $11 billion to approximately $6 billion. Out of these $5 billion [in the reduction of assets in Odeabank], probably 60 percent is due to exchange rate depreciation, but there [is] $2-3 billion of real derisking and deleveraging. We also have rebalanced our loan portfolio toward local currency lending instead of foreign currency lending.

E   Only in Turkey or also in Lebanon?

This was in Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon, but the bulk was in Turkey; this has allowed us to sustain almost the same level of daily net interest income in Turkey, despite the fact that the size of the business has shrunk. Thus the first reason behind those important results is improved topline net interest income. Our consolidated spread in the first nine months of 2018 improved by almost 40 basis points (bps) with respect to the corresponding period of last year. This has been generated by improved spreads in Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt. It is not coming just from one geography.

The second point to note in relation to the performance management strategy is the cost efficiency measures which have been implemented. We have shown 20 percent increase in profits. When you look at our operating expenses in the consolidated nine-month 2018 results, they decreased [year-on-year] by $80 million, out of which probably 25 [million] are due to depreciation of the Turkish lira, because of the resulting shrinking in the counter value of the cost base. The remaining [reduction in operating expenses] is real cost savings in Turkey of $30 million and from Egypt and Lebanon, too.

We also have improved NIM [net interest margin] from $780 million to $907 million, so we have $127 million of additional topline, and we have $80 million of reduced cost. Our profits increased by $68 [million] because we had $80 million of additional taxes with respect to new taxation of banks, mainly in Lebanon, comprised by the tax on deposits and the increased income tax. The remaining was $40-50 million in additional provisions—this is real recurring [income] driven by the performance management where people [in the bank] are focusing much more on sustaining the quality of existing loans instead of granting new loans on a daily basis and revising yields on loans with respect to operating environments in each market. We are trying to reduce the cost of deposits not by decreasing [deposit interest rates], but by letting go of opportunistic big tickets—this translates into savings [for the bank], while we are also increasing the more granular base of small depositors.

E   Did the cost of deposits in Lebanon go up significantly after the extension of high interests for long maturity deposits? 

By end August, we had $120 billion of domestic deposits in Lebanon [in the banking sector]. Bank Audi is always lower, although we launched 15 percent [interest] programs for deposits of five years. We did maybe $500 million or $600 million [of such long-term deposit contracts with high interest rates] and probably other banks did the same, whereas you have the equivalent of $54 billion in local currency deposits. So if there was $1 billion [out of these $54 billion], this is a small margin [of the total deposit portfolio in the sector].

Look at three-month LIBOR. The average cost over one year increased by 60 bps whereby the benchmark rate increased by 1 percent year-on-year, from 1.32 percent to 2.32 percent. This means we are paying less spread with respect to the benchmark, despite the fact that the costs [in the form of interest on deposits] are increasing, and stand at 4.2 percent today. I would not be surprised if they reach 4.5 by December. But can you imagine that if you make a big ticket deposit, say $5 million over three months, in whatever large global bank today, they will give you 2.6 or 2.7 percent?   

My main message is that Lebanese banks—assuming [for this exercise] that they would be a single bank—today are capable, despite all that we are witnessing in the country, to sustain a deposit base of $120 billion at 4.2 percent. This represents less than a 2 percent premium over what leading global banks are paying [as deposit interests]. This speaks for itself.

December 18, 2018 0 comments
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BusinessComment

Outlook and potentials in the Lebanese insurance sector

by Nadine Habbal December 18, 2018
written by Nadine Habbal

Regional geopolitical turmoil and ensuing economic uncertainties continue to place increasing pressure on the insurance sector. Stagnation in most of the sectors of the national economy is reflected in slower growth in premiums written by Lebanese insurers, and higher strain on profit margins.

In light of this, the Insurance Control Commission (ICC), which is the regulatory authority for the supervision and control of the insurance sector, reporting to the Ministry of Economy and Trade, forecasts growth rates in 2018 of -7 percent for life insurance, driven by lower new business and little activity on mortgage and personal loans: -4 percent for motor insurance also driven by lower new business; and -1.7 percent for property and casualty insurance. The stagnation in property and casualty lines is directly correlated with the economic situation in the country, which is witnessing little activity in terms of new projects, transportation, and other similar activities.

The downtrend in the above business lines is juxtaposed with an important expected 16.1 percent growth for medical insurance, triggered by an anticipated increase in the number of persons insured following the recent implementation of Decision 186/ICC, pertaining to the guaranteed renewability of medical insurance products.

As such, the expected gross written premiums in 2018 should reach $465 million for life insurance, $365 million for motor, $560 million for medical, and $270 million for the property and casualty lines, for a sector total of around $1.66 billion, a growth of 1.2 percent when compared with 2017.

The mitigation of the challenging economic conditions requires increased focus on innovation in terms of products, services, and operations in the broad sense. Large segments in personal and property lines remain weakly insured, if at all. The sector is yet to show a marked commitment to innovation, despite serious but sparse initiatives.

Digitalization is still largely shy; while it imposes an understandably complex path, it remains a necessity if the sector wants to benefit from the present challenges and prepare for coming growth opportunities. Digitalization needs to be considered at different levels of the insurance operations, starting with distribution and going all the way through to financial reporting. Embarking on this path will undoubtedly foster significant improvements to the core administration systems, enhancing the data quality and enabling advanced pricing and risk management techniques to be deployed.

Good governance and transparency play a major role in this proposed scenario, as they provide the guarantee that an institutionalized and rigorous approach to capacity building and innovation can be deployed. In other circumstances, shareholders would be highly reluctant to provide the support needed to boost innovation through digitalization or other creative ideas.

The ICC is progressively deploying a framework that would help the sector to pursue new avenues. The rollout of this framework started several years ago with enhanced reporting transparency, through annual report statistics, providing stakeholders with an enriched perspective on what is going on with the sector. Risk-based capital would be the next major step, reinforcing the financial condition, and establishing a scientific context within which insurers would have to manage their underwriting, investment, and credit strategies to reach an optimal setup.

In this context, one of the ICC’s focuses is its service tasked with providing Lebanese policyholders with adequate assistance and consultation for complaints related to insurance policies and services. Launched in 2018 under the name “ICC Care,” this service’s uptake by policyholders is already showing the importance of ICC Care’s growing role in the resolution of misunderstandings and complaints. At the time of writing, the ICC is preparing the launch of an extensive awareness campaign related to ICC Care, targeting the insured population holding individual or group medical insurance coverages. This is essentially an extension of the social media efforts that were initiated recently. The latest announcement related to the commencement of Lloyd’s direct activity in Lebanon via cover-holders is reflective of the ICC’s efforts in this perspective.

On a separate note, the ICC is using its website and social media to keep the public informed about the implementation and implications of Decision 186/ICC, which is related to the guaranteed renewability of medical insurance contracts for individuals and groups. For instance, the ICC published a list of insurance products that have received the ICC pre-approval, and introduced a number of infographic slides that summarise the key features of this decision.

As a concluding remark, I would like to restate that the insurance sector in Lebanon has an excellent opportunity to build itself into a natural platform for insurance in the Levant region. This is within our reach, and we all need to strive toward this objective in a disciplined and cooperative way.

December 18, 2018 0 comments
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BusinessComment

The financial situation in Lebanon

by Marwan Barakat December 18, 2018
written by Marwan Barakat

This has been a difficult year for the Lebanese economy, sectors of activity, and financial markets at large. Compounding matters, political uncertainties have grown, especially during the second half of 2018. This year has witnessed a low real GDP growth, which Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, estimates at 2 percent and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates at 1 percent. The Lebanese economy needs to grow at no less than 6 percent annually to ensure sufficient job creation to meet the annual demand for jobs by the estimated 30,000 Lebanese joining the labor force each year.

The BDL coincident indicator, a gauge of real sector activity, demonstrated over the first nine months of 2018 a growth speed at half that experienced during the same period in the past five years. The evolution of real sector indicators suggests that almost all economic sectors experienced additional weaknesses this year.

As for financial markets, inflows reported a net contraction this year, weighing on deposit growth, which, though still positive, reported one of its lowest performances in recent years.

The growing political uncertainty over the past year, driven by the delay in cabinet formation, adversely impacted economic conditions in four main ways: (1) Adverse effects on private investment driven by the postponement of investor decisions amid growing uncertainty; (2) Adverse effects on public investment in infrastructure through the non-materialization of CEDRE pledges and the ensuing risk of losing them; (3) Adverse effects on the awaited fiscal reforms to curb Lebanon’s elevated debt and deficit ratios; and (4) Adverse effects on capital inflows that are sorely needed to finance the country’s external deficits.

While the above factors are quite meaningful, the real economy, which slowed down further over the past few months, has not yet fallen into a recessionary trap, as evidenced by a persistently positive—though low—growth rate. This is tied to the quasi-resilience of private consumption, the continuing support of the large Lebanese diaspora, and the stable domestic security conditions in a region characterized by instability.

Macro forecasts for 2019 are based on a 2.5 percent real GDP growth forecast (with 6 percent nominal growth) on the assumption of a successful cabinet formation, along with slow progress in CEDRE reforms and implementation. Nominal growth will be driven by factors that diverge significantly from one another. These factors, as conditioned upon the positive assumption of government formation, will be: (1) A 6.5 percent domestically-driven growth in private consumption; (2) Likely stagnation of private investment at 2018 levels amid politico-economic uncertainties weighing on private investors initiatives; (3) A 24 percent growth in public investment from a relatively low base within the context of the state’s new Capital Investment Plan; and (4) A 14 percent growth in exports on the basis of the recent reopening of Syrian/Jordanian routes for Lebanese land exports (mainly the Nassib border crossing).

In parallel, money supply (M3) will grow by 4 percent on the back of an 8 percent growth in financial inflows that will generate an almost equilibrated balance of payments. It will generate, at the banking sector level, a $7 billion growth in deposits, of which circa 30 percent would be in Lebanese lira and the remaining in foreign currencies.

I do not foresee financial instability in 2019. This expectation comes on the back of strong monetary and financial buffers related to large hard currency (FX) reserves (standing at 80 percent of domestic currency money supply) and abundant bank liquidity (standing at 50 percent of FX deposits).

Elements of positive financial reality notwithstanding, the most significant challenge facing the government is to address the public finance imbalance that today represents the most significant vulnerability in the economy. With the public debt ratio expected next year to exceed 150 percent of GDP (the third highest worldwide) and a fiscal deficit ratio of 10 percent of GDP (in the top ten globally), adjustment reforms are now sorely needed to ensure the soft-landing of the Lebanese economy.

These much-needed reforms include spending rationalization through severe austerity measures, raising domestic resource mobilization, improving tax collection, fighting tax evasion, and reforming the electricity sector, along with a series of growth-oriented measures that aim to improve the overall business environment in Lebanon.

While exits still do exist and require tough economic choices on behalf of policymakers, Lebanon no longer has the luxury of delaying the long-awaited adjustment reforms. Having said that, a tangible advance in reforms, along with the thorough implementation of the CEDRE pledges to finance infrastructure spending, could create positive catalysts that would move Lebanon from an era of widening macro uncertainties to an era of gradual containment of risks and threats, as a prerequisite for economic recovery and the corollary re-alignment of growth with Lebanon’s long-term potential.

December 18, 2018 0 comments
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BusinessOverview

Lebanon’s banks remain stable, seeing moderate growth

by Thomas Schellen December 17, 2018
written by Thomas Schellen

Socioeconomically, Lebanon at the end of 2018 gives the appearance of having experienced a year of only two seasons: an overlong Carnival of political absurdities, and a Halloween of economic horrors. As opposed to the usual cycles of tilling, seeding, ripening, and harvesting, these two seasons of 2018 were profoundly unproductive.

If this failure of productivity has led the country to deteriorate in popular perception into a haunted house with many vacant dwellings, the financial sector nonetheless remains the top-performing attraction in the house of Lebanon. In this sense, banking looks like a huge, flattering, magical mirror right in the hallway of this haunted house that affords those who look into it the best possible reflection of the national economic reality.

International observers, local economists, members of the business community, and broad swaths of the population appear unanimous in their view of the banking sector as the remaining primary motor of the Lebanese economy.

At the same time, however, there are also strong opinions that target banks are at fault for any and everything: from operating as an oligarchic sector and being politically exposed to standing in the way of genuine and equitable economic development.

On yet another perception frontline, views of the banking sector as healthy and pivotal for Lebanon’s economic sustenance are juxtaposed by widespread perceptions that the banks are unfairly siphoning profits away from society (although they are carrying large and increasing tax loads), and growing fears that the course of the monetary system, and the entire banking sector, is either unsustainable or could even comprise a large risk factor in an alleged trajectory toward a crash landing of the Lebanese economic system.   

Focus on the data

Compared with the adrenaline rush and emotional thrills that are triggered by horror scenarios like a warning of impending economic doom for Lebanon by way of a currency devaluation or other shocks, a review of the numbers is outright boring. Not only is such brain work inherently tedious, but could be unwelcome to Lebanon’s populists because the analysis of data variations and ratios in the national banking system go a very long way toward tempering any irrational impulse of flight, submission and resignation, unqualified complaint, or blind outrage.

On the upside, a look at the data can sober a person. Taking account of data in general, and of Lebanese banking sector data for 2018 in particular, is not conducive to generating panic. Rather, it is an outright antidote to such outbreaks when examining banking data with a view to economic forecasts on near-term horizons. However, assumption-heavy data speculations over the medium and long term cannot safely be preferred over the reading of coffee residues, tarot cards, or palms.

In 2018, the latest observations by Lebanese financial consultancy BankData available at time of this writing continued to report moderately encouraging growth in banking activity.

According to BankData, assets of the group of 15 Lebanese banks with deposits above $2 billion (alpha banks) grew by 7 percent over the first nine months of 2018, from $232.8 billion in December 2017 to $249.2 billion. At the funding level, the alpha banks’ domestic deposit growth in the period was $3.6 billion, translating to 2.3 percent. Albeit acknowledging that this increase was noticeably below the $6.9 billion growth in the first nine months of 2017, and also lower than the average growth of $5.4 billion in the same period over the past five years, BankData consultants pointed to the environment of political uncertainty. They explained that overall deposit growth was to 72 percent in foreign currency and to 28 percent in Lebanese lira, raising the dollarization ratio of domestic deposits to 67.7 percent in September 2018.

Juxtaposed to lending developments in 2017 as well as lending trends over the past five years, which saw loans to the private sector grow in the first nine months by $1.7 billion and $1.2 billion respectively, the nine-month period in 2018 saw loans to the private sector contract by $1.1 billion, driven by a contraction in private sector loans denoted in a foreign currency. Other data observations by BankData point to increasing average costs of funds for alpha banks in Lebanese lira and in foreign currency by 43 and 24 basis points (bps) respectively, which the consultancy noted was below the rise in the US benchmark rate.

Net contraction of lending portfolios and the imposition of added taxations on banks were reflected in declines of net profits for the alpha banks, even as they increased their efforts to control costs. According to BankData, net profits at the end of September contracted by 13.8 percent overall and 9.7 percent in domestic terms. “As such, alpha banks posted declining profitability ratios, with an annualized return on assets ratio of 0.94 percent against 1.17 percent over the same period last year, and an annualized return on equity ratio of 10.48 percent (11.43 percent for return on common equity), against 12.65 percent (14.01 percent for return on common equity) over the same period last year,” the consultancy said, adding that banking in Lebanon is “showing no sign of caving in, despite an accumulation of domestic economic stresses and external pressures.”

Asset utilization and net operating margins of alpha banks saw declines and overall performances in 2018 and clearly lag behind those of earlier, more glorious periods of growth. However, this is not what one should see as a field littered with macro-economic mines on hair-triggers, especially when assessed in context of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, given its orientation and proven track record as a defender of stability and confidence.

Neither the historic nor present levels of BDL’s hard currency reserves lend credibility to mental assumptions by international banking analysts that the central bank would ever choose to fund the external financing gap purely from its own FX reserves. This would continuously degrade the domestic money supply (M2) to a mere 10 percent by the end of the period over five years between mid-2018 and mid-2023, as a December 2018 report by investment bank Goldman Sachs speculated. 

In light of realities, it does not seem appropriate to flatly buy into the twin assumptions by Goldman analysts that, over the next few years, capital inflows to Lebanon will fail to pick up from the 3 percent range of autumn 2018 while the country’s external balance sheet will continue to deteriorate. Predicated on those assumptions, the analysts wrote: “We believe it is only a matter of time before the BDL’s ability to maintain the peg will be widely questioned.”

Contrasting such ‘ifs’ and generally extreme assumptions, there are innumerable signals that the need for reform and the limitations of the (working) tool sets in BDL and commercial banks are increasingly understood across all levels of Lebanon’s monetary and financial decision making, and are even understood by fiscal policymakers. With this in mind, it is prudent to realize that the short-term perspective for the Lebanese banking sector is certainly not littered with risks and red flags anywhere near the extent that the Lebanese natural environment is littered with garbage and exposed to pollutants. 

Further domestic and

international contexts

The relative health of the Lebanese banking sector is accentuated in the overall financial markets picture when one expands the consideration to the domestic financial sector and the year’s challenges on emerging markets on the internal and external vision axes respectively.

First, however, any analyst of the banking sector in relation to the whole economy is well-advised to be cognizant of the dangers that come with the sector’s disproportionate role. Namely, there is a danger that policy decision makers look into the banking mirror and forget the need to be prudent in fiscal and economic reform decisions, along with the danger that bankers and their allies might be so over-awed when looking at their own images in this flattering mirror they become desensitized to the needs of the little players in the real economy. In the financial markets, the insurance and capital markets of Lebanon did pirouette through 2018 with less vigor and performance than banking.

International conditions and shifts in the world economy in the course of 2018 were perhaps to the greater or smaller advantage of advanced markets, but the same cannot be said when one considers the pressures that emerging economies and many small countries in the third world were exposed to. From the rising tide of trade conflicts affecting the largest emerging economy, China, and political uncertainties that have been prone to affect developed economies, who for decades had been insulated from heavy domestic and external political shocks, to the currency pains for financially exposed emerging markets that accompanied the normalization efforts of the Federal Reserve in the United States, disruptive impulses radiated throughout the global economy in 2018.

What could be easily overlooked in this regard is that Lebanon, despite its self-induced problems, handled itself not at all badly when compared with larger regional neighbors like Egypt and Turkey in terms of currency pressures, or with similarly sized or positioned countries in terms of income bracket (high middle-income) or their sovereign and financial credit risk ratings.     

On the domestic financial economy, the sole underwriting segment of the insurance sector with strong positive outlook for growth as measured by premiums development in 2018 is the medical business line, largely owing to changes relating to guaranteed renewability of medical insurance contracts and improved coverage continuity of employed persons who reach retirement age. Overall, it seems that insurers in Lebanon are faced with enduring international industry challenges, such as the need for digitization, and local ones related to the improvement of insurance awareness and acceptance.

Performance expectations for Lebanese insurers in 2018, apart from the medical line, are at best modest, and reported financial developments leave room for questions. This is even more so the case when the high inflation rates in 2017 and 2018, by local standards, are taken into consideration in conjunction with the sector’s total premiums in 2017—a year in which the sector according to the Association of Insurance Companies in Lebanon (ACAL) achieved written premiums of $1.636 billion, reflecting an increase by 3.45 percent from the previous year—and in 2018, where the Insurance Control Commission (ICC) expects negative growth in life insurance premiums alongside stagnation in the property and casualty lines. The ICC sees this as correlated with the economic situation in the country, and the anemic situation in many sectors.    

The picture turns still a few shades darker when looking at the 2018 “performance” of Lebanese capital markets, namely the market capitalization and trade volume developments at the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). Total trading volume at the BSE for the first 11 months of 2018 was $349 million, more than 36.5 percent lower than in the first 11 months of 2017. In that period, the total trading volume was $551 million (after having experienced a similar annual weakening from a multi-year high of $885 million in trading volume during 2016). With the market cap hovering up to $1 billion below the $10 billion line in 2018, the BSE represents less and less financial market fire power when one regards its market cap as a share of the official Lebanese GDP that amounts to more than five times this value.

“The anemic performance of the Beirut Stock Exchange stems from two main reasons,” Lebanon’s Capital Market Authority (CMA) tells Executive in response to emailed questions. “First, its current legal structure, which represents a public company that reports to the Ministry of Finance. Second, the rising economic uncertainty and political landscape in Lebanon has dealt a blow to the Beirut Stock Exchange.” CMA also expresses optimism that current “circumstantial performance of the BSE” would return to average performance levels seen over the past seven years, noting that fundamentals of companies listed on BSE have not changed and that the book value of many of these companies—most of which are banks—is higher than market prices of these stocks near the end of 2018 (to the chagrin of bankers).

While mirroring in the first instance the investor perception of listed assets, a fatigued stock market might also be an alert to imbalances in the functionality of the entire economy. The general consideration is that a highly valued or possibly overvalued securities environment is reached when market capitalization at national exchanges equals 120 or more percent of a nation’s GDP and that anything below 50 percent is an indicator of undervaluation of listed companies and the whole market. This could even signal some degree of dysfunctionality of capital markets or a drag on economic development, with the reasoning that highly functional financial systems facilitate better usage of economic growth potentials in economies by enabling the best investment opportunities to receive optimal funding.

Moreover, research conducted since the global financial crisis of 2008 has suggested that stock market performances in emerging markets contribute importantly to economic growth in these economies. Other research has noted that rich countries with large equity markets in relation to their GDP also have high standards of living, while underpowered capital markets tend to correlate with countries underperforming in terms of economic development.

When taken as mirrors of the real economy and signalers of good or ill health in the national context, the persistent and growing disproportionality of the Lebanese banking sector and the other pillars of the financial economy reinforces the acknowledged fact that a continuation of the financial and, by implication monetary, practices of the past quarter century cannot continue indefinitely, and that a reboot, invigoration, and rebalancing in the financial economy deserves a near-term higher ranking on the national to-do list than discussions over currency stability and parity.   

The weather is changing

International economists’ collective crystal balling on the coming year is comforting in that, whatever really comes to pass in the global economy in 2019, pressures and national worries are not going to be limited to Lebanon. In a poll of some 500 economists and economic analysts around the world taken by Reuters in September/October of 2018, expectations on a majority of the 44 economies covered in the poll were for unchanged or downward GDP growth rates and unchanged or increased inflation in 2019. By analysts and economic media, the specters of bear markets and recession were raised under questions of when, not if.

Hinting to already materializing risks in the global economy was, for example, the director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, when she said just in advance of the IMF-World Bank’s convening in Bali for annual meetings in October that it has become more difficult for most countries to deliver greater prosperity because the “global economic weather is beginning to change” when compared with spring of 2018. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook at the same time admonished in further detail that “downside risks to global growth have risen in the past six months and the potential for upside surprises has receded.”

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also voiced its concerns in an economic outlook in November. “As central banks progressively, and appropriately, reduce their liquidity support, markets have started re-pricing risks as reflected by the return of volatility and the decline of some asset prices,” the OECD observed.

Pointing to reversing capital flows away from emerging to advanced economies, especially the United States, the report noted the increase of political and geopolitical uncertainty in Europe and the Middle East, along with highlighting the uncertainty caused to businesses by heightened trade tensions and the risk that these tensions could be “disrupting global value chains and investment, especially in regions tightly linked to the United States and China.”

In this broad context of under-optimistic global forecasts for the coming year, trade confrontations between large economic powers, and oil price developments, there is naturally  room for nuances in such a vast and challenging landscape of expectations. For example, in its outlook on global markets, Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BofAML), in a research report published in December of 2018, expects 2019 to see “modest gains in equities and credit, a weaker dollar, widening credit spreads, and a flattening to inverted yield curve.” The research team thinks this will translate into a tighter squeeze on liquidity that would likely contribute to higher levels of volatility.

Besides a continuation of late-2018 bear vibes in the US securities markets and a slowing of the US economy overall, BofAML expects global profit growth to decline and global economic growth to decelerate amidst global monetary policy divergences and a weakening dollar. Alongside a “modestly positive” outlook for commodities and projections of strengthening euro and yen, the research team opines that the outlook for emerging markets in this scenario is broadly positive, as EM assets are “cheap and under-owned.”

For the economy of Lebanon—which is neither overly correlated with other emerging markets nor typical by profile—it is not necessarily a bad thing that prominent expectations for geo-economic developments in 2019 are accompanied by narratives of impending risk and uncertainty. It will perhaps be more important that the latest global outlooks have room for factors such as less upward interest rate action by the Fed, and a relaxation of oil prices. Both factors might contribute to relieving external financial pressures on the Lebanese state.    

Much more meaningfully, on the domestic front, the potential for improvement has a numerical advantage at the end of 2018. Possibilities of grave shocks always exist, but the hopes for stability have a stronger currency.

Encouragement and room for positive expectations come, for example, from the impact that political constructiveness—a formation and great performance leap on the government level—would have on public investment growth and for financial inflows. News of the past few months have been actually pointing to improvements on some infrastructure fronts such as the PPP outlook, as elusive as parts of it still looks today, and on the internet connectivity side.

Nota bene, one of the side effects of the superb strength of Lebanon’s banking sector as a distorting mirror attracting attention in the economy, is that other aspects of the financial economy, such as development of capital markets and the microfinance industry, can be overlooked and left behind. That is unfortunate, as demonstrated by a report on the current state of stock markets around the world,  published in December 2018 by the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). The report explains how international portfolio investments can be attracted to exchanges in emerging and frontier markets, and how these can then contribute to economic development.

Necessary factors to this development, according to WFE, include adoption of reporting standards (such as IFRS), encouragement of English-language corporate disclosures, and implementation of elevated corporate governance practices. Stating that “the greatest predictor of foreign inflows into emerging markets is emerging market equity returns,” the WFE report notes that an increase of domestic returns on equity by merely 1 percentage point can be associated “with a $24.4 million increase in monthly inflows” to the average market.

In capital markets, we have waited another year for hot news (as Executive expected in our 2017 year end issue). However, the CMA confirms that after having conducted a flurry of other constructive activity throughout 2018, in early December it finally issued its Request for Proposal (RFP) to launch its Electronic Trading Platform (ETP), which the CMA counts on to “significantly improve liquidity in the Lebanese markets, allowing Lebanese diaspora easier access to invest in Lebanon, and contributing to the growth of the economy.”

According to the CMA, the RFP sets the guidelines for developing the ETP and the securities allowed for trading on the platform and thus enables financial institutions that are interested in owning and operating the platform to apply for the license issued by the CMA.

“With the enhancement in the types of securities available for trading by local and international investors, we are certain that the Lebanese capital markets will regain their appeal and attract an enhanced private sector participation given the renewed opportunities that the ETP provides,” the CMA confirms—so, in short, there is finally something moving in regard to the BSE/ETP.

Elsewhere in the financial economy, BDL has sent new and positive impulses that actors in the small, but motivationally important microfinance sector see as encouraging and, along with the arrival of veritable Fintech initiatives in the entrepreneurship ecosystem (see Executive’s November report), some announcements hint at new and improved initiatives in regard to cybersecurity and at least further considerations of digital currency at the central bank level.

This leaves the big long-term task of banks upgrading themselves to contribute to the digital transformation of the economy and activate new thinking in ways that should help in bursting through many current mental and operational idiosyncrasies, barriers that have formed as collateral of the years, while banking was the only reliable engine of the Lebanese economy.      

December 17, 2018 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyNumbers & Figures

Infographics

by Ahmad Barclay & Jeremy Arbid December 17, 2018
written by Ahmad Barclay & Jeremy Arbid

 

December 17, 2018 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyQ&A

Ziad Hayek discusses new PPP projects

by Thomas Schellen & Jeremy Arbid December 17, 2018
written by Thomas Schellen & Jeremy Arbid

At the end of October, Executive interviewed Ziad Hayek, secretary general of the High Council of Privatization and PPP (HCP), to learn of proposed public-private partnerships. The HCP had organized stakeholder meetings to discuss public-private partnership (PPP) proposed projects. This interview primarily discussed two PPP projects that are now in the pre-planning phase—the expansion of the Beirut airport and a toll road plus highway extension. A third PPP project, discussed as part of a published interview with Hayek in Executive’s November issue special report on entrepreneurship, concerns the construction of a national data center.

E   Two projects—relating to Rafic Hariri Airport, the toll road and highway extension—have been officially mentioned as PPP projects that are underway.

The airport expansion project is to build Terminal 2. This is a longer-term plan for a new terminal and not about the immediate improvements planned for airport Terminal 1. This new terminal will be on your right-hand side if you are going to the airport. Just before you reach the main building, there is an open area on the right, where you nowadays can see some private jets parked. The project is to build a new terminal on this land and build the access roads to it [at an] estimated cost of about $500 million, and we are now at the stage where we have retained the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to advise us. The IFC selected [four] technical consultants and legal advisers, (yet to be announced). We had our kickoff meeting for this project [on October 22], where everybody came together, all the stakeholders in government as well as the consultants. Ministries—the Ministry of Public Works, the airport, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Middle East Airlines, Middle East Airport Services, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Defense, the Council for Development and Reconstruction—all the stakeholders were there. As of today [October 23], consultants are conducting separate meetings with each stakeholder to gather more information [for] a full-fledged feasibility study, which will include a transaction structure that we can present to the Council of Ministers for approval, at which time we would launch the process starting with requests for expressions of interest, receiving them, prequalifying companies, and then work with [the winners].

E   What is the planned timeline for this project?

We hope to be able to go to the Council of Ministers sometime in March [2019].

E   A second PPP project under consideration is a toll road from Dbayeh to Nahr Ibrahim including a highway extension from Khalde to Dbayeh, what can you tell us about this?

Our consultants are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The total project is more complicated [when compared with the airport project], because we have the [government] decree for expropriation of land for one segment of the [planned highway], but we need [the expropriation decree related to] the second segment as well for it to be a viable project. We are waiting for the new government to come up with that decree. What we have done in the meantime is to optimize the design of this road, which will go from Dbayeh to Okaibe, near Nahr Ibrahim. We optimized the design of this road and made sure that the road will have access points from all roads running from east to west that lead up the mountains in the Keserwan area. We also optimized the design to use tunnels as much as possible,  decrease the cost of expropriation, and make traffic flow more smoothly.

E   Is there already a map of the planned optimized route?

There is a map, but it is not an official document without the approval of the Council of Ministers. The planned road will be running through a tunnel under the mountain of Harissa. The total project, including the Beirut ring road which is supposed to run from Khalde to Dbayeh, has an estimated cost of about $3 billion.

E   Does this include the cost of expropriation of land for the two stretches of highway in Beirut and from Dbayeh to Nahr Ibrahim?

I am including everything in the cost. We are reducing the cost of expropriation by including tunnels, but these are expensive in themselves. The current [draft] expropriation decree covers Dbayeh to Nahr Ibrahim; what we are waiting for is the decree for the route from Khalde to Dbayeh. In this project, we think it will take some time before we can finalize the design because we have to do most of the design. Also, we need to do the expropriation of the land before we can award [the project]. We think it will be about three years before we can award [the project]. If we are lucky, we think construction can commence in 2022, with the road set to be completed in 2030.

E   In two large infrastructure projects in Lebanon that were carried out or discussed at the height of the national reconstruction in the 1990s, a very different toll road concept called Altoroc could not be financed with planned private sector participation. The rehabilitation and expansion of the Beirut airport involved late design changes, significant cost overruns, and arbitration with contractors Consolidated Contract Company and Hochtief. As cost overruns are always a danger with large infrastructure projects, what mechanisms can you deploy to counter such tendencies when contractors might bid low and deliver at higher prices when concepts are modified during the contracting period?

We have learned from international best practices, the way we designed the PPP law and our specialist PPP team. The approach is no longer about having a tender for project, awarding it to the lowest bidder, and then bringing in variation orders and all this stuff. [The approach] is slightly different now. First, we have a very strict prequalification process. Then we are sharing the information with all the stakeholders. In the case of the toll road, this involves municipalities and various ministries. From the design of the project, the selection of the prequalified companies, and then the involvment of all bidders in the contract, and by having the contract as part of the tender documents, we are making sure that all elements in the process lead to full transparency and the ability to do a good assessment of the proposals. Thus, it is not necessarily the lowest [bid] that will get awarded. You can have a low price and still lose the tender because of the way that company history, quality, and the other aspects are taken into consideration. There is no foolproof system, but I think with those control mechanisms we are improving the procurement a lot.

E   How are you distributing the risk between the public partner and the private ones?

It is exactly a partnership in risks. It is through this process of working with prequalified companies when you determine who is bearing what risk and [who] is best positioned to bear which risk. Generally, with this type of project, the private sector will bear the construction risk, the financing risk, [which includes the] interest rate and exchange rate [risk]. The government will bear the risk of tariffs [related to setting the toll rates], the risk of force majeure, airstrikes, and whatever security issues. There are so many things. When you are starting to talk about risks, the first impression is that there are two or three risks. In reality, there are 20 or 30 risks that you need to deal with.

E   How about the operational risk for toll roads, such as working with revenue projections that turn out to be wrong, as it has been seen in some countries in Europe in recent years?

About the toll road tariffs, traffic estimates are always the most difficult thing to deal with. But there are two things to keep in mind. One thing is that you cannot question your decisions. Each one of us will make decisions in our lives, and there is a saying that there is no wrong decision. When you make a decision, you are convinced that this is the best thing to do. To look back and say, ‘We screwed up, this was wrong,’ is fine. There is no shame in having gotten something wrong and we all do in our daily lives. There is shame in not doing your homework, in not considering all the variables and mitigating all the risks. So [in regard to the operational risk of estimating traffic forecasts and setting tolls], I want to say first that the onus is on us, and the private sector companies, to dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s. The second thing is that having a PPP project with a contract that is not flexible enough to deal with changes that will happen in the future, is a badly designed PPP project. PPP projects are meant to last for 20 and 30 years, yet no one has a crystal ball to determine what will happen. For example, now we may be working on a toll road but in 15 or 20 years, roads may be obsolete and we will be using flying cars.

E   Some very large multinational companies in the automotive sector are considering trends in automated driving, like autonomous delivery vehicles, as survival issues. Does this suggest that the operational risk in a toll road scheme today is daring from such perspectives?

It is daring. Your PPP contract has to be flexible enough to deal with uncertainty. We are not talking here about having rigid contracts where you end up having to go to court. There are provisions for discussions and arbitration mechanisms; flexibility needs to be built into the contract. Coming back to my point about how one should not be concerned over making the wrong decision but should do their homework, I would add that in case of a toll road, the thing to remember when people later criticize such a road and say there was an overestimation of traffic is that there was a decision made at some point in time whether we need a road or not. If we need a road, there is a cost. If you do it through normal procurement, the government is bearing all the risk. If you do it through PPP, the government is sharing the risks [with the private sector]. PPP will always be better, because you [as a government] are sharing the risks, instead of bearing all the risks yourself.

E   Does a successful partnership require goodwill from both sides, with potential asymmetries in mutual readiness to invest goodwill?

Sure. But that is all hypothetical. In practice, the question is, ‘Do we need the road?’ If we say, ‘We don’t need a road, we are fine with the current situation,’ then fine. If we say that, ‘Yes, we need a road,’ the question [for the government] becomes whether you build the road yourself or do it with the private sector. If you have the money to do it yourself, go ahead and do it. It is faster and it is cheaper financing-wise because the government borrows money [at lower rates] than the private sector. If you don’t have access to the money and still want the road, then you should work with the private sector and accept the risks while doing your best to mitigate these risks.

E   In regard to doing this homework, have you assessed extreme scenarios, such as radically decreasing amounts of traffic in 10 years because of shifts in mobility and traffic behavior?

We have not done the traffic assessment yet, and we don’t have that expertise. This is what the technical advisers will do. We will be relying on experts to do this. But I venture that the best thing one can usually do is estimate traffic increases based on population increases, urban development, and GDP increases, and then discount that [to allow for these predictions to be inaccurate].

December 17, 2018 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyFiscal policy

Lebanon’s financial woes are home spun

by Bassel F. Salloukh December 17, 2018
written by Bassel F. Salloukh

Much like Ebenezer Scrooge’s selfish deeds, Lebanon’s past monetary and fiscal policies have finally come home to roost. As 2018 ends, most Lebanese have but one haunting worry: What kind of economic showdown will 2019 bring? To answer these fears, we first have to look at how we arrived at this wretched economic condition that haunts our future prospects.

There is nothing magical about Lebanon’s present economic crisis. It is rooted in the ghosts of past economic visions and choices. The lopsided pre-war merchant republic was recycled, producing a postwar rentier economy anchored on largely nonproductive tourism, real estate, and financial sectors, regressive tax rates, and depressed wages. High interest rates were the price paid to stabilize the Lebanese lira and ensure a steady increase in bank deposits which, alongside remittances from an ever-growing immigrant population, were used to redress the country’s balance of trade deficit. Considered at the time a necessary short-term measure, this postwar economic philosophy rewarded investments outside the real economy and financed a way of life based on uber-consumption, allowing many Lebanese to live beyond their otherwise logical means. Consumption, rather than saving, became the Lebanese way of life—capital concentration took precedence over sound fiscal policies. Today, we are reaping the results of these past ghosts: 1 percent annual economic growth in 2018; a 6.2 percent average inflation rate year-on-year through July; $83.7 billion public debt as of August 2018 (compared with $3 billion in 1993); a total fiscal deficit at 8.3 percent of GDP through June of 2018; an ‘unsustainable’—as the World Bank keeps reminding us—debt-to-GDP ratio of 155 percent at the end of 2018, expected to rise to 166 percent by 2020; and a trade deficit of $11.7 billion through August 2018.

Alarm bells are ringing

This postwar economic model overlapped with a peculiar political economy incentivizing cronyism, an endemic corruption organically connected to the Taif Accord’s power-sharing arrangement with its massive sectarian redistributive policies and political mobilization along mainly sectarian lines. Nowhere is this more glaringly evident than in the predatory rent-seeking practices of the postwar political elite, a fiscal evasion gap of some $5 billion in 2017, the equivalent of 10 percent of 2017’s GDP, according to Bank Audi estimates, and the ballooning of the public sector’s workforce size and wage bill. Constituting some 300,000 employees in 2017 and representing 35 percent of GDP according to Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, the postwar public sector emerged as a source of political rent, part of the sectarian political elite’s ensemble of clientelist networks and strategies deployed to produce docile sectarian subjects. The result is a Lebanese state that looks nothing like the modern Weberian state, with its measure of institutional autonomy from private societal interests. Rather, it is an archipelago of patronage networks that sustains the political economy of sectarianism.

Most worrying today is the insouciance creeping into reactions to persistent International Monetary Fund and World Bank warnings pertaining to the gravity of present economic conditions. This is especially so if we try to peek into our future economic prospects. If we do that, we see three potential but alarming and overlapping trends: 1) increased pressures on BDL’s foreign exchange reserves; 2) a persistent balance of payments deficit exacerbating the country’s perennial balance of trade deficit; and 3) rising debt financing as a result of pressures to raise interest rates and a concomitant increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio which, at least according to analysis of one worst case scenario published in Al Akhbar in November 2018, may reach 215 percent in the next five years.

Now that we can see the specters of our future more clearly, will policymakers, much like Scrooge, see the error of their ways, and start thinking about how to address what is a glaring contradiction between existing monetary policies and the need to reboot the real economy beyond non-productive rentier structures? Will they realize that relying on unorthodox monetary policies to rectify predatory and populist postwar fiscal policies cannot continue indefinitely, especially given new geopolitical realities and emerging market pressures? And if they decide to embark on an economic restructuring beyond the freshman logic guiding the infrastructural projects presented at CEDRE, has anyone paused to think for a minute about how to spread across classes and sectors the inescapable pain and agony that comes with deep economic reforms, particularly the privatization of strategic public services?

It is axiomatic that the postwar political economy, with all its distortions, has now run its course. But to exonerate the average citizen from part of the blame is to miss how the sectarian system operates through a combination of material and immaterial incentives to obviate the emergence of alternative forms of interest-based identities and modes of political mobilization. It is high time we free ourselves from the ghosts of economic policies past, and start making the kind of difficult fiscal choices that can reverse the present meltdown, without torpedoing the livelihoods of the poor and disadvantaged. Anything else would be sheer humbug!

December 17, 2018 2 comments
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Economics & PolicyGender inequality

Rape subculture in Lebanon

by Mariam Shour December 17, 2018
written by Mariam Shour

The world over, legal systems are failing victims in cases of sexual violence and rape. In these cases, what should be a simple roadmap to justice takes twisted turns until the victim is blamed and the rapist is cleared. A mixture of lax laws and skewed perceptions of accountability often leave these victims shunned, shamed, and without recourse against their rapist.

Fueled by this harsh reality, ABAAD, a local nonprofit that seeks to empower the marginalized, launched the campaign #ShameOnWho in order to challenge the endemic victim shaming in Lebanese society. ABAAD is calling for more severe penalties against rapists—penalties that actually hold the rapists, not their victims, accountable for their actions.

Law and culture

Through a series of initiatives, including a viral social experiment video, a stunt at the Beirut marathon, and an immersive play open to the public, the organization grabbed much needed attention and debate on the issue. In Lebanon, one in four women are subjected to a form of sexual assault in their lifetime, according to ABAAD.

Rape culture is still very much prevalent both in the laws and the societal attitudes of Lebanon. Just last year, ABAAD’s ran a campaign that was successful in having article 522 of the penal code, which had allowed a rapist to escape punishment if they married their victim, repealed. However, women’s rights organizations argue that the repeal did not go far enough because there are other articles in the penal code that are interpreted in such a way that allow the rapist to escape ciminal charges.

That the previous Parliament would water down proposals from women’s rights groups is not surprising, given that in 2016—at a women’s rights conference, no less—then-Kataeb MP Elie Marouni brazenly stated: “There are certain circumstances where we need to ask ourselves if women have a role in pushing men to rape them.”

The blame game

These attitudes are not only reserved to parliamentarians. In ABAAD’s viral video, a young actress plays the part of a rape victim seeking help on the streets of Beirut. Those who respond to her are all members of the public, and it does not take long for the victim blaming to kick in.

The men and women in the video quickly excuse rape by commenting on the victim’s clothes: “My sister would never wear that,” or: “A girl going out with a guy, looking like that?”

Others make comments on her state of mind: “Are you on something? Did you take drugs? Are you drunk?”

Some make assumptions about her character: “Seems like she goes from one guy to another,” or “She looks like some random hooker.” 

And then there is the flat out victim blaming and shaming: “She’s just a slut,” “What does she expect?” “You’re embarrassing yourself, don’t let anyone know what happened.”

It is no wonder that rape goes unreported.

Society has placed all the blame on the victim, her clothing, her choices, her actions, and none on the perpetrator of the crime itself. These attitudes are insidious and can make women falsely believe they might have done something to provoke their attacker. Not only does this undermine the victim’s experience, it also gives rapists a free pass. No one is prosecuted, no one is punished—except, arguably, the victim herself.

But rape happens because of rapists. End of story. 

In a society that continues to feed and normalize rape culture, ABAAD’s efforts to break this vicious cycle will only be successful through joint efforts by the public and the government. Rape is a crime and it should be treated as such. It is time to judge the rapist, not the victim.

December 17, 2018 0 comments
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