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Economics & PolicyPPP Law

A partnership in risk

by Jeremy Arbid October 5, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

This summer, Lebanon ratified a new law enabling the government and private sector to share risk in investing, building, and operating infrastructure projects. The legal framework, known as a public-private partnership (PPP), encourages companies to provide services that the government cannot afford to deliver at efficient costs to end users (see article).

To understand the applicability of the new law and its potential, Executive met with Ziad Hayek, the secretary general of the Higher Council for Privatization (HCP), the public agency now responsible for coordinating new PPP projects with the private sector.

E   Lebanon has infrastructure projects that have had at least elements of PPP. What difference will the new law make?

We do not have PPPs that have worked out well. That was the main problem. PPPs are a very special type of procurement, and they really involve a dialogue about the sharing of risks and the mitigation of risks. And they’re done on the basis of the specification of outputs rather than inputs for a particular project. Instead of saying, ‘I want this project to be built by the private sector,’ you say, ‘I want this service to be provided by the private sector,’ so that’s output as opposed to input specification. It’s not a partnership in equity or investment. It’s not a partnership in revenue. It’s not a partnership in profits. It’s a partnership in risk. This is the definition of PPP.

Until now, PPP has been approached in Lebanon like normal procurement. It’s always been done wrong because there’s been a tender to find out the price—who is going to offer the lowest price. This is not what PPP is about. This is what we tried to do in this legislation: insist that from now on, PPP projects have to be subject to international practices in tendering. And the main aspects of that are, first, insistence on transparency because this is paramount for the success of PPP; and second, having an organ within the government that has the expertise to deal with PPP projects and with the private sector—the Higher Council for Privatization.

E   What role will the HCP play, as per the new law?

The HCP’s role is to assist the government in tendering projects that are PPP in nature. We’re still a small team; we’re in the process of drafting the Council of Ministers’ decisions that enable us to increase the size of our team, and adjust our budget so that we can cope with new responsibilities. We couldn’t do that until now because there was no legal basis for us to do this. Now there’s a legal basis for us to have these responsibilities. Until that is done, we have a very small team, so we cannot manage more than three projects at this point in time.

I’d like one of the projects to be related to infrastructure—most likely in transport—and one project to be related to public buildings because that, I think, will be one of the ways to introduce PPP to the nation. And the third project could be what we call people-first PPP, a project having a social dimension like a hospital, or school, or rehabilitating a sports facility, or something like that. But I don’t know what projects they will be. They will have to be presented by the ministries and agreed [to] by the HCP, which is not just me. The HCP [is governed] by a permanent ministerial committee. And I head the staff of that committee.

E   You’ve been the HCP secretary general for nearly 10 years, and the law was in draft form for nearly as long. In Lebanon, there really never is a clear path to legislating, but is there any reason that August 2017 was the month the PPP law was finally ratified by Parliament?

I think it has to do with the nature of PPP. First, it’s not a concept that’s easily understood by people. I faced a lot of objections. The public sector was like, ‘What, you want to let the private sector do such things? This is privatization.’ And the private sector was like, ‘Partnership with the government? You want a government representative to sit on the board with us? We’ll never finish with the  bureaucracy. No, we don’t want anything to do with government.’

It took almost three years to get people to understand [that] when we talk about PPP, no, we don’t mean mixed investment companies. We’re talking [about] the private sector providing a service to the government, which then provides that service to the citizens. And then it took us a long time to get the legal community to agree that it will not violate the constitution—because there’s an article that states [that] you cannot give concessions without a specific law—and [to agree] that PPP is not a concession. Then, it took time to get to the Council of Ministers, and then  [the government] changes all the time. Every time it was presented to cabinet, a committee would form to study it, then the government would change, and then we would wait for another government. Then it took a long time in Parliament.

E   As you put it, the HCP is now scaling up its institutional capabilities to advise the government, and it will take a lot of time to develop potential PPP projects. In doing so, what’s it’s interaction with the private sector?

Presenting a proper PPP offer or bid can cost upward of $1 million, versus the cost of around $10,000 when preparing a bid on a tender under normal procurement rules. [Under procurement rules], if the government is buying a power plant where it will determine all the variables and specify exactly what it wants, it will then offer a tender, and whoever gives the lowest price wins the bid. In this scenario, a bidding company will take the list of what the government is asking, make a few phone calls to get the pricing, add in a profit margin, and present the bid. It costs like $10,000, and if the process is not transparent, at the end of the day somebody wins the bid, but no one knows how; $10,000 is an acceptable cost of doing business when failing to win the bid.

[pullquote]“When we talk about PPP, no, we don’t mean mixed investment companies”[/pullquote]

In PPP it’s not like that. If I’m bidding on a power plant, I don’t know what the power plant is going to be—I just know that the government wants to buy the cheapest electricity possible. How am I going to produce it, and what technology am I going to use; how many turbines am I going to have; how much fuel storage will I use? Consulting firms for designing a power plant is not cheap, and then I have to sit and negotiate with banks because even if I have the same design as a competitor, if that competitor has financing at a quarter percent less than mine, they’re going to win. So I have to negotiate [with] the banks, and to do that, I need financial experts with me to structure the bid, whether this is going to have mezzanine financing or Islamic financing as part of the structure. These cost a lot, and it takes a long time, so when I present my bid, I’m not willing, if I’m a serious participant, to participate in a tender where I don’t know at the end of the day how the bid will be awarded.

E   Is the PPP law a first measure in this path to correction that needs to put in place, and are there other laws that you see could help the private sector flourish again? Regulations?

What makes me excited about PPP is that as you invest in infrastructure, you create jobs in large numbers. A major infrastructure project is going to employ thousands of people, and not all are going to be construction workers. You’re going to have accountants, managers, IT, architects, and engineers. And investing in infrastructure is, by definition, the basis on which you then build your economy. When you invest in infrastructure, you’re investing in things that are going to stay. We ran a study: If we invest $6 billion in infrastructure projects, how many jobs would we create? Our analysis showed—and it depends on the type of projects that you invest in—that we would create more than 200,000 jobs in five years’ time. That’s huge compared to the size of our labor force.

E   Lebanese banks and investors certainly have the capital, and maybe the appetite, to invest in infrastructure projects. Will the PPP law encourage their participation?

We will probably not see this in the first generation of PPP projects, but what I hope for future projects is listing on the Beirut Stock Exchange because then we’re going to be creating a snowball effect. Lebanese companies have, for decades, been obliged to generate capital internally. Having access to an efficient stock exchange to raise money you need means businesses could grow from the level of an SME [a small or medium-sized enterprise] to [the] level of a corporation. And if you’re a corporation, you can generate more jobs than you would as an SME: this is the snowball effect that I’m hoping PPP would start.

October 5, 2017 1 comment
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Cover storyOil and Gas

Lebanon’s fiscal conundrum

by Mona Sukkarieh October 5, 2017
written by Mona Sukkarieh

There are two arguments being made today. Both agree the state should maximize its share of benefit, though they do not agree on what is the maximum benefit achievable. Some aim for a bid round that is as competitive as more comparable bid rounds—while others demand a greater level of state participation.

While it is commendable to stand up for Lebanon’s rights, we would all be well advised to avoid misinformed populism. To put it simply, arguing Lebanon deserves a fair share implies the existence of a “share.” This share can only exist if the state contracts partners to explore for and produce potential resources. There are two parties to the deal; the terms must be attractive enough for both sides to commit to signing a contract. If no contract is signed the “share” vanishes, given the absence of indigenous capacity to conduct upstream operations.

Contrary to some claims, perpetuated by a political class that is struggling to manage expectations, current market conditions are unfavorable for Lebanon. The country’s offshore area is mostly deep and ultra-deep waters. Low oil prices since late 2014 means expensive exploration in Lebanese waters is unattractive at the moment. Companies must actually be persuaded to bid by Lebanon offering attractive fiscal terms.

Opponents of how Lebanon is conducting its first licensing round argue: (1) the model exploration and production sharing contract decree is in conflict with the 2010 offshore oil and gas law as it prevents the state from participating in the tender, distorting the system from an originally-intended production-sharing model to a profit-sharing model; and (2) the royalties and taxes, set out in the contract degree and tax law, are too low compared to a “global average.”

In fact, the 2010 offshore law explicitly says the Council of Ministers may establish a National Oil Company (NOC) “when necessary” but only “after promising commercial opportunities have been verified,” which rules out an NOC in the first licensing round as this cannot be verified ahead of exploration. Moreover, the state retains ownership of resources in the ground and a share of the produced hydrocarbons once the company recovers capital and operational expenditures, meaning Lebanon’s chosen model contract is a classic production-sharing system. The distinction some wish to establish between a production-sharing model and a profit-sharing model is non-existent.

As for the fiscal terms, comparing them to a “global average” may seem to lend an air of seriousness and professionalism, but in reality, it is closer to comparing apples to oranges given the diverse range of countries with oil and gas resources. These countries include legacy producers with resources located in a variety of environments and other aspiring producers. One cannot compare a country with proven reserves to a country where drilling has not yet begun. Similarly, one cannot compare countries or provinces where exploration is relatively cheap and easy to countries or provinces where it is expensive and complex. Finally, one cannot ignore Lebanon’s political risk, especially considering the country’s first licensing round is now slated to close more than four years behind its original schedule. These are all elements that affect how attractive a country is to foreign companies. One way to compensate for Lebanon’s relative disadvantage (i.e., no proven reserves in both a high-cost drilling and high-risk political environment) is offering attractive terms for potential investors.

A more coherent approach would entail identifying a group of countries or provinces with similar basins (deep-water offshore, and a more or less comparable status—early exploration or production activity). Ideally, we would also add other elements: A local market that is comparable in size and the existence of little or no export infrastructure, in addition to the sociopolitical environment. By comparing Lebanon to a “global average,” those making this argument have steered the discussion toward unreasonable demands and inflated expectations.

Future licensing rounds will not necessarily be governed by the exact same legal framework. Future exploration and production-sharing agreements (and the royalties included in them) will not necessarily be the same. Fiscal terms are not set in stone. Though regulatory stability is important, they may change in the future to adapt to new realities. Realism is key, whether now or in the future.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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Cover storyOil and Gas

Icing on the cake

by Matt Nash October 5, 2017
written by Matt Nash

It came at the last minute. For two years, the Ministry of Finance and the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA) have been drafting a tax law focused specifically on the oil and gas industry. In late September, Parliament approved it just in time for the law to potentially govern the first oil and gas exploration and production contracts the state hopes to sign during or before Spring 2018 (with bids due October 12).

Contract signature is not a given, but with the passage of the tax law, Lebanon’s oil and gas fiscal regime is finally complete. The new law is tailored for the oil and gas industry and imposes higher tax rates on oil and gas companies than it does on other corporations registered or operating in the country. Corporate income tax, for example, is set at 20 percent in the oil and gas tax law, as opposed to the 15 percent corporate income tax imposed by existing legislation (even higher than the approved but annulled hike to 17 percent).

The oil and gas tax law was initially slated for parliamentary debate in August, but lack of quorum scuttled the discussion. In early September, partially because the law had not yet been passed, the LPA recommended postponing the deadline for submitting bids in the country’s first offshore oil and gas licensing round from September 15 to October 12 (a new deadline officials insist will not change—see story page 16). Model contracts oil and gas companies will use to bid include a so-called stabilization clause, which protects companies from tax increases that come after contract signature. Stabilization clauses are common in the oil and gas industry as a way to hedge tax increase risk given that oil and gas exploration and production contracts typically run 30 years or more in duration. By passing the new oil and gas tax law before signing contracts, the state will increase its tax revenue under any contract, or contracts, signed as a result of the first licensing round.

Targeted tax language

As is common around the world, Lebanon’s new oil tax law is industry-specific, explains LPA board member Wissam Zahabi. Aside from a higher corporate income tax rate for the sector, there are other differences between this tax law and the standard Lebanese tax code. Some differences—such as an unlimited time period for carrying forward losses, as opposed to the three-year limit in the standard tax code—are incentives for the industry. Others, however, are designed to keep oil and gas companies honest when it comes to reporting costs and revenues (key factors that will impact the government’s overall take from potential future revenues from the sector). One example is enshrining the concept of “arm’s length” transactions in the oil tax law. This means transactions between related and affiliated companies are evaluated as if they occurred between unrelated entities in a freely competitive environment. Zahabi elaborates: “[Oil companies sometimes] don’t tell you their right price. Let’s say you buy it from an affiliated company for five, they’ll tell you for six. They’d like to inflate the cost. Or whenever they sell, they sell at a lower price, and they tell you higher. So it goes both ways for cost as well as for revenue. If it’s an expense, they have an incentive to say it’s higher, if they’re selling they’ll say they sold it at a low price to cash in more profit.” This is important because the government’s portion of revenues from the sector is directly related to the costs and revenues of their contractual partners, the oil companies.

Lebanon’s fiscal toolbox

Taxes are only one means of several the Lebanese government will use to capture revenue from the sector. Additionally, the model contracts impose a royalty on both oil and gas production. According to the contracts, the royalty on gas is set at 4 percent and the royalty on oil ranges between 5 and 12 percent based on the amount of production. Royalties can be taken in cash or in kind meaning oil companies either deliver the government oil and/or gas it can use, or sell on its own; they can give the state the requisite cut of commodities the companies sell on their own; or they can do a combination of both.

In addition to royalties and taxes, the government will have a share of hydrocarbon production as well. Like royalties, this share can be taken in cash or in kind, but unlike royalties, the share progressively increases over time. The government’s share is biddable in the model contracts and related to project cash flows. Deepwater drilling is expensive, and the time frame between incurring expenses (drilling) and realizing revenues (production) can stretch to several years. As is standard in the industry, Lebanon’s model contracts allow companies to recover their costs. Production-sharing “payments” from companies to the state (whether in cash or in kind) will be made quarterly. Each quarter, companies can deduct their costs from revenues and the contracts call for a recovery ceiling of 65 percent. This is a biddable item, so companies may well bid lower than 65 percent to produce a more attractive offer from the state’s perspective.

What this means is that until costs are recovered, every quarter that companies generate revenues from oil and/or gas sales they are able to “keep” at least 65 percent of those revenues, splitting the rest with the state. The initial split must be at least 30 percent, according to the contracts. This percentage, however, is also biddable, meaning it can be higher. The other two biddable fiscal components relate to the revenue split percentage after costs are recovered and the point at which this new percentage will be triggered (i.e., once costs have been recovered by a factor of 1.5).

A step in the right direction

Passing the oil tax law was important for the sector because it completed the fiscal regime. The government’s share of benefit from this sector comes from multiple sources—as is current international best practice—and having all of the rules in place from the start is wise from a regulatory perspective. There is still, however, a bit of work to be done in terms of passing a few implementation decrees so the law’s provisions are fully enforceable, Zahabi says. As for how the law stacks up against other global tax laws, Zahabi says the LPA hired consultants to help draft it, referred to OECD guidelines, and benchmarked Lebanon against eight other countries to produce the law. Passing it just weeks before bids are due, he speculates, will not have an adverse impact on how ready companies are to present their bids because they arguably saw this coming. “We’ve already done some presentations about it, so we gave them the general headlines,” he says.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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Agriculture

Show me the honey

by Nabila Rahhal October 5, 2017
written by Nabila Rahhal

Honey might not come to mind when thinking about Lebanese food products. But Lebanon has a deeply rooted history with the gold nectar; it was even mentioned in the Old Testament.

Though honey production may have receded from the forefront of the Lebanese agro-industry since the days of the Bible, it has garnered increased attention since 2012, thanks in part to international non-governmental organizations. And while a lot of work still needs to be done to further develop the honey industry, the past five years have seen many steps in the right direction.

Low cost investment

Beekeeping and honey production are considered to be businesses with relatively low barriers to entry. Nadine Chemali, technical director of marketing and exports at the USAID-funded Lebanon Industry Value Chain Development (LIVCD) project, says, “Our goal is to increase the income of people in rural areas. Honey is ideal for that, because it’s a low-investment project, and you don’t need to own land.”

Beekeepers in Lebanon move their hives three times per year, according to what is blossoming during that season: citrus trees in the spring, honeydew from oak trees in the fall, and wild flowers and thistles in the summer. Chemali explains that most beekeepers ask landowners for permission to place hives on their property, or work out agreements to share a percentage of the honey produced.

Investment in honey-making is also relatively low: The price of one beehive is just $200, according to the beekeepers interviewed for this article. Given that the current yield of a single beehive in Lebanon is around seven to 10 kilograms, and that honey is sold at an average of $33 per kilogram, new beekeepers can theoretically recoup their investment at a fast rate.

Kafalat, a Lebanese financial company that helps small and medium-sized enterprises obtain loans, helps honey producers access funding from commercial banks. A number of the beekeepers Executive spoke with say they have benefited from this program, which covers part of their initial investment, mainly into beehives, equipment, and small workshops.

Gentlemen beekeepers

In addition to the efforts of international NGOs to promote and grow beekeeping in Lebanon among rural families, an increasing number of personal investors have been developing honey production businesses over the past five years.

An architect by profession, Marc Antoine Bou Nassif founded L’Atelier du Miel in 2012  with his brother and a friend. “We wanted to reconnect with nature, and we started thinking of different activities to do that, but the one that really captured our goal was beekeeping, for a variety of reasons,” Bou Nassif says. “Most activities done with nature only connect you with one aspect of it: one season or one region. With beekeeping, it’s all of nature, and all seasons.” L’Atelier du Miel owns 2,000 beehives and works with eight beekeepers.

Roland Kaddoum, (no relation to Kaddoum honey brand) the director of pediatric anesthesia and director of the operating room at the American University of Beirut Medical Center, will launch Le Miel du Nazih by the end of 2017 in memory of his father, who was a reputable beekeeper, and because the activity brings him joy. Kaddoum owns 200 beehives with a yield of 900 kilograms.   

The number of beekeepers in Lebanon rose from 5,546 in 2011 to 6,340 in 2016, and the number of beehives increased from 194,520 in 2011 to 274,390 in 2016, according to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Climate change is here

Despite this growth, Lebanon’s average annual honey production is low compared to other countries. A beehive in France typically yields 40 kilograms of honey, four times more than the average Lebanese beehive. In 2015, when figures were last collected, Lebanon produced just 1,920 tons of honey, up from 1,360 in 2011. That same year, France, a medium-scale honey producer, produced 18,500 tons of honey.

Fady Daw, the founder of Adonis Valley—a Lebanese producer of organic food products, including honey—explains that yield has been low for the past three years because of the effects of our climate change on the environment. “Our dry season has become very long, and sometimes stretches from May to November, while in France, for example, it rains a whole lot more during this period. Also, temperatures in Lebanon are rising up to the 30s very early in the season, which is killing our flowers,” says Daw. Since bees rely on these flowers for their nectar, the high temperatures affect their ability to produce honey. Daw says that Adonis Valley produced a ton and a half of honey this year, slightly more than last year.

Maurice Habib, a longtime beekeeper who sells his honey in both Souk El Tayeb and the Earth Market, says annual production from his 600 beehives has dropped from an average of 16 tons five years ago to just four tons last year because of changes in the weather.

According to Chemali, many beekeepers have not have not formally studied their craft, and are unaware of how to increase the efficiency of their bees so that they naturally produce more honey, or how to make sure they all stay alive during winter. So LIVCD has provided training for 3,600 Lebanese beekeepers, and partnered with professionals to develop queen bees’ production centers to supply the beekeepers with better queen bees, which control their hives and protect them from diseases.

Wading in murky honey

Faced with such low yields, some honey producers resort to dirty tactics to increase their supply.

The most common trick is mixing Lebanese honey with a cheap imported variety—despite a $5 tax per kilo on imported honey, some honey can cost just $1 per kilogram—and selling it as pure Lebanese honey. “How do you compete with that? You can only do so if you continue to follow best practices despite losses,” says Habib, who hopes that his reputation will keep his customers loyal to him.

Oak honey, which is also known as black honey, is the most popular variety  among Lebanese, but it is also the one whose yield is decreasing the fastest. A popular trick to increase its volume, Daw explains, is to feed bees sugar or a synthesized syrup developed in China just before the onset of oak-honey season. The honey produced through this type of feed is then mixed with whatever oak honey is naturally produced so that its dark color is retained, and then sold as Lebanese oak honey. This is an accepted practice, but honey produced this way may have higher traces of sugar and less beneficial enzymes.

Other tricks include heating the honey to give it a looser consistency and more clarity, or exaggerating the amount of honey in jars for sale.

The buzz on quality

While such techniques are not life-threatening, consumers are cheated by being sold a lower quality product under the guise of a superior one—and they miss out on health benefits associated with the enzymes in natural raw honey. “The idea is that the consumer has the right to make well informed decisions about the product they choose. They may choose to buy the cheaper one despite the quality, because it is all they can afford. But you cannot sell the cheaper produced product as [as if it were] a high-quality one,” says Kaddoum. He says these issues motivated him to produce his own honey and prove that “high-quality, authentic, and clean honey can be produced in Lebanon.”

Small-scale honey producers are also affected. “Consumers cannot easily distinguish the difference between quality, well-produced honey and honey that has added sugar. They buy the cheaper one from the supermarket shelf believing they are the same Lebanese honey,” explains Habib.

In an attempt to combat this lack of awareness among consumers, some beekeepers are organizing educational workshops on beekeeping and tours of their beehives and production workshops. Both L’Atelier du Miel and Adonis Valley organize tours (Le Miel du Nazih will do so once their workshop is open), and L’Atelier du Miel is also providing classes.

Wayniyeh el Dawleh?

LIBNOR, the Lebanese standards institution that is a part of the Ministry of Industry, has set some basic standards for honey production that include limits for purity and freshness, assessed using eight simple chemical tests, and provisions on accurate labeling.

However, according to those interviewed for this article, these standards and other international ones only come into play for export markets, and are rarely—if ever—enforced in the domestic market. As Bou Nassif explains, standards are imposed locally only when a consumer makes a complaint through the Ministry of Economy’s Consumer Protection Board.

This leads to a chaotic market where consumers tend to not trust large local producers. Many still prefer to buy their honey directly from beekeepers in their stores or in the markets they exhibit in. (A growing number are buying local honey from organic or healthy-food boutiques due to its increased availability in such stores).

Daw explains that this model has its advantages because there is more accountability when dealing directly with the beekeeper. But he says basic business practices—such as labeling the jar with at least the name of the product, net weight, and contact information—are a must.

Bou Nassif advises consumers who want to buy honey directly from the beekeeper to do so only from those they trust and who have a solid experience in honey production, because inexperienced beekeepers may use antibiotics or pesticides that leave traces in honey.

A worthy product

According to Bou Nassif, Lebanon is one of the few countries where bees can feed naturally throughout the year. “We decided to produce different kinds of honey, and we discovered that in Lebanon we have a very special topography, which allows us, in a very small area, to produce honey all year long,” he says.

He goes on to explain that honeybees in Lebanon are polyfloral, which means they feed on a variety of blossoms in the same space, which is also relatively uncommon and adds more health benefits to the honey.

These characteristics make Lebanese honey high-quality. In 2016, LIVCD organized a national media campaign in collaboration with the Syndicate of Dietitians that promoted the health benefits and superior quality of Lebanese honey in the domestic market. Beekeepers applauded the effort, but Daw says that such campaigns are needed on a more consistent basis.

While Lebanese honey is exported in small amounts to the region, Bou Nassif says its quality can compete internationally, albeit at a boutique level with high prices. He proposes that Lebanon should take a leaf from Australia’s book and its promotion of Manuka honey.

Manuka honey is sold according to a grading system—the higher the grade, the more expensive it is—and Bou Nassif says the Lebanese honey industry would greatly benefit from a similar system that will incentivize beekeepers to produce high-quality honey. “I believe the best way to boost the honey industry in Lebanon is to promote the quality we have and communicate that in the region. This needs marketing at the level of the ministry, but when it has quality grading in place and communicates that well, we can sell honey at premium prices internationally,” Bou Nassif says.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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Automotive 2017OverviewSpecial Report

Drive … At your own risk

by Hani Bathish October 5, 2017
written by Hani Bathish

Our roads are unsafe. A large number of the cars on our roads are inefficient, polluting, and even dangerous to drive. Many go uninspected, as people thumb their noses at the law, and many more are cheap cars that were damaged and repaired badly, bought secondhand on the gray market. On top of everything else, our commercial-vehicle fleet is in desperate need of renewal.

The crisis we face is dire. It was instigated by a shortsighted government tax policy that financially incentivizes people to keep driving their old cars, and effectively discourages them from buying newer, safer, more fuel-efficient models through the imposition of a high tax on even the most compact and affordable vehicles.

What makes matters worse is the fact that the full implementation of the new traffic law continues to be hobbled by political cover for violators, expensive fines that the authorities balk at issuing, a failure to implement parts of the law concerned with training driving instructors, and a failure to impose measures that are designed to change driving behavior rather than impoverish drivers, like the points system and the suspension of driving privileges.

All these elements together contribute to a chaotic and dangerous driving environment in the midst of economically strained times.

A tax threatening our health and safety 

Selim Saad, advisor to the Automobile Importers Association in Lebanon (AIA), says that consumers can expect to pay as much as 43.5 percent of the price of a $9,000 car in taxes, between customs duty, VAT, mechanical tax, and registration fees. “And that’s before we add the dealership’s profit margin,” he says.

According to AIA figures, for a $25,000 car, a customer can expect to pay up to 59 percent of the price in tax, and for a $70,000 car, he or she can expect to pay 70 percent of its value in tax. “As of the end of 2016, we had 1.58 million registered cars on the roads in Lebanon—41.1 percent of them, or 739,000 cars, are over 15 years old; 681,000 are over 20 years old. Out of the total number of cars on the roads, 613,000 didn’t pay mechanical tax or go through periodic inspection to see if they were still roadworthy,” Saad says.

The tax burden on consumers looking to buy a new car is immense, and serves no apparent nor rational purpose—unless its aim is to keep polluting, unsafe vehicles on our roads. Emile Mabro, chief executive officer of the Kettaneh Group, the exclusive dealer in Lebanon for Audi, VW, and Skoda, says that paying $120,000 in tax on a $200,000 car is excessive. “Maybe the high tax policy was initially intended to limit the number of cars on the roads, [or] maybe it was intended to finance the government, but it has opened the floodgates to the gray market,” he says. The gray market, full of imported used cars of unknown provenance and concealed mechanical and electrical faults, has flooded the country with vehicles that have, as Mabro puts it, “issues.”

“This has created a supply of unsafe second-hand cars that is the direct consequence of the high tax and customs duty policy,” he argues. The main issue with the gray market, Mabro says, is that the origin of a vehicle cannot be traced, nor its driving history examined. Most are bought cheaply at auctions abroad and shipped in, some are flood-damaged or have been crudely repaired after being in an accident—problems not immediately apparent to the buyer, but which slowly emerge after intensive usage over time.

Polluting our lives

The government tax policy is flooding the urban ecosystem with deadly gaseous emissions. That is in effect what happens when aging, uninspected, inefficient, fuel-guzzling cars are allowed to drive on our roads, just so that the government can collect as much tax as possible in an attempt to balance its books.

Najat Saliba, a professor of analytical chemistry at the American University of Beirut, found in a 2011 study that vehicle emissions in Lebanon are six times worse than in California. “We measured emissions on the five-lane Jal El Dib highway, and we found 600 milligrams of particulate matter [mpm] per kilogram of fuel burned. When we compared that to the seven-lane I-110 highway in California, we found emissions to be 100 mpm per kilogram of fuel burned,” Saliba says.

“Our road vehicle fleet is emitting far more particulate matter. This is the fine particulate-matter emissions, which are directly correlated to deaths from cardiovascular disease, lung disease, and asthma,” Saliba says.

And it is not just the car market that the government manipulates through its policies—the quality of the fuel our cars burn is also subject to governmental oversight. As the AIA’s Saad notes: “Cars today are produced to meet Euro 6 emissions standards; unfortunately, the fuel used in Lebanon, whether petrol or diesel, is Euro 3 standard, which emits 500 parts per million [ppm] of sulfur.” He adds that LIBNOR, the Lebanese standards institution, has already issued Euro 6 fuel specifications, which require sulfur emissions to be reduced to a mere 10 ppm for both gas and diesel engines. “The law has been issued, but it needs an implementation decree,” Saad says. “It’s an important measure for health.” In the meantime, as we await implementation, we continue to breathe—at our own risk.

Road safety council

The National Road Safety Council (NRSC), which is headed by the prime minister, is the body entrusted with implementing all facets of the new traffic law. Ramzi Salameh, the director of the masters program in management of road safety at Saint-Joseph University, was appointed secretary-general of the NRSC by former Prime Minister Tammam Salam. Salameh says that the traffic law needs decrees of application to be fully enforced and effective, which means a lot of text and drafting. Most of that is under the purview of the NRSC.

To date, however, the council has met only twice: once in December 2015 and again in June 2016. The council is behind on implementing nearly every dimension of the new regulations. “The traffic law calls for the reform of training procedures for new drivers, and to make sure all drivers possess the knowledge, abilities, and attitudes needed for safe driving,” Salameh says. “To date, only the computer-based driving theory test has been approved.”

The part of the law concerning enforcement of fines and penalties does not need new texts or instructions to be enforceable. “However, the level of the fines needs further thorough study, as the legislature placed greater emphasis on the amount of the fine than on the means and procedures to deter drivers from breaking the law,” Salameh says. “[Internal Security Force] policemen have complained about the high value of the fines, which citizens may see as unjust, while at the same time political patronage plays a role in the failure to enforce the law.”

The points system, when implemented, would penalize consistently bad drivers who commit many traffic violations, eventually revoking their driver’s license after repeated offenses. “This system has not yet been put into force. The system is awaiting the implementation of the intelligent [biometric] license,” Salameh says.

A change of driving culture is needed

Salameh says there is a need for deep reform of the driving culture in Lebanon. “The culture here does not respect principles of good, safe driving. “We need a cultural change, a change in mentality on how to use the roads, how to share the roads with others, to be patient, to think of others and not just ourselves.” But even if fully implemented, the law in Lebanon remains deficient. It does not, for example, prescribe airbags as compulsory, only seat belts, whereas in Europe, airbags and various other driver-safety aids like sensors are compulsory on all vehicles.

Salameh says that there is no age limit placed on passenger vehicles that are permitted to use the roads. He feels that proper maintenance is more important than placing an age limit on old cars, pointing to the number of vehicles that fail to submit to periodic mechanical inspection.

The primary duty of enforcing periodic car inspections rests with the ISF, who have the authority to stop any vehicle on the road to check it has passed inspection. “Ultimately, to enforce the law integrally we need a political will from the entire political class and a commitment to deter all violations, including enforcing compulsory annual mechanical inspections,” says Salameh. “But people know that all those who violate the law think they can because they are supported by one politician or another, this deters the policeman from enforcing the law.”

He adds that France, which in 1972 had roughly the same number of collisions per mile driven as Lebanon, managed to change driver behavior. It took time, but France ultimately succeeded in reducing fatalities from road crashes from 18,000 per year in 1972 to 4,000 per year today, a major drop considering the exponential increase in the number of cars on the roads over the past four decades. “Through the introduction of countermeasures, radars, the reform of the driving schools, and the introduction of a points system, the French changed driver behavior,” Salameh says.

Vehicle tax breakdown

The AIA’s Saad says that in most countries, car importers pay either VAT or customs duty on imported new cars—but not both. In Lebanon, however, a customs duty of 20 percent of the value of a car is levied on cars valued at LL20 million ($13,333) or less, while a customs duty of 50 percent of the value of a car is levied on cars valued at over LL20 million. “On top of that, you pay 10 percent VAT, and on top of the registered selling price, the customer pays 5.3 percent of the value of the car as a registration fee,” Saad says, adding that in other countries the registration fee is very low and of symbolic value.

For cars with engines between 11 and 20 horsepower, the mechanical tax ranges from LL53,000   ($35) to LL525,000 ($350). For cars between 41 and 50 horsepower, the mechanical tax is LL2.5 million ($1,666). “Whereas cars that are more than 13 years old pay only LL230,000 ($153) in annual mechanical tax, these older cars are also running on our roads, they pollute more, and cost more to run and repair,” Saad says, describing vehicle tax policy as insane. He adds, “In France, they scrapped the mechanical tax because they found it to be unfair.”

If Lebanon had a well-organized public transport system, Saad believes, people would gladly give up their aging cars. “These old cars, in addition to the health and safety and pollution problems they pose, burden their owners with high repair bills,” he says.

Every car and road tax the government collects goes into a common pot at the treasury, from where the money is distributed to wherever it is needed. Saad suggests it would make more sense if the money at least went directly to repairing and upgrading the country’s roads and bridges, which are in bad shape.

Car-buying behavior changing

Opting to turn their backs to the unreliable gray market, new car buyers in Lebanon are very price sensitive. As the middle class is being pushed into a lower income bracket, smaller, more fuel-efficient and affordable cars are gaining popularity, according to AIA figures. Korean cars continue to lead car sales in the country: Kia sold 4,671 cars in the first half of this year; coming in at a distant second, Hyundai sold just 2,803 cars. Japan’s Toyota holds third place, having sold 2,620 cars in the first half of this year, followed by Nissan, which sold 1,959 cars in the first six months of the year. Chevrolet and Renault hold on to fifth and sixth place, having sold 1,093 and 1,088 cars respectively in the first half of the year.

“The car-buying trend follows the socioeconomic evolution of the population. The middle class in Lebanon is shrinking, which is affecting the car market,” says Kettaneh’s Mabro. “Sales of very cheap cars priced below $20,000, or even below $10,000, are growing, as are sales of very expensive cars priced at $150,000, or even over $200,000. Sales of cars priced between $30,000 and $70,000 have been hit hard,” he  says, adding that overall the new car market only fell by just 1 percent from last year.

This assessment is in agreement with AIA figures. According to the AIA, total new-car sales last year reached 36,300, while new-car sales in the first six months of this year reached 23,559. Saad predicts just a 2 percent drop in sales this year from last year. Mabro says that demand from wealthy customers remains strong: “Even the Audi R8, which is a $300,000 car, is selling well.”

For most new car buyers, affordability and low running costs remain top priorities. Maria Rita Boustany, marketing and human resources manager at Toyota of Lebanon, says that due to the lack of proper public transportation in the country, compact vehicles are in high demand. “There is an ongoing trend as well for compact crossovers, which are rising in popularity. The launch of the Toyota C-HR [a compact crossover] was a tremendous success, as was the Lexus NX, a luxury compact crossover,” Boustany says. A crossover combines features of a sport utility vehicle with those of a passenger vehicle, especially a station wagon or hatchback. Examples of the body type include the BMW X1, Dacia Duster, Nissan X-Trail, and the Korean-made SsangYong Korando. Mid-sized crossovers include the Mercedes-Benz M-Class, Ford Edge, and the Volkswagen Touareg.

Pre-owned cars and competition

Many car dealerships in Lebanon sell pre-owned, refurbished models at their showrooms that sell for much less than brand-new cars. Unlike other used cars, these cars have a dealer’s warranty. Kettaneh sells pre-owned VW, Audi, and Skoda vehicles. “It’s important for us to show that our pre-owned cars are as good as new—for this, we give customers a warranty on pre-owned cars. We need to do this to show we are serious about combatting the gray market,” Mabro says.

Sales of new Toyotas, according to Boustany, exceed those of pre-owned cars. “People are very disinclined to trade in or sell their Toyotas,” she says. As for the competitive environment, Mabro says that the new kid on the block—the Chinese—do not yet pose any serious competitive threat, as the poor quality of Chinese cars overrides their cheapness. “The Koreans are managing to compete well—they are bringing in cars with a lot of extra features like auto-park and cameras—but they are overall of a lower quality compared to German cars,” adds Mabro. He says people are choosing to buy cheap, non-durable cars because of affordability, but said that this was not a good calculation. “Buying a cheap car only makes you happy for a few months,” he says.

Public transport

The World Bank and the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction are preparing an urban transport project to organize public transport in Greater Beirut. The Project Information Document (PID) Concept Stage was updated in January 2015. Included in the project is a bus rapid transit line to connect Tabarja to the north and Jiyeh to the south of Beirut, Saad says, “It will be a closed, dedicated two-way road just for buses.”

However, when such a project will see the light of day is anybody’s guess. For now, the country is faced with a growing number of taxis and minivans as the mainstay transport option for those who cannot afford or choose not to drive in this country. But even as taxis and minivans offer cheap transport options, the fact remains many are unregistered, even dangerous to drive in or near, and offer few to no passenger safety features. “There are a total 33,000 red taxi number plates in Lebanon for approximately 60,000 taxis operating on the roads today; there are 4,000 minivan buses registered in the country for about 20,000 currently operating on the roads, not counting all the cars coming from Syria, which makes the situation quite dire,” Saad says. He adds that investments in public transport boosts the economy, and would create 25 percent more jobs than the same investment going to build roads and highways, as well as help the environment and alleviate congestion. What’s more, a highway for cars is 175 meters wide, a dedicated road for buses is just 35 meters wide, while a metro train line is just nine meters wide, which makes mass transit the better option in terms of land footprint too.

Renewal and a fresh start

Saad says the AIA will continue to lobby the government to institute policies that encourage people to replace their old cars, thereby protecting the environment and people’s health. Meanwhile, Salameh says that the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has a draft proposal for the renewal of the country’s commercial fleet, which suggests introducing tax and financial incentives for operators to replace their aging trucks, busses, trailer trucks, and concrete mixers, among other vehicles.

Renewal and perhaps a fresh approach is needed in Lebanon. The current situation gives people few choices: buy cheap or used cars, keep your old car that is falling apart, or ride in a suicide-machine minibus with a crazy driver at the wheel, or a shared taxi, or pay through the nose for a private taxi. The crisis is not a product of competing interests so much as it is a product of an inability to move forward on any of these issues—or perhaps an unwillingness to do so. People have waited long enough, and they deserve better.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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Cover storyOil & Gas

Tick tock

by Matt Nash October 5, 2017
written by Matt Nash

Some view it as a race against Israel Our neighbor—which is definitively not stealing Lebanon’s gas—closes its first offshore licensing round on November 15. Israel had previously awarded exploration licenses directly.Lebanon just postponed the close of its own first round—yet again—from September 15 to October 12. The new deadline, however, actually seems to have been chosen this time based not on the usual insistence of local officials, but on comments from Dharmendra Pradhan, India’s oil minister.

The curious case of ONGC

In July, after a meeting with Lebanon’s Minister of Energy and Water Cesar Abi Khalil, Pradhan tweeted: “The meeting was important in the context of @ongcvideshltd participation in the upcoming bid round for offshore gas fields in Lebanon.” ONGC Videsh Ltd is India’s national oil company, which had prequalified as an operator in Lebanon’s first offshore licensing round in April. In September, however, Pradhan told Reuters, “We will definitely bid for Israel’s oil and gas blocks.” It is unclear, however, how much capital the company has to deploy in either jurisdiction, let alone both. The Mediterranean Sea gets deep fast off the shores of both Lebanon and Israel. Drilling in water more than 1,000 meters deep is expensive, and the Indian company said in an August interview that its planned $150 million exploration budget will focus on Colombia, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh.

Assuming ONGC is seriously contemplating bids in the Eastern Mediterranean, if Lebanon closes its round before Israel, it could capture ONGC’s bid at a time when officials admit the possibility that not many offers will come rolling in. If Lebanon closes after Israel, however, ONGC could bid to the south, complicating a later bid in Lebanon from a political—and possibly even a legal—perspective (Lebanon still technically has a boycott office at the Ministry of Economy). The Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA) would not comment specifically on ONGC (or any other bidder), but LPA president Wissam Chbat told Executive in an interview that “we might end up in this situation” (of having only one bid), but “we haven’t been expecting [only] one bid.”

Infographic by: Ahmad Barclay

While 51 companies are prequalified to bid in Lebanon, all but five went through the prequalification process back in 2013. It is difficult, therefore, to predict how many will actually bid, especially given that Lebanese law requires companies to form consortia with a minimum of three members  in order to submit bids; each consortium must include an operator, and there are only 13 prequalified operators. This means that even if many non-operators want to bid, they cannot do so without wooing one of the 13 operators. On the one hand, extensive seismic surveys that look promising, coupled with big natual gas discoveries nearby, suggest that Lebanon should be attractive as a greenfield investment. On the other hand, the industry currently has a suppressed appetite for the expensive deepwater drilling required to prove whether or not Lebanon has oil and/or gas reserves. Executive has repeatedly reached out to the prequalified companies for comment on their plans in the past and has been repeatedly reminded that companies do not comment on such matters. In a statement released shortly after the most recent postponement the LPA said that part of the reason for the delay was to allow companies to form consortia—suggesting bids are indeed being prepared.

What to expect on the big day

Once bids are submitted, Chbat says the LPA will have three days to report back to the cabinet about which companies bid on which blocks. The LPA will then evaluate the offers. For the commercial offers, this means running nine different simulations (which include three volume assumptions and three price assumptions) and taking an average of the results. Companies will also be scored on their technical offers, and based on both outcomes, Chbat says, the LPA will choose provisional winners for each block. The list of winners will be provisional because the government/LPA can negotiate with companies on their technical offers, which include proposals for additional surveys of Lebanese waters, as well as the number, location, and depth of the wells they plan to drill. The offers are negotiable, Chbat explains, because requesting slightly more surveying, or a slightly deeper well, results in more valuable information for the state.

The LPA has slated one month for evaluating offers and choosing provisional winners before sending that recommendation to the cabinet, which will ultimately approve which contracts, if any, to sign. While the LPA announced in April that contracts should be signed by November, legally the government has a full six months after bids are received to sign an award. Chbat says the bidders will be announced when the LPA submits its report on the subject to cabinet. Until then, it is a waiting game.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyOverview

Sharing the risks

by Jeremy Arbid October 5, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

A new law passed this summer could help facilitate sorely needed investment to fix the country’s infrastructure. The legislation, a framework for public-private partnerships (PPP), puts into law new options for sharing risks between companies and the government when investing in, building, and operating new public works.

Ziad Hayek, secretary general of the Higher Council of Privatization (HCP), tells Executive that Lebanon needs at least $6 billion to revitalize its infrastructure. The country’s roads are jammed with traffic, it has no long-term garbage solution, and its electricity supply is unreliable. Amongst other proposed infrastructure projects, the government has recently announced intentions to expand capacity at Beirut’s airport and to re-open Tripoli’s Rene Mouawad Air Base to passenger traffic.

Lebanon has had difficulty structuring PPP projects, and the new legal framework should help clean up that process. Lebanon has already had a few PPPs: Jeita Grotto, the waste treatment plant in Saida, and LibanPost. But judging their success through the lens of the new PPP framework, Hayek says, those examples—at least in the case of LibanPost—have deviated from the terms and conditions of their contracts, and are not great examples. “We want to make sure that when we talk about PPP, we really have fully successful projects that live up to the letter of [the] contract, that provide periodic reports on operation and how they are meeting key performance indicators, that are held responsible for [meeting those] indicators, where any payment from the government is dependent on their meeting those indicators.”

Weak finances

Prime Minister Saad Hariri stressed Lebanon’s desperate need for new infrastructure at an April aid conference in Brussels. There, he asked donors to fund a $12 billion “large-scale capital investment program (CIP)” to help Lebanon rebuild its economy and continue supporting the more than 1 million UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees living in the country. Since then, the government has not articulated any infrastructure investment plan, but has indicated that it wants around 25 percent of financing for the CIP to come from PPP approaches, says Peter Mousley, a PPP specialist at the World Bank’s Beirut office (see Q&A page 30). “We’re anticipating the government will move forward with this CIP, [and] that they will be wanting to reach out more to potential private investors,” he tells Executive.

While the government has known for years that it needs to fix its infrastructure, it has not been able to set much money aside for capital expenditures. According to the most recent numbers from the Ministry of Finance, only 4.4 percent (or less than $600 million) of the more than $13.5 billion in total public spending for 2015 went to capital expenditures, a percentage that has not varied much since at least 2011. Last year, Lebanon spent almost $5 billion more than the revenue it brought in; about a third of that went to interest payments on debt, public worker salaries, benefits, and pensions, and to cover losses by the nation’s electricity utility, Electricité du Liban. The country covers its deficit by issuing debt, which totals nearly $77 billion as of July. In August, Moody’s, a credit rating agency, downgraded Lebanon’s borrowing grade to a B3 rating, indicating that it considers Lebanon’s finances to be weak. In a press release, the company stated, “The principal driver of the downgrade is the rise in the country’s debt burden. Moody’s estimates Lebanon’s 2018 government debt to reach close to 140 percent of GDP […] government debt will remain close to 700 percent of government revenues next year.”

Would Lebanon’s credit rating be an obstacle to financing a PPP project? For the government, such a project can be cash-neutral because it could participate with an in kind contribution, such as land. But when the government contributes financing, it does so by issuing bonds, not debt. The downgrade could have an impact on pricing, says Iyad Boustany, managing director of local investment firm FFA Private Bank. Low credit ratings mean the bond issuer, here the government, offers higher premiums to the investors buying the debt issue. A rating downgrade would “increase cost of funding, as investors would want higher returns for their investment,” Boustany wrote to Executive in an email. The HCP’s Hayek hopes the new law will help Lebanon issue securities and develop a capital market, as the government sells bonds to pay its share of financing a PPP project. Rather than straight debt, bonds are tradeable, and can be moved in a secondary market. For Lebanon, that could mean a reinvigoration of dormant and always-demanded capital markets.

PPP financing, Mousley explains, typically includes equity. “There’s a lot of liquidity in the market, [and] the financial sector is very robust here. But the indications from a lot of the commercial banks here is that they would like to diversify, and PPP gives them that opportunity,” he tells Executive.

Risk, then, is another reason why Lebanon has not poured money into fixing its infrastructure. Hayek tells Executive that PPP is “a partnership in risks.” What he means is that the private company winning the PPP tender, depending on the terms of the agreement, might take on the risk of financing, constructing, and operating the project, while the government deals with revenue guarantees to the company, political risk, or environmental risk. “For each of these risks, then, [comes] a conversation about how you’re going to mitigate it,” Hayek says, adding that transparency is important in the tender process. Companies do not want to invest heavily to prepare bids—designing the project and negotiating financing options with banks can be costly—if the evaluation methodology is not made public and the selection process is opaque. “Obviously [local banks] want to take informed risks,” Mousley says. “Doing it in a PPP framework that takes proper account of the risks involved is liable to create a more enabling environment for infrastructure investment.”

[pullquote]Risk, then, is another reason why Lebanon has not poured money into fixing its infrastructure[/pullquote]

Transparency has two parts, according to Hayek. First, the process of preparing to tender the PPP project should involve an open consultation with all stakeholders, public and private, so that expectations regarding deliverables and compensation are determined upfront. “No longer can [tendering] be a black box within a ministry,” he says. Open information matters too: Companies should know how their bids are evaluated, and the model contract should be publicly accessible. Hayek says these conditions are all spelled out in the framework, adding that “transparency is paramount for PPP success.”

The HCP is now scaling up to meet the demands of the new PPP legislation, and Hayek says that it will have the capacity to coordinate up to three projects in the foreseeable future. That is okay, says Mousley of the World Bank. The takeaway from other countries’ experiences with PPP, he says, is that it is best to move slowly and build a pipeline of PPP projects over a long period of time.

As for the HCP’s first PPP project, that depends on the government’s priorities. For now, it has yet to outline a long-term infrastructure investment plan, and the projects it wants—and needs—to undertake. There is an ongoing tender for wind and solar power plants that could benefit from the new PPP framework, though Hayek says the electricity sector is not an area the HCP would recommend—there are too many competing interests to make it a successful first project. Instead, Hayek says that while the HCP has not agreed on which projects it will recommend to the government, his preference is to start with a project related to transportation, a public building like a hospital or school, or a project to rehabilitate a sports facility. “I think one of these will be the way to introduce PPP to the nation,” he says.

October 5, 2017 0 comments
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IssuesOctober 2017

October 2017

by Executive Staff October 4, 2017
written by Executive Staff
space

 

[media-credit id=2635 align=”alignright” width=”246″][/media-credit]

EDITORIAL

Licence to steal


LEADERS

Stalled progress

Whatever taxes come next must be transparent

A storm is coming

The car industry braces for impact

Quit clowning around

Incompetence in the sector is no longer funny

COVER STORY

Tick tock

Let the bidding commence

Icing on the cake

New oil and gas tax law completes sector’s fiscal regime

Lebanon’s fiscal conundrum 

What would make a good deal for Lebanon?

ECONOMICS & POLICY

Sharing the risks

Lebanon’s infrastructure could get a much needed boost from PPP

A partnership in risk

Ziad Hayek, secretary general of the HCP, explains what’s changing

A marriage of convenience 

The World Bank’ Peter Mousley talks benefits and risks of PPP

SPECIAL REPORT

Drive … At your own risk

A close look at the driving environment and the car market in Lebanon

Going nowhere

Lebanon is ill-prepared for electric mobility

The other side

How highways divided Beirut’s neighborhoods

McLaren lands in Beirut

Q&A with McLaren Automotive CEO Mike Flewitt

REAL ESTATE

Passion and profit in Lebanon

Q&A with Carlos Ghosn

HOSPITALITY AND TOURISM

Destination: Shouf

From ancient forests to grand palaces

Hugged more tightly 

Another European budget line targets Beirut

AGRICULTURE

Show me the honey

Lebanese bee keepers discuss growing their industry despite challenges

LAST WORD

Lebanon needs to clean up its act

The country lacks a long-term waste management strategy
October 4, 2017 0 comments
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EditorialOpinion

License to steal

by Yasser Akkaoui October 4, 2017
written by Yasser Akkaoui

The Ottomans taught us too well. In exchange for a minimum level of freedom, the rulers of the Empire empowered (and armed) local leaders and tasked them with collecting taxes. Policy makers and stability maintaining were the domain of the central government in Constantinople. This worked brilliantly for the Empire, but in the case of Lebanon, it helped create a mindset that valued rent-seeking over productivity. Hundreds of years later, we are a nation ruled by feudal tax collectors and have lost the policy making and security that once came with it. Our political class has still not learned how to build, develop, and improve a nation, let alone build and bolster a productive economy. Regrettably, our political hierarchy views the state as a cash-cow to milk. Nothing more.

Look no further than our tired roads, clogged with an ageing fleet of vehicles which contribute to the country’s poor air quality. Where is urban planning? Where is a coordinated and regulated public transport strategy? I would venture and ask about electric cars, but with a solidly unreliable supply of electricity, the question answers itself. Our leaders do not make policy. They drain and exhaust us with ever higher import taxes on new cars.

I fear that this situation will not improve, even with the new public-private-partnership (PPP) law, which would have injected an energizing ray of hope for the transport sector. We worry we won’t soon see a new era of nation-building under the PPP law because those who will implement it are more concerned with devouring payoffs than studying  key performance indicators when it comes to public works. To effectively benefit from PPPs, we need a new mindset, not a new law.

Most worrying is the fate of any oil and gas the country may have. Politicians have been playing games with this not-yet-established sector for years now. Those games will  continue, and the Lebanese people will be defrauded as a result.

Our politicians have pursued extractive, not inclusive, economic planning–enriching themselves and leaving the rest of us out in the cold.

October 4, 2017 0 comments
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CommentEconomics & PolicyOil and gas

Strengthen our environmental protections

by Diana Kaissy September 27, 2017
written by Diana Kaissy

As Lebanon gears up to explore for offshore oil and gas resources, it is critical that environmental protection is a front and center priority. Oil and gas development activities have high environmental risks that could impact Lebanese communities living along the coast, as well as businesses working in the fishery, tourism, and shipping sectors.

To adequately protect Lebanon’s environment throughout the exploration and extraction phases, it will be necessary to revise Lebanon’s strategic environmental assessment (SEA).

An SEA is a report filed according to international standards and best practices, which offers governments a comprehensive view of environmental constraints and the potential impacts of developing a resource extraction sector in their country. It is used to develop solutions to potential environmental risks, guide the development of tailored regulations of petroleum companies’ operations, and create a formal platform to engage all appropriate stakeholders, including civil society, in the process. In short, an SEA is a critical assessment tool required for proper policy and environmental planning, which Lebanon should have as it develops its oil and gas sector.

Recognizing this, the Lebanese Oil and Gas Initiative (LOGI) is renewing a call it first made in May 2017 for a complete review of Lebanon’s SEA. LOGI is an independent NGO focused on developing a network of Lebanese experts in the global energy industry. It aims to educate policy makers and citizens on building an oil and gas industry that benefits all citizens, while avoiding the resource curse.

The Lebanese government commissioned an SEA in 2011, and published it in 2014. LOGI, in partnership with Publish What You Pay and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, as well as third-party international experts, reviewed the approximately 800-page document to synthesize and release their findings to the wider public. LOGI found that Lebanon’s SEA, although a step in the right direction, fell short of meeting international standards. Of particular concern is the fact that the SEA was compiled with minimal input from ministries and concerned citizens, did not conform to existing environmental legislation in Lebanon, and featured outdated or incomplete data. In fact, the SEA did not address questions that were directly, and publicly, posed to the team that compiled it.

Ticking clock

This gap presents a range of problems, but also opportunities, which must be seized upon with the assistance of concerned civil society organizations and the public at large.

LOGI shared its findings in May 2017 with the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA), the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Tourism, as well as other government agencies and several civil society organizations.

LOGI’s key recommendation is that Lebanon’s SEA be revised to improve the protection of the environment and decrease the likelihood of significant impacts. What should be apparent is that LOGI is not seeking a wholesale remake of Lebanon’s SEA. In fact, quite the opposite. It is our firm belief that Lebanon should move to establish its petroleum sector at a vigorous pace, particularly as licensing was stalled for years.

A review and revision of the SEA should not hamper this process, which is why LOGI and its partners have advocated for a review in parallel with the first licensing round (with the bid submittal deadline fast approaching on September 15). Such a process has been carried out with success in Montenegro and Croatia, where clauses were inserted into licensing round conditions, stating that the given SEA is under review, and its findings, conclusions, and mitigation measures will be binding on all operators. In fact, Lebanon has already adopted similar language that binds all operators to any new mitigating measures.

Based on LOGI’s recommendations, the LPA decided to undertake a revision of the SEA in May 2017. We are now in August, and the process is progressing at a slow pace. Our call to renew the SEA is time sensitive. LOGI renews its call and urges all decision makers and citizens to pay close attention to this matter. We need a revised SEA to inform our environmental regulations in Lebanon’s oil and gas sector. The time is now.

September 27, 2017 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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