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Economics & PolicyOil and gas

Inching closer to the edge of our seats

by Matt Nash September 26, 2017
written by Matt Nash

Regardless of what local banks keep proclaiming, Lebanon has no oil or gas. There’s reason to believe it does, but the process of finding out is only just beginning. On September 15, companies will bid for rights to explore for oil and/or gas offshore Lebanon. Executive takes a look at what that means, what to expect next, and answers other commonly asked questions.

How much oil do we have?

Only drilling will tell what Lebanon does or does not have. At the moment, it has blurry renderings of earth below the Mediterranean Sea. There’s much, “Wow, that could be something,” but until contracts are signed with companies capable of drilling to find out just what that “something” is, we simply will not know.

Why does everyone seem to think Lebanon is rich in oil and gas?

There is a lot of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med), and a general understanding of where it comes from (ancient sediments, and — only recently proven in this area — ancient coral). Huge natural gas discoveries (Israel’s Leviathan in 2010 and Egypt’s Zohr in 2015) have fueled and sustained interest in the East Med, despite a price environment over the past three years that is disfavorable toward drilling $100 million wells in “ultra-deep” waters. Lebanon can likely expect some big industry names to bid for drilling and production rights, but that has not actually happened yet. The country was supposed to accept bids in 2013, but the process got subsumed in political bickering until January of this year.

[pullquote]Only drilling will tell what Lebanon does or does not have[/pullquote]

Where are we now?

Fifty-one companies are pre-qualified to bid. A 2010 law requires they form partnerships of three or more companies to bid for exploration and production rights. This means they will offer the government a cut of revenues from whatever resources are found, in return for finding and extracting said resources. If the winners find nothing, the government will not have to reimburse the exploration costs incurred. Bids are due on September 15.

Will Lebanon get a good deal?

There is a lot of misinformation regarding what Lebanon might get from a revenue standpoint. Lebanon is following international best practice by using a model contract with certain specified criteria, related to the government’s cut of revenues. clearly defined. It is impossible to say now whether or not the country will secure a good deal, but it is on the right track toward doing so.

Who’s going to bid?

No one can predict the future. Some of the companies prequalified in Lebanon recently bid in a licensing round that Cyprus organized in 2016, which could indicate they will bid in Lebanon too. That, however, is far from certain, and will only be known when bids are submitted.

How public will the bid evaluation be?

In interviews with Executive in both January and April this year, Wissam Chbat, president of the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA), said that once bids were received, the LPA would announce which companies bid on which offshore blocks (Lebanon has 10 offshore blocks, five of which can be bid on in the first licensing round). Chbat also said that the LPA would take one month to evaluate the bids (evaluation is based on technical criteria — further geo-physical studies like seismic surveys, the number of wells companies commit to drilling and the depth of those wells, and the companies’ financial offers).

The commercial offer is worth 70 percent of the evaluation, with the technical offer representing the remaining 30 percent. The commercial offer will be set in stone once submitted, but Chbat explained that the technical proposal can be subject to further negotiations (i.e., pushing companies to drill slightly deeper, for example). After the assessment and negotiations, Chbat said that the winners would also be announced publicly. Signing the final contract depends on a decision from the Council of Ministers. The political timeframe for the evaluation process sees contracts signed by November 2017, but the model contracts that will govern the relationship between contractors and government allow a total of six months between bid submission and contract signature.

September 26, 2017 1 comment
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Economics & PolicyEnvironment

Going shades of green

by Jeremy Arbid September 25, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

Lebanon could license the construction of nearly 380 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy plants as early as this summer, a Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) official tells Executive. This would mean a rise in generation capacity of just over 20 percent — a far cry from satisfying the country’s demand for power. This clean electricity, generated through new windmill installations and solar farms, would, however, help Lebanon reach its 2020 target of 12 percent renewable energy in the national power mix. Companies would need to raise capital to finance construction of the projects, a not-so-difficult prospect thanks to a 2010 central bank incentive and spurred on by last year’s Paris Agreement on climate change.

(Click on image to enlarge)

Wind’s picking up

It is in a blustery part of north Lebanon that the government envisions construction of three windfarms. Near Akkar, in the country’s wind corridor, rotating turbines would generate some 200 MW of clean electricity if the government finally licenses their construction.

The MoEW began the tendering process back in 2013, shortlisting three bids. Four years on, “We’ve hopefully come to the last steps,” says Pierre el-Khoury, head of the Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation (LCEC), the technical body at the MoEW responsible for renewables.

Electricity Law 462, ratified in 2002, stipulated that a regulator would license new power plants, but the government never got around to appointing that body. Instead, Parliament passed legislation in 2014 and 2015 to get around the legislation by allowing cabinet, on the recommendations of the MoEW and the Ministry of Finance, to decide when the private sector could build power plants. Now, Khoury tells Executive, the windmills are waiting for approval from the Minister of Finance so that both ministries can ask cabinet for the permits.

In addition to the 200 MW of wind energy, the MoEW also wants to license up to 180 MW of solar. At the beginning of 2017, the ministry asked for expressions of interest (EOI) for the construction of 12 solar farms, consisting of three projects each in the districts of South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, Bekaa Valley, and North Lebanon. The EOI call resulted in 265 project proposals submitted by 173 companies, Khoury says. “Based on this high rate of replies, the MoEW finalized the tender documents and sent a request asking [companies] to submit detailed offers.” Khoury says the deadline to submit bids is mid-August, adding that the ministry needs to move quickly. “It will take us some time to review these offers. But we need to finalize the whole process before April 2018,” as that is when Cabinet’s mandate to license new private sector power plants expires.

A new dawn approaches

If the Council of Ministers does end up licensing the windmills this summer, and the solar projects before April 2018, then companies will need to finance the cost of construction.

That does not seem like much of an obstacle. In 2010, Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, moved to spur investment in renewables by creating a funding mechanism known as the National Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Action (NEEREA). FFA Private Bank, a local investment firm, recently announced a $1 billion investment vehicle they have termed the “Lebanon Infrastructure Fund” to pour money, at least initially, into renewables.

While the cost of constructing the wind and solar projects would be financed by the private sector, the terms to sell that electricity to Lebanon’s public utility, Electricité du Liban (EDL), will be governed by a power-purchase agreement (PPA). For wind, an official cost figure has not been disclosed because it would affect the government’s negotiating leverage, but media reports speculate costs could range from $120-150 million; for solar Khoury says that it is “important to have 180 MW costing $300 million.” The government, on behalf of EDL, will enter a PPA with companies to buy electricity for point x dollars per kilowatt hour over 20 years — the idea, Khoury tells Executive, “is to have a 20-year PPA contract at a fixed price.” PPA terms are still being finalized for the wind project, but once they are, companies will have three months to sign. Companies will then have 18 months to complete all the necessary legal, administrative, and logistical issues to have a completely ready-to-build situation.

PPAs could be costly to the government if power prices decrease because they lock prices in over a long period of time. Companies will look for assurances that the government will pay up if, for some reason, the utility cannot take in the electricity, termed a “take or pay clause.” The clause is typical of PPA contracts as it reduces the risk to companies, reflected in lower cost premiums. The clause could cost the government $55.1 million for wind and $25 million for solar upfront, but alongside  other derisking measures, could save the treasury hundreds of millions of dollars over the term of the contract, Vahakn Kabakian, Lebanon’s Climate change portfolio manager at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), argued in an April 2017 op-ed for Executive.

(Click on image to enlarge)

If Cabinet licenses the projects on time, then clean electricity could begin flowing to Lebanese homes and businesses before 2020. Now that Parliament has, after eight years and two extensions of its mandate, finally figured out a new electoral law (see vote law infographic), the hope is that it will vote on the Paris Agreement. Lebanon would then be required by law to meet its renewable energy promises and the climate change pledges it put forward at Paris.

Local meteorologists are forecasting strong breezes and a lot of sun.

September 25, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyTaxes

Salary adjustment

by Sami Atallah September 20, 2017
written by Sami Atallah

So much has been said about the salary adjustment. While many people are opposed to it over the perception that it imposes higher taxes, public sector employees and teachers think that an adjustment is long overdue. For one, their salaries have been adjusted only twice — in 2008 and 2012 — since 1997, and these salaries have failed to maintain their purchasing power. That is, the rise in prices of more than 120 percent over 20 years has eaten up part of their income in real terms, and reduced their standard of living.

Public debate has simmered for five years over how to finance the salary adjustment bill. Twenty-two taxes were signed into law on August 21, but are currently under review by the Constitutional Council. They include an increase in VAT, stamp duty tax, an air transport exit fee, as well as capital gains on the disposal of fixed assets, corporate income tax, and taxes on interest, among others, to cover additional spending.

As many can get caught up in choosing sides, it is important to reflect on how the issue was framed over the last few years, how the debate took place, and how and why it was settled now. It is through this that we can better understand the intentions and priorities of the political elite.

Let us start with the issue at hand, namely, why was the salary adjustment bill presented as a separate expense that requires additional financing? The fact that state revenues have increased over the last 20 years, partly as a result of the rise in prices, suggests that salary adjustment ought to be financed from revenues. In other words, the increase in public sector salaries should be treated like any other expense in the budget, and revenues should not be viewed as being earmarked to finance a particular expense. Hence, what is required from the government and Parliament is a study of revenues and spending in the budget together — often referred to as unity of the budget — to figure out ways to address the fiscal situation in the country. The government should have examined public salaries, current spending, and capital spending to reduce expenditures in addition to its revenue stream, including public property management and taxes, some of which are under-collected.

In other words, the salary adjustment bill should be framed as part of total spending and revenues in the budget, rather than isolating additional salary expenses. The latter has resulted in muddying the debate over salary adjustment and made the beneficiaries a target for a general public that pays taxes to finance public workers’ salaries, among other state expenses. In reality, the public is shouldering more of the tax burden to make up for public finance mismanagement on the part of the government and Parliament, both of which have failed to prepare, debate, and approve a budget for the last 12 years to ensure fiscal discipline, and effective, efficient spending. The absence of such a credible process hardly fosters requisite trust between the political class and voters.

Another common argument in the public sphere centers on the assertion that a salary adjustment is undeserved because Lebanon’s bureaucracy is overstaffed, unproductive, and it is fiscally draining on the treasury. This does not hold water for two reasons: One, while some state agencies are overstaffed, many are understaffed, casting doubt on the policies that subsequent governments are pursuing in terms of wanting to build a professional bureaucracy. Public sector reform that addresses tasks, salaries, and merit criteria is sorely needed. Lest we forget, the government has tasked the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform with reforming the public sector administration, which remains as elusive as ever, since the problems lay first and foremost with the same people who are asking to reform it: political parties who are using government agencies to deliver services to and hire people who are politically loyal, and serve their political and electoral ends.

Any serious reform to the bureaucracy cannot be carried out through denying a salary adjustment to public sector employees that is not based on merit, but rather, on salaries’ purchasing power. Furthermore, asserting that all public staff do not deserve a salary adjustment on equal terms fails to distinguish between those who are productive from those who are not, and fails to recognize that they are entitled to the adjustment under Lebanese law.

One thing that is clear is that the political elite — both in government and Parliament — are unwilling or incapable of raising revenues and curbing spending by tackling waste, mismanagement, and corruption in the public sector. There are many public allegations about unnecessary spending or state properties being stolen or underinvested. What is worse is that many parliamentarians are content making speeches about corruption in parliamentary oversight sessions, but rarely follow it up with action. Others manage to unearth corruption deals after a bill has passed, and not before. The fact that the government is not increasing revenues or lowering spending by tackling mismanagement and corruption indicates clearly that they are unwilling or incapable of threatening the interests of cronies, either due to collusion or fear.

The easiest route to shore up public revenue is to increase taxes. While their instinct is to impose indirect taxes that fall disproportionately on middle and lower income groups, they have opted to actually distribute the burden between consumers and capital. In fact, the increase in VAT from 10 percent to 11 percent will make up about 18 percent of the total of new revenues. The increase in interest tax from 5 percent to 7 percent will make up 25 percent of new revenues.

Despite the fear mongering rhetoric of the private sector about the implications of new taxes on the economy, such new taxes include a capital gains tax, corporate income tax, property sales, and interest tax, which in total cover half of new spending from the salary increase. As modest as it is, some of these taxes can rectify the burden that usually falls on consumers, rather than on capital, businesses, and other types of rents that are left untaxed. The government’s tax policy since the end of the civil war has favored indirect rather than direct and progressive taxes, in the process, favoring the rich over the poor.

It may very well be of no coincidence that tax legislation was passed after the electoral law, and with the election season just around the corner, as it is becoming the norm that salary bills like the one in 2008 and 2012 are made before scheduled elections. Over the last five years, no government or Parliament established a proper process to deal with how to finance a salary adjustment. As contentious as the issue is, the political elite could have studied it as part of the budget, figured out how to cut waste and tackle corruption to finance it, and then studied its impacts on various sectors and the public. This is what any decent government or Parliament should have done if they care about the public. In fact, this is how one would go about gaining back the people’s trust.

September 20, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyTaxes

Myopic taxation

by Georges Corm September 19, 2017
written by Georges Corm

The package of tax measures recently signed into law and published in the Official Gazette was characterized by a lack of any fiscal and economic vision. It does not proceed from a well-designed tax policy addressing the various gaps and imbalances that characterize our fragmented and complicated set of taxes. As we all know, our tax system relies heavily on indirect taxes. Many sources of income are untapped, and there is no single overall income tax rate for individuals, as we are still living under the old-fashioned French “cedular” system of income tax, whereby each source of revenue is assessed and taxed separately with different rates. In fact, one of the most urgent tax reforms should have been to replace this old fragmented income tax system with a unified single rate applying by tranches to the total of all combined revenues for each individual. This is a system that could yield substantial amounts to the treasury, while making the life of taxpayers much easier, as just one tax return would have to be filed by them. It will also make life much easier for the Tax Administration Directorate.

As for the increase in VAT by 1 percent, this does not make much sense. It would have been more efficient to leave all essential goods at the rate of 10 percent, while creating a new rate for luxury goods at the level of 14 percent or 15 percent. The yield to the treasury would have been much higher, while for the poorer part of the population there would have been no increase in the price of essential goods. There is no doubt that the trade sector will take advantage of the 1 percent increase in VAT to raise prices by several percentage points, especially for goods imported from Europe, as the euro is on an ascending trend vis à vis the US dollar.

This increase in the VAT rate will also be amplified by the numerous increases in stamp duties, as well as in public notary fees. It should be noted here that most countries canceled stamp duties when they introduced a VAT system, but Lebanon did not, keeping old dating duties and excises taxes.

Missed opportunities

The increase in the tax rate for revenues of companies from 15 percent to 17 percent is not a bad measure, but it could have been raised up to 18 percent or even 20 percent, given the needs of the treasury to reduce the ever-increasing gaps in public finance, and to avoid future changes in the level of companies’ rate of taxation.

On the other hand, the increase in the tax on interests paid on deposits, or on state treasury bills in Lebanese lira from 5 percent to 7 percent, could have been advantageously replaced by a decline in interests paid by the treasury on its borrowings in Lebanese lira and US dollars, or by the decline in the central bank payment of high interests on the certificates of deposits it issues for subscription by local banks. In this regard, it is important to note that a 1 percentage point decline in interest rates paid by the state on its total debt of $75 billion, represents a decline in its annual debt service of $750 million, a huge amount indeed. It is also worth mentioning here that interest payments by the state on its public debt is the second largest item in budget expenditures, and therefore, there is a need to reduce the cost of servicing the debt. It would be preferable to reduce the present level of interest paid on Lebanon’s public debt, instead of increasing taxation on all deposits, either belonging to residents or to non-residents. After all, our national debt is being refinanced through an increase in deposits in the banking system accruing from the annual flow of emigrant remittances. Therefore, taxing interest revenues is not a very healthy measure. In any case, it would have been adequate to exempt small deposits from paying this tax. 

As for the fines that the new law has imposed on those that have infringed the law on exploiting the state maritime domain, I do not believe that the treasury will collect large amounts of unpaid rents and fines. This is because the basis of the rents to be paid are still determined according to a 1992 decree by the then-government, which states the square meter value of rented land along the coast by region at prices that are no longer relevant, given how much real estate prices have been going up during the last few decades.

One should not be surprised by the heteroclite nature of all these tax measures, considering that for years successive Lebanese governments have had no vision or plan on how to reform Lebanese public finances, except for the short period of the Hoss Government in 1999-2000 which produced a detailed fiscal consolidation plan for 1999-2004. It might be time for Lebanon to seriously plan an escape from the vicious economic and financial circles the country has trapped itself in. Until such a plan emerges, we remain enclosed, increasing anxiety in public opinion about our economic and financial stability.

September 19, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyTaxes

Finally, some clarity

by Jeremy Arbid September 16, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

After deliberating for much of 2017, Parliament met in late July to ratify new taxes. The legislation then sat on the desk of President of the Republic Michel Aoun for nearly a month, while he contemplated whether or not to sign the taxes into law. In late August, he finally inked his name, briefly ending a period of public uncertainty and frustration around lawmakers waffling on the issue. But, adding a fresh layer of confusion, as Executive went to print the Constitutional Council issued a freeze on the tax hike pending further review.

The measures had, when first announced in the opening months of this year, led to street protests against a hike. Throughout the year, there was much confusion over which new taxes would be introduced or increased, how much more people and businesses would have to pay, when the new measures would enter into force, and what the revenues would actually be used for. It did not help that conflicting narratives from both  sides of the aisle skewed the public conversation, confusing — intentionally or not — the details of the taxes and necessity of the measures. In an effort to make sense of the discourse at the time, Executive reported in April that opaque decision making made for confused tax policy.

Public perception then was that the new taxes would pay for a salary increase for public sector workers, but that is not accurate, as Director General of the Ministry of Finance Alain Bifani pointed out more than once and reiterated in an interview with Executive (see page 44). The legislation does not allocate the added revenue that the new taxes would generate. Instead, that money will head to the treasury toward covering the deficit. Deficit spending is set to increase because of the salary increase estimated at $1.2 billion — a figure that could grow or not depending on public sector recruitment — and that  new spending needed to be covered by revenue that did not exist, hence taxes. So yes, it is true that the new spending is correlated to the new taxes, but the new revenue is not specifically allocated to pay for the wage increase.

According to the Ministry of Finance all taxation money is fungible and not tied to a specific purpose. That is the principle. This principle is practically invisible to the public, and has not been properly explained by MP’s and ministers. It also seems that some members of the Lebanese Parliament might not know the term fungible, or have little understanding of taxation, so even they have linked the new taxes to the salary scale. But the reality is that these taxes are not designed for paying the wage scale increase, but for filling a hole (the deficit), which is being made bigger by the wage increase.

For much of the year, the government did little to correct this narrative with the general public. Since  the new taxes were announced, Executive has sought to understand their mechanics, and though the topic had come up in a March interview with the Ministry of Finance, the answer then was that the ministry was not yet in a position to detail the proposed taxes.

All but two of the new taxes (see box list of taxes) entered into effect immediately upon publication of the legislation in the Official Gazette on August 21, 2017 — though are now frozen.

An increase of the Value Added Tax (VAT) to 11 percent will not take effect until the start of the fourth fiscal quarter of the year, October 1, the law reads. The rate at which corporations will be taxed was increased to 17 percent to be applied at the start of next year, January 1, 2018. 

The Ministry of Finance estimates the new taxes together will generate additional revenue of LL410 billion ($272 million) for the remaining months of this year, and in 2018 estimates collection of LL 1.6 trillion (more than $1 billion), excluding the new alcohol tax revenue as the Ministry of Finance expects that measure to be revisited.

September 16, 2017 0 comments
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Special ReportWealth management

Talking about wealth

by Thomas Schellen September 15, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

Wealth is a contentious issue when seen through the lens of social improvement. Viewed from the position of social equality, it is a recipe for dissatisfaction and, sometimes, disaster. How does a private banker reconcile obligations to clients with social responsibility and ambitions for national improvement? Executive sat down with Jean Riachi, chairman of FFA Private Bank, to discuss.

E   Statistics on the latest developments in global wealth in 2016 suggest that the number of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) and families is increasing again worldwide and that, for the wealthy, the pain of the recession and post-recession years has passed. How do you see the global wealth management landscape from the Lebanese vantage point?

I agree that the rich are getting richer. This is an effect of globalization but also of something else that has been happening since the early 1990s, which is the increasing concentration of wealth. Numbers are large and growing, for the rich as well as for the middle class. In Asia for example, business people and entrepreneurs are making large fortunes in countries where the middle class is growing. This is because successful entrepreneurs are finding bigger markets for their products.

E   How is it in Lebanon? How much private wealth and concentration of wealth are we talking about in this country?

I don’t know if there are real statistics and I have always wondered how many people you would have in Lebanon whom you would call high-net-worth, high-net-worth being above $1 million in liquid assets, or ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWIs), meaning liquid assets above $30 million. We [at FFA Private Bank] have 2,000 clients and I am sure we don’t have everybody in Lebanon [who is a HNWI or UHNWI]. Almost 95 percent of our clients are HNWIs, and a good chunk are UHNWIs. So I would say, yes, there is wealth in the Lebanese community, and we are talking traditional wealth, not even new wealth or suspect wealth.

E   So the rich in this country are getting richer, as you alluded to before?

I’m not sure that the rich are getting richer in Lebanon. I was talking about other areas. Lebanon, unfortunately, has been in so many economic and political crises. Also, you have people who made a lot of money in Africa or in [other] Arab countries, but situations [there] have worsened. So you have many Lebanese people who are very wealthy, but [also] have financial troubles of some sort because their businesses are [based] in oil-rich countries, and those countries are suffering.

E   Since the concentration of wealth accelerated globally in the 1990s, and with the recession in the 2000s, some theories of trickle-down wealth have lost credence. From a wealth manager’s perspective, are stories of wealth and getting rich today still encouraging people to believe they can get rich too, or are they getting more fed up with the inequality between the top and the rest of society? 

If we look at what happened recently in the world, with the election of Trump and with Brexit, I think these were signs of some kind of revolt against these inequalities. Although this looks like a paradox in the case of Brexit, which will impoverish Britain, and with Trump being a billionaire — [ordinary] people grab what [opportunities] they can to express their views. There certainly is some kind of frustration in the middle class against inequality. Such behavior, [not accepting unequal treatment] is even observed in experiments with monkeys. So imagine [how it is] with people. Even though I believe that the middle class is benefiting from the growth that has been occurring almost everywhere in the world, it’s clear that the concentration of wealth creates frustration, and we saw that people were ready to sabotage [their own economic standing in protest]. So, yes, inequality is an issue.

E   How does this make your life as wealth manager more difficult?

You know, one has to separate things. We’re dedicated to a certain target [group] of clients. We have a niche, which is serving corporate entrepreneurs for finance and investment banking, and serving high-net-worth individuals and institutions on wealth management issues. We believe our clients are very good people; some of them are very successful entrepreneurs and have businesses where hundreds of families are living off the job opportunities they are giving them. I’m very comfortable with this, and I think [this also applies to] our contribution to society as FFA. We have 120 families living a good standard of life [because their breadwinners work here]. I have people who started working here as trainees in order to pay for their own university tuition. Today, they still work here and have children for whom we are paying university tuition. So, we’re contributing to the social welfare of the country. I don’t believe this story of the divorce of the elites. Yes, we have good people and bad people, but you have rich people who are doing a lot for their community, and rich people who are very egoistic and don’t deserve [to be rich]. But you know, we are not here to judge. If there is a God, he is gonna do it.

[pullquote]It’s clear that the concentration of wealth creates frustration[/pullquote]

E   It seems that as a responsible business leader, you have to not only take economic issues into consideration, but also human behavior, such as the importance of equality.

I agree. In my family, they accuse me of being a leftist, but I am not actually. What I mean is that you have good people and bad people among the rich and the poor, and that’s it. Everyone in his place has to contribute to the welfare of others.

E   You say that FFA has 120 employees today. How many did you have 20 years ago?

We were four.

E   One of the repercussions of the recession years after 2008 was that clients asked for lower fees and took their wealth managers to task for not achieving expected high returns. Some clients even turned away, it seems, to manage their own stock portfolios and so forth. How is the situation today? Are people trusting their wealth managers?

I think that integrity, professionalism, and transparency are the key issues here. We at FFA are not geniuses, but we have good people. They have good education, they are intelligent people — in our recruitment process we have tests because we believe that IQ is important — and more importantly, we value the integrity and moral values of the people we have on staff.

Very often people felt that they were ripped off, not that somebody had stolen money from their account, but that they were mis-sold on some assets because it was in the best interests of the wealth manager or the bank, not in the best interest of the client. They also saw that some of the fees were hidden, not disclosed enough, etc. Of course we have regulations — and in Lebanon, with the Capital Markets Authority and the central bank [Banque du Liban] being active, we have much higher regulations [than many other jurisdictions] in terms of disclosure and separating by category of clients — but you still have a moral obligation. We want to treat our clients fairly and professionally, and give them what we believe is best for them. Very often we are wrong, but at least clients know that we have acted in good faith. They are likely satisfied, because we very rarely lose clients and we still acquire new ones, meaning word of mouth is doing very well for us.

E   But can’t investors manage their own assets, just as well as those using the services of a wealth manager? Isn’t all the information available practically for free if one only looks?

How can you do it yourself? You need somebody to screen the markets for you and identify the right investment opportunities, to follow up on your investments, to execute your transactions — and make sure that every transaction is executed properly — and to safeguard your assets. This is our role, and we need to be paid for that. We are quite flexible but not very flexible on our fees, because people have to understand that we have to pay for our expenses. We’re transparent, and actually, we like our clients to be informed because it makes the conversation better and easier. The more that our clients are aware, well informed, and sophisticated, the better it is for us. We’re here to advise them. We want to have conversations and are happy when they challenge our ideas because when we reach a conclusion and decide to invest somewhere, or do something together, it’s a joint decision, and this is very different.

E   Do you need malpractice insurance as a wealth manager?

There is [such insurance], but we try to avoid malpractice. This is why for us HR recruitment is very important. If there is malpractice, it’s not going to be me personally [who is liable for it] — it is going to be someone in the team who might have misled [a client] or where misconduct might come about. It’s therefore very important to have people who have integrity, and this is where we put a lot of emphasis.

[pullquote]We’re at a stage in Lebanon where we need an active local market. This is an effort that must be carried out by the authorities[/pullquote]

E   We all remember stories of banks like Barings who were ruined by their traders. Do such stories make you worried at night?

[Being] ruined by traders [does not worry me] because of regulations, and because we’re very conservative. There’s nothing that we could do on our own account that could ruin us. But I’m worried about [the possibility] that a broker or private banker would mistreat a client, and that we would therefore have to pay for this [person’s] errors. It’s very important for us that this never happens. And do you know how many lawsuits we have had in 20 years? Five, maximum. This is famous as the industry where you have the most lawsuits on earth. And how many lawsuits did we lose? None. I tell you why.

E   Because of the state of the Lebanese juridical system?

Not at all. The only reason was that when we have made a mistake, we don’t even wait for the client to sue us, we tell them, ‘it’s our fault’ or that it’s a shared responsibility, and we’ll find a way to [rectify the situation]. However, sometimes there are people who undertake a lawsuit as a business decision [to get extra money]; in such a case, we don’t care and pursue the matter to the end. But when we make mistakes, we are ready to pay for them. That’s why we want to minimize mistakes, and very often mistakes originate with people who do not follow rules or regulations, do not follow the procedures, or sometimes from people who do not have the moral fiber. However, I can tell you that today all our people are very professional and very educated. And let me tell you that we not only choose our employees, we also choose our clients. We do screenings of our clients for anti-money laundering and combating terrorism finance etc., but we also look at their background because we don’t want bad people [to be our clients]. Sometimes we were wrong, and we [ended up] firing clients.

E   We also are trying to gauge the development potential of Beirut as a wealth management hub for the Middle East. As far as I understand, there is no central directive or regulator for wealth managers in the region such as the MIFID directive in the EU or the SEC in the US. Does Beirut stand a chance in serving as a wealth management hub for this region?

The KSA is different [from Lebanon in wealth management] because the KSA has a domestic market. A domestic market means domestic securities, bonds etc., which create a lot of activity. This is what we don’t have in Lebanon. We are striving to have it, [but] it’s very difficult. By today, we should’ve had a dynamic stock exchange, but we haven’t [achieved this]. We have an investment banking arm [at FFA], and we’re getting lots of mandates, but we have to refuse mandates of companies that have reached a certain point where they have family issues and need to do something about them. We’re at a stage in Lebanon where we need an active local market. This is an effort that must be carried out by the authorities. One of the sectors that we believe could be a trigger is infrastructure. This is why we’re putting large efforts into the infrastructure sector.

E   In your view, does the newly adopted PPP law play a role in this context?

The PPP law was adopted, and it is a very beautiful law. We have ideas about how the infrastructure in Lebanon has to be financed. We have been lobbying hard for things to happen, and we even managed to get an amendment into this PPP law that allows the use of the securitization law, (Law 705). What we are seeing, [however] is that a small group of people will monopolize and control these infrastructure projects, which will prevent the public offerings that we would like to do. This isn’t very encouraging. These are very lucrative projects; there is a lot of money to be made for investors, for lenders, for mezzanine [debt] holders, for equity holders.

E   But if the infrastructure projects are controlled by a small group, doesn’t that mean that the competitiveness of the biddings would be limited?

Let’s forget about the bidding, [and instead, look at the benefits of the projects]. We already know what is in the market, and there will be very good margins. We see a future in wind and solar, electricity production from fossil fuels, and with FSU (floating storage unit) — those boats that convert liquefied gas etc. These projects are useful for the country and they can bring in FDI. We have a problem in this country, and this problem is the balance of payment. We can solve this fast by getting inflows of investment, and this is not hot money. This is long-term money and will be invested where it’s needed, meaning it will create jobs. Also, there will be economies for the economy, meaning there will be less imports of oil and more gas, so that the [energy] bill will be lower, and there will be renewable energy; you’ll improve efficiency and lower the budget deficit. As you know, the state is paying the difference [between power generation cost and] the electricity tariffs. Also, we have to solve our traffic congestion issue, so we have to do toll roads. All the money [for these investments] can be private. It mustn’t be political money because the politicians do not actually invest. They just share the profits, and get the money from loans, and so on. This is not what they want. We’re really lobbying to, at least, let the public have a share of these projects. There are foreign investors, funds, and institutional investors, who are telling us, ‘bring us the [opportunities for] investments; we have money to deploy in Lebanon on infrastructure.’ Of course there are high returns, at the expense of the state, but this money comes from abroad, and we won’t have small groups benefit from it. We want foreign investment and equal opportunity for the public, where everybody can be [involved], and this can start the stock exchange, we can issue notes, bonds, whatever.

E   Will that be of equal benefit to the wealth management clients in Lebanon?

Of course. Our clients will bring back money from their foreign investments and invest it [here, in Lebanon].  We’re doing some studies for some of the projects, and you can do sub-loans, mezzanine — of course the seniority will go to bank lenders — and then, you have the equity investors. You can have 12 to 15 percent return on those [investments and therefore] people will bring their money back to Lebanon. This is very important. Why would the central bank subsidize everything? No, let’s bring the money, and if there are subsidies, let the subsidies benefit investors, not sponsors. This is a strong message I’m giving because I’m in touch with reality now. This is the first time that we have told people that we have money, and nobody wants our money.

Let’s be positive. We have a huge opportunity, and a lot of good people in Lebanon. We’re talking to people to make them understand that this infrastructure investment is for the good of the country and that the opportunity of infrastructure investment will bring private money from Lebanese expatriates, from Lebanese residents who have money outside of Lebanon, from foreign funds, and from supra-national [institutions]. We talked to them all, and they like our schemes. They say, ‘yes, go and bring the projects.’ This is an immediate opportunity for the country, it’s money flowing in, it’s job creation. We need to do it.

[pullquote]We have a problem in this country, and this problem is the balance of payment. We can solve this very fast by getting inflows of investment[/pullquote]

E   Are there barriers from HIFPA, international politics, or fears about security that still have to be overcome?

Yes of course, but this is why you have high returns. Today, for example, renewable energy in other countries will have a purchase price between three and five cents. It’s going to be much higher in Lebanon, but this is fine because it’s still much better than what we’re doing now, and if you don’t have these profit margins, you don’t get the investments. So the state, meaning the Lebanese people, are going to sacrifice by remunerating [investors] for these projects — let it benefit the country, and let it benefit the public. It’s a very important issue.

September 15, 2017 0 comments
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Brand Voice

Rural entreprise

by Victoria Lupton September 14, 2017
written by Victoria Lupton

“Agriculture at the National Museum? No, we don’t have anything about that here.” The answer was definitive. I was visiting the museum in search of traces inscribed in stone or clay of the millennia-old relationship between Lebanon’s people and the land. As it turned out, there is not a single farmer represented in Lebanon’s National Museum. Thousands of years harnessing nature and all we have to show for it is an ancient section of cedar tree and a pre-Common Era terracotta figurine of a child carrying a goose.

This very absence of agriculture at the center of the nation’s heritage is an apt signifier of the state of rural enterprise in Lebanon as a whole: overlooked, undervalued, and yet, fundamental to its history and social fabric.

For millennia, people have worked Lebanon’s land in order to provide for themselves and their families. From the monumental staircases that the Phoenicians carved into the slopes of Mount Lebanon, to the Bekaa Valley, once the granary of Rome, local people have engaged in ecologically sustainable integrated farming. Economic and environmental imperatives have been broadly aligned, as farmers have harnessed Lebanon’s natural resources — difficult but prodigiously generous terrains of steep slopes and red earth — in the knowledge that safeguarding the land’s fertility for future generations is necessary to economic success.

A century and a half of displacement and rural depopulation, changing trade relations, and economic instability have broken down this compact. Agriculture now needs to be environmentally unsustainable in order to be economically sustainable. The source of Lebanon’s sustenance and ubiquitous symbol of belonging to the land — the village — has been hollowed out, leaving communities struggling to support their families, let alone a disastrously deteriorating natural world.

Since 1997, SEAL (Social & Economic Action for Lebanon) has revitalized these communities with small and strategic investments in ambitious and sustainable nature-based social enterprises. For 20 years, the Lebanese diaspora in the US has stood at the forefront of this mission; now it is time for those in Lebanon who have the means to join in.

The challenge

Hundreds of generations of Lebanese farmers have sustained flourishing rural economies by combining ancient techniques with the Lebanese flair for innovation. From fishing along the coast and banana groves lining the southern seafront to olives and citrus fruits in coastal areas, pear and apple orchards rising up steep mountainsides, and mixed cultivation in the Bekaa Valley and vineyards further east, a strikingly diverse mosaic of food production ecosystems are packed into 10,452 square kilometers of land.

It took only a few decades of state underinvestment in rural development, rising land prices, and asymmetric trade terms to create the dire economic conditions faced by rural people today. Lebanon’s adoption of a market-based, services-oriented liberal economy came at a price: the demise of small and medium-sized enterprise farms that are unable to compete with food imports subsidized in their country of origin. These farmers form the vast majority of the agricultural production sector in Lebanon, and instead of being supported by the Lebanese government, agriculture comprises only 0.4 percent of national spending.

To put this 0.4 percent into context: agriculture contributes 4.5 percent of GDP. Agriculture and food production are the primary source of income for 11 percent of the Lebanese.

This has allowed environmental concerns to become unmoored from the economic. Lacking clean water for irrigation due to the absence of proper sewage networks, farmers are pushed to dig illegal wells. Lacking training and market access support, farmers flood their crops with unsuitable pesticides, leading to the proliferation of resistant strains of diseases and affecting the ability of Lebanese farmers to access international markets. And out of desperation linked to dwindling fish stocks, fishermen resort to using dynamite and illegal nets, despite the clear long-term unsustainability of this practice, which has already devastated coastal marine life .

Add to this the closure of the final overland export route through Syria in 2013 (the closure of the Syria-Jordan border at Nasib threatened up to a third of Lebanese agricultural sales, leaving only the option of sea routes that are 10 times more expensive than overland ones), and the profits from agriculture are barely even covering the high input costs. The reality in 2017 is a country where most Lebanese farmers are only waiting to sell their land and live off the proceeds.

Rural rescue

It does not need to be this way. We all dream of seeing a revived Lebanon rising from the ashes of economic stagnation and soaring inequality. And a simple vote of confidence is enough to transform a frustrated would-be migrant into a committed rural entrepreneur, restoring their dignity along the way.

Members of the Lebanese diaspora saw an opportunity to make this a reality. Twenty years ago, a group of highly motivated entrepreneurs from the Lebanese diaspora — themselves all too aware of the pressures compelling Lebanese to leave the country — began to join forces with entrepreneurs in Lebanon’s rural areas to create SEAL. SEAL was born from a dream, to replace a dystopian present with the prosperous and responsible stewardship of natural resources in order to ensure a dignified economic future for the Lebanese who choose to stay on their land.

Supporting rural communities to stay on their lands is effective on at least three levels. First, agriculture is the main source of livelihood for 29 percent of those living below the poverty line. Rural development can ensure a more inclusive national economy that addresses the current crisis of rising poverty and inequality.

This social impact is further amplified by the fact that farmers are an ageing demographic in Lebanon. In the absence of state pensions and a functioning hospice system, nature-based enterprise is a key way for older people to continue providing for themselves and their families into old age.

Second, farmers’ movements are well documented in Lebanon’s history. The peasants of Mount Lebanon began to revolt in 1858 over economic hardship, exploitation of labor, and the decreased availability of land, which continued with the declaration of a republic in 1859 by the peasant leader (and, notably, artisan entrepreneur) Tanios Chahine, enforced by a 1,000-strong militia. The revolt ultimately led to the 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war, which stretched across the Bekaa to Damascus, cost an estimated 23,000 lives, and permanently changed Lebanon’s sectarian makeup.

The protests in 1973 by tobacco farmers from the south — largely overshadowed by the war which broke out in 1975 — were equally important and the result of declining tobacco prices due in part to weak government regulation of import prices, within the context of peasants forced off their land and into cities or into rural wage labor. More recently, we have seen armed conflict between cannabis growers and the army in Baalbek-Hermel, and protests by apple farmers last year, who burnt their produce in the streets in response to the low demand for apples. Uneven development across the territory and rural-urban inequalities continue to form a basis for unrest, and pose a barrier to national stability and unity.

Finally, rural communities are the best guarantors of the land. When properly supported, those working in nature-based social enterprise have the greatest incentives to protect the environment. In the absence of agricultural zoning regulations (restrictions on land use to protect farmlands) by the Lebanese government, rural entrepreneurs are forced to leave their lands, leaving them in the hands of property speculators, whose industrial and residential developments ensure neither the social fabric of our rural areas, nor a regard for the natural environment. Such a situation is a disaster for Lebanon’s poor, for Lebanon’s natural and social environment, and for Lebanon’s food security.

Bringing change

SEAL matches rural entrepreneurs working for the benefit of their communities, and committed to producing good, clean, and fair products locally, with grant financing from private entrepreneurs. Acting in the same way as an investment manager — with an eye to the financial sustainability of the project, the social and environmental impact per dollar, and the viability of the business model — SEAL invests in the most ambitious and under-resourced nature-based enterprises across the country.

Fouad Abdo, the 50 year-old founder of Le Bon Lait cooperative in Akkar (north Lebanon) is a typical SEAL grantee. Enthusiastic and committed to his region, (“something in the air here makes it impossible for me to leave,”) he founded the cooperative in 2007 and makes natural cheese and dairy products. Ten years on, and in one of the poorest areas of Lebanon (53 percent of the population in Akkar lives below the poverty line), Le Bon Lait now hires a mixed group of 13 women and men from different backgrounds.

In 2015, SEAL purchased a refrigerated truck for the cooperative, allowing them to sell to supermarkets as far as Beirut, to confectioners such as Hallab, as well as door-to-door in the local area. This truck — a $34,000 investment — has allowed the cooperative to transport and sell a 50 percent increase in produce (from 20 to 30 tons). Staff have been able to double their earnings from $800 to $1600 per month, and seven new employees were hired as a direct result, including several women who are working for the first time. As Abdo says, “It’s important for women to be productive. Women didn’t used to have any work except helping their husbands with the land, and working in the house. Since the women have started working here, their personalities have changed — they feel they’re productive, they’re important. They’re helping their husbands with the costs of the house.” Abdo’s remarks shows how SEAL’s model of grassroots economic development not only helps people attain economic stability, it also produces a more equal society.

As with all of SEAL’s factory projects, there is a second layer of impact in the form of income for the seven dairy farmers whose produce supplies for the Le Bon Lait factory.

SEAL’s work stems from the belief that it takes only a nudge to move a group of women from net food consumers to net producers, and help them make money to send their children to school. Joumana al-Taki from Wadi el-Taym (Bekaa) is a case in point. At age 29, she decided to enter the workforce for the first time by training to grind zaatar bought from local farmers and setting up a cooperative to ensure that the benefits of the production spread throughout the community. Thirteen years on, 24 women across religious spectrum produce two tons per month of their special zaatar, walnut, and almond mix. SEAL purchased $23,000 worth of industrial equipment including mixers and roasters for the cooperative, and the impact of this investment has been revolutionary. Production has increased by a factor of 10 (from 200 kilograms before their grant), the cooperative regularly sells all of its natural produce at premium prices, and they are planning to start exporting in 2018. The incomes of the 24 women doubled purely as a result of SEAL’s funding, allowing them to contribute to the family purse, build their independence, and support local farmers.

SEAL’s work also extends to Lebanon’s fishing communities (having distributed almost 9,000 nets to fishermen along the Lebanese coast), and to small-scale irrigation projects. The small town of Anjar in the Bekaa was settled in 1939 by several thousand Armenian refugees, and, according to local lore, there was said to have been a single fig tree amid what was a dry, desolate landscape at the time. Almost 80 years later, there are over a million trees in Anjar. However, severe water shortages have recently threatened agriculture in the area. This year, SEAL supported the installation of a drip irrigation system and the deepening of the local well to 120 meters with presidential permission. The new system will lead to water savings of 20 percent, and an increase in earnings for 35 farmers working on the irrigated lands. As Vartkes Khosian, the mayor of the municipality, says, “The situation all over Lebanon is the same; everybody is rushing to urban areas because in villages there is no opportunity. The government doesn’t create job opportunities for young people to stay in their villages.”

Call to arms

In 20 years, SEAL has implemented 125 projects, including almost 40 irrigation initiatives, a major program distributing 92,000 rootstocks to upgrade fruit tree supply chains, an innovative biocoal project creating energy-efficient blocks of fuel from olive pits in the south, and a factory producing orange blossom water that has farmers, who 10 years ago called the blossoms “the black flower,” now planting new orchards. The projects are non-religious, non-politically affiliated, and spread throughout the entire country. They are united by an approach that sees community-based enterprises as viable businesses that need nothing so much as careful incubation, and an injection of liquidity. Because you may need a doctor occasionally, but you need a farmer three times a day.

During times of urgent need in Lebanon, SEAL has been ready to provide strategic and targeted support to those rural entrepreneurs best able to leverage the investment. Directly after the July War in 2006, SEAL acted quickly, raising its largest ever amount of funds, and investing in livelihood rehabilitation clinics across the country, helping rural people, and particularly women, rebuild their lives and empower themselves. Today, Lebanon is at a similar crisis point, with poverty at its highest level since the end of the war in 1990, and Oxfam, an international confederation of charitable organizations focused on alleviating global poverty, estimating an increase in poverty by 66 percent since 2011 alone. In response, SEAL has seen a significant increase in demand for its funds, and is scaling up its activities.

There is enormous opportunity in nature-based enterprise, and in order to maximize its benefit to communities, farmers need the support of like-minded and entrepreneurial individuals across the globe. In this, SEAL’s 20th year, the organization is issuing a call to all entrepreneurial individuals in Lebanon: to join hands with rural entrepreneurs and be ready to participate in breathing new life into our countryside, rather than leaving it to property speculation and rural exodus. It is time for Lebanon to take advantage of its considerable human and territorial capital, and to bring a revived present to its mythological landscape.

September 14, 2017 0 comments
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Special ReportWealth management

All the makings of

by Thomas Schellen September 14, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

It is common to associate wealth management with private banks, family offices, brokers, asset managers, and other financial intermediaries. But the structuring and transmission of wealth also touches upon many that are outside of the financial trade.

Interactions between essential sectors in an economy and smaller surrounding activities are normal. Some globally significant industries, such as the natural resources and mining industry, are known for involving significant ancillary industrial and service activities. Others, like tourism and hospitality, have deliberately nurtured the perception that they not only add directly to GDP, but also do so indirectly, and through vaguely “induced” contributions.

While outside of the real economy, the financial industry is interrelated with practically every sector of it. Thus, as some European asset managers argued publicly in the aftermath of the great recession, professional asset management is a “vital source” of economic growth, by linking investors in search of appropriate savings vehicles with the financing needs of the real economy.

“Total investment fund assets represented 66 percent of the European Union’s GDP at end-2010, whereas total assets professionally managed amount to more than 100 percent of EU GDP,” a 2011 paper in the OECD Journal pointed out as evidence for asset management’s “crucial contribution” to the European economy by enabling capital flows in service of productivity, providing liquidity needed for sound capital markets, and securing tools by which investors could achieve their objectives.

When it comes to wealth management — defined in broader terms than asset management — not all interrelations with the real economy and potentially positive interactions with other sectors may be as obvious, however, nor receive government support for enhancing the value they could bring to a nation’s economic output. If wealth management is regarded from a perspective of its direct and indirect contributions to GDP, the importance of indirect wealth management activities, such as legal services in the structuring of assets, tax and accounting services, and estate planning, jumps out.   

Lebanese advantages

For local law professionals, wealth management is a field of great importance, even if lawyers would not get directly involved in the management of wealth itself, explains Chadia el-Meouchi, managing partner of EBSM (Etude Badri et Salim El Meouchi) law firm in Beirut. “Wealth management is a banking and financial activity, so it’s not something that law firms will typically do. From a lawyer’s business perspective, you support either the investors, or the institutions that are taking those services, so that’s what we do [at EBSM]. We understand the wealth management business very well, and can provide all the legal services and support for that business. We  give a lot of advice on wills and succession issues, as well as on the tax on structuring wealth management assets,” she tells Executive.

In this context, the circumstances for wealth management already seem to offer some potential for growth, as Meouchi points out several legal advantages that exist in Lebanon. One is the fiducie law, which is similar to a trust law. “Under this law, banks and financial institutions can act as a fiduciary, and you can place your assets with them — but not any kind of assets, there have to be conditions. The bank will then manage those assets, with specific instructions as to what happens in case of bankruptcy, or inheritance. Also, under the fiducie law, there is no disclosure on the ultimate beneficiary,” she says.

According to her, favorable circumstances for the management of wealth in Lebanon exist through measures, like the holding law and the offshore law. “We can do a lot of structuring of different assets [under these laws] to put them in the most tax-advantageous vehicles for the clients,” she says, before adding that another major advantage resides in the Lebanese banking secrecy law, even after it has been weakened to accommodate anti-money laundering and combating of terrorism finance. “We are still a country that benefits from banking secrecy, and this is usually quite attractive to clients,” she concludes. 

The legal attractions of placing wealth under the Lebanese jurisdiction are very real, confirms Mohammed Alem, managing partner in law firm Alem Associates. “The system is designed to provide a very good environment for local wealth management. It’s not taxed to have money in Lebanon. You’re shielded from any review by the Ministry of Finance, and even your own laws forbid your tax authority from finding out what your real tax declaration is,” Alem tells Executive, furthermore pointing out that residents enjoy a large amount of freedom in aspects related to taxation or to personal transactions.

No fear of the latest taxes

Even with regard to the latest increases and new measures in taxation, private bankers and law experts seem to see little that could disturb the existing peace in this area. Charles Salem, head of private banking and wealth management at BLF says that the Lebanese measures are merely following an international trend to full tax transparency. He sees this as having positive ramifications for private banking and the wealth management industry, in moving from an off-shore to an on-shore model, and in adapting to a fully transparent and internationally accepted new environment.

“International recognition is very important for your business, especially in private banking today,” he says, reasoning that the transition to full transparency will not be difficult to achieve for private banks. In his view, clients of Lebanese private banks, many of whom are used to operating in transparent environments from other countries they have dealings in, will be more comfortable in a regulated world that resembles what they are used to.

Based on measuring impacts of recently implementing taxation for revenues from foreign investments by Lebanese residents, Toufic Awad of Audi Private Bank does not anticipate major repercussions for private banking, such as significant loss of clients, or withdrawal of assets under management because of new or higher taxation at the rates imposed in 2017. “I don’t think that any investor in today’s world should, or could, avoid taxation altogether,” he says, adding that one has to agree — overall taxation in Lebanon is still reasonable.

EBSM’s Meouchi also sees the Lebanese tax environment as favorable when compared to tax regimes in Europe and many other regions, even as she stresses the importance of having a reliable environment when it comes to imposition of tax duties. “If you keep changing tax regimes, there is uncertainty, and businesses start asking if there are going to be more taxes and additional increases. This creates a sort of instability and discomfort. But relative to other tax systems, our [taxes in Lebanon] are still relatively benign,” she says.

In her understanding, other issues than taxes act as detriments to growth of the wealth management industry in Lebanon. “When you think about the wealth management industry, the real problem is the market as a whole. You might have the best regulations, and the best tax system, whatever you want, however, there are other, very important factors, [namely] if your economy is so unstable, if there is so much corruption, and if there is instability in the judicial sector. These factors are what I regard as the real impediment and obstacle to a flourishing wealth management industry in Lebanon,” Meouchi elaborates.

[pullquote]“You’re shielded from any review by the Ministry of Finance, and even your own laws forbid your tax authority from finding out what your real tax declaration is”[/pullquote]

The challenge that remains

It is critical for wealth management, as for everything else in Lebanon, to set the spotlight onto the need for fundamental reforms, Alem also says. “There is, of course, a lot to be done to develop Lebanon into an international hub [in wealth management], but first we have to re-consolidate the trust in the Lebanese banking system and its financial position. The real threat to the Lebanese financial system is by infrastructure issues, by deep issue how the economy is structured, and how you can maintain a spending level [as we have] with a loss-making operation at all levels,” he confirms.

When approached from angles of the country’s social and economic structure, wealth management in Lebanon is entwined with the strong role of family businesses, says Hania Hammoud, who is a family business and wealth advisor as second generation member in the Hammoud Law Firm in Beirut. Lebanon as a country in the Arab world is influenced by cultural taboos against planning for future, and the Lebanese family is constructed in ways that are close to Arabic culture, she notes.

“This is why western wealth management methods and tools practiced by many large international consulting firms don’t totally respond to the family wealth needs and requirements,” Hammoud tells Executive, arguing that cultural and legal impediments both affect the implementation of the western family wealth management approach in Lebanon. “Therefore, it’s paramount to adapt tools and techniques in a way that fit the family and country’s needs and requirements,” she says.

In her view, this spells out as need for legal action. Family businesses and family wealth management require attention from the Lebanese government and Parliament, by way of changing or amending laws to better protect family wealth and to encourage family businesses to stay in the market, she says. “We urgently need a huge constructive reform of the applicable Lebanese laws, namely [the] personal [status] law, [and the] business and corporate law, which don’t respond to the current and future economic and social needs.”

Family business is the backbone of the Lebanese economy, and this must be taken into account through long-term thinking and incorporation of concepts, such as a family’s emotional commitment to their business, to the management of the family’s wealth, Hammoud emphasizes. “Wealth centricity, by itself, is not enough.”

In the right direction

There is wide agreement in the legal and business communities over the need to modernize and develop the laws that regulate matters stretching from creation of companies and bankruptcy rules to inheritances and equality in questions of citizens’ personal statuses. If legal initiatives reconcile between globally accepted principles and the specificities of the Lebanese terms of existence, measures could be a boost to the — just awakening — Lebanese wealth management industry as to other activities in the economy. And since the financial business of wealth management interacts with other businesses, development of this particular industry appears to have good potential for its own multiplier effect.

[pullquote]“Wealth management is definitely an activity that could grow in Lebanon, but you need an underlying fundamental infrastructure for that, and I would say regulations are very important in this regard”[/pullquote]

When compared with other potential and emerging wealth management locations in the Middle East, the cause of Lebanon seems neither lost, nor destined for automatic perfection. What encourages contemplation of the country’s specific potentials as a wealth management hub is the fact that steps in the right direction have already been taken. As FFA’s Riachi explains, “Wealth management includes many businesses. Usually these are entities that are licensed and have the right to do specific kind of businesses according to their license, such as advising, managing, providing custody, executing, etc. Individuals are not licensed [as wealth managers], but they have to pass certain exams. These are mandated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), and the central bank [Banque du Liban]. Today, you have very strict regulations. [As a corporate financial intermediary] you have to be licensed and regulated by the CMA, and you have to apply very straightforward rules and procedures.”

Lawyer Meouchi gives a similar assessment. “Wealth management is definitely an activity that could grow in Lebanon,” she says. “But you need an underlying fundamental infrastructure for that, and I would say regulations are very important in this regard. We’re lucky to have good regulations today, as the Capital Markets Authority is playing a positive and active role.

“From the perspective of a legal mind, the CMA shows flexibility toward foreign investors to the extent that we’ve seen them come up with ‘tolerated practices’ and other things that aren’t written in the law, if the laws do not enable foreign investors. Seen against all the other institutions that we face in Lebanon, both the central bank and the CMA are doing a great job on the level of developing things to encourage foreign investors. I think what we really need to work on is getting a more stable economy, less corruption, and making the country generally more attractive.”

September 14, 2017 0 comments
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Cover storyReform

Program for a nation or national myth?

by Executive Editors September 13, 2017
written by Executive Editors

The egg as symbol of rebirth is powerful. It can inspire. In the case of Lebanon, the egg is more than a representation of fertility because it plays into the enduring myth that the constituents of this nation will rise from the ashes of their destruction. This myth also conceals a warning and question, however: Will the new be fundamentally different and better, or is there a danger that the new will be just as vain as the old? This question is rising to  an existential level for Lebanese democracy and its spectrum of—not yet fully formed—anti-establishment political movements, parties, programs, and coalitions.

Without assuming that any type of research, let alone journalistic, can provide more than a rough prediction of the winding story that might lead from the 2016 presidential election to parliamentary elections in the first half of 2018, it still is non-negotiable to try and put such a story together. It is a must-write because this story could turn out to be the largest game changer in the Lebanese state’s history. In other words, it could prove more decisive for the safe future and prosperity of Lebanon than the transition from the French Mandate of the 1920s to independence in 1943, more corrosive to legacy power structures than the upheavals of the 1950s, more advantageous to national wealth creation than the golden years of the 1960s, more confused than the multi-factional serial disputes of the 70s and 80s, and more pivotal than the incompletely implemented Taif Accord of 1989.

Speculatively, a successful 2018 tipping point leading to a sea of change in the Lebanese economic reality, political authenticity, and national identity could, in the hindsight of historic studies commemorating the Lebanese Republic’s 150th anniversary around 2070, be seen as the event that set society on a track of productive development. It would provide the possiblity to overcome and undo all the damage that external interferences, domestic assassinations, governmental vacuums, usurpations of power, and peaks of corruption  have brought upon Lebanon in the 28-and-a-half years between Taif and the 2018 elections.   

The counter scenarios can be as extreme. The elections might not move the status quo by even a single iota. In discussions with Executive, sentiments representative of the anti-establishment—the most politically engaged population group— reflected the whole spectrum. We heard a view that this upcoming election was the chance—with poor odds of winning—of a century; we heard confident opining that the coming election would fulfill or exceed expectations for a productive change; we were also confronted with fears that any elected opposition would be wholly ineffective, or that the elections would be cancelled by existentially threatened leaders under any pretense or self-engineered threat. One opinion leader thought that, because of the deterioration of the Lebanese mindset into an extreme cynicism and acceptance of intolerable national circumstance, such cancellation would even go unchallenged in what he lambasted as a mix of over-assimilation and under-engagement in the majority of civil society.

Opportunity and threat

Ahead of—in the views of some more than in the views of others—an all-decisive election, the anti-establishment forces appear to be moving in three directions that may or may not interrelate productively. One activity that comes from new political movements is the building of election machines: the apparatus to campaign, draw in voters through participatory program-building surveys, fundraise and influence media, assess issues and election districts where majorities can be fought for with a reasonable chance of winning, etc.

The second sphere of activity is the development of political and economic programs, position papers, and codes of ethics. Today’s political aspirants are pursuing this road more than their predecessors, saying that detailed programs will be the only, or most important, competitive edge in the coming elections. The third sphere of activity is talk. A considerable number of hopeful politicos are busy with the perilous task of figuring out who they are and what they want. This is perilous because this still existing indecision and ceaseless debating among anti-establishment actors can turn into a spiral of unproductive introspection. On the other hand, it could provide the training to produce convincing arguments for the coming debates in front of the voting public. It could also help identify and energize people who can credibly sell the arguments of the anti-establishment in public debates. The outcome of the current introspection and retreats among civil society might hinge on one factor: Can this fragmented assembly of individuals overcome the barriers of self-interested competition among wannabe alpha animals that are unwilling to concede claims to top roles? Will some activists confess to, and implement, the will to be political water carriers in opposition campaigns, in exchange for being able to contribute to the campaigns behind the scenes and make an election victory possible?

All of this is in the realm of possibility and is not an exercise in rediscovering the gravity rules of politics. In reviewing scenarios and possible trajectories of Lebanese political and economic realities, one should perhaps resist the temptation to see Lebanon as a standalone case that is not influenced by political trends in Western democracies. It certainly seems true that the Lebanese case is an outlier of democratic societies and has one-of-a-kind aspects, such as institutionalized confessional structures that led to mutual paralysis. But, on the other hand, Lebanese political minds are clearly exposed to, and aware of, the deep changes in the old games of politics: changes that have germinated in the years since the great recession and marinated the populaces and politicians over several years. From changes in the scientific side of propaganda and manipulation of voting outcomes, to changes in the willingness to try out untested solutions. The political worlds tumbled in 2014, 15, and 16, and there is no reason to assume that these changes will be less radical in future—on the contrary, they might only be more pronounced in coming decades.

Non-traditional political actors

This international development is reflected in the names that influence and inform the thinking of local political actors (whether they are imbued with positive or negative connotations is irrelevant in this regard). Names and events, such as Trump, Brexit, Syria, Podemos, Five-Star, Le Pen, De Vos, and Macron made appearances in discussions which Executive had with Lebanese anti-establishment movements and their leading ideologues, or sometimes second-tier representatives.

As UK-based political commentator and journalist Steve Richards theorizes in his recent book, “The Rise of the Outsiders,” people from outside of the political mainstream in many countries have risen to more influence when compared with the pre-recession world. These outsiders “across the democratic world are intimidatingly strong, and yet transparently weak” in a confounding combination of winning power and bringing historic change while at the same time exhibiting silliness, inconsistency, and fragility that make them both vulnerable and dangerous.

This seems to be an apt description of the anti-establishment outsiders in Lebanon as it is for those in Europe. Outsiders are not necessarily elected, but they effect change even if they are kept at bay by mainstream parties. At the same time, they demonstrate the weaknesses, fissures, and fault lines that exist in mainstream parties.

The Lebanese political mainstream is in many ways an oxymoron because core components of the mainstream in Western democracies—institutional party machines and programs—are not among their props. People, specifically dynasties and tribal heirs with legacy communal obligations and loyalties, are. Thus, political programs and ideas are as unhelpful and counterproductive in the traditional political game here as skis on a cow and even political institutionalism only leads to disturbances when a dynastic pattern dictates that a nephew or grandson-in-law of the za’im become the helmsman of the machine.

At the same time, though, the narrative of outsiders versus establishment, of the politically inexperienced against the isolated and self-absorbed elite, with all its sub-plots and narrative twists seen in the admired democracies of the Western hemisphere, is very much the same narrative as exists in Lebanon. This country also has self-proclaimed outsiders taking on the political insiders whose power base is in a state of erosion from disenchantment. This could also be disenchantment with an undeliverable promise, such as full employment for all, reduction of immigration numbers in a country with open borders, or an end to refugee arrivals.

Whether the disenchantment is justified or not is secondary—most Lebanese will of course claim it is strongly justified, but so will protest voters in Europe and the US. What matters is the storyline. The storyline of disappointment with a government that cannot manage to deliver the possible or impossible and the simultaneous counter-story, on part of the outsider, offering an unambiguous improvement of a problem—but simultaneously camouflaging the real dimensions of the problem with bold rhetoric—is what is happening in Lebanon. Voting as means to express displeasure with the ruling elite is of course not new at all. But it is a dangerous gamble that can endanger the stability of a system. On the other hand, as the past few years have shown again from Western states, this gamble can result in fundamental, historic change.

[pullquote]Outsiders are not necessarily elected, but they effect change even if they are kept at bay by mainstream parties[/pullquote]

Thus, with all the peculiarities, anachronisms, and insular behavior molds in Lebanese society, the dynamics of the outsider phenomenon and its impact of effecting fundamental policy change in countries like the UK and the US—there would have been no Brexit referendum without the rise of UKIP, suggests Richards—indicate that the 2018 elections will have a deep impact in Lebanon, even if perhaps in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways.

Even in the scenario with the most optimistic bent from an anti-establishment point of view, however, the essentials of leadership in human relations will not vanish like an anti-establishment party might rise in meteoric fashion and disappear nearly with equal velocity. As Richards notes, political parties only flourish when they have smart leaders, and no party will acquire momentum when a leader cannot lead.

Establishing leaders

What is required of a leader is more than what some executive training courses might be able to deliver over the course of a few weeks, as it includes some skills that need to preexist at least in basic form: a capacity to frame policies with wide appeal and assure that they are consistent with the party’s fundamental values, the skill to communicate these policies via media—and social media—to voters, the ability to unite and rally the party around those policies, and the skill to implement a program when in government while maintaining the flexibility to respond to unexpected events and win electoral battles.

The most daunting task of the anti-establishment opposition in Lebanon may well be to produce such leaders and, thus, the biggest danger may be that those leaders will either turn into the politicians they want to replace or are already dyed in establishment wool under their coats of anti-establishment identities (see leader on page 10).

Party programs, uncommon as they have been in the past, and election machineries are functions of two elements that the Lebanese have been known to mobilize—mind power and money power. It will be a demanding intellectual exercise to create platform and programs that have enough momentum to penetrate walls of disillusionment and cynicism in the Lebanese populaces on the one side, and dissolve traditional links of clientelism and short-sighted self-interest in other voter strata. But it does not look to be an impossible task, given the knowledge, rich heritage of designing concepts, and global reach that the Lebanese have.

Even the ability to coexist—which is the perhaps most enduring form of the elusive characteristic of unity—is strong in the Lebanese and well-trained, despite the country’s experiences with self-induced political paralyses. The idea of a strong unified anti-establishment program platform as the strongest argument and differentiation mark of the new opposition is hardly convincing—by countless foreign examples with desperate searches for unity in opposition movements. Winning elections without credible leaders, on the other hand, looks like mission impossible in a country that is so heartily attuned to the importance of good, old-fashioned identities.   

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The anti-establishment

by Matt Nash September 13, 2017
written by Matt Nash

As a nation, Lebanon was doomed from the start. This is the unifying theme of the mainstream anti-establishment message. The country’s sectarian power-sharing arrangement spawned a cancer that prevented the growth of a national identity and crippled state institutions. Today, a “leader” in Lebanon cannot rally the nation. He can rally his community, or a fraction of it. That is about it. And just to be clear, using “he” does not indicate gender insensitivity. There is almost no space at the political top in Lebanon for a “she,” a fact many among the burgeoning opposition are quick to lament.

Lebanon, so the argument goes, must abandon community quotas in all state positions, and its people must see themselves as citizens with equal rights, not serfs begging favors of a lord. How to achieve this, and what to do once in power, of course, are far more complicated questions.

Over the past two months, Executive sat with nine parties, groups, and individuals with political aspirations who self-identify as anti-establishment (a fraction of the 30 or so group sources say are considering parliamentary runs). Nearly all are taking aim at the parliamentary elections slated for the first half of 2018 (two groups were not certain if — or how — they would run, and two groups Executive wanted to speak with declined to talk, as they had not yet decided whether to contest the polls). Those set on running hope to unseat the parties who have held power for the past 27 years, if not longer; parties the new opposition accuses of selling Lebanon to the highest foreign bidder, while ruling with fear and favors in a system where inequality under the law has become an accepted norm. A Lebanon for fully equal Lebanese citizens is the promise on every lip, with only one aspirant, Roger Edde, making full decentralization an absolute public policy priority.

No interviewee believed the task ahead would be easy. In fact, nearly everyone interviewed stopped Executive at one point in the conversation to clarify that the establishment may yet postpone the 2018 elections (which would be the fourth delay for polls originally scheduled for mid-2013). However, when it comes to actually attempting to unseat a political class that has a massive arsenal of name recognition, party mechanics, and clientelist loyalty, visions on how this should be done vary. As do political platforms, most of which have yet to be finalized.

Click on image to enlarge

One thing that is clear: The Western dichotomy of left and right does not seem to apply in Lebanon. Take Citizens’ Movement (CM), a group with a core of 15, still unsure if they will run. Members say they are far left when it comes to personal freedoms (supportive of gay marriage, for example, but cognizant that it would not be a campaign pledge to highlight in every district of the country), yet ranging between center-left and center-right on economic policies, as per their own self-description. Pressed to consider how to sell policy positions that are not consistently “black or white,” Citizens’ Movement Co-founder Elias Abu Mrad offers, “People in Lebanon don’t ask this. Europeans ask this.” Assad Thebian, co-founder of the You Stink movement, agreed, suggesting: “[Lebanese] don’t care if you’re socialist or progressive. All they care about is two things: Who are you and what are you going to do?”

So who are they?

The opposition today roughly resembles a Venn Diagram with three sets. In general, the would-be new political class has a background in civil society, the private sector, or politics. There is a lot of overlap, and especially amid the 2015 garbage crisis, meetings among the different groups were, by all accounts, frequent. Those meetings continue, with crowd size apparently varying (some groups no longer attend, some attend sporadically). Given the electoral law they will presumably be working with, unity makes the most sense, and many are still hoping for — and working toward — it. During interview after interview, however, Executive asked whether egos or policy differences were the larger barrier to unity, with egos being the democratically selected answer to that question.

The path toward unity

Nearly everyone interviewed for this report agreed that part of Lebanon’s governance problem is the unwritten agreement that all decisions be made by consensus. Establishment politicians frequently meet, discuss issues, and make policy choices outside the framework of state institutions (i.e., cabinet or Parliament). The choices that politicians make are not the result of voting in the Council of Ministers, nor the Chamber of Deputies. Choices are made behind closed doors, and only if everyone can be brought onboard with what that choice may be. Whatever policies and platforms establishment parties tout around election time, the critique is that none have solid principles that they stand by and use to guide decision making. A clearly stated and detailed list of principles and policy goals is the only winning value proposition the opposition can offer. Campaigning with a clear platform is the only hope of success, interviewees explain. As Mohammad Alem, a lawyer who has been involved in opposition meetings since 2015 and who helped draft a 2006 electoral law that inspired the current law agreed upon in June, puts it, “We think that the only way out is the creation of a very strong, unified political platform that has the courage to try to take 10, 15, or 20 seats in the election.”

According to Alem, Thebian, and Gilbert Doumit, a management consultant self-described as having a foot in all three of our Venn Diagram circles, efforts toward a unified opposition platform — with a socio-economic focus — is advancing.  Doumit elaborates: “I think everyone is conscious that there’s no way but coming together. There’s a maturing process. Conversation and substance in social movement are maturing. In my experience it’s [now] the first time that people are taking it seriously that there should be an agenda and joint platform. This was not there at previous election times. A different conversation is happening now.”

As individuals, the three say they are involved in attempts to build a unified opposition coalition. Additionally, a group with some 20 members called Alternative Lebanon is also in the mix. Party member Nassib Khoury explains that Alternative Lebanon is in talks with no less than 34 other groups and parties. While Alternative Lebanon seeks parliament seats as a primary objective, Khoury says that the group prioritizes disrupting dysfunctionality in Lebanon through lobbying and fact-checking information the government disseminates. 

But not everyone is waiting to hammer out a unified opposition platform.

The decided

Citizens in a State, a new political party headed by former Labor Minister and long-time critic of government policy Charbel Nahas, has a platform, which it ran on during the 2016 municipal elections, explains Ahmad el-Assi, a group member who says the party received 7-8 percent of the vote in the municipalities where its candidates ran. Assi says Citizens in a State grew frustrated with the attempts at building consensus around a unified platform two years ago, and thus, wrote their own. He says the party will still “welcome anyone who wants to talk to us.”

Assi explains that his party’s economic priorities are making Lebanon more productive and better distribution of wealth through taxation and increasing public-sector wages. He also says Citizens in a State tackles policy issues as they come instead of regularly trumpeting each piece of their party platform (for example, they have an electricity plan, he says, but at the time of the interview, before the public sector wage increase was approved by Parliament, the party focused its messaging only on the wage scale).

Although Citizens in a State has a platform in hand, the party has not decided on a set strategy for contesting the 2018 polls (i.e., running candidates in each district, striking alliances with other opposition groups, etc).    

The Party of Lebanon (PoL), by contrast, has a set goal of fielding candidates for all 128 seats in Parliament, according to its president; Jacques Mechelany. The protests inspired by the 2015 garbage crisis convinced PoL’s core members — around 25 people out of 300 total partisans — that Lebanon was ready for political change, however the party was also frustrated with the lack of clear policy proposals during anti-establishment discussions in 2015. “People were ready to destroy everything, but had no alternative to propose,” he says of the 2015 meetings.

PoL has a 13-point manifesto  that, Mechelany says, represents hope for building a better Lebanon. It is heavy on reform and private-sector involvement as a means to upgrade the country’s crumbling infrastructure, with building a non-sectarian meritocracy at its core. PoL’s platform is its litmus test for creating alliances, and its goal is 1 million members and a parliamentary majority to realize its platform. Mechelany will not set a timeframe for achieving either goal, but is confident that with an estimated 7 million potential voters living in Lebanon or maintaining close ties from abroad, 1 million members and a parliamentary majority is not the stuff of dreams. 

The crowdsourced approach

In October 2016, purple billboards (one featuring many small fish ganging up on a very large fish) were found all over Lebanon. The $60,000 campaign introduced the country to Sabaa, a new political party in the discussion phase of building a platform. Secretary General Jad Dagher explains that Sabaa is still in talks with the various opposition circles to forge a united policy agenda, while also engaging people throughout the country, so that  “citizens participate in this program.” The party has experts to draft position papers, but also wants to ensure its proposals meet local needs.

Like the others, Sabaa eschews right/left labeling. Dagher describes the party as “center” and explains, “We do give priority to the prosperity and welfare of citizens, the happiness of citizens. This is why we base our policies on indices measuring the happiness of citizens, sustainable development, and give less importance to traditional indexes, which measure only the economic activities of the country.”

He insists Sabaa’s goal is a parliamentary majority in 2018, even while admitting that “we are of course realistic, we are doing our calculations in a realistic manner, but I will not lower the bar for the moment.”

The outsider coming from inside

Over a decade ago, Roger Edde, whose brand is ubiquitous in Byblos, founded the Peace Party. Born two years before the Lebanese Republic, Edde is related to the country’s first president post independence, Bechara el-Khoury, through his mother, and former president Emile Edde through his father. As a young man, Edde says he was politically active and retains ties with could-be candidates in districts throughout the country.

The Peace Party has been involved in opposition talks for two years now, he says, and is gearing up for a campaign run on a platform of hope that has yet to be finalized (it will likely entail 10 main points related to privatization, full decentralization and socio-economic priorities). As for opposition unity, he sees the Peace Party as an umbrella various groups will eventually come under. “I will lead the effort 100 percent, and will coordinate it,” he explains, offering his lineage to explain why. “Nobody has my inheritance of leadership.”

While Executive did not query every source on how willing they were to join Edde, the asset he sees in his heritage could actually be a liability. Speaking of some other likely candidates with a history of working within the system, one source described their anti-establishment credentials as “bullshit.” The question of how much exposure to the system can discredit someone attempting to join a unified opposition is likely to receive more intense focus in the months to come.

Still deciding

Everyone interviewed for this article explained that opposition parties are still not yet in full campaign mode, and that strategic decisions are yet to be formally made (i.e., which specific candidates to field, which districts to contest, whether or not and with whom to ally). Some have not formally decided to run, Beirut Madiniti being the most prominent example. Representatives of the group told Executive that, since it began as a city-focused initiative, it has not decided internally whether to shift to a national focus or not. That said, there are lesser known groups, such as Citizen’s Movement, that hope to have an impact on the overall policy discussions in the country, whether they run or not.

Citizens’ Movement (CM) grew out of an initiative called Take Back Parliament that attempted to run in the repeatedly postponed 2013 parliamentary elections. Registered as a political party, along with its core membership CM has a board of five. It has not decided whether or not to run, explains co-founder Abu Mrad, and is focusing on building a platform by doing deep studies of specific issues (public transportation, fair trade, and oil and gas are among the topics on which CM is currently well-versed with specific policy proposals). The party may run in 2018, or may wait until 2022, Abu Mrad says.

Hopeful but realistic

While the final shape of Lebanon’s opposition during the 2018 polls is still unclear, everyone interviewed for this article admitted they face an uphill battle. They anticipate dirty tricks and attempts by the establishment  to delegitimize them. While they all recognize that a parliamentary majority is the only way to implement even parts of their platforms, most realistically expect no more than 20 seats in 2018. Once the exact mode of campaigning is settled, one expects the next challenge will be governing as a minority or continuing to push campaign messages from the outside until the next chance to transform the system.

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