• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
Comment

Shifty as a desert fox

by Paul Cochrane August 3, 2010
written by Paul Cochrane

As readers of a business magazine, I am no doubt preaching to the converted, but it really does pay to scan the financial pages to know what’s going on with the movers and shakers of this world. If you had confined yourself to reading ‘straight’ news and the op-ed pages, or watching TV news for that matter, you would have missed out on the biggest media deal in the Middle East this year. A deal that has been a long time coming and is set to have major implications for the region’s TV landscape.

In February, global media ‘emperor’ Rupert Murdoch, owner of News Corp, acquired a 9.09 percent stake for $70 million in Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal’s Rotana Group, which has six TV channels and is the world’s largest producer of Arabic music.

Murdoch has been itching to get into the booming Middle Eastern market to extend his control over the planet’s media consumption, with an empire already spanning the Americas, Australia, Europe and Asia with the Fox network, the Star TV network, Sky News and a plethora of newspapers including The Wall Street Journal   (WSJ) and The Times of London. Signs of News Corp’s entry into the region started with Rotana launching two Fox channels last year. Then came the stake in Rotana, which sparked speculation that a Fox Arabic news channel was in the pipeline.

Bin Talal denied this in February, but in July the prince announced that he is to launch, independently of Rotana, a 24-hour Arabic news channel in partnership with the Fox network. Murdoch’s move into the region then took a further twist in mid-July, with news that British pay-TV broadcaster BSkyB, 39 percent owned by News Corp, is in talks with a private Abu Dhabi investor to launch an Arabic news channel.

Such developments would have previously lit up the news wires and the blogosphere, as happened when News Corp bought Dow Jones, owner of the WSJ, in 2007. Instead, the News Corp-Rotana deal seemed as if it had never happened. Few regional newspapers ran any form of commentary, and the news was nowhere to be seen outside the business pages.

Perhaps editors assumed that Bin Talal’s news channel, whenever it may launch, will have little impact, given that there are 487 Arabic satellite channels already broadcasting in the region. But one might have thought that in the Arab world, of all places, there would have been more than a muted response to the entry of a media empire that banged the drums of war louder than any other organization for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and, moreover, is rabidly pro-Zionist.

The more likely reason for the media’s silence is more alarming.  Elsewhere, when News Corp expanded, people decried the fact that media consolidation would lead to less diversity in opinions and affect freedom of expression.

Yet in the Middle East, the major media outlets and newspapers have long been in the hands of the few. Bin Talal is the biggest shareholder in News Corp outside of the Murdoch family, at 7 percent, while he owns the majority stake in the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation’s (LBC) satellite channel and is a stakeholder in Lebanese newspapers An Nahar and Al Diyar. Other Middle Eastern media heavyweights are owned by or linked to Gulf royalty. Clearly, no one wanted to ruffle any feathers or affect future job prospects by critiquing the deal. As Bin Talal is one of the richest men in the world, Murdoch’s buy-in is not solely about further monetary gain.

The prince said as much in February: “The [News Corp] transaction is way, way beyond finance… Rotana does not need to be financed. It has near zero debt.” Perhaps when Murdoch acquires a further stake in Rotana — which he is entitled to do in late 2011, to 18.8 percent — courageous voices in the media will speak up about what a strange tie-up this is, between a Saudi prince and a media mogul whose outlets continuously bash Arabs and Muslims while offering unflinching support for Western and Israeli military aggression in the very region where he is investing.

Or, perhaps, there will just be a short story in the business pages to let us know it is, well, business as usual.

PAUL COCHRANE is the Middle East

correspondent for International News Services

 

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

The rial’s slow starve of Yemen

by Alice Fordham August 3, 2010
written by Alice Fordham

Yemen’s currency woes do not top global concerns. And yet the wobbling Yemeni rial, having depreciated 13 percent against the dollar since January, could have devastating consequences for the stricken nation, the ripples of which could well wash ashore through the Arabian Gulf and beyond.

When oil prices plummeted more than two years ago, Yemen’s single-resource economy took a pounding, as the government had overestimated its income and overspent. The result was a 2009 deficit around 10 percent of GDP: crippling for a country unable to borrow from international financial markets and whose primary means of raising funds is to borrow from its central bank and sell foreign currency reserves.

International Monetary Fund policy advice and some aid have reduced the deficit, but the finance ministry predicts it will still be 7.7 percent of GDP in 2010.  Further problems have come in the form of a national shortage of dollars. Yemen imports nearly everything it consumes, and a policy designed to make importing easier and more profitable saw low taxes on imported goods last year. Reliable statistics are hard to come by in Yemen, but Deputy International Planning Minister Hisham Sharaf said that luxury goods, including cars and electronics, came pouring into the country as never before. Exporting dollars for imported goods, traders have depleted dollar reserves, which stood at $6.2 billion in March, their lowest level in five years. This dollar demand consequently boosted its value over the rial.

Respected economists also allege that as much as $3 billion dollars has left the country in money-laundering activities. Political analyst Abdulghani al-Iryani, however, reckoned that sum to be on the high side, and said that the more common practice was for people to dump their rials for dollars and stash them in Dubai banks, exacerbating the dollar shortage and leaving the rial ever-more vulnerable.

Recently the rial has held stable on exchange markets, but only because the government has propped it up through drawing on some $1.1 billion in foreign currency reserves; this is unsustainable and would devour these reserves within two years. As long as the pressure on Yemen’s economy is maintained, oil supplies dwindle, gas exports remain negligible, investors are scared and no cash injection comes, the rial’s fall is inevitable.

How much it will fall is debatable: optimists hope for a gradual, controlled descent, while pessimists foresee a rush to change assets to dollars and a possible run on the banks. Even the current stability measures are harmful. Interest rates, for instance, are being held around 20 per cent, which businessmen say is preventing them taking out loans to expand or start businesses.  Given that almost all Yemen’s food is imported, food prices have risen and will rise more. Yemeni consumers are fairly thin already and will have to tighten their belts further, despite there being more malnourished children here than anywhere in Africa, with the World Food Program classifying a third of the population as “acutely hungry.”

High food prices in 2007 sparked riots. Yemen is critically unstable, and large parts of the non-urban areas of the country are ungoverned, with Houthi rebel groups in the north, an increasing Al Qaeda presence and secessionists in the south. The IMF and World Bank, along with the government, are attempting to improve the situation. The bloated civil service has had its pay frozen and last year’s Ramadan bonus was cancelled. Massive government fuel subsidies, which benefit the rich far more than the poor, have been cut slightly, and a general sales tax has been introduced targeting importers.

There is talk of helping Yemen move from an oil to a non-oil economy, encouraging fishing, mining and tourism. But these are slow, long-term changes difficult for a country hanging on the edge of civil war and bankruptcy, with dwindling income, growing population, chronic unemployment and rapidly-diminishing savings. It is also an open secret that those close to the top of Yemen’s opaque power structure benefit from oil subsidies and unreformed business laws.

Western powers worried about Al Qaeda, and Gulf countries worried about a failed state on their borders need to look to the nitty gritty of the Yemeni economy. They should use their leverage with the government to cut corruption, slash fuel subsidies and get Yemenis trained and internationally employed in Saudi to help rebuild Yemen, one rial at a time.

ALICE FORDHAM is a correspondent

 for The Times of London

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

American imports of influence

by Riad Al-Khouri August 3, 2010
written by Riad Al-Khouri

In praise of free trade, 19th century British politician Richard Cobden described it as “God’s Diplomacy,” bringing people together to prosper. Taking a page from his book, the United States has successfully applied this idea in the region, using trade to further political ends even as America’s traditional Middle East diplomacy stumbles.   

This regional success for America began with the launch of the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) model in the mid-90s, allowing joint Israeli-Jordanian output to enter the US duty-free, mandating 7 to 8 percent Israeli value-added input into a product as one condition for the trade privileges. QIZ resulted in massive Jordanian garment exports to America, reaching a peak of over a billion dollars annually. So successful was the model in promoting trade that Egypt got the same privilege — the Israeli component in the Egyptian case being 11.7 percent — and started in 2005 to sell textiles and apparel to the US, with those exports jumping to $764 million in 2009.

On the political side, QIZ has been another way for the US to both support Israel economically and effectively buy off Jordanian and Egyptian complicity with the Jewish state, thus furthering America’s political agenda in the region.

Investment in a QIZ is particularly attractive to industries such as textiles and clothing, which are subject to high US tariffs. Consequently, 80 percent of QIZ companies in Egypt and almost all of those in Jordan produce such articles, with big-name US buyers including, among others, Wal-Mart, Van Heusen and JC Penny. Around the States these past few months, I saw more of these products, labeled “QIZ made in Jordan” (or Egypt). This is a far cry from 15 years ago, when it was almost impossible to find Jordanian products on sale in the US, and very rare to see items from Egypt.

There were times when almost the only things our region exported to the rich markets of the West were crude oil and a few other minerals in raw form. By the 1980s, with the expansion of immigrant communities, some foods joined the list of regional exports, as Lebanese hummus and such became available on Western supermarket shelves.

The counterargument runs that selling these ethnic products is easy and ultimately a small niche, while exporting garments to be sold by Wal-Mart is a poor man’s game, so all this exporting hubbub is not really making people rich through higher value-added products.

Could this pattern now be changing? The answer from Egypt, Jordan, and a few other countries in the region seems to be yes. Egyptian QIZs are now kicking in with furniture, leather products, footwear, and glassware. Jordan, which has had a free trade pact with the US since 2000, goes beyond QIZ garment production and has started exporting a growing breadth of goods to America, including air conditioning equipment, branded pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, among many others.

Of course, the hummus and falafel mixes are still there, but in increasingly sophisticated form, and joined by higher-end goods such as spices, herbal tea, and burghul wheat — products that have also penetrated Europe Union with help from EU free trade deals with many Arab states. Not that this is a simple process: such hurdles as EU technical requirements and US Food and Drug Administration product guidelines have to be negotiated, but regional exporters are increasingly managing to comply with requirements of Western markets.

The image of a Middle East exporting only crude oil and crude hummus is fading as regional exporters manage to penetrate Western markets with a widening variety of higher value-added goods, thanks to free trade deals. The next big surprise on this score could even be the Syrians, whose commercial pact with the EU may be coming on stream soon, after which Syria’s industrial exporters will no doubt begin invading European markets.

Given the current state of the regional peace process, however, God’s Diplomacy may take a little longer to bridge the divide between Damascus and Washington.

RIAD AL-KHOURI is a senior economist at the William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and the dean of the business school at Lebanese French University in Erbil, Iraq

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Sanctions stalk Iran’s free market

by Gareth Smith August 3, 2010
written by Gareth Smith

As Iran’s 2005 presidential election approached, a broker active in Tehran’s stock exchange was downbeat. “Pessimists look at the elections and see no new ideas and no new faces,” he told me. “They worry that pressure from outside means tighter rule at home. And that, in turn, means more bad politics, more bad economic policy and no markets.” Five years later, his words appear prophetic. Expanded economic sanctions imposed by the United States and — to a lesser extent — the United Nations have curtailed Western investment in Iran’s economy, strengthening the role of the state. The conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has presided over a crackdown on the reformist opposition and reversed the sluggish economic liberalization that took place under the previous president, Mohammad Khatami. Strange, then, that the Tehran stock exchange (TSE) should be at record levels, with the most-quoted index, Tepix, reaching 15,361 in the third week of July, above even the bull market that peaked at 13,882 in late 2004. But today’s “boom” at the TSE is very different to 2003 and 2004. In those days, expatriate money was flooding back, feeding rising prices in stocks and real estate. At the same time, private banks were expanding, Western energy companies were signing deals for developing Iran’s oil and gas resources, and Tehran was in talks with the European Union over its nuclear program.

The current rise of stocks in Tehran takes place in an exchange more and more dominated by state, or quasi-state bodies, which have proved adept in exploiting the Ahmadinejad government’s privatization policies. Funded to a greater or lesser degree by oil revenue, the state sector is far better placed to survive sluggish economic growth, currently at 2 percent according to the International Monetary Fund. The retirement fund of the Revolutionary Guards was also involved in the consortium that last year bought a 50 percent plus one share stake in the state-owned Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI).

“The government and quasi-government bodies have made the TSE far more of a co-operative than a competitive game,” an Iranian economist told me. “As a general rule, in developing or risky economies cash dividends are more prevalent [than retained earnings] and pay-out ratios higher. Buying and selling stocks can help increase an extraordinary income to make up for declining profits from normal businesses. And of course, we should not forget that high oil revenue over recent years, despite the falls since 2008, has built up greater liquidity and that there are a limited number of investment opportunities in Iran.” Isolation cuts both ways, and sanctions make Iranians reluctant to invest abroad.  Government and quasi-government bodies are especially cautious. Another factor in the bourse’s boom, said the economist, was a perception that political unrest after last year’s disputed general election had died down: “The surge in the TSE began around five months ago as people perceived an apparent stability after nearly a year of uncertainty.” The buoyancy of the Tehran stock market has also attracted liquidity from falling markets in the region and elsewhere. Turquoise, an investment firm majority-owned by the London Stock Exchange, offers an Iran equity fund and has described the TSE as “one of the most under-valued emerging markets in the world.”

Traders detest the growing politicization of the Iranian economy. Many Western media outlets described last month’s protests in a Tehran bazaar against tax rises as a potential return to the strikes that helped topple the Shah in 1979. On the other hand, Hussein Shariatmadari, editor of the leading conservative newspaper Kayhan, recently wrote that officials were slow to take action against “a handful of prosperous capitalists” in the bazaar. Shariatmadari has been a strong supporter of Ahmadinejad and is clearly in no mood to pander to advocates of lower taxes or market liberalization.

Across the board, sanctions weaken the private sector. If the US is successful in blocking the insurance of goods being transported in and out of Iran, then the government may well take over the responsibility. 

As the broker said back in 2005, “more bad politics, more bad economic policy, and no markets.”

GARETH SMYTH is the former Tehran correspondent for the Financial Times

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

“Those who tell the stories rule society”

by Mark Helou August 3, 2010
written by Mark Helou

The above quote from Plato has never rung more true. At a time when perception is stronger than reality, the people who can tell the stories and influence public opinion are now as powerful as the strongest armies in the world. Heads of media conglomerates are feared and even revered by most heads of state and politicians, who are fully aware that they can ‘make or break’ them.

The power of the media today is such that it can even make or break the image of a whole country. With the proliferation of 24-hour news, satellite TV, social media and the Internet, influencing people’s perceptions of a country has never been easier. Inhabitants of the “global village” are continuously subjected to a stream of movie and TV productions that also contribute to forming numerous stereotypes and images, which they end up perceiving as reality.

 

This is not to say that motion pictures and television are the only, or the most influential media channels, but they are often the channels most able to transcend linguistic, ethnic, social, and cultural barriers. Whether you are watching a Charlie Chaplin or a Steven Spielberg movie in English, Spanish, or Chinese, chances are, you are going to understand the messages behind it and sub-consciously pick up and form what you believe are your own ideas and perceptions.

How a country is perceived by investors and visitors can make the difference between economic prosperity and stagnation – especially for a state such as Lebanon, which is eager to attract investment and rebuild its tourism industry as an economic backbone.

A nationwide thinking process around this issue is all the more relevant today, as Lebanon is at the threshold of an extremely promising touristic season, confirming the country’s potential as a destination of choice for tourists of all nationalities. Its image should thus be optimized to take full advantage of this potential. 

Sadly, the media – especially Hollywood – continues to portray Lebanon as a land of war and violence, perpetuating an image of the country as being unsafe, dominated by extremists, or a haven for terrorists. There are many examples of Hollywood movies such as Syriana, Spy Game, Naked Gun and, more recently, From Paris with Love, in which silver screen stars use Beirut as a metaphor to express a state of mayhem and anarchy. While we might think that this is only done in the context of a movie, and will not have any lasting effect, emphasizing again and again that same message will ultimately affect global opinions of Lebanon, especially in the many without first-hand knowledge.

Shorthand for destruction

The same applies for other media outlets such as TV and newspapers, where Beirut has been constantly used as shorthand for destruction and anarchy. Whether there is intentional malice behind it or not, this further confirms the fact that Beirut remains a byword for chaos. This originated with the stream of horrific images that came out of Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War. Among the first conflicts in the era of 24-hour news and live broadcasting, and also involving foreign deaths and hostages, the 15-year conflict seems to have burned an indelible mark on the city’s reputation.

The fact that Beirut was a sophisticated westernized city in the eyes of the international community made its rapid descent into mayhem all the more striking, rendering it a sensationalist example of a ‘good thing gone bad.’

The interest that the international media had in Lebanon during the war years was such that the terminology “Lebanonization” or “Libanization” even became part of the media and political analysts’ lexicon. Such terms even made it into dictionaries as synonyms for the breakdown of a country into various religious communities.

Believing the hype

But the media can not only break a country’s image; it can also help build it to the extent where the line between fiction and reality often becomes a blur. 

Take the case of the United States: While Hollywood and the US media in general have often portrayed Lebanese and Arabs as violent, backward, and blood-thirsty terrorists, they were able to create an image of the regular American as the quintessential hero in the waiting, always willing to sacrifice himself to save the world. Movies like Armageddon and Independence Day are only a couple of the scores of films that have helped build the image of America, among its citizens at least, as “the land of the free and the home of the brave.”

Westerns also succeeded in the acrobatic task of portraying the settlers of the new world as the “good guys” while their Indian victims were confirmed as all-time villains, and series like “Sex and the City” have established the image of New York as glamorous and romantic, downplaying its darker side.

What the media has effectively done is to entrench the feeling among Americans that they have a responsibility to lead the world, that they are the guardians of humanity. In that sense a cliché becomes a stereotype, and a stereotype becomes a reality for many.

One thing we can learn from Hollywood is that the only way for us to amend Lebanon’s image is by using the same medium that got us here in the first place: the power and reach of the mass media.

Changing scene

So far, there have been a number of sporadic and ad-hoc efforts, some spearheaded by the government and the Ministry of Tourism, and others that came spontaneously or as a result of a particular media’s interest in Lebanon, such as the New York Times article that ranked Lebanon as the number one destination to visit in 2009, the article in Paris Match focusing on Lebanon’s  joie de vivre, or the report on CNN highlighting the fact that Beirut has become a “top city to party in.”

That said, a concerted national effort to develop a clear and holistic communication strategy to rebuild Lebanon’s image is still lacking.

We have to decide how we want Lebanon to be perceived and which key attributes we want communicate. Do we want Lebanon to be seen as a place for those looking to party all night long and enjoy the naughtier side of the country? Do we want Lebanon to be seen as a perfect getaway for family relaxation and for those looking to enjoy its mountains and beaches? Do we want Lebanon to be positioned as a place filled with history, focusing on our archeological heritage, or do we want to position Lebanon as a hub for business and investments instead?

Media campaigns should focus on communicating Lebanon’s positioning and edge, as should politicians and civil servants abroad in all their meetings and conferences.

Seeing how the movies can help build a country’s image, the government must support the local film industry; several home-grown offerings have already started shifting the public perception of Lebanon away from that of a bombed-out haven for terror and fundamentalism.

But more importantly, we as Lebanese citizens should take advantage of the current emergence of new media channels and the drastic decrease in production costs that have come about thanks to the omnipresence of digital technologies.

The global media and communication scene has reached a new stage where anyone can make themselves heard across the globe, and where creating and disseminating impactful content has become accessible to each one of us.

As such, changing existing perceptions or creating new ones becomes only a matter of creativity, a creativity that each Lebanese citizen can exercise in order for us to help successfully build the image that truly reflects the history, values and uniqueness of our country.

 

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

“War Games”

by Executive Staff August 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

Aid is big business. The wealthy donor governments that belong to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development together give around $120 billion annually. In addition to the United Nations, there are a growing number of both international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing for a piece of this sizeable pie — but very little popular debate over how they spend it.

In her new book “War Games,” Linda Polman seeks to redress this omission through a savage critique of the aid industry. The veteran Dutch journalist accuses aid organizations of continuing the cycle of violence in the countries they are supposed to be assisting, as aid is appropriated by various militias in conflict zones and used to further their own, often bloody, ends.

In Rwanda, for example, Polman claims that the Hutu extremists would not have been able to murder up to a million Tutsis, based from their UN camps in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, without the humanitarian benefits they received as refugees. “Without humanitarian aid, the Hutus’ war would almost certainly have grounded to a halt fairly quickly,” she states.

Polman also touches on the issue of bribes, the morally questionable kickbacks that aid organizations often have to offer local militias in order to be able to safely deliver aid in some of the most lawless places in the world. It’s something the people involved want to keep a lid on: “Aid organizations and donors usually prefer to keep silent about the aid to war-torn countries that is extorted or stolen, and there’s no collaborative attempt to quantify the damage,” says Polman.  

Polman argues that ignoring politics when delivering aid is murderous. “Humanitarian crises are almost always political crises, or crises for which only a political solution exists. When donors, militias and armies…play politics with… aid, NGOs cannot afford to be apolitical.”

“War Games” offers a strong argument for aid organizations to engage with their context. But simultaneously, it also unknowingly provides a counter argument as to why aid organizations should be wary of dabbling in politics. What if they get it wrong, or misunderstand a complex situation, as Polman does several times?

For example, in criticizing UNRWA, the UN agency responsible for Palestinian refugees, for supposedly allowing the creation of militant breeding grounds by providing shelter and services to the civilians displaced by the creation of

Israel, she makes the following statement: “When Sabra and Shatila… were attacked by Phalangist militia units in 1982, half the world was incensed, saying the militia had massacred innocent people, while the other half believed the attack was justified because the camps were in fact military bases.” If Polman had done even the most basic research she would know that the armed members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization had left the camp and that the massacre was carried out on an unarmed civilian population. Polman also makes no mention of the Israeli Army’s collaboration in the massacre.

So, what if aid organizations get it wrong politically? Polman argues convincingly that by not engaging they are getting it wrong anyway. The question is not whether we should simply do nothing at all — rather, donors and NGOs need to ask themselves where the balance lies between the positive effects of aid and its exploitation by warring parties. At what point do humanitarian principals cease to be ethical?

Despite the many faults of this book, Polman delivers a stirring polemic that does ask important questions about the aid industry today. Whether aid organizations will seriously take on the debate raised by “War Games” is yet to be seen.  

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

Crisis-proof style

by Emma Cosgrove August 3, 2010
written by Emma Cosgrove

What does luxury powerhouse Louis Vuitton do as designers step away from haute couture and multi-national brands file for bankruptcy? They throw a party – several in fact.

Still basking in the golden glow of their World Cup triumph – providing the trunk from which the cup itself traveled from Paris to Johannesburg  – the legendry fashion house finally opened its long-awaited Beirut store with a string of soirees and press events. The ostentatious branded trunk facade that covered the Beirut Souqs store whilst it was being prepared came off with a fanfare, perfectly illustrating the statements of brazen confidence from Vuitton’s chief executive officer Yves Carcelle.

“We were the only brand which published double digit growth 2009 worldwide, so yes there was a crisis but we didn’t feel it. We rather have the feeling that each time there is a crisis, that reinforces our market share because people in these periods tend to turn to objects of real value,” said Carcelle at the July 15 opening of the Allenby Street boutique. The Beirut store marks Vuitton’s 453rd store worldwide with regional outlets in Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Jeddah. In addition to the traditional Louis Vuitton luggage, bags and shoes, the brand will also produce a city guide for Beirut, as they do for all of their stores, with restaurants, hotels and activities fitting the brand, which should be available in October. Joseph Ghosn, editor in chief of several Conde Nast Paris websites and a native of Lebanon will be heading the effort.

Vuitton is one of the headlining brands of luxury conglomerate Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (LVMH). In 2009 LVMH profits dropped 13 percent, causing group Chairman Bernard Renault to announce that “bling went out of fashion with the crisis.” But Vuitton seems to be one of the few brands not affected by the bling backlash.

Though Louis Vuitton has been growing strongly, the brand’s behavior is congruent with current trends in the luxury fashion world, which is squarely looking east.

In October 2009, Vuitton became one of the first luxury brands to open a store in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. The brand is also choosing to upgrade its flagship stores in London and Paris, even in these lean times.

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

Carving a slice

by Executive Staff August 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

There are few markets more obstinate to penetration than the automotive industry. To compete with the giants of East and West — Korea and Japan on one side, Europe and the United States on the other — you need either a massive resource base to fund your start-up operations or a full nelson on regional sales, and preferably both, as is the case for government-run manufacturers such as China’s Zhongxing.

So when a new, independent automaker of limited size crops up in a region already thick with competition, take-off is going to be a measured and gradual process.

This has been the story for Britain-based McLaren Automotive, which has worked for two decades to extricate itself from the larger milieu and gain traction as a truly independent manufacturer. From its debut in 1989 to the release of its last road car, the Mercedes-Benz SLR McLaren, the high-performance automaker has always preferred to partner with better-entrenched, more fully equipped brands in the production of its vehicles. Its first car — the McLaren F1, celebrated for almost a decade and a half as the world’s fastest road vehicle — flowed naturally from the McLaren Group’s experience in Formula 1 racing in terms of design and dynamics, but was powered by an engine designed and built by BMW. Later models were built with and distributed by Mercedes-Benz.

The McLaren MP4-12C, set for launch in early summer 2011, breaks this trend. At last the world has access — albeit extremely limited access, as only 1,000 cars are to be released in the first year of production — to a road vehicle that is solely and completely the work of the company that brought the world the F1. Enthusiasts seem unanimous in their predictions that the MP4 will compete with the best in its segment, including the Lamborghini Gallardo, Audi R8, Mercedes-Benz SLS, and most notably, the Ferrari 458 Italia.

At first, this fact seems antithetical. The massive overhead costs of design, testing and development that go into producing a supercar mean that, as often as not, sales of the finished product barely compensate for the resources poured into its manufacture. On some occasions, a supercar costs a company more than it reaps in benefits. So how is it that a micro-manufacturer like McLaren can hope to build its own supercar from scratch, relying exclusively on their own facilities and team, and still profit enough to carry out their stated aim of expanding operations in the future?

The answer: they’re not building it from scratch. The MP4 draws not only inspiration, but much of its technology from its F1 predecessor, including brake steer — a technology which applies the brake to the inside rear wheel during sharp turns, tightening the radius — and a seven speed ‘seamless shift’ dual clutch gearbox. It is a highly scientific car, with every ounce of weight accounted for, in accordance with the company’s oft-repeated motto “everything for a purpose,” and uses a chassis molded from a single piece of carbon fiber, reducing weight without sacrificing strength.

Even the new developments in the vehicle were designed, tested and retested before McLaren fastened a single rivet: a virtual vehicle was built and tested in McLaren’s F1 simulator, which was readjusted for the MP4’s own parameters.

“By the time we began production of our first prototypes, the car was already 60 percent complete,” Ian Gorsuch, regional director for the Middle East, Africa and Asia Pacific, told Executive at a recent media roundtable in Beirut: “We cut our costs down dramatically by simulating the car before we ever physically built it.”

From its earliest beginnings, McLaren has been a piecemeal innovator. It has been a producer of parts, some of which ended up in road cars, others in racecars, and some which found their way into the late Mars Orbiter (after the Orbiter’s unfortunate crash, those pieces now dot the surface of the red planet, while McLaren insists that their technology had nothing to do with the crash). Finally it has come up with enough parts to assemble a complete vehicle.

It’s still a modest step — in the Middle East, the company will limit its distribution to dealers in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, restricting its operations in Lebanon to a single service station — but for a maker just stepping out in its own shoes, even modest steps are important ones.

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

Q&A – Stefano Macaluso

by Executive Staff August 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

Girard-Perregaux is one of the first of a number of high-end watchmakers to open monobrand outlets in the Beirut Souks. Executive sat down with Girard-Perregaux Vice President Stefano Macaluso recently to talk shop, the economy and the Lebanese market.

E  Monobrand outlets are a new phenomenon in Beirut’s high-end luxury market, and yet we’ve see a number of them cropping up already in the Beirut Souks. Any thoughts on what could be causing this trend?

The idea of monobrand outlets is, as you say, relatively new here in Beirut, and I think it reflects an increased interest by big-name brands in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general. At a time when luxury watchmakers were tallying losses in Europe and the United States, sales soared in this region. Even in Dubai, which suffered its own imploding economic bubble, we had our best year ever for top-end, extremely complicated pieces in 2009.

I think the Middle East continues to hold a lot of potential. Middle Eastern countries will not be affected like European countries, which resorted to big cuts in social investment.

The situation is still complicated in the United States and in Europe, but we are also reacting there, though a little behind our developments in this region, and will shortly be opening a monobrand boutique on Madison Avenue in New York. So the next stage for the brand, even if the market has slowed, is expansion.

E  How long have you had a foothold in Beirut?

Our first contact was [just over] a year ago, after I was invited by Ziad Annan [of A&S Chronora] to discover the location. I fell in love with the city immediately and saw great potential for growth, because as I’ve said, Lebanon was booming even in the face of global recession. With a strong regional partner and a good business climate, it seemed an opportune moment to open our own boutique.

We consider the location [in the Souks] to be very good, even if it is currently under construction. Compared with other sites in the Middle East in particular, I appreciate the architectural approach, as opposed to say that of Dubai, Abu Dhabi or Kuwait, which tend to opt for a more aggressive supermall approach. The Souk is a good compromise between the traditional market, with visibility for every brand, and the sophistication of modern architecture. In all, it feels like a more human approach to commercial development.

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Economics & Policy

Frozen in the past

by Caroline Anning August 3, 2010
written by Caroline Anning

There are so many things we need here,” says Seera Hablas, surveying the small, run-down village of Zouq Al Habalssa from the vantage point of the overgrown hillside, on which she keeps the hives of her beekeeping business. “We need the government to acknowledge that this part of Lebanon exists and needs attention — it’s as if the state only sees it as a place for martyrs and terrorists.”

Akkar, Lebanon’s northernmost province, with a population close to 300,000 people, has the air of a land forgotten. Covering nearly 800 square kilometers, it provides a large portion of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ recruits and militant Salafist networks are known to be active in the area, but for the most part this primarily agricultural governorate simply doesn’t feature on the mental maps of most Lebanese. Tourists don’t visit, investors don’t invest, and the government is conspicuously absent. As former Member of Parliament for Akkar Karim Rassi tells Executive: “Akkar is only around 100 kilometers from Beirut, but it’s like going back a few centuries.”

Zouq Al Habalssa is typical: infrastructure is crumbling, jobs are in short supply and education and healthcare provision is weak. Women are expected to stay at home, and the men — when they can find work — are mostly employed in the army; if not, says Hablas, they usually have to leave for Tripoli, Beirut, or further afield. Akkar, with its dated and uncompetitive agricultural economy, has little to offer them.

Out of sight, out of mind

“It’s difficult to work out exactly what Akkar’s problems are, because there is a real lack of accurate, up-to-date data on the region,” says Fawaz Hamidi, director of the Business Incubation Association in Tripoli (BIAT), a local non-profit business support organization, particularly because the province only became a governorate in 2004 after previously being subsumed under the North Lebanon governorate.

However, some things are broadly known: According to data from the United Nations and local non-governmental organization Mada, Akkar has the largest share of individuals living below the poverty line in Lebanon at 64 percent, with 23 percent living in extreme poverty.

It also has the lowest average individual income, with 16.6 percent of households earning less than $40 a month, compared to a national average of 4.5 percent. With approximately 80 percent of residents living in rural areas, Akkar has the lowest rate of urbanization in Lebanon, and it also has the largest average family size, with families averaging 6.1 members compared to a national average of 4.8.

Human capital is weak due to one of the country’s worst school systems, resulting in a poorly trained workforce and Lebanon’s highest levels of illiteracy.

In addition, despite being rich in water resources, a 2008 report by Mada noted that mismanagement in Akkar has led to a situation in which only 53.8 percent of houses in the governorate are connected to the public water supply — compared to a national average of 85.5 percent — and 20.9 percent have no running water whatsoever. 

 

Currently, 98 percent of the economy is comprised of microenterprises, primarily family-run agricultural businesses. All of this — coupled with Akkar’s limited infrastructure — has put off the private sector from investing in the region, exacerbating the already-major problem of access to capital, says Hamidi.

“There is no culture of equity funding, and micro loans are still expensive in Lebanon,” he says. “The banks don’t like to give small loans.”

According to a report conducted in 2008 by the International Finance Corporation, the advisory arm of the World Bank, only 11.5 percent of potential micro loan demand in Lebanon is being met.

The roots of Akkar’s troubles lie in its geography and history. With its relatively homogenous sectarian makeup (primarily Sunni, with a small Christian minority) and location well out of Israel’s line of fire, Akkar was not directly affected by the civil war, but the district’s remoteness, proximity to Syria and the long-term presence of the Syrian army led to it being economically and socially cut off from the rest of Lebanon.

While it escaped the war, it also missed out on the benefits of reconstruction, and concerted economic development has been virtually nonexistent in Akkar until recently. Residents have traditionally relied on Syrian markets for cheaper goods and services and, until its destruction in 2007, the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp also served as an economic hub for the region, acting as a tax-free zone where local people could procure smuggled goods at knockdown prices.

“North Lebanon has always been poor, but the South was also poor and it suffered so much from security threats, so it got the most attention,” says Sateh Arnaout, an advisor to the Council of Ministers on regional development, on leave from the World Bank. “That was reasonable, because if you’re in a country with limited resources you have to make difficult decisions about where to channel those resources, and clearly the South needed it most.”

Wake up call

However, several factors have coincided in recent years to bring Akkar to the attention of policymakers, non-governmental organizations and international donors. The Syrian army’s 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon drew the region back into the government’s sphere of influence to some extent, and after the 2006 war, says Arnaout, “attention started shifting to the other neglected regions, which is really all the ones that border Syria.” 

 

A 2008 report by the United Nation’s International Poverty Center highlighted that Akkar is now the poorest region in the country, quashing the previous assumption that the South was the sick man of Lebanon and redirecting the government’s attention northwards.

“Economic development in North Lebanon is now one of the government’s main priorities, as it realizes that prosperity in this area will contribute towards peace and stability in all of Lebanon,” Arnaout adds. Peace and stability in Akkar became a prime concern for both Lebanon and the Islamist-fearing West after the 2007 Nahr al-Bared conflict; an international Salafist group battled the Lebanese army for three months at the camp, located 16 kilometers to the north of Tripoli on the Akkar coastline, leaving some 450 soldiers, civilians and militants dead and hundreds more wounded.

The crisis resulted in the complete destruction of the camp, forcing some 30,000 refugees to flee their homes and damaging the economy and infrastructure of the surrounding area. The general consensus is that, to some extent, the poverty and isolation of the region contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, driving home the problems that can arise from leaving a large, remote region to fester.

As a result, the last few years have seen tens of millions of donor dollars and the usual footmen of economic development — engineers, development experts, sociologists and the like — file in to Akkar. The United Nations has a number of programs in the region, as does Relief International and several other major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, as well as well-established local organizations such as the Safadi Foundation.

Failing farms

Akkar’s economy is mostly agricultural, so this sector has been the focus of much of the development work. The existing system of small, family-run farms doesn’t work, says BIAT’s Hamidi, because “by the third generation the farmers have lost the know-how, they’re out of touch with international developments.”

Elias Wehbe, an agricultural engineer working with the Safadi Foundation, agrees: “Akkar has more potential than any other region, especially in agriculture, but [the farmers] don’t have any scientific knowledge,” he says, adding that until now the Bekaa has been seen as Lebanon’s breadbasket. European countries won’t take much of Lebanon’s produce because it doesn’t meet international standards, and the local press is full of scares about the toxicity levels of locally-produced goods, from strawberries to parsley.

“Farmers don’t understand about the fertilizers they’re using, and nothing is industrialized. There’s still so much still to be done in agriculture,” concludes Vanessa Campos Yakan, a spokesperson for the Safadi Foundation.

The work on improving the agricultural sector covers all areas, from identifying potential new products — with mushrooms and kiwis among the appetizing foodstuffs of the future — to conducting soil testing and vaccinating livestock. Unlike other aspects of development work in Akkar, this is one area where organizations tend to coordinate their projects.

Safadi, for example, has partnered with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on agricultural projects in Akkar: the UNDP provides the equipment and the Safadi Foundation contributes two engineers.

According to Abdallah Muhieddine, the UNDP’s area manager for North Lebanon, one of the most successful programs has been to offer farmers weather station data every two weeks to help them optimize their production methods. “One farmer reduced the cost of his fertilizers from $1,500 to $250 because of this weather prediction project,” he reveals. 

The UNDP also works with Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute (LARI), a government body, to test soil and water in Akkar in order to improve the quality of the produce and bring it up to international standards.

After years of absence, “the Ministry of Agriculture is much more active now through LARI,” says Wehbe. In addition to these broad-based programs, a number of NGOs fund individual agricultural ventures with small grants. Relief International, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provided part of the finances for Seera Hablas to revive her father’s beekeeping businesses in Zouq Al Habalssa, which had languished after all her brothers left to join the army. The venture has provided a vital source of income in a village where unemployment, especially among women, is very high, says Hablas.

Time for variety

Although agriculture is at the heart of Akkar’s spluttering economy, BIAT’S Hamidi believes that it can be only part of the solution to the region’s problems. “The key issue for Akkar is to diversify its economy… we can’t rely on agriculture alone, there needs to be two or three sectors to spread the risk,” he says.

With tourists pouring into Lebanon at rates not seen since before the Civil War, Hamidi suggests that Akkar should be looking to take advantage of the annual international influx, setting up eco-tourism lodges and nature trails to show off the region’s unspoiled natural beauty.

Some local residents are already getting in on the act. Tony Antoun used to own a dairy production business in Akkar, and expanded his successful enterprise to Baghdad. But in 2004, after the US-led invasion, Antoun was kidnapped on suspicion of being an American spy. He had to pay $500,000, everything he had, to secure his release.

“When I came back to Lebanon, I had nothing,” he says. “I was really in debt and had to sell my business. I thought the best thing to do would be to open a small business with low costs.”

He came up with the idea of opening a tannour, a traditional Lebanese bakery, calling it Hadbe w Nar (grain and fire) — “because when you have nothing, that’s all you need to get something started again.”

Inside the bakery, women knead the dough and press it against the baking hot walls of the oven pit with a practiced flourish, creating warm, deliciously crispy bread in a matter of moments. Over endless glasses of hot sage tea, Antoun talks about his plans to open a restaurant in the style of a traditional Lebanese house, as well as a number of reasonably priced holiday chalets in his picturesque location in the hills of Qobayat. 

“Relief International gave me a $6,000 grant, and arranged for access to a $65,000 loan from Kafalat [a Lebanese organization providing loan guarantees to small and medium-size enterprises], which will pay for the restaurant,” he says. “The money for the chalets will have to come from elsewhere, but there’s amazing potential for tourism here: the hospitality of people [here] is the closest to the traditional Lebanese hospitality. But there’s no interest from the government or others; no one thinks to go to Akkar when they come to Lebanon. We need to promote our region.”

With outsiders staying away, the low-income levels in Akkar mean that the local market is limited: “The only problem here is customers,” explains Antoun. “There’s no lifeblood in the region. I only make around $1,000 a month here; in Beirut I would make that in a day.”

Essential investments

Creating a viable, diverse local market needs more than soil testing and bakery funding; serious work is needed to upgrade infrastructure and stem the tide of the fleeing workforce.

“We need major investments in railways, roads, telecommunications, electricity; none of this is happening,” says Hamidi. Some moves are being made to improve infrastructure — the UNDP, for example, has installed solar panels on the roofs of schools and hospitals in Akkar — but so far the work has been largely tokenistic. And, Hamidi argues, the famous “Lebanese entrepreneurship” that people speak of just isn’t a reality on the ground, especially in places like Akkar. The poor quality of education in the area, particularly in the government-run schools, means that many people are not qualified for jobs even when they are available.

“I go to the villages in Akkar, and all I see is guys smoking arguileh [water pipe] by the side of the road all day,” sighs former MP Rassi.

“One guy in my village is 37, jobless, retired from the army. Because he gets his retainer from the army he doesn’t feel the need to do anything. He just keeps his minimal salary, doesn’t work and waits to die.”

Some NGO workers also complain of a growing culture of entitlement in Akkar. Both the UNDP and Relief International have programs that try to strengthen municipal councils, with the aim of creating bodies that can actually spur economic development in their areas and respond to the needs of the local population. Unlike the organizations associated with local heavyweights — such as the Safadi, Mouwad, Fares and Hariri foundations, who are around for the long term and whose operations are both philanthropically and politically motivated — groups such as Relief International have a greater interest in building up sustainable local institutions that can take over their development work.

Akkar exists under the yoke of the client-patron political system, which is found across Lebanon but is particularly prevalent in rural, disenfranchised areas. A few major families dominate politics in the area, including the Fares and Frangieh clans.

“The linkage between the local and national level is individual,” says the UNDP’s Muhieddine. “It comes from the local leaders in society who have a personal relationship with the MP,” he explains. “The local leaders’ power is boosted by the services provided by their patron in the national government, while the national MP benefits because of all of the local guy’s village votes for him. This is not a situation conducive to economic development — it leads to stagnation and maintaining the status quo.”

As such, both the UNDP and Relief International are working to strengthen the municipalities, which are currently, for the most part, not fit for purpose.

“We aim to strengthen the social networking between local people and the municipal authorities by building knowledge and skills regarding local economic development, better engagement and participatory approaches,” explains Vrinda Dar, chief of party for Relief International. “Economic development can neither happen nor be sustained just by injecting money.” 

However, an injection of money seems to be exactly what people are looking for. Dar says she found “most municipalities” initially negative to the scheme, which only offers limited USAID funding and focuses on capacity building and facilitating public-private partnerships.

“Some people, when they don’t see the money, they don’t want any part of it. So I don’t bother with them,” says the UNDP’s Muhieddine. “I’m not here to solve all the villages’ problems. I provide ideas, experience, tools, access and a road map to development. What’s the point of coming in, building something, cutting the ribbon in a nice ceremony and then what? They just wait for the next donor.”

Achieving independence

Eventually, Akkar will need to be weaned off its donor dependency if it is to develop fully, and the state and private sector will have to take over. After its long absence, the renewed interest of the central government (see box on p.67) in the governorate is promising, but with its huge debt burden it does not have the funds to act on its own.

And after years of neglect, the problems facing Akkar are great; both human capital and basic infrastructure, the building blocks of economic development, are lacking. It will take a prolonged, concerted effort and investment from the government, donors and the people themselves to pull Akkar out of the past and into a prosperous future.

 

August 3, 2010 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 411
  • 412
  • 413
  • 414
  • 415
  • …
  • 696

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

    • Facebook
    • Twitter
    • Instagram
    • Linkedin
    • Youtube
    Executive Magazine
    • ISSUES
      • Current Issue
      • Past issues
    • BUSINESS
    • ECONOMICS & POLICY
    • OPINION
    • SPECIAL REPORTS
    • EXECUTIVE TALKS
    • MOVEMENTS
      • Change the image
      • Cannes lions
      • Transparency & accountability
      • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
      • Say No to Corruption
      • The Lebanon media development initiative
      • LPSN Policy Asks
      • Advocating the preservation of deposits
    • JOIN US
      • Join our movement
      • Attend our events
      • Receive updates
      • Connect with us
    • DONATE