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Executive RoundtablesTaxation

The search for a fairer, more redistributive tax system

by Thomas Schellen December 24, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

The roundtable covered in this piece was dedicated to economic angles of fiscal reform and taxation. Thus, in the context of Executive’s mission and coverage focuses, both it and the accompanying sixth roundtable on financial reality were a hardcore expression of this magazine’s existential paradigm to cover the Lebanese economy to the best of its ability. Both roundtables were conducted on November 21 under sole content authority of Executive editors.

The discussion brief for the fifth roundtable stipulated that participants would be discussing ways to shift to redistributive taxation structures, to identify opportunities to tax economic rents with no detrimental impacts on overall economic participation, to improve tax collection in fair and equitable ways, and to introduce new transparency to fiscal and tax institutions.

On taxation and fiscal reform

The roundtable on the implementation of the fiscal reforms and taxation entailed a pivot away from highly technical tax questions, such as requests for proposals on effective and ethical taxation of economic rents or the implementation of schemes to enable economic transfers from highly developed economic metropolises to disadvantaged communities. Questions at the table re-focused on participants’ recommendations for fiscal reform measures, on the best and most fair approach to the taxation of banks, and on ways to migrate toward more efficient tax collection, to increase the ability of productive sectors to comply with international market requirements, and to achieve more formality in the economy.

As a baseline of the fiscal reforms and taxation roundtable, participants had zero disagreements in saying that Lebanon in recent years—and in context of 2019—has shown no evidence of any fiscal policy, but that fiscal actions have been comprised wholly of fiscal measures without any discernible vision or strategy. Haphazard measures in recent years were aimed at increasing state revenues through tax law revisions (e.g. 2017), but were implemented without necessary impact assessments. Equally undisputed were comments that taxation policies—which over years were only adjusted in minor ways, even when the national value-added taxation program was enacted from 2002—needed to pivot from indirect and regressive to direct and progressive. A shift from indirect to direct taxation would favor social equality.

It was depicted as prudent to recognize that personal and corporate incomes in Lebanon are taxed rather mildly in international comparison.

However, the organization of society toward being more inclusive and fair would also have to come with behavioral reforms of the economic system whose current structure supports rent seeking, wealth-derived gains, and the concentration of wealth under strong protection for rich individuals.  

Strongly criticized were taxation decisions in the 2010s that were described as reallocations of market-generated incomes to the “black hole” of an increasingly unproductive public sector. Less than universally agreed, however, were the perspectives which participants espoused in assessing existing realities of poverty prevalence versus the concentration of wealth in the country, the most appropriate ways to gauge banking performance and profit rates achieved in the sector, and productive paths for ethical and efficient taxation of incomes and economic rents.   

Arguments that private concentration of deposits in bank accounts was extremely high were challenged with reference to Lebanon’s banking secrecy, which was argued would not facilitate collection of such information for the entire banking sector. Disagreement over the right approach to taxing bank profits—juxtaposing nominal profit levels of Lebanese banks in recent years with the return on equity ratios highlighted by bank economists—also remained very noticeable.

Advocacy for the general removal of banking secrecy in the Lebanese system was voiced as the path toward income transparency and removal of tax evasion incentives for individuals in the liberal professions who engage in diverse economic activities and hold several bank accounts, but do not declare all their incomes. Also proposed was to increase pressure to implement tax compliance of companies that operate on the border of informality by not paying their dues, ranging from VAT and corporate income taxes to national social security fund contributions for all their employees. It was argued that the enhancement of governance in tax collection and fight against tax avoidance should be achieved before attempting a discussion on the economic order of Lebanon, including questions over the desirability of a welfare state or an economy with a very large public sector. 

With regard to the question of the economic system and the course of Lebanon, it was argued that a very big problem in the country existed in having governments but not an efficient state. The apparent dwindling of the Lebanese middle class in the past 30 years and the continued influence of militia structures and militia persons who had been able to transition into political roles were pointed to as other obstacles in need of remedying in order to achieve a more effective state. Furthermore, voices around the table drew attention to the need of achieving a balance of private sector growth and implementation of laws by an empowered state. A participant argued that unfettered activities of the central bank and commercial banks had led the country to the difficult place that it found itself in this year.  

Attesting to the necessity of looking beyond taxation when seeking to address social inequality and poverty prevalence in Lebanon, several participants emphasized the importance of social expenditures from quality spending on education and health to liberating the poor from cost burdens and improving the labor market. It was further emphasized by participants that young companies with growth and job creation capacities are faced with taxes and levies that do not make sense and, suffering greatly under indirect taxation burdens, are in want of government policies and incentives that compensate them for their contributions to economic opportunities and keep them in Lebanon.

Toward inclusiveness

Besides acknowledging the problems of persistently regressive taxation and the need to change these practices, it was depicted as prudent to recognize that personal and corporate incomes in Lebanon are taxed rather mildly in international comparison. The major challenge in the fiscal constitution from this perspective are problems on the other side of the fiscal balance sheet, such as irrational hiring in the public sector, indiscriminate expenditure, haphazard spending, and other wasteful deficit drivers. Participants argued that increasing expenditures and heightening deficits led to higher interest rates that blocked economic growth, on top of which the long existing exchange rate peg and low productivity made Lebanon noncompetitive. This malaise was further exacerbated by absence of business friendly regulations, weakening in the Gulf markets, the conflict in Syria, and the Lebanese government shift to borrow in US dollars. All this was contrasted with governmental economic rescue propositions that were badly insufficient.

There were divergent views on whether wealth in Lebanon is highly concentrated or not to the extents believed by some.

It was acknowledged around the table that tax policies need to incorporate elements of societal guidance and be grounded in a national economic vision on what sectors in the economy should be promoted and how spending of fiscal revenues should be targeted. In the case of Lebanon, participants noted that this translates into a question on how to move from an extractive economic model to an inclusive one.

A resurging factor of irritation and divergence in the discussion arose from the—universally acknowledged—lack of reliable data on the Lebanese economy and the actual performance of its economic agents. Insistence on the deficiency of hard data in areas ranging from poverty to income concentrations was juxtaposed with passionate emphasis of visual evidence of high poverty levels, for example. There were divergent views on whether wealth in Lebanon is highly concentrated or not to the extents believed by some. In the perception of Executive, this discussion once again pointed to the utter importance of initiating a national socioeconomic census under any government seeking to design policies that can achieve socially meaningful targets.

Reforming taxation

Concrete measures in the area of taxation needed to involve closing tax loopholes by reforming the frameworks under which offshore companies operate, unifying income tax, and simplifying tax codes, it was suggested. Newly anchoring the system on progressive taxation was a priority need in the perception of numerous participants. Other areas of note from a taxation perspective according to participants were succession taxes and the need to make the entire tax and fiscal system more transparent to tax payers. In this and other regards, digitization and introduction of e-government functionalities was viewed by participants as an enabler for improvement.

Application of essential rules on tax equity—such as taxing personal or corporate incomes equally and protecting tax payers from arbitrary changes in their tax burdens—was emphasized in the discussion, as was the importance of taxing productive sectors and banks on basis of principles of equality and fairness. Emphases for fiscal development were reiterated as restructuring of expenditures and elimination of wasteful practices in the public sector. The fiscal mission was described as a combination of moving from waste to productivity in the public sector, reducing the public sector, putting public finances in order by fighting tax evasion, increasing transparency, and instituting internal auditing as a constituent factor in public and private sector economies.

The majority of participants did not think that experiments with new public sector entities aimed at better management of economic cycles, such as a publicly-owned investment bank, would be applicable given Lebanon’s over-politicization of political economy institutions. Issues such as the idea of a digital currency under central bank management, as discussed in some countries, were not perceived as being of current importance for Lebanon. 

In evaluation of the overall fiscal and taxation discussion, and in the conclusion of roundtable five, participants stated that the public finance problem was also a political problem that originated from the unchecked existence of conflict of interest issues engulfing political actors and that, likewise, the determination of a national government was indispensable for devising practicable solutions in the fiscal and taxation space. 

December 24, 2019 0 comments
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EducationExecutive Roundtables

Reinventing Lebanese education for an uncertain future

by Nabila Rahhal December 24, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal

The third discussion in Executive’s roundtable initiative was designed to cover a broad selection of topics—regarding health, education, and labor—under the banner of social development. Already a dense focus, the third roundtable was further restrained when it became clear to Executive’s editors that plans to carry out 10 roundtables over the course of November 18 – 22 would be scuppered by two events scheduled to take place that week—the first, a rescheduled parliamentary session that was intended to take place on November 19 amid intense opposition, and the second, Lebanon’s Independence Day celebrations on November 22. 

Folded into the discussion in the organizing phase then was the impact of pollution on human development and—in a last minute move due to the withdrawal of several participants, the focus of a planned roundtable on poverty alleviation was also folded into the mix. It was, by anyone’s standards, an overloaded and ambitious discussion list. Prior to the roundtable, which was held in the early afternoon of November 20, participants were encouraged to consider the following topics: the organization and provision of healthcare, pensions, and education; the development of labor statistics and labor markets; incentives for highly qualified graduates and professionals to work in Lebanon; the need to re-evaluate the labor law; environmental protections, and the impact of pollution on human development.

It was perhaps due to the overloading of this roundtable, along with logistical challenges on the day, that discussions instead were centered on education and the labor market as related to university graduates. Executive’s Economic Roadmap, however, has sections dedicated to developing strategies for improving education and healthcare, a section on combating poverty and pollution, and a section on developing labor. This is born out of our belief that all these elements of social development and capacity building are essential to move the economy—and indeed the country—forward. When applicable, the roadmap has been amended to reflect relevant points submitted by email or form by both participants and the wider public.

The quality of education 

The discussion began with a reflection on education for the 21st century and how, in the views of the moderator, students in Lebanon’s schools were not being equipped with the tools and skills they needed to excel in the jobs of the future—which the moderator said required education in creativity, curiosity, collaboration, and communication. Participants were then asked for their reflections on these opening remarks. 

Several of those at the roundtable believed that, contrary to the views of the moderator, private education in Lebanon was of high quality and had kept up with the changing needs of the students to become more skill-based than knowledge-based, with one citing various real life examples found in their own work. Participants also noted that Lebanese students have successfully taken the skills they have learned at educational institutions in Lebanon and used them to excel abroad. The issue lay, according to one participant, in the inability of students to apply these learned skills in Lebanon—something it was believed was in the process of being changed through youth participation in the thawra.

It was noted that quality assurance measures do not exist at the school level in Lebanon, which creates an uneven landscape for students upon entering higher education.

There was, however, some agreement with the moderator’s premise, with one participant saying that time is running out and Lebanese schools need to catch up fast by teaching the skills needed for life in the 21st century, starting with primary school children. 

It was noted that quality assurance measures do not exist at the school level in Lebanon, which creates an uneven landscape for students upon entering higher education. To resolve this, it was suggested that there should be a regulatory body—made up of both public and private schools and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education—that should set a new educational system, with indicators that would focus on teaching the skills needed for the 21st century. This view was echoed by several participants. The responsibility of the state was seen in terms of standardization, one participant argued that there needed to be a program that would be followed by all educational institutions in the country that was decided upon at the state level.  

The discussion then flowed on to public schools and the vital need for elevating the quality of the education to produce more competitive graduates that would help rebuild Lebanon. A participant suggested that instead of the government draining itself running the public schools, its role should be to simply manage them through inspections and ensuring they adhere to certain standards. This could also be achieved through a public-private partnership, according to some participants. 

The mismatch between education and labor

The mismatch between education and the labor market was also raised by those around the table. One participant noted that an investment in quality education was very costly—estimating it to be $500,000 from pre-school to university—and questioned how many years of work in Lebanon it would take to recoup that investment. This argument was furthered by another participant who said that there needed to be an understanding of the cost relative to the returns in order to be table to address both. While the costs of private education are known, it was argued that data on the cost per student to the state of public schooling or a degree from the Lebanese University was lacking. It was also suggested that a study should be taken to survey the incomes of students of private education institutions from the past five years to determine the average income in relation to the upfront cost of their education.  

The discussion on the mismatch between the skills of Lebanese graduates and their labor opportunities continued, with one participant noting that Lebanon suffers from a nonproductive economy whereby we have 30,000 graduates every year, and yet only create around 3,000 to 4,000 jobs, which are mostly in the public sector and so are relatively low-skilled. 

Beyond this, they continued, the mismatch was impacted by two interlinked phenomena: corruption and clientelism. It was argued that in Lebanon it was immensely difficult to open a business, complete official paperwork, or get a good job—one for which you were qualified—without wasta or being from the right sect or political party. What was needed was a reorganization of the political system into one that could move Lebanon toward a productive economy and open up the labor market with equal access to all those qualified, participants argued.

What was needed was a reorganization of the political system into one that could move Lebanon toward a productive economy.

There was also a consensus around the table on the need to obtain data on labor market outcomes to guide strategies in education development. Several participants noted that in order for the discussion to move forward and practical measures to be agreed upon, it was necessary to know the baseline from which we were starting in order to determine key indicators of success. Lack of data to assess the current situation and, therefore, its needs was a theme raised throughout the roundtable initiative. 

Hopes & dreams

Beyond this, participants also questioned what the goal of education was, with one quesstioning whether they believed education was a means to an end, or an end in itself, noting that there were other outcomes to education beyond economic ones, including improving citizen engagement and civic education. It was noted that if a goal of education was to produce engaged citizens, then students’ and youths’ participation in the thawra was evidence enough of the benefits of the Lebanese education system—though this idea was challenged by another participant who thought that civic education was lacking
in Lebanon.

Also raised by those at the table were questions on what problems were being addressed through the discussion—was it reach of education, consistency across schools, the outcome of education, or its cost? Defining the problem clearly was seen as a necessary first step to
tackling it. 

Amid closing comments, it was asked that the Ministry of Education and Higher Education apply existing regulations when it came to the inspection of institutions of higher education, and especially when it came to issuing of
graduate degrees. 

Another closing remark was a practical suggestion related to the strengthening of students’ skills versus their knowledge base, which recommended extracurricular activities between private institutions of education and civil society (charitable organizations for example) whereby students could learn a variety of real life skills.  

This roundtable highlighted the value all participants placed on education as a vital building block for almost all pillars of a functioning
country.

December 24, 2019 0 comments
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EntrepreneurshipExecutive Roundtables

Hard new looks at the tech ecosystem and its entrepreneurial future

by Thomas Schellen December 23, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

Before the October 2019 uprising, it was not difficult to list unresolved questions and some outright disappointments with the way that the Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem had been shaped in the past six years since Lebanon’s central bank, Banque du Liban (BDL), effectively launched it with publication of its Circular 331. In mid-November, amid the uprising, the Executive roundtable on entrepreneurship (the second in a series of six) witnessed most of the same systemic and operational concerns as had been debated in the ecosystem before, but with two added accents: the money will never be the same, and the discussion has gained honesty and clarity.

In other words, the financial wells to nurture the knowledge economy and the few Lebanese startups with real economic promise need to be re-drilled elsewhere and meet new specifications. And everyone in entrepreneurship acceleration is beyond wasting their time on idle ecosystem diplomacy or polite compliments to the old 331 system. 

In years one to three of the entrepreneurship ecosystem there were already warning signs of clientelistic allocations of projects and a lack of competency in some of the ecosystem’s most privileged cogs—its units that had been established with 100 percent BDL-guaranteed funding instead of the 75-percent guarantee of bank investments into tech venture funds and startups.

Ecosystem insiders from early on also lamented about distortions that had crept in, due to money inflows under 331 that had led to inflation in startup valuations and financing pitches of more attractive looking business plans. Observers next noted very critically how the ecosystem’s venture capital (VC) playing field was tilting increasingly away from super-high-risk startups that needed finance the most, in favor of investments with risk profiles tending to the private equity corner.

Tech startups and especially ventures in deep tech are more resilient due to their international migration opportunities.

Throughout the entire six-year period, as they had been before the launch of 331, the existing legal and judicial frameworks remained ill-suited for facilitating an economic activity that needed permission to fail fast and reboot. Before and after 331, some good projects never even got such  permission as they were killed by over-cautious investment committees. In times of 331, however, failures of ambitious startup projects happened, but they were often not revealed in ways that would allow the system’s players to learn all they could from them. Transparency, from the ecosystem’s financial top at BDL to its operational bottom layer of VC funds, remained as alien as an interstellar visitor.

In the latter part of the current period, from 2017 to 2019, the questionable wisdom of regulatory rules that limited 331-supported startups to allocations of their funding in Lebanon was put deeper into doubt when the financial reporting requirements for these companies, under instructions from BDL, were tightened to the point of being counterproductive.  

Still, despite these flaws and other questions, such as the ability of the small ecosystem to create enough jobs to make more than a tiny dent in the long-standing employment malaise of a country that produces an estimated five to 10 times more college graduates than jobs, Executive’s reporters every year found positive aspects to point out in the ecosystem—although in 2019 less so than in previous years, and warranting far less exuberance than signaled by the foreword of an external report that was published this summer (see box below).

Entrepreneurship in the thawra age

Executive noted that internal and external stakeholders—such as the promotional units attached to the system and international partners with interests in its success—had embarked on several mapping exercises from the third and fourth year after the launch of 331. These exercises, however, tended to be afflicted by the difficulty to obtain data (which was limited due to the system’s very brief existence) and even more so by methodological imperfections or, all too often, special interests.      

The outlooks and assessments of the ecosystem stakeholders participating in the Executive roundtable on November 18 were decidedly uncheerful in the short term, to the point of diagnosing the death of financing paradigms that had been in force until now. According to participants, absent visibility on the future of 331, uncertainty on the ability to still tap into any of its hitherto unused funds, and a strong expectation that the funding environment would not be sustained in the coming months were juxtaposed with the understanding that entrepreneurship will be vital for economic development and job creation after the tremors in the political economy recede.

Noting that the ecosystem was nearing a pivotal juncture with need to shift from the 331 funding paradigm to activating private funding already necessary before the uprising, participants concurred that this path forward is now fully in the dark to the point of having to ask how currently operating startups will stay alive until the funding finds firmer ground. Entrepreneurial flight to other markets, meanwhile, is a downside risk of the current situation, with regard to all tech startups, hardware startups, other young companies, and even manufacturers that
have the ability to move out of Lebanon.

Emphasis on the upsides of the past six years entailed the acknowledgement that 331 was responsible for assembling the entrepreneurially high-powered minds that were gathering last month at the Executive roundtable. Participants agreed that the ecosystem’s emergence under the 331 initiative was also successful in creating a new mindset and culture that is compliant with the patterns that made tech entrepreneurship succeed in those countries where it flourished, beginning with a readiness to stand up after a venture’s failure.

There was a divergence of views if the shrinkage of new startups applying for acceleration in recent years was coupled with an increase in the average quality of the applying ventures. Views were also diverging on the funding environment, as some participants noted that private money at the end of 2019 has been exiting the Lebanese ecosystem, while others pointed out that investors with new unwillingness to expose themselves to the banking sector’s deposit schemes have inquired with VCs and accelerators about investing into entrepreneurship (traditionally not a prime conduit for most investors due to the high risks associated with startup investing).

Broad agreement among roundtable participants showed in their emphasizing the importance of overcoming Lebanon’s financial liquidity problems and preserving banking sector sustenance, given that the ability to transact with local and international counterparties is just as vital for entrepreneurial ventures as for all companies. At the same time, participants noted that tech startups and especially ventures in deep tech (focus on hard-to-copy innovations in technology and science, e.g. artificial intelligence) are more resilient due to their international migration opportunities when compared with non-tech or e-commerce entrepreneurship ventures that rely strongly on non-tradable expertise such as local market knowledge.     

Experiences of the past few years cleared out some hopes of Lebanon-focuses in tech entrepreneurship, first of all expectations of fintech successes in the local market where negotiations between startups and a small group of banks as potential clients, partners, or acquirers had, in the past 18 months, come to naught. This in the opinion of one accelerator program has ruled out entire verticals as being viable for pursuit in Lebanon, most notably fintech, but also has shown that ventures targeting small local e-commerce and e-services niches have very poor chances of success in the Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem.

It was important for several of the stakeholders at the roundtable to highlight that systemic limitations translate into better chances for startups whose team profiles reflect considerable expertise in the targeted field, emphasizing that entrepreneurship is not a cure-all for career and employment obstacles encountered by university graduates. Entrepreneurship is also not the answer to business cycles, demographic mismatches, or the dearth of employment opportunities in labor markets in the Gulf that have previously attracted Lebanese graduates. Moreover, while age is not a barrier, young success stories are exceptions, and the value of being trained in entrepreneurialism in tertiary or secondary education lies mainly in students’ improved ability to satisfy international employer demand for entrepreneurial thinking, it was said.     

Further limitations in the system seems to be based on blind spots on the side of its agents and proponents, and distrust and lack of information on the side of entrepreneurs. According to this view, many local entrepreneurs and hopefuls are invisible to the ecosystem and prefer to stay away from it because of their perceptions that the ecosystem is corrupted, the game rigged, and money not accessible to them.     

Some at the table suggested that startups should avoid—at all costs—local banks and the 331 framework as hindrances on their development paths, adding that the ecosystem needs to tap into funding sources that offer invested startups the right conditions. Further reiterated were emphases on linkages to universities and boosts of research and development as well as industries and suitable exit platforms. 

Economic vision

To save the entrepreneurship ecosystem from its operational dysfunctionalities that have been building under the financial reign of Circular 331, capital guaranteed funding needs to be redirected to only the companies that need it, said one strong recommendation. The entrepreneurship and knowledge economy ecosystem needs to be rooted in a shared and clear vision of the type of economy that Lebanon wants to have, the recommendation also noted. Entrepreneurship needs a purpose, and mindsets need to mature. Instead of pursuing a startup as the hoped-for ticket out of Lebanon, the mindset of the civil revolution should be expressed in “national entrepreneurship” commitments, while at the same time advocating for reforms of the regulatory and legal frameworks.  

According to participants, options for moving forward exist also in further activation of the business angel networks created over recent years and link them to diaspora investors who want to engage with cogent entrepreneurship ideas in Lebanon. International advisory councils can also still be cultivated on the strengths of alumni networks at universities like AUB, on condition that the ecosystem is managed trustworthily.

It was noted at the table that immediate remedial action for the preservation of companies in portfolios began during the Q3 financial crunch. This action included efforts of accelerators and funds to consolidate operational costs and reduce burn rates of their hosted companies, improve coordination between startups and mentors, and create clustering benefits by bringing portfolio companies together that operate in the same industries.

Some at the table suggested that startups should avoid at all costs local banks and the 331 framework as hindrances on their development paths.

Internationally connected funds and accelerator programs according to managers at the Executive roundtable can further help startups that are faced with bottlenecks in their transactions by helping them to establish bank accounts and corporate partnerships outside of Lebanon, find “soft landing spots,” incorporate in startup-friendly jurisdictions (e.g. Delaware), and navigate legal requirements that, under conditions of global crises, can turn into economically deadly cash flow chokers.    

In their concluding remarks, participants reiterated that the initiative of Circular 331 was the beginning of an experiment that can bring many benefits to the Lebanese economy, but that further development of this entrepreneurial process requires improvements of governance structures in this country. Discussants agreed that entrepreneurial spirit is a mindset of problem solving and pointed out that all entrepreneurial ventures launched in Lebanon since the early 2000s had found themselves confronted with one or other tough period soon after their launch. The need for an entrepreneurial spirit and belief in what one is doing was undisputed around the table, as was the need to reign in uncertainty
and have a functional government.

December 23, 2019 0 comments
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CorruptionExecutive Roundtables

Corruption looms over all aspects of Lebanese life

by Nabila Rahhal & Sarah Shaar December 23, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal & Sarah Shaar

Executive has long recognized the importance of fighting corruption as an essential step toward creating a strong economy for Lebanon. Both previous versions of Executive’s Economic Roadmap (version 1.0 published in December 2018 and 2.0 published in February 2019) had sections dedicated to combating corruption, as does the reshaped Economic Roadmap 3.0 that has been updated to reflect the reality of Lebanon in the last quarter of 2019, aided by the findings of Executive’s roundtable initiative. 

The first of six roundtables held in mid-November, roundtable one on combating corruption was chosen as the opener on November 18, given its urgency in the context of the ongoing protests and the demands on the streets. Yet, over the course of all six roundtables—on corruption, on entrepreneurship, on social development, on access to rights and information, on taxation and fiscal policy, and on financial reality—corruption was a topic that participants repeatedly cited as one of the major roadblocks in the way of long overdue and necessary reforms. 

Participants were almost unanimous in their view that Lebanon needed to fight corruption—at any cost.

The discussion brief provided in advance to participants of the corruption roundtable invited them to discuss legal initiatives to retrieve embezzled funds, the enhancement of penal codes, and the adoption of laws for prosecuting incidents of corruption. Other discussion points mentioned in the brief included the establishment of institutions to combat corruption and audit public spending, awareness and education on public service paradigms and appreciation for effective administration, and finally a redesigning of services and digital access to government. 

Changing systems not symptoms

To start the discussion, participants were asked whether institutional prevention, prosecution, or education and awareness building were the best tool in combating corruption, and which of the three were seen as a priority.

Almost all agreed the main issue lay beyond the proposed question, and that before addressing prevention, prosecution, or awareness building, the first goal must be to change the political system in its entirety—along with its leadership. It was argued that corruption in Lebanon was so flagrant because the political class failed to consider the concept of the public good, and, as a result, the citizen was never a pillar in policy-making. The consensus was that the way forward in fighting corruption was to first create a new government, independent of all current ruling parties, which would, in turn, allow for an independent and empowered judiciary system that could hold politicians to account by allowing for the legislation and implementation of anti-corruption laws—as such, participants called for the passage of laws that would grant independence to the judiciary system, as well as an independent security force that would prevent and control the use of governmental scare tactics to stop prosecution against corruption. Access to information was also brought to the table as one of the main tools that would help with the fight against corruption, in particular when it came to attempts at prosecution.

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

Corruption was also seen as being a lubricant of what was termed “the political economy of sectarianism.” Under this paradigm, corruption was not the sole purview of Lebanon’s political elite as it was argued that it was in the best interest of the latter to allow corruption to trickle down—thereby reinforcing sectarian identities and moving the populace further from an ethos of accountability. 

Leadership in the fight against corruption 

The following discussion point was the question of whether or not the fight against corruption should be led by politicians or civil society members, and whether investing in e-government would benefit this fight. Most agreed on the need for leadership in the fight against corruption and that it should come from independent judicial bodies and through the establishment of anti-corruption laws. There was, however, some disagreement on whether leadership would come from above or below. A common thread among participants was that bottom-up approaches—such as the establishment of new political parties with a background in civil society and strengthening independent voices within syndicates and orders—were a necessary long term approach to combating corruption. In this vein, the victory of independent candidate Melhem Khalaf in the elections for the head of the Beirut Bar Association the day prior to this roundtable was seen by participants as the first milestone in a long battle against corruption. 

Others, however, believed that change would be imposed from the top down, and therefore, before new political parties or leadership, it was necessary to rehaul the system itself or risk replicating the same corrupt leaders. It was argued that Lebanon’s sectarian constitution needed to be changed to eliminate the idea that citizens need their sects for protection and to start building the idea of protection coming from the government and a strong independent state.

Regarding e-governance, several participants argued that we needed leaders who understood modern technology and were able to put in place a system that would help fight corruption through eliminating the middle-men in bureaucratic procedures—who often ask for bribes—and through making it easier to trace instances of tax avoidance. However, it was also warned that given the state of the internet in Lebanon, migrating official paperwork online would be a nightmare, and the priority would need to be in fixing the internet infrastructure before even thinking of putting time and effort into e-governance. 

The battle against corruption is a long one, and it should be led by the new generation who have proven through this uprising to have a clear understanding of what needs to be done. 

Participants were asked to consider the fact that a society that has corruption also incurs some economic benefits from it. Executive editors then asked for a simple yes/no response from around the table on two questions: whether they felt that the economic benefits of corruption in Lebanon would be bigger than the cost of fighting it, and regardless, whether Lebanon could afford to not fight corruption? While there were some attempts to address the first question—several participants, while acknowledging some economic benefits, argued that the cost of opportunities lost was still greater—most responses singled out the second question, with participants almost unanimous in their view that Lebanon needed to fight corruption—at any cost. One dissenting voice was against such a fight under certain circumstances, arguing that in the past, Lebanon has been able to thrive under the stewardship of moderately corrupt leaders. At this point, the moderator quoted South Korean development economist Hyun Chang, author of “Bad Samaritans,” who argued that certain elements of anti-corruption were actually promoted in order to keep developing economies from gaining an advantage—what German economist Frederich Lust termed kicking away the ladder after you have used it. This view was well-received by the table.

An environment for change 

The judiciary’s role in combating corruption was the focus of the general debate. Participants were split between the idea of working within the current system to change it versus the need to change the system altogether. One argument for the former was that honest lawyers could impact positive change despite a corrupt system. This was met with criticism by others who again raised the point that corruption needed to be weeded out from the system itself, and the first step toward that goal would be an independent judiciary. 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

The value of a bottom-up approach was again highlighted as the preferred mechanism of achieving an independent judiciary within a corrupt environment embedded in za’ims and sectarian party leaders, with participants calling for a series of small victories—such as Khalaf’s Beirut Bar Association win—within orders and syndicates that would lead to change, giving the example of professional orders in Tunisia as key to the success of the revolution there.  

The idea that there were two battles being waged—one against the sectarian system, but also one within the system itself—was also floated. Within each sect are people who are fighting against their political parties, but also those who want to keep the regime as is because they benefit from it economically. Participants concluded that the battle against corruption was a long one, and that it should be led by the new generation who have proven through this uprising to have a clear understanding of what needs to be done. 

The question of how long the protests could last given the current economy was asked by one of the participants, two scenarios were proposed: either the current government would take action before the country goes bankrupt—because it goes against their interests—or the economic situation would severely deteriorate further. The latter was argued to be good for the protests as it would tip the scale between an uprising of middle income to lower-middle income citizens to one with full participation of lower income citizens—a full-on revolution.

Throughout, the tone of the roundtable was one of grim determination to face the difficult task of weeding out corruption through changing the current system, yet hope for a better Lebanon was evident in all the participants’ answers. 

December 23, 2019 0 comments
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Economic roadmapThird draft

Economic Roadmap

by Executive Editors December 20, 2019
written by Executive Editors

This document—Economic Roadmap 3.0—is the most definitive Roadmap yet in Executive Magazine’s ongoing quest for providing a working platform for advancing the Lebanese economy. Building on a first version published in the December 2018/January 2019 issue of Executive, and a second version published with an additional 261 measures and three entirely new national priorities in February 2019, Executive presents this third iteration at the end of 2019 in the hope that its reflection of fourth-quarter developments will accelerate the discussions seen in Lebanon after October 17 and elevate the economic discussion to one that can generate a new and healthy productive economy. As was the pattern from the beginning, we took a participatory approach in deliberations of Economic Roadmap 3.0—this time by inviting both online recommendations and querying around 50 diverse and qualified individuals in a series of six roundtables conducted in November 2019 (See intro to roundtables). The stakeholders at these tables ranged from representatives of civil society and persons with personal commitment to Lebanon’s civil thawra (revolution), to economists, industrialists, entrepreneurs, and academics.

As in the two previous Roadmap iterations, there was little or no disagreement on the top priority for moving Lebanon to safe economic ground in the face of a financial liquidity and confidence crisis that erupted from September 2019 in parallel to the October protests. However, while many needs of the Lebanese economy had not been met since we published Roadmap 2.0, priorities were added especially in the Build and Reform pillar as well as in the Combat pillar, specifically in Combat Corruption. The Build and Reform pillar addresses agenda priorities in the areas of fiscal policy, capacity building, state institutions, judicial reform, and regulatory frameworks. Moreover, while the list of pillars and agenda priorities in Roadmap 3.0 is the same as in iteration 2.0, we note that the agenda items discussed at the November roundtables (agenda priorities 1-6, 8, 11-13, and 15-18) saw more additions, new emphases, and modifications than the other five agenda priorities, but want to emphasize that the shifting toward urgent issues and short-term economic survival priorities does not detract from the importance of the remaining components in the Economic Roadmap. The fundamental question over the best economic system for Lebanon is still open but one dichotomy, a line of deceptive argumentation used throughout past periods of governmental vacuums in Lebanon and into the period after the resignation of the Hariri government at the end of October, has been revealed as fake news. This is the argumentation from some political quarters that addressing the economy is more important than adhering to the will of the people, as well as the view of some economic protagonists that political health will follow upon a vigorous private sector performance. In truth, as the last months of 2019 have proven, Lebanon needs a government that implements the will of the people and an economy that serves them. Ultimately, Lebanon has to decide what kind of system it wants to implement and move forward collectively. While the country seeking to rebalance state and society in a cogent new system, Executive is committed to contribute to this vital search by continually striving for a definitive, collaborative, and passion-empowered Economic Roadmap.

December 20, 2019 0 comments
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AnalysisBusinessOverview

The madness of clowning around in an economic tornado

by Thomas Schellen December 20, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

Two months after a blundering collage of new budgetary revenue measures drove people into a unified and spontaneous civil uprising, the state of Lebanon remains an unresolved mess. Six weeks of attempts by the political regime to uphold and reorganize what the people perceived as a corrupt system only made the country’s social and economic predicaments more intractable. Failures of the process to determine a cabinet in the first week of December then further exacerbated questions if the stakeholders in the old regime have understood the popular will and demand for a new independence of Lebanon from its soiled political past and the seriousness of the country’s economic disaster and looming financial implosion.

From a banking and finance perspective, the dire monetary state of Lebanon in the final weeks of 2019 is neither the fruit of the populace’s political struggle for a redesign of the country’s electoral and representative paradigms nor the root cause of this struggle for a new system on the threshold of the symbol-heavy year 2020. Nor is the current monetary and economic mess the direct result of just another period during which the implementation of government has been stalled by a—as socially entrenched as societally lethal—mix of political selfishness, communal inertia, and national disunity.

What was triggered by another government attempt to tap into the people’s pockets—and specifically the sensitive communication expenditure pocket—was the eruption of society telling the state “enough” with a voice that could be neither overlooked nor silenced: the unified voice of the street. This voice coincided with a crisis of confidence—according to some views long overdue and to others premature—in the sole functioning pillar of economic strength, Lebanon’s monetary stability and banking resilience.

Total information loss

What could not be expected from this voice of civil thawra (revolution) in this highly combustible constellation of vanishing confidence and financial instability, however, and what did not come to bear, were concise answers on the concrete need to maintain economic life support for the large private and public consumption needs, equally gigantic dependence on financial inflows, and the comparatively small productive capacity existing in the national economy.

The offspring of this unintended union of civil revolution in politics and draining of liquidity and confidence in the economy appeared firstly as a total loss of actionable information in the financial system. From an observer’s perspective, this collective lack of transparency and early warning signals might have been attributable in part also to the behavior of stakeholders in the Lebanese financial system, who did not make determined efforts to regain the trust of private account holders on corporate, small-to-medium business, and household levels, as would have been wise, and instead acted behind smoke screens when seeking to rein in financial transactions.

One side-effect of the worrying monetary movements that set in during the year—which in hindsight appear to have become visible to system insiders from mid-2019 but remained largely camouflaged in communications between the banking sector and the public—is that it is impossible to draw any conclusions on the health of the banking sector’s performance in the second half of 2019 on the basis of the performance up to the middle of the year.

Neither a 1.3 percent contraction in domestic customer deposits in the first half of the year, nor the slowing asset growth trajectory of alpha banks (with deposits exceeding $2 billion each) to $263.6 billion by end-June 2019 provided data that at first glance would have supported immediate alarm in response to six-month results. Alpha bank assets were recorded as a 1.6 percent growth in consolidated assets (a 2.2 percent growth in domestic assets versus an exchange value deprecation-induced contraction of assets at overseas operations). A stagnation of domestic branch network developments and a headcount decrease of some 300 banking employees in Lebanon also provided no cause for crying out. The sharpest deterioration in bank activities, a 7.5 percent drop in domestic loans, could be taken as reason for another exasperated sigh over the state of the Lebanese economy rather than as a sign of new weakness in the banking sector.

Primary liquidity ratios of banks even increased significantly on paper, to almost 60 percent (an increase by 8.7 percentage points from a year ago) and the downturn of bank profits—an 8.1 percent contraction of domestic net profits in the first six months—should, if anything, have been comforting to critics alleging disproportionate banking sector profitability. In the sum of the data, while the sector numbers gave no reason for euphoria, there appeared to be no huge noticeable alarm signals, sharp digressions from historic banking performances in multi-year time series, nor data points of any predictive crash dimension for the first half of 2019.  

Arguably, this first-half performance only made it more difficult for many business and household clients of banks to prepare adequate and rational behavior in response to the altered behaviors by banks that came as a full surprise near the end of Q3 of 2019.

Left in the dark

Moreover, when the first wave of protests was triggered in mid-October and quickly escalated into the civil thawra that resulted in the government’s demise by the end of the month, there was little else than fear, instinctive self-interest, and very short action horizons for the bulk of banking customers to go by. Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh addressed the country on November 11 with assurances that there was no intention whatsoever of embarking on a capital control, haircut, or devaluation policy, saying as reported by the National News Agency that the protection of deposits and depositors is “a basic and final matter, and we have taken the necessary procedures so that there will be no losses borne by depositors.”

Meanwhile, banks took what they considered as decisions in their best interest, dispatching updates on withdrawal and transaction barriers via messages to their customers individually and often on ultra-short notice. But in any larger sense, thawra was a non-event as far as communication by the systemically most important pillar of the private sector. Even in the beginning of December, the home pages of alpha banks contained next to no comments on the national societal situation or, as far as the deteriorating economy, either systemic financial assessments or personal advice on how to behave rationally as a customer in times of national economic crisis.   

This left the field wide open to all the legitimate concerns voiced by economic experts (but also some almost pejoratively imprecise or premature labeling of the role of banking and finance in the crisis with negative to criminal connotations), erratic exchange rate signals from the private currency market, viral anti-banking rumors and accusations as part of the thawra expressions of systemic disapproval with the ruling status quo and the exploitative cliques of corruption, and even what looked to some like orchestrated attempts to further destabilize the country through attacks against the central bank and banking sector at large. 

In published economic evaluations and discussions—such as the Executive Roundtable series that took place November 18 – 21—credible views on the scope of liquidity problems, on the extreme danger to the banking system, or even a practical “bankruptcy” on central bank level were debated. Scenarios of recovery and rescue were juxtaposed with scenarios of extended bleakness for the banking system and the economy at large.

Opaque or invisible

Some impacts on the financial fabric of the worrying liquidity and currency situation were visible by the example of the insurance market in Lebanon. A few weeks into the economic and currency dilemma, international insurance ratings agency AM Best published a snapshot report on the situation of Lebanese insurers in November 2019, in which the agency noted that amidst an accelerating decline in investor confidence and US dollar cash-flow constraints, Lebanese insurers with dollar-based fixed costs face new challenges and have been seeking to maximize their dollar inflows and minimize outflows.

“AM Best notes as an example that companies have been paying obligations such as staff costs in the local currency where possible, limiting the risk for short-term operational problems,” the report says, adding that ability of premiums collection in insurance companies has suffered. “Insurers with weak asset and liability management frameworks that have not matched their US dollar-denominated liabilities with US dollar-denominated assets may find themselves exposed to the risk of a Lebanese pound devaluation,” According to AM Best, Lebanese insurance providers have resorted to measures  such as leveling a surcharge oriented on the exchange rate in the parallel market on policyholders settling premium obligations in lira, or refusing to pay claims in dollars if a policy holder paid all or part of the premium in lira.

“Over the longer term, should BDL find itself in a position in which it is not able to refinance its US dollar debt issuances, pressure to devalue the Lebanese pound could increase, leading to a significant erosion of shareholders’ equity for companies with poor asset-liability management. A devaluation could also result in significant inflationary pressure,” the agency warned.

In an interview with Executive in the first part of November, Farid Chedid, chairman and CEO of Chedid Capital Holding, explained that the bigger worry for the Lebanese insurance sector since the eruption of protests resided in investment concerns, not underwriting issues. Attributing this to the uncertainty on the fate of investment portfolios held in the local financial system under regulatory mandates, he pointed to work interruptions, difficulties in premiums collection and achievement of renewals, and new business as additional burdens of local insurers.

He conceded that local insurers face further challenges for their reinsurance dealings where a very large currency mismatch is being created between lira and dollar at the level of insurance companies that have all their reinsurance contracts with international providers in dollars. “But having said that, insurance companies are well protected because reinsurance contracts are all in dollars. Assets of clients of insurers are well protected because contracts are in US dollars,” he noted.

Insurance stakeholders participating in the Executive roundtables further emphasized that settlements of reinsurance obligations at the end of 2019 or any point of contractual payment obligation in 2020 could unleash crises on coverages under the important insurance verticals from medical and motor to property and life business lines.

When compared with the opaque outlook for the insurance sector, the ability to predict banking sector health developments in the new year and even before the arrival of 2020 is even more limited. At this point, consensus in discussions of economists and informed stakeholders appears to be that central bank directives for the bolstering of bank capitalization and the initially temporary realignment of interest rates away from the excessive levels seen earlier in 2019 and before are steps in the right direction but may not suffice, depending on the development related to the formation of a real government and support from the international level.

Requiem for a global failure pattern

Lebanon’s financial and economic outlook for 2020 is interdependent with geopolitical factors and prone to be influenced by the wider international economic outlooks. This, however, is no comfort. The global debt problem is being increasingly thrust into the spotlight. Quoting the total combined public and private debt at world level as never-before seen 230 percent of global GDP at time of her speech in early November (something like $188 trillion dollars, up from $184 trillion mentioned in a January 2019 document), Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said that private and public debt were responsible for the high total in a ratio of about two to one. While noting that some countries with rooms in their budgets should consider borrowing to finance “productive public investments” she also highlighted the “darker side of debt” and the “devastating effects of unsustainable credit booms.” The borrowing of developing nations has to become more sustainable, transparent, and organized in collaborative ways with creditor options, she said.  

The uncertain and dichotomous global financial realities picture comes, moreover, in a frame of sharp contrasts of almost scarily complacent market perceptions in developed markets with recent boosts of vibrant consumer spending and increasing numbers of developing countries in desperate struggles against state failures, corruption, inflation, rising impoverishment, and outright hunger. In this context of a world that has over the course of the last 40 years incurred massive liabilities on the dual fronts of debt and climate under irresponsible economic behaviors of overwhelming proportions, the descent of Lebanon into a vicious cycle of national spending beyond national means no longer looks like a purely local madness.

Too important to fail

For the time being, one retrospective argument that seems in order relates to the fact that measures of quantitative easing, unconventional methods, and financial engineering have not only been the practice of the Lebanese central bank. The challenges of financialization and redefinition of fundamental monetary paradigms are universal and not a problem suited for exclusionary views on Lebanon’s monetary authority or allegations of local thievery. Other than that, it seems that in the concluding weeks of 2019, all perspectives on the local banking sector entail too many variables and unknown elements to dare predictions or rational expectations. 

In conjunction with the civil uprising’s attempts to generate, in the medium or even shorter term, a new systemic political reality, the banking system can only benefit from pursuing a path of constructive adaptation instead of passive rejection of slowly impending change. In the immediate term, the implications of the currently witnessed turning points on systemic and banking realities converge at the threshold of 2020 in the sense that any progress will have to rely on international interventions.

Sadly, it seems against the backdrop of the uprising experiences of the last quarter in 2019 up to the middle of December that the representatives of the existing communities and structures cannot be entrusted neither on the individual, nor the organizational level to be effective agents of meaningful innovation. The consequence of this for the financial and economic rescue of Lebanon is that an IMF-type program with foreign supervision is the best option for moving forward. The Lebanese banking sector, even if considered as a single bank for the purpose of discussion, in this regard does not have the advantage of being “too big to fail” in global perceptions. The best hope might be that the Lebanese polity as factor of relative stability and peace on the edge of a most volatile geopolitical crisis zone, is too important to fail.

December 20, 2019 0 comments
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Executive RoundtablesIntroduction

Executive’s roundtable initiative

by Thomas Schellen December 19, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

When darkness and despair are the first two options on the menu for your country, followed by austerity and depression as the plat de jour proposals, nothing is more appropriate than to assemble a crowd of light seekers and path finders. In this sense, it is a testimony to the seriousness of the national economic, financial, and even political situation of Lebanon—and to the immense reservoir of smart and educated brains in the country—that proposals for this country’s betterment have been proliferating not only in form of thawra protests and public sentiments on the street, but also in more structured and tractable outpourings. The drafting of emergency economic rescue plans has become something of a national sport in Beirut intellectual and business circles as of late.

The Economic Roadmap 3.0 at the heart of this issue of Executive is one such effort. However, the Executive economic roadmap project differs from other recent proposals in that, compared to drafts that have entered into circulation in the past two months, the magazine’s project has had a head start of over 18 months from its first written draft, and of exactly one year from publication of its version 1.0 in the 2018 Facts and Forecasts issue.

It is also not a monoculture effort in the sense of representing just one economic school or narrow way of thinking found in many proposals circulated in the fourth quarter of 2019. This is a notable characteristic when one contemplates the current wave of ideologically front-loaded socioeconomic propositions in Lebanon and elsewhere, whether these approaches were voiced in a spirit of globally financialized neoliberalism (that in the past decade has been met with some acerbic assessments and not only among heterodox economists or austerity-regime critics in countries like Greece) or a post-Keynesianism that has been on the rise in some academic circles (and most recently reflected in the developments of labor-oriented political parties in countries like the UK and Germany).

A collaborative effort

But the most important distinction of the Executive Economic Roadmap in the Lebanese context is rooted in the fact that this entire project is designed for and driven by participatory passion and broad consultative collaboration. It is not an exercise that has been undertaken under any external financial dependency or in response to a political commissioning. Moreover, it has not limited its horizon politically or socioeconomically by exclusively pursuing inquiries with presumed elites and narrow
interest groups.

In that vein, when the need to draft version 3.0 became clear—version 2.0 was released in February this year following consultations across the country with civil society stakeholders on the original Economic Roadmap—given the monumental economic and societal shifts that we have witnessed in Lebanon in the final few months of 2019, Executive decided to host a series of roundtable discussions in mid-November. 

These discussions, which in the end comprised six roundtables held over November 18 – 21 at Le Gray, in Downtown Beirut, covered the following topics: corruption, entrepreneurship, education, labor, women’s empowerment, access to information, taxation, fiscal policy, and, arguably most importantly, Lebanon’s current financial reality. 

Executive’s team spent a stressful two weeks trying to turn this last minute roundtable initiative into a reality, contacting over 150 individuals across varied sectors and internally creating the topics and questions to be discussed at each roundtable. In the end, around 50 individuals—economists, academics from private and public institutions, entrepreneurs, and a diverse range of civil society actors—came together to discuss issues vital to the future of the Lebanese political economy. 

Starting points

These roundtable discussions were held under Chatham House rules—meaning that while the individuals present at each roundtable are listed as contributors to our Economic Roadmap 3.0, both the roadmap and our coverage in this issue of Executive refrain from attributing ideas or quotes to any individual persons. 

In conclusion of the November 2019 roundtables, it can be stated with confidence that, although a starting point for any possible journey toward economic rescue and revival from the present and still increasing misery has to be a competent and at least marginally accepted government, the way forward has its brightest outlook in holding recurrent discussions among stakeholders in the economy. Technical knowledge is required as a pillar in any such discussion—with taxation, fiscal, monetary, and political economy deliberations tending to the highest requirement of expertise—but based on the experience of the six Executive roundtables any future discussion rounds would actually be most productive if built on three pillars: the technical knowledge pillar and two equally important non-technical pillars, trust and commitment to Lebanon’s betterment being the first, and wide stakeholder diversity on many axes—meaning not just gender balance, but also age and professional and life experience—being the second. 

December 19, 2019 0 comments
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Overview

Executive’s “Quote of the Month” throughout 2019

by Executive Editors December 18, 2019
written by Executive Editors

JANUARY

“It’s different from Washington and London, we
should maybe teach them how to run a country without a budget.”

Then-caretaker foreign minister, Gebran Bassil, answering a question on cabinet formation in an interview with CNN, January 22, 2019.

FEBRUARY

“My decision and the government’s decision is to work, work, work.”

Prime Minister Saad Hariri, speaking to Parliament ahead of a vote of confidence in the government on February 15.

MARCH

“How does stockpiling tens of thousands of rockets and missiles in Lebanon territory for use against Israel make this country stronger?”

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking at a press conference in Beirut on March 22.

APRIL

“This decision shows that the US audacity and folly went beyond limits.”

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on the US decision to designate Iran’s IRGC as a terrorist organization, during a speech on April 10.

MAY

“The 2019 budget is not the end. This budget is the beginning of a long road that we decided to take in order to lead the Lebanese economy to safety.”

Prime Minister Saad Hariri, speaking about the proposed budget for 2019 at an iftar dinner in Beirut, on May 25.

JUNE

“The plan will help the Palestinian private sector capitalize on growth opportunities by improving access to strong, neighboring economies.”

Extract from the White House’s Peace for Prosperity plan, launched in Bahrain, on June 25-26

JULY

“They know we are lying to them, and we know that they know we are lying to them. This is the truth, so there is no problem.”

Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party MP Salim Saadeh, speaking in Parliament about the fiscal reductions in the budget and the reforms pledged to donors at CEDRE, before the budget vote on July 19.

AUGUST

“We are not here in solidarity with Mashrou’ Leila. We are here in solidarity with our freedom.”

Part of a statement read aloud by Nada Bou Farhat and Badih Abou Chakra at a concert organized on August 9 in Beirut to protest Byblos International Festival’s dropping of Mashrou’ Leila following a campaign accusing the band of blasphemy.

SEPTEMBER

“Banque du Liban has its reserves in dollars that exceed $38.5 billion and is present in the market and there is no need for any special measures especially because the fear mongering that is happening is more in the media than in the market.”

Banque du Liban Governor Riad Salameh, speaking during a televised press conference on September 23.

OCTOBER

“Kellon ya’ni kellon.”

All of them means all of them. One of the chants of the October uprising.

NOVEMBER

“If they do not like it and there is not a single decent person in power, then they should go and emigrate.”

President Michel Aoun in a live interview discussing the protesters in Lebanon, on November 12.

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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CorruptionEconomics & PolicyOpinion

Lebanon needs concrete steps to tackle corruption to restore confidence

by Arkan Seblani December 18, 2019
written by Arkan Seblani

Trust in politicians and governments is usually a result of a successful performance, but it is also—perhaps more significantly—an ingredient for success. Without it, citizens and businesses are less likely to respond to public policies, especially those that are seeking to promote economic recovery and stability. Trust is necessary to increase the confidence of investors and consumers alike, while also being essential for key economic activities—most notably finance and banking—and for upholding the rule of law.

Trust in politicians and governments has become a rare but vital commodity. Data shows that trust is deteriorating across the globe, including in OECD countries. In Lebanon, trust levels are among the worst in the world. In 2017, the World Economic Forum ranked Lebanon 128th out of 137 countries in terms of public trust in politicians, a score of just 1.7 out of a possible seven. In February 2019, a poll by Beirut-based consultancy firm Information International found that 85 percent of Lebanese lacked trust in their government. While it may be possible to argue with the methodologies of such studies, there is no denying the unprecedented social upheaval that has been sweeping across the country since October 17. And with the economy on the brink of collapse, action must be taken—now—to narrow that trust gap.

Integrity is considered a crucial element of trust, yet Lebanon does not fare well on indicators measuring integrity or the lack thereof; it consistently performs poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. In 2018, Lebanon ranked 138th out of 180 countries, with a score of 28 out of 100, compared to a regional average of 34 and a global average of 43. The score for 2019 is due in January and expected to be even worse.
Lebanese politicians of every creed are finally acknowledging that decisive action is needed to curb corruption. Nonetheless, concrete and meaningful steps forward remain absent. Decades-long inaction has been replaced by a bias to adversarial and erratic case-based action, without proper prosecutions and major convictions. If such actions were meant to restore trust, then they have done exactly the opposite.

Much needed structural reforms remain unheeded. The adoption of Lebanon’s first-ever national anti-corruption strategy has been repeatedly delayed, as has passage of, or updates to, critical legislation, such as amendments to the grossly flawed illicit enrichment law and the introduction of conflict of interest regulation. Even when relevant legislative breakthroughs are made, countless obstacles emerge barring effective implementation—the access to information law is case in point.
The widening trust gap and poor performance on anti-corruption have created a vicious circle, but one that Lebanon can escape with real political will.

Adopting the national anti-corruption strategy and establishing an independent national anti-corruption agency is just the beginning. Ensuring that both have the appropriate financial and human resources to start working immediately is the real test of trust. The independence of the judiciary is also imperative. This will require legislative amendments that allow the Higher Judicial Council to carry out judicial appointments and rotations, but beyond that, also safeguard every judge against undue influence and ensure that the council itself is formed and functions according to principles of good governance. Only with all these steps in place can real progress take place.

Beyond those initial steps, parallel paths of legislative and executive action to enhance integrity are needed in two other spheres of public policy—people in decision-making positions and public money. This includes deep and meaningful reforms related to public procurement, election financing, and modernizing the country’s audit and control system.

Such reforms will inevitably take time, but trust cannot wait. Lebanon needs swift and immediate action to ensure that specific integrity measures can be seen through in the span of a few months. This includes executive action to seize critical opportunities to demonstrate integrity in practice, namely in relation to large infrastructure projects and areas where there will be major investments, such as in electricity, or potential major revenues, such as oil and gas. It also includes ensuring full compliance with Law 28 (2017) on access to information. This can be achieved by implementing the national action plan that was drafted for this purpose, but not yet adopted. It also includes overhauling the country’s archaic systems of asset declaration by public officials and introducing effective measures to regulate the working relationship between the public and private sectors and manage conflict of interests.

As the saying goes, “a fool throws a stone into a well and it requires a hundred wise men to get it out again.” For this Christmas, I am wishing for wise men and women.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial views of Executive Magazine, nor the views of the UN or the UNDP.

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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F&B OverviewHospitality & Tourism

Lebanon’s F&B operators face an economic crisis and low tourism

by Nabila Rahhal December 18, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal

The once mighty food and beverage (F&B) sector is today falling under the weight of the current economic crisis—the dollar shortage, increased cost of living due to exchange rates, and lower purchasing power—and lack of tourists, with no respite in sight. Once optimistic F&B operators, who had always insisted that the sector was resilient enough to withstand internal turmoil, are nowadays at a loss for words when asked about the current state of F&B sector in Lebanon and its future. 

The early indicators

Despite the first nine months of 2019 being good for tourism in Lebanon, F&B operators told Executive that they did not feel the positive effects, instead continuing to face the difficulties they had encountered in 2018 and then some.

Executive reported at the end of 2018 that the F&B sector was suffering from an unregulated market and a subsequent increase in competition that had negatively impacted many venues. This continued this year as well, according to Jean Claude Ghosn, CEO of Ghia Holding, a hospitality management company that owns and operates Duo and Ahwak, among other restaurants. “The F&B industry has been suffering since the end of 2017,” he tells Executive. “This is mainly due to an increased supply of F&B outlets [coupled] with a decrease in demand as local consumers’ purchasing power dwindled. Summer in Beirut used to be busy, but over the past three years the market has been expanding to areas out of Beirut. This spread the supply and—with demand [from tourists] not increasing significantly—also created a problem: increased competition with not enough market demand was the core of the problem.”

Another issue the sector has faced since 2018 is the hike in taxes for some imported foods and alcohol in June 2019, which drove up operators’ cost margins. “Our cost was rising, but we could not increase our prices because our customers were already struggling under the increased cost of living brought on by the increased taxes on them as well,” explains Toni Rizk, CEO of TRI Concepts, a hospitality management company that owns and operates Almodovar and The Bohemian, among other nightlife venues. “As a result, people were going out less, and spending less when they did.” 

According to Joe Njeim, owner of Paname in Saifi Village and managing partner of Leila, a Lebanese restaurant with several outlets in Lebanon and the region, banks also contributed to the challenges the sector was facing by reducing the number of newly issued subsidized loans in 2019 to almost zero.  

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

All of these factors combined led the Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Nightclubs, and Pastries (SRCNP) to issue a statement in early October 2019, warning that 130 F&B establishments had shut down in September alone. The statement also alleged that summer 2019 was not as good as expected due to the security incident in Qabr Shmoun on June 30 which made some tourists wary of visiting Lebanon. Executive was unable to obtain Ministry of Tourism numbers to confirm this. 

Although the F&B sector has been resilient to challenges Lebanon has faced in the past, overcoming the events of the fourth quarter of 2019  proved harder. “Maybe the size of the disaster was bigger in July 2006 (when the majority of outlets in Lebanon closed for two months during the war with Israel), but the difference is it was coming after several years of a very solid economy, and so of good profitability and growth for the sector,” Njeim says. “So we were able to endure those two months of losses and paid full salaries and rent. Today there is a big difference, we’ve had three previous years where the sector had been suffering from a bad economy and a low
purchasing power.” 

After the last straw

The F&B sector was already suffering before the onset of the October uprising, which made withstanding its subsequent pressures that much harder.

In the early days of the uprising, when there were almost daily road closures, many F&B outlets—whether in malls, clusters, or standalones—shut down for an average of 12 days, which negatively impacted sales, according to those interviewed.

With bank closures, limits on cash withdrawals, and an absence of dollars in the market, consumers are more keen than before to hold on to their money. Even those who do have disposable cash in their hands are not in the mood to spend it, says Njeim. “You need a certain mood to spend your money on outings, and the mood on the streets today is cautious and not conducive to spending,” he says.

It is no wonder then that Ghosn says sales in his venues have dropped almost 70 percent since October 16, while Njeim places the average drop in revenues at 40 to 60 percent across the sector depending on the location (interview conducted in mid-November).

Some areas in proximity to Downtown Beirut appeared to be doing better than others—since protestors would head there for a break between demonstrating at Riad el-Solh or Martyr’s Square—but F&B operators say this is not telling of the sector as a whole. “Even if the venues in proximity to Downtown had increased activity for a week or two when the protests were at their peak, in the long run this has no real impact on their bottom lines and is not indicative of the sector,” Rizk says. “We have to think of the long-term survival and see where we are going.” 

When the doors close

On November 25, the SRCNP released another statement saying that out of 12,000 F&B outlets in Lebanon, 265 had closed down over the past two months (October and most of November), a figure which online restaurant directory and delivery app Zomato collaborated. In an interview with Executive, Tony Ramy, president of the syndicate, warned that if the situation continues like this, there could be as many as 400 outlets closed in a three month period (from start October to year’s end). 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

Putting these figures in context, according to Zomato, 1,196 outlets have closed down so far in 2019 (mid-November)—but approximately 1,209 venues have also opened. This is similar to last year in terms of restaurant closures and openings roughly negating each other, but what has changed is the rate at which this turnaround is happening. In 2018, restaurant closures and openings only reached around 500 outlets respectively for the entire year. 

Those in the sector therefore remain apprehensive, particularly in regard to what this heightened rate of restaurant closures means for the economy and the country as a whole. “Today it is about one thing and one thing only: the survivability of our operations, and the survivability of our employees,” Ayoub says. “If a sector like the [F&B] sector breaks down, it would create a high level of social chaos. It would put 150,000 people and their families at risk of losing their job, which also means being out of the national social security fund (NSSF) and not having a paycheck at the end of the month—it would be a disaster.”  

Since the protests, some of the operators Executive spoke with in interviews from mid to late November say they have given their employees pay cuts across the board, while others said they have decreased the number of shifts their staff work or cut down on opening hours in general—with the knock-on effect on salaries. Some have also shuttered some branches—Ghosn has closed two branches of Ahwak in Saida and Choueifat, for example—and laid off employees. 

Hand in hand

Those Executive interviewed in the F&B sector have called for support and understanding across the entire hospitality chain—and for personal sacrifice at each level—to keep the sector going. “Developers and landlords have to think rationally and accept deferred payments, or decrease rent to keep operators and their venue going,” says Rabih Saba, co-partner of Venture Group, an operator of hospitality clusters. “Local distributors also have to understand that they need to make less profit to keep the industry going. Employees have to understand that, in light of circumstances, they need to focus on retaining their jobs and on surviving this period—they need to think long term. International suppliers also have to understand that their profit is at stake if they are not more sensitive to the needs of the sector. The hit has to be across the board.” He argues that the F&B sector is at risk of a domino effect, whereby if one element in the chain chooses to think individualistically, the entire industry is at risk of collapsing.  

Indeed, all operators Executive spoke to have asked for leniency from landlords when it comes to rent payments, saying that this is their biggest expense. Others have asked for support from the government through tax breaks: “In most countries, private investors are encouraged to put money in by giving them tax breaks,” Rizk says. “This should be the case for F&B in Lebanon. The government should look into decreasing taxes on the sector by lowering taxes on imported goods, such as alcohol
or cheeses.” 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

The list of demands proposed by the SRCNP incorporates these demands and more, for example calling for debt restructuring from banks. The syndicate has promised to lobby for the needs of the sector starting next year, if they feel that measures called for are not being taken on board.

While operators are asking for the swift formation of a government, they recognize that this alone is not enough to fix the situation that they and the country are suffering from. “Even if the government is formed today, the economic situation will take time to stabilize—and until that happens there is no purchasing power, and so no spending on F&B,” Ramy says. “When the situation stabilizes, we really need to work on the sector and have a proper tourism strategy that attracts new markets to Lebanon. There is a lot of work to be done, which includes our adjusting our prices, working on preserving our natural environment and resources—a lot of things need to be done.” 

For the first time in the seven years this writer has been covering the industry, questions on future plans have gone unanswered. Hospitality operators Executive spoke to do not want to talk about their plans for 2020, and most say all future projects are on hold (with the exception of Njeim who says he will continue with plans of opening a Lebanese cuisine restaurant in Downtown Beirut in early 2020). Operators are instead focusing all their energy on weathering the current storm, so that they and their team can live to see another, hopefully brighter, day.   

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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