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Book ReviewEconomics & Policy

Yossi Alpher, No End of Conflict

by Riad Al-Khouri February 22, 2017
written by Riad Al-Khouri

Yossi Alpher, a veteran of Israel’s intelligence services, starts “No End of Conflict” with a personal and emotional account of his role in an attempt to reunite two sisters from the Holy Land, separated since 1947 – first by their choosing different paths in life and later because of the new borders imposed on Palestine post-1948. Alpher describes attempts to bring the siblings back together; the messy details of the story seem unimportant compared to the grand political and diplomatic themes of the book, but even though a physical meeting between the sisters seems rather easy to arrange, the reunification never materializes. Heavy fears on both sides and actual threats made stand in the way – a metaphor for the lack of real peace and durable long-term relations between Israel and her neighbors, especially the Palestinians. Though not related directly to the core content of No End of Conflict, the tale of the two women sets the tone for the rest of the book, painting a dark picture.

After his description of several failed peace initiatives, Alpher argues that renewed attempts to achieve full-fledged final status peace agreements are merely symbolic dances that only show the ignorance or disingenuousness of the initiators, with the actors directly involved not serious about making peace and in some ways preferring the status-quo. If anything, these Oslo-style rituals are seen as actually deepening the conflict.

Israel is facing increasing international pressure over its occupation of the Palestinian territories, its treatment of Palestinians and its attitude toward human rights, as well as recent undemocratic tendencies within Israeli politics. This is further fueled by the growing influence of right-wing ideological, messianic and settler movements within the government, security agencies and state bureaucracy, making any possible peace deal that includes settlement withdrawal increasingly unlikely.

Alpher describes an overall situation emerging of an Israel-Palestine heading toward a binational state, in one form or another, with several unwanted and likely negative consequences. The author refuses to call the current situation apartheid but warns that this is the direction Israel is heading toward, with several actors  advocating racist, apartheid or quasi-apartheid policies. As key to integrating Arabs into a singular state, many on the Israeli right advocate a colonialist approach that includes “Westernizing” and “civilizing” the Arab population and improving their lives economically to encourage them to perceive their situation as superior to any alternative, even though the history of Israel-Palestine shows no indication that economic prosperity determines Palestinian attitudes.

  Alpher is highly skeptical of further attempts for all-encompassing peace talks, deriding them as pathetic and unrealistic. According to him, it is time for a more pragmatic approach to managing the conflict and mitigating some of its most damaging effects, rather than trying to solve it altogether. As such, in the second part of the book, Alpher describes some ideas to muddle through, among which include the international community taking charge, the Arab Peace Initiative, and a stable, long-term ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza.

The final part of the book deals with the ramifications of Israel’s current course and the consequences if it remains unchanged from moving toward a single, openly apartheid or a binational Arab-Jewish state, or some blurry area in between. Some proponents of West Bank annexation and apartheid-like policies are confident that it will not be sustainable and that the world will cope with that reality as long as Israelis stay “united and confident”. There is also a sense that as relations with the West worsen, new economic and security relations can be found with the East – including through the idiotic “Sunni alliance,” surely a peak in the political foolishness of some Israelis. Yet on the other hand, many wiser Israelis – including the author himself – believe that some progress toward a peace agreement with the Palestinians must be made to save Israel and preserve its standing in the world. Alpher, for his part, sets out all these arguments and points of view fairly and succinctly in a book that is well worth reading.

February 22, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyMobile Smuggling

Shedding light on a black market

by Jeremy Arbid February 20, 2017
written by Jeremy Arbid

This past November Lebanese authorities disrupted a smuggling operation that had evaded detection for over a decade. The items trafficked were mobile phones to the tune of 2.5 million devices valued at some $45 million during the network’s lifespan, local media reported. The trafficking network’s alleged mastermind? Kamel Amhaz.

The name might sound familiar. Just a few years back, in July 2014, the United States placed financial sanctions on Amhaz, his businesses and several associates. The US accused Amhaz of using Stars Group Holding (whose subsidiaries together form one of the larger distributors of mobile phones in Lebanon, with retail branches throughout the country) to buy sophisticated electronics for Hezbollah. “Items obtained by Hizballah using the Stars Group Holding network have directly supported the group’s military capabilities,” a statement announcing the sanctions read.

The sanctions came just months after Lebanon lifted a regulation meant to curb mobile smuggling. Last November, Ahmaz was arrested on smuggling charges. His release on $10,000 bail in December indicates the government does not really care about an underground market that costs the treasury tens of millions of dollars in lost tax and tariff revenues every year, distorts the competitive landscape and negatively impacts consumer welfare.

Whitelisting

In 2013 the Ministry of Telecommunications attempted to control the mobile phone market, implementing a software system intended to curb smuggling by verifying a device’s International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), a 15-digit serial number unique to the phone. The IMEI number was used by the government to verify the phone, a process known in industry terms as whitelisting. IMEIs that were not imported through proper channels were blacklisted and blocked from connecting to the cellular networks of Lebanon’s two publicly-owned but privately managed operators, Alfa and touch.

The new regulation added an extra layer of bureaucracy, but whitelisting was, in theory, a relatively simple process. All importers had to do was register their shipment’s IMEIs with customs; upon import, traders were to clear their shipment with the customs Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, paying a 10 percent value added tax (VAT) for each device imported and a 5 percent customs duty on the total value of the shipment. After receiving payment, customs forwarded the IMEIs to the Ministry of Telecommunications for whitelisting. Travelers from abroad had to register their device’s IMEI upon arrival at the airport. Local subscribers were grandfathered in and users looking to trade in their mobiles, or switch their SIM card between phones, first had to send one text message to release the number from the initial phone’s IMEI.

The IMEI block had two intentions: to prevent mobiles that were not whitelisted from connecting to the country’s cellular networks, and requiring importers to trade above the table. It’s not clear how effective the system was because figures are not public and government officials would not discuss the matter with Executive. But the IMEI block did have an impact, Lebanese customs data shows. For less than a year it turned a mostly black and gray market into one that was nearly as clean as the sullied snow along the road to Faraya.

In 2014, with Boutros Harb at the helm, the Ministry of Telecommunications did an about-face, cancelling the IMEI block. Harb agreed to an interview with Executive for this article, but did not commit to its scheduling. In a statement from 2014, Harb cited a number of reasons for cancelling the system but offered little evidence to support his claims. According to Harb, the IMEI block forced mom-and-pop shops out of business, eliminated jobs, delayed imported mobiles from reaching the market to the benefit of other traders and had no effect on revenue collection or in curbing smuggling. At the ripe age of ten months the IMEI block was no more.

Regardless of the motive, Harb’s arguments do not appear to have actually been measured; there are no figures published online and the Ministry of Telecommunications, now led by Jamal Jarrah, did not grant an interview.

Lack of data

Nicolas Sehnaoui, the minister of telecommunications who implemented the IMEI block, who also was not available to comment for this story, said back in 2013 that it was meant to curb mobile phone smuggling, as his administration estimated the market to be 70 percent black.

Implementation of the IMEI block uncovered not only the black market, but also dimensions of the market that industry players estimate to be at least 20 to 25 percent gray (see explainer below on black versus gray markets), leaving legitimately imported phones to account for as little as 5 percent by quantity, if both estimates are correct. 

Lebanese customs data does show that the IMEI block made the market more transparent. In 2012, before the IMEI block was put in place, customs recorded imports of almost 150,000 mobiles with a declared value of nearly $31 million. Implementation of the IMEI block got underway in the middle of 2013 and end-of-year records show nearly 1.4 million phones were imported with a declared value of $193 million. In 2015, the first full year of data after the IMEI block ended, the figures dropped off a cliff: 263,000 devices at a declared value of $21 million.

A comparison of UN Comtrade Database, a depository of international trade data reported by countries, with Lebanese customs data suggests a much larger black market than the government thought and shows a total market size by quantity larger than industry insiders project. The IMEI block was not in place for a full calendar year, only the second half of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014. The 2.3 million devices officially imported over 2013 and 2014 is only 30 percent of the 7.6 million that trade partners reported leaving their countries with destination Lebanon. The database is not specific enough to make any conclusions for intra-year changes and neither global market fluctuations nor reported Lebanese exports explain the discrepancy between imports from one period to another. What the UN’s data does suggest is that smuggling is much more rampant than the government thought and shows a market size 2 times larger than industry projections.

In terms of revenues, it is not clear how much in VAT and tariffs the IMEI block helped catch because the financial data is not public, and government officials would not discuss the matter with Executive. What is available are overall figures on VAT and customs revenue that flow to the government’s coffer. But those figures do not give an indication of what is collected from mobile phone imports because there are too many variables to isolate – the data combines all duties assessed on the total value of imported shipments where the flow of trade can fluctuate from month to month, and it lumps together VAT collections on goods and services at points of sale, which might fluctuate due to consumer behavior, with VAT collected on each product imported.

For the treasury, the removal of the registration system meant lost revenues that the Ministry of Telecommunications estimated in its 2013 annual report to be upwards of $40 million annually, though Sehnaoui placed the loss at no less than $60 million per year when he announced the IMEI block that year. But if the UN data were the measure, treasury losses might be above $100 million every year.

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New regulation added an extra layer of bureaucracy, but whitelisting was a relatively simple process

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The Ministry of Finance declined to comment on the impact on VAT collection and the amounts that were received before, during or after the IMEI block was in place. Customs, which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Finance, was also not available for comment on the flow of revenue to the treasury from the collection of duties on mobile imports.

Rita Khairallah, then a project manager at the telecoms ministry, told The Daily Star in 2013 that the IMEI block was an impressive success. An assessment conducted by the ministry after the first three months of implementation claimed that customs and VAT revenues on mobile phone imports multiplied by more than ten times, she said. Khairallah, now a customer experience manager with network operator touch according to her LinkedIn profile, did not respond to Executive’s requests for comment.

The lack of data and the unwillingness of government officials to discuss the issue might suggest an undercurrent to this story that publicly available sources alone cannot tell.

The losses for industry

Industry players had long wanted the government to crackdown on smuggling and parallel imports. Eddy Cherfan, CEO of Cherfan, Tawil & Co. (CTC) – the one market player that agreed to speak on the record with Executive – argues at least 90 to 95 percent of phones on the market before the IMEI block were, and are now again, black or gray devices.

The IMEI block provided what Cherfan thought was a golden opportunity. With it in place, he moved to aggressively expand CTC, updating stores and adding new ones, increasing the payroll and growing the distribution line, where the company does the bulk of its business, with a new warehouse.

Cherfan was thinking strategically. He saw opportunity in a retail market he viewed as unorganized, offering little to customers in terms of service and guaranteed quality, and in return, he believed the IMEI block would level prices. Before and after the IMEI block, Cherfan cited smuggling, parallel imports and the misinvoicing (see explainer below on misinvoicing) of imported shipments as reasons why CTC could not compete on price. He guessed that with more importers paying taxes and tariffs, the number of cheaper black and gray phones in the market would shrink. “We thought we had a fair chance competing in mobile phone sales. Consumers would come to our shop and find well-trained salespeople offering a full-fledged service, with original accessories and warranty at a fair price,” he tells Executive.

It’s not clear how much market share CTC grabbed while the IMEI block was in effect, and Cherfan wouldn’t say. CTC doesn’t have exclusivity on Samsung mobile phones (it does for other Samsung consumer electronics), but the company is the only authorized distributor in Lebanon. He calculates the country’s mobile phone market size to be above 1.5 million devices annually, a much smaller estimate than UN data shows. But given the aggressive expansion plan, it’s a fair guess that CTC projected an increase of market share by healthy margins.

The move to discontinue the IMEI block halted any ambitions Cherfan had planned. The company immediately lost $1.2 million, he says. Retailers stopped buying, content to wait for cheaper mobiles to flood the market. “As soon as minister [Harb] went on TV to announce the cancellation of the IMEI block, the market stopped buying, and we had a large stock [left] in our warehouse – thousands of phones,” Cherfan says.

In the months that followed the IMEI block’s removal, CTC losses added up to millions of dollars. Stores were closed and 80 employees were let go. Cherfan was forced to change tack, shifting much of the company’s mobile trading business, due to regulatory uncertainty and lower investor confidence, outside of the country.

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In the months that followed the IMEI block’s removal, CTC losses added millions of dollars. Stores were closed and 80 employees were let go

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“The cancellation of the registration system cost our company dearly,” he tells Executive. Tallying stock losses, compensation to employees that were laid off, the closure of five shops that had been renovated, rental fees that were paid upfront, IT infrastructure and a new warehouse built for mobile phone distribution, Cherfan says the total losses approached $4 million.

Adding insult to injury was the speedy shut down of the IMEI block. Before its implementation, the government allowed a grace period of several months for traders to clear their stock. Importers that had smuggled phones into the country by not paying VAT or duties were forgiven, able to avoid financial losses and join the market above the table. But when the government decided to cancel the IMEI block, “They gave us only three days. They gave six months to the smugglers and gave us three days,” Cherfan recounts.

State of affairs

That the mobile phone market is openly recognized as a mostly black and gray market raises concerns. The governing element of the story is that the state is giving up revenue due to the treasury, potentially in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and acting to its detriment for unknown reasons. The removal of the IMEI block allows some competitors to have a better cost position, because the data shows some importers continue to evade taxes and duties, resulting in a distortion of the competitive landscape. Because of the opacity of decision making, one is left with the conclusion that the government condones smuggling.

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The removal of the IMEI block allows some competitors to have a better cost position

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Explainer: Black versus gray

A black market is one that functions below the radar of the state. Smuggling is an underground activity where the demand or profit margin for controlled products like weapons, or illegal ones like narcotics, or counterfeit goods create a supply incentive too juicy to pass up despite risks. Tax evasion is another form of smuggling, even when the product imported is a legitimate one. Smugglers might also, knowingly or not, import stolen devices whose data has been wiped, updated with a new operating system and reboxed with new accessories and portrayed as a new or used phone.

A gray market, sometimes called parallel imports, differs in that the product is not illegal but is brought into a country through distribution channels that may be unintended by the manufacturer. The driving force behind parallel imports can be due to price variation between versions of the phone meant for different markets, currency fluctuations where the device may be cheaper when traded in a currency that is stronger than that of the country of origination or of destination, or simply due to consumer demand for a mobile in a market that has not yet officially launched. While consumers may gain by paying lower prices, their experience with a parallel import product can be compromised. The mobile they purchase may be a version of the device localized for another market, so the consumer might not receive the appropriate accessories, or might not qualify for the manufacturer warranty, or it may even be a refurbished phone described as new.

Gray markets often come about because of certain rules in a given market. The gray market definition requires two conditions: “(1) The existence of the agreement of exclusive rights to sell a certain product in the territory, (2) The existence of a strong registered trademark, which is recognized in a territory where a potential grey marketing activity may occur,” reads a 2011 research paper on gray markets.

Lebanese law allows for exclusivity rights for companies, and the economy is often described as laissez-faire. But, the “Lebanese economy is largely oligopolistic”, a slideshow presentation hosted on the Ministry of Economy website (it’s not clear when the presentation was prepared or published) points out, adding that a new competition law is necessary to level the economic playing field. The “ultimate objective of competition policy in general, and competition laws in particular, is consumer welfare that is served by lower prices, better quality products and, eventually, by a more efficient and dynamic economy”, reads a 2002 report prepared by a local consultancy for the Ministry of Economy.


Explainer: Misinvoicing 

Importers can skirt customs duties and VAT taxes by mislabeling, intentionally or not, the shipment’s Bill of Lading (BoL) – what is written on the label may not be exactly what is in the box. At its simplest, mislabeling affects the shipment by misstating its content, downgrading its number of units or their total value.

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit researching illicit financial flows, misinvoicing could result in the direct evasion of taxes and customs duties by under-reporting the value of goods, an outcome that would easily be measurable if Lebanese customs data on mobile phone imports, the UN’s data on mobile phone exports to Lebanon and the Ministry of Finance’s figures on VAT and customs revenues for those imports could all be cross-checked. However, the latter is not available and officials with knowledge of government finances were not cleared to discuss the matter with Executive.

Mislabeling the invoice is as simple as it is sophisticated, with the shipment passing through potentially one or more intermediaries between the exporter in Country A and the importer in Country B. The shipment could pass through one of four major distribution points for mobile phones – Hong Kong, Dubai, Amsterdam or Miami – before reaching the country where the units will ultimately be sold. So while the exporter in Country A may declare the actual value of the shipment, intermediaries may alter the BoL at points along the distribution path before forwarding the shipment to Lebanon where the importer might again obscure the true value of the shipment.

Sometimes the opposite might occur and the value of the shipment might be inflated. Intermediaries that are subsidiaries owned by the importing company, or companies working with the importer, might raise the value of the shipment to skim cash off the top, sending the proceeds to offshore bank accounts, where taxes can be dodged and the cash laundered. Because of the volume of trade and the sheer number of and speed at which containers move between ports “trade misinvoicing has become a fairly low-risk endeavor for criminals – especially those who only moderately misinvoice their transactions by, say, 5 to 10 percent”, GFI says.

February 20, 2017 1 comment
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Economics & PolicyInterview

Putting meat on the skeleton of the state

by Thomas Schellen February 16, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

Walking through the center of Beirut, Nejmeh Square, to the steps leading up to the Lebanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) is even more eerie today than it was 19 years ago. Back then, Downtown was still riddled with brokenness – with scarred streets and uninhabitable buildings that showed the results of the years of conflict. Passing through the district evoked pity and a longing for reconstruction.

Traversing Downtown in January 2017 means wiggling in between concrete barriers while empty store windows stare back at you. The last international chain coffee shop in the area recently shut down, and all that the expensively restored buildings evoke are memories of restaurants and shops that thrived here in the more vibrant times of ten years ago.   

Up in the welcoming office of MoF Director General Alain Bifani however, there is some cheer and confidence. One of the most crucial issues for Lebanon’s future is the adoption of a state budget. “We stand a very good chance of having a budget this year. I think that everybody means business. It is clear that the political level is very aware of the importance of having a budget,” he says.

According to Bifani, the draft budget for 2017 was prepared in August of last year in line with the same schedule that the MoF follows every year and sent to the Council of Ministers by end of that month. In a normal year, the council would then send the budget as a draft law on to Parliament where it would be examined, debated and voted into law by end of the year – but normalcy in Lebanese politics has been quite the exception.

Budgeting for tomorrow

Bifani is therefore not troubled by the fact that the budget might not reach Parliament until late 2017, calling this “an acceptable delay”, especially when taking into account that the budget draft was prepared under the previous cabinet. “Now that we have a new government, the draft of course needs to be revisited, and my understanding is that it is going to follow a fast track, which means reviewing mostly at the level of the Council of Ministers, after which the [revised] draft will be sent to Parliament for discussions and approval. There will be arbitrage about many issues, the usual stuff, but altogether there is no doubt that we have momentum and I really hope that we will be able to build on that and finally get out of this very long period of unorthodox managing of public finances,” he tells Executive. 

The budget is one of the top concerns for advancing Lebanon to a future of greater stability, bankers and business leaders told Executive upon the appointment of President Michel Aoun in late 2016. Lebanese state budgets have generally over the years been bones of discontent. The last time that a budget was adopted by Parliament was in February 2006, when the 2005 budget was voted upon and passed. Since then, failures to adopt a budget had been associated by critics with a wide variety of issues, from political discrepancies to dysfunctional administrations and the need to complete national accounts for most of the years since the end of the Lebanese conflict over a quarter century ago.

When talk turns to the recent years and the sorry state of the area around Nejmeh Square, Bifani agrees that Beirut’s Central District has become a nightmare for the reputation of Lebanon, a hole in the tax base and a burden for the people who invested heavily into the reconstruction of the center’s business venues. But this is not the only heritage that weighs on the Ministry of Finance, in addressing still unsolved issues in the financial past, Bifani explains. “Of course there is the issue of closing the accounts from the beginning of the 1990s until now. This remains a valid issue, but nevertheless, it is better to have a budget while waiting for proper accounts to be finalized than not to have either.”

In his update regarding the progress of closing accounts for the years between 1993 and 2015, Bifani elaborates that of the 11 accounts worked on vertically by the MoF team, eight have been reconciled and reconstructed completely, up from four completed in late 2015 when Executive last interviewed the general director. A ninth account is currently being finalized. “Hopefully we will be done within a month. There remain two accounts of which the work is between 70 and 80 percent complete. We are really reaching the last phases,” Bifani says.

Reiterating that it was once considered mission impossible by international experts to complete this work, he insists that the effort’s most important aspect is not how many man hours were invested by MoF staffers. “I don’t have an accurate figure but it was huge. We mobilized civil servants from all our directorates. These people worked in dust, in humidity, in horrible places. They found enormous amounts of papers that were thrown [into storage indiscriminately]. You had 2012 [mixed] with 2001 with 1993 all thrown together. To reconstitute and classify this took an amazing amount of time,” he says.

Nor is the most important aspect the timescale of its implementation, Bifani emphasizes, under the often asked question of whether the MoF has finished this work yet. Instead, it  is the proper framework that he and his team are building. “That is not the point. We are building on [the reconstruction and reconciliation of the accounts], giving the republic the means and procedures for proper accounting; it is a base and a very important milestone and we have to do it properly,” he emphasizes.

Beyond the job of reconciling the creative fiscal history of Lebanese administrations with the reality of  sorting out records at various ministries, agencies, and municipalities, Bifani’s focus is on Lebanon’s ongoing budget process. This involves consultations with all 24 line ministries, the presidency of the Republic and the Council of Ministers as well as the agencies that are included in the budget, which according to him, means practically every entity in the public administration. “All together there are about 45 units that we need to integrate,” he says.

The draft process entails reviews and modifications by the Minister of Finance after which the budget proposal is sent to the Council of Ministers by the end of August. From there it enters as a draft law decree to Parliament. “What usually takes time [at Parliament] are discussions at the Budget and Finance Committee where the whole budget is scrutinized after the Council of Ministers has approved it. Then it goes to the plenary to be voted upon, ideally by end of the year,” Bifani explains.

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Now that we have a new government, the draft [budget] of course needs to be revisited

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Budget administration

On top of this regular process, the MoF has to incorporate new legislative decisions into the budget, such as implications of the rent law or parliamentary discussions over waiving municipal obligations to pay outstanding dues to solid waste removal companies. Asked about the issue and what amounts could be involved in having the payment responsibility taken by the treasury, Bifani says the problem resulted from a misguided redistribution practice that created huge liabilities and translated into massive distortions, but he would not provide an estimate for the amounts in question. “This is a story that started in 2002 and was very poorly managed. We as an administration have been raising [this issue] and been flagging it forever,” he says.

He adds that the ministers of finance in two recent administrations made significant progress in alleviating the problem by adjusting the percentages taken by the government from municipalities but declares that it still was not yet possible implement the solution, “which is to have municipalities themselves decide on what they can contract and what they cannot”.

His overall approach to the reality of getting decrees and laws implemented in Lebanon is reminiscent  of the Realpolitik paradigm that politics is the art of the possible. When people inquire as to why he would accept imperfect measures, or not insist on laws that cover all imaginable issues, for example, in legislation on oil and gas and the creation of a sovereign wealth fund for the management of revenues from this national asset, he says he accepted such legislation because “otherwise, it would not have passed at all. As long as we fight to the last moment, we are making this system better and better and have the best we can”.

On the question of Parliament’s readiness to examine the draft budget law after a long period without the chance to discuss state budgets, he declares that he is not worried about Lebanese parliamentarians and radiates confidence that it will all go “very smoothly”.

“Despite everything that people say, our parliamentarians are educated people. I know that the work will be done seriously in the [Budget and Finance] committee,” he says, citing evidence from prior debates over budgets in the committee even if these budgets in the end were not sent to the plenary. As to broad discussions in the plenary budget debates, which have been customary in earlier years, he describes this as reflection on the fact that the budget is “the translation into money of the government’s whole policy”.

“Thus it is normal that everything is raised during the budget [debate],” he concludes. “I am not worried about it. I think our Parliament has shown the ability to react very quickly to legislative texts and in a very efficient manner. And I have to tell you that while the finance part is our job at the ministry, we learn a lot from discussions at Parliament.”

February 16, 2017 0 comments
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Civil ServiceEconomics & Policy

The administration’s missing cogs

by Thomas Schellen February 14, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

Try driving an aged Mercedes 280 of W123 vintage all the way from Tyre to Tripoli with a faulty gearbox or without a fan belt. Possible? It might be. Temporary fixes such as a pair of tights have been famously used to keep many old engines running when the fan belt has been destroyed. A very skilled driver might be able to upshift from first to fourth gear when the second and third gears can’t be accessed. But your transmission suffers, and it sure makes for risky driving – if you get very far at all. For your vehicle to run smoothly, safely and at its optimal efficiency, its wheels and cogs all have to be in place and well lubed. To drive a broken car is dangerous. Everyone knows this.

Now imagine an organization where important decision making positions, like vice presidents or department heads, are not occupied. The organization might still run, but the transmission of decisions from the top will be slower than it should be, and many intermediate level decisions will not be taken. In the bottom up direction, decision requests will be passed on to the senior-most decider, such as the president or chief executive, and create an overload of work for top management. Erroneous decisions will accumulate and mistakes will be harder to spot if important positions are not filled.

This is not a theoretical vision, take a look at senior administrative positions in Lebanese government entities. According to a list compiled by Lebanese research company Information International and provided to Executive after the latest updates in January, there are 27 administrative “grade-1” posts in Lebanon’s public sector entities vacant as of the beginning of February 2017, all of which are reserved for members of specific religious communities. What is more, at least five of these positions have been vacant for more than a decade.

Some additional positions that were recently introduced, or are not specified in terms of communal identity of the office holder, have also not been filled. When accounting for all these vacancies at public sector entities in Lebanon, and moreover adding in senior positions that would need filling at state-owned enterprises, the void in qualified decision makers is huge. This arguably causes a very large sinkhole in public entities that could undermine the government’s integrity even though a president and cabinet have been put into place.

A Long road to reform

Grade-1 positions are the top tier of the five-tiered civil service network in Lebanon. They comprise positions such as a general director in a public entity and judges in the judiciary. According to sources that include the Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and private researchers, the structure and competence building in Lebanon’s civil services has been marred by problems that were diagnosed as far back as 2001. OMSAR noted in a paper back then for the Strategy and Reform of Lebanon’s Public Administration that the Lebanese civil service “recruitment and testing system is outdated and cannot reliably help in detecting necessary skills and abilities in various jobs, especially in the absence of a job description and classification system”.

Even earlier than that, a study on Public Services Accountability was undertaken at the American University of Beirut in the 1990s on the back of several academic papers by local and international researchers and high-ranking civil servants in Lebanon. This study said that the Civil Service Council (also known as Civil Services Board or CSB) – an institution established in 1959 with extensive powers over practically all aspects of personnel administration in every ministry and autonomous agency, and a mandate to protect and modernize the civil services – was hampered before and directly after the Lebanese conflict through an erosion of powers. Drafted in 1996, the study said: “Despite repeated statements by the government about the need to re-activate and strengthen central control agencies in order to enable them to play an active role in rehabilitating and reforming the public administration, we have been witnessing during the past three years a disturbing trend to circumvent and weaken these control agencies, especially the Civil Service Council.”

Understaffing of higher ranks in the civil services hierarchy has also been entrenched for many years and seems to have only increased over time. In a 2004 public administration country profile for the United Nations, the authors quoted OMSAR’s 2001 paper saying that 10,000 of 22,000 positions were vacant at that time. Citing a CSB report from 2010, a private researcher said in 2013 that the number of vacancies in all categories exceeded 15,300 out of some 22,000 full-time civil service employees.

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The problem [is] in qualification. Having qualified people take administrive positions will reduce the harm of wasta

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The CSB seems not to have published new figures since 2010 (at least none were to be found on its website) and OMSAR likewise has not uploaded an annual report in the last few years. The last annual report on its website, containing scores of plans and project descriptions related to anything from efforts to streamline administrative procedures to completed projects in tourism and municipal solid waste, only covers the years 2010-2012.

It is an established fact in the story of Lebanese administrative reform efforts that initiatives to move appointments of grade-1 civil servants toward a purely merit-based selection process fizzled out within a few years after they were initiated in 2005. In the last five or six years, not much seems to have be done in taking administrative reform forward, and the public debate over the problems of the civil service by all appearances has slowed considerably as threats to Lebanese security and regional problems came to the fore.

The present administrative malaise

In this sense, it is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg that is visible in the list researched by Information International and categorized by the religious affiliations for each position. The list indicates that the 27 vacancies affect positions that are associated with “ownership” by Sunnis, Shia, Druze and various Christian communities in the Lebanese game of politics. This practice is entrenched and reflective of the fact that all across the country’s communal spectrum, groups are vying for shares of the national power pie. According to the advisor to one of Lebanon’s top political figures who had agreed to speak with Executive on condition of anonymity, it was a stipulation of the Taif Accord that the president of the republic should form a committee with the task of overcoming sectarianism in the allocation of administrative posts.

This did not happen, however, and posts are still handed out along sectarian lines to maintain the current confessional balance, according to the advisor. In his view, this pattern is not a problem in itself. Allocation of administrative jobs to political associates is an accepted practice in other countries, he argues, pointing at the United States as an example. “The problem [is] in qualification. Having qualified people take administrative positions will reduce the harm of wasta [nepotism],” he added.

It is arguable if the persisting practice of aligning grade-1 level positions in the Lebanese civil service with a specific religious identity can be anything but detrimental for discovering the most qualified candidates, restricting as it does the candidate pool by a non merit-related selection factor. It would certainly appear as a factor that makes seeking a position in the Lebanese public sector less enticing for the most qualified candidates, on top of the – fairly universal – fact that top jobs in the private sector come with better governance environments and much better remuneration packages, at least for ethically minded candidates. The ones that do apply perhaps do so out of a sense of patriotism, not because they are seeking to convert political power into economic benefit.

Culturally, the practice of aligning office and religious identity might have its merits for keeping the peace in a religiously defined society, even if it flies in the face of the prevalent ideology in western countries that – often enough wrongly – define themselves as liberal democracies, but are in reality driven by special-interest groups and their narrow ideological and political agendas. Political democracy is not the universal pursuit of all stakeholders after the greater good or the nation’s benefit, but the more or less unfair competition between any number of groups seeking after their respective partisan interests.

More than with systemic political debates, however, Lebanon’s political class seems preoccupied with power issues. In discussing those, it appears to be somewhat under-concerned with the economic and social impacts associated with the different jobs that lie vacant or are managed – for example by incumbent position holders beyond expiry of their term – without a clear mandate that meets all legal requirements.

Barriers to economic growth

Arguably not all the vacant positions are equally critical and urgent in their direct or indirect importance toward the Lebanese economy. Some are also occupied by more or less qualified office holders who stayed on beyond their term, so they are not vacant in the strictest sense of the term. However, rotations of office, term limits and durations of tenure are tools designed to help in supervising the efficiency of a position and guaranteeing that a public office does not deteriorate into a personal fiefdom or license for exploitation for private gain. The high number of vacancies, even if some positions are vacant pro forma and not in reality, is alarming from the perspective of governance.

When one further correlates some vacant posts with their impact on the economy, combined with the recent track record of the concerned institutions, the importance of presently vacant grade-1 posts is simply staggering from an economic perspective. This can be said because of the nature of the positions, even if the economic loss for Lebanon from having such posts empty is impossible to assess and so is the cost-benefit ratio that would come with each position.

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The high number of vacancies, even if some positions are vacant pro forma and not in reality, is alarming

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Examples that jump out at first glance are the role of urban planning for Lebanese urban productivity and the importance of the Beirut Stock Exchange in the national economic context. The position of director general for Urban Planning has been vacant since 2005 and the position of head of the Beirut Stock Exchange Committee vacant since February 2009.

The largest hole in a single institution that has to be filled is at the Council for Development and Reconstruction. Fourfold gaps in the CDR’s senior leadership have existed theoretically since 2009 and 2011 – for the Greek Orthodox secretary general, the Shiite vice president, the Maronite vice president and the Sunni president of CDR, although according to the list the Shia vice president and the Sunni president of CDR both continue to “assume their functions” beyond expiry of the council’s term back in 2009.

Other institutions of economic importance where vacancies wait for qualified office holders are the Investment and Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) and the Social and Economic Council where director general tenures expired in 2009 – even as IDAL’s general director continues to hold his position – and in 2011. At the Higher Council for Customs, two seats need to be filled and vacancies appear also at the Office of the President of the Republic and at the Office of the Prime Minister (for the entire list, see page 34).

In the judgment of Information International, the Lebanese public is not sufficiently aware of the number of vacancies and the importance of filling these positions for upgrading the functionality of important administrative entities and public bodies. As the saga of insufficiency, political sectarianism and the perpetual lingering of corruption goes back further than many Lebanese can remember in their own lifetimes, solving the issue of civil service appointment methodologies, upgrading civil service efficiency and filling the many vacancies could be as important for the systemic revitalization of Lebanon as addressing the more obvious problems in infrastructure and economy.

In an interview with Executive, the new Economy and Trade Minister, Raed Khoury, says that the problem of modernizing the civil service and finding a solution to the non-merit-based political appointment process is on the new government’s agenda. Acknowledging that the problem is huge, as “key positions have been vacant for a long time and civil service cannot function,” Khoury says there is a clear will among political parties for coming up with a solution for filling these vacancies, as “every party is now rethinking their positions and we will put them to a round table and try to come up with a conclusion.”

In past attempts of the 1990s and 2000s to reform the civil service, resistance against innovation was apparently too strong and could not be overcome. Given the gravity and duration of the civil service problem, 2017 would seem a good time to try again – but perhaps with a multipronged approach that seeks in the longer term to engrave Lebanese society with a stronger awareness of good governance. While in the short term, vacant positions need to be filled, and better selection methodologies and supervisory mechanisms installed, in the public administration.

February 14, 2017 0 comments
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CommentEconomics & PolicyOil and gas

A roadmap for the first licensing round

by Mona Sukkarieh February 8, 2017
written by Mona Sukkarieh

On January 4 2017, the Lebanese government approved what many observers have been waiting for since March 2013: two oil and gas decrees, without which the country’s first licensing round could not proceed. One delineated offshore blocks, another detailed the model exploration and production agreement and set out the tender protocol.

To signal its determination, the government passed the decrees on the first meeting since gaining Parliament’s confidence. This was a remarkable achievement on the surface, and marketed as such by the government. For others, it was perceived as a long overdue fix.

Roadmap

With the decrees ratified in late January, the Ministry of Energy (MoE) announced which blocks will be open for bidding, as well as a roadmap outlining the steps for Lebanon’s long-delayed offshore licensing round. Block one in Lebanon’s northern waters, block four in the center, and blocks eight, nine and ten in the south will be open for exploration companies to bid on.

According to the roadmap, as Lebanon moves toward accepting bids it will first allow new companies to pre-qualify. That process will take around 60 days, from the beginning of February to the end of March 2017. Companies that had already pre-qualified back in 2013 remain eligible. By mid-April, all eligible companies will be announced. Bids are due in mid-September, and by mid-November 2017, the cabinet is scheduled to sign exploration and production sharing agreements with the winning bidders.

The government is also expected to examine the petroleum tax law and submit it to Parliament for final approval. Hopefully, the political class will not be tempted to drag the process out. It should be noted that Parliament is only in session until March 20. Actual gas or oil production will depend on how successful the companies’ exploratory work is. In case of a commercial discovery, the consortium must submit a development plan that is subject to approval by the government. If granted, the consortium can proceed with production.

Regaining confidence

The pre-qualification round in early 2013 exceeded all expectations. Fifty-two oil and gas companies sought to pre-qualify for Lebanon’s first licensing round. Forty-six of them were successful. But the tender has been postponed five times and was on hold since it was launched in May 2013, due to an incomplete framework. This has affected the initial enthusiasm witnessed in early 2013.

It is essential now to do things right, even if that means taking the time needed. The entire legal and regulatory framework must be complete before inviting companies to place bids, so as not to repeat the same mistakes made in 2013. A competitive fiscal regime, in addition to regulatory and fiscal stability, are key to gain back investors’ confidence.

This must be coupled with targeted campaigns to promote Lebanon’s potential among investors, including  organizing roadshows and official participation in major oil and gas events around the globe.

Lebanon retains an interesting energy potential. This largely explains the success of the pre-qualification round in 2013. Future interest will depend on two things: global market conditions and what we offer investors. There isn’t much we can do to affect the first, but there are some things we can do to attract investors – finalize our legal and regulatory framework, offer a competitive fiscal regime, and actively and aggressively promote our energy potential where it matters.

Beyond the sector, it is important for the government to address and at least contain – if tangible progress is too ambitious at this stage – two impediments that have long hindered investments in Lebanon: corruption and the difficulty of doing business. Currently, Lebanon ranks poorly on both fronts, but the government is determined to improve the conditions for doing business in Lebanon. A new portfolio has been created in the current cabinet charged with combating corruption, and an anti-corruption institution is also being considered. The government has also announced its request to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a global standard promoting transparency. Time will tell how effective these measures will be. At times, country risk might be high, but that does not entirely conceal Lebanon’s energy potential. Oil and gas companies are used to operating in areas where political and country risks are high.

Industry context

After a few difficult years for the industry, with a sharp decline in oil prices that has affected appetite for exploration in certain areas, including the Eastern Mediterranean, a soft price recovery is generally expected by analysts in 2017. Although exploration and production spending is expected to increase by seven percent in 2017, according to a report by Barclays, offshore exploration and production will still suffer (though on a smaller scale compared to 2016) ahead of a more positive outlook for 2018. On the other hand, with more and more Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) projects coming online, the LNG surplus is expected to continue until the early 2020s, likely keeping gas prices low – a challenge for companies operating costly and complex projects.

Regional context

Lebanon will also have to compete with other players in the Eastern Mediterranean that are several steps ahead. The third licensing round in Cyprus attracted six bids from eight companies, drawing some of the biggest names in the industry – no doubt lured in by the discovery of the Zohr gas field in Egyptian waters, not far from the three Cypriot blocks on offer. A consortium made up of Eni and Total was preselected for negotiations for explorations rights in block six, with Eni alone selected for block eight and ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum selected for block ten. An exploration license will be awarded if negotiations are successful, and final results are expected in the first quarter of 2017.

Israel’s first offshore licensing round, which opened in November 2016, is also an opportunity to assess foreign companies’ interest in being involved in the region at this stage. Twenty-four blocks are on offer. They do not include northern blocks running along the Lebanese-Israeli borders. The bid round will close in April 2017 and results are expected three months later. Beyond assessing foreign oil and gas companies’ interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli tender might also be of relevance to Lebanon, as, in principle, companies operating in Israel cannot operate in Lebanon.

February 8, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyElectoral law

How to have a fair election

by Matt Nash February 8, 2017
written by Matt Nash

The goal of any electoral law in a representative democracy is fair and accurate representation. Many people in the country have argued that even with parliamentary seats divided among the country’s different religious groups, Lebanon has not done well in achieving this fair and accurate representation with its own electoral laws. A long-standing allegation against Lebanon’s political elite posits that those in power draft laws to keep themselves and/or their political parties in those positions. And for at least the past 12 years, politicians have debated more than ten draft laws aimed toward fairer representation, with little success.

Draft law discussions are currently raging among the country’s various political parties, outside of both Parliament and public spotlight. Daily press reports offer hints as to the drafts being tabled, but no repository of draft law texts exists for interested citizens to examine the various ideas in detail. According to the current schedule (set forth in the existing electoral law from 2008), parliamentary elections should be held on May 21, and the law governing the polls should be agreed and published in the Official Gazette by late February. To help readers understand the various options available, Executive will explain the current voting system, the systems allegedly under discussion, and a few other proposals that have been suggested over the years.

The status quo

Electoral law 25 of 2008 saw Lebanon’s 128 parliamentarians elected from 26 districts (qada being the Arabic singular). The law relies on a majoritarian seat allocation system, meaning the candidate with the most votes wins the seat. As an example, imagine a district with five seats: Two Sunni, two Maronite, one Druze. The majoritarian calculation system means that the top two Sunni candidates with the most votes get seats, as do the top two Maronite candidates and the top Druze candidate, even if all of those candidates individually only secure 33.3 percent  or more of the votes in the district. The obvious downside of majoritarian systems is that it means a lot of wasted votes, for instance in our example, 66.9 percent of the voters in that district would be represented by MPs they didn’t vote for.

Full proportional representation

One way to mitigate the risk of minority rule highlighted above by adopting a seat allocation system based on proportional representation (PR), which roughly means that seats are allocated based on the percentage of votes received, instead of based on the “highest number of votes wins” principle currently in place. Moving to such a system would first and foremost mean electoral lists have to be mandated by law, which they currently are not, although in practice parties did form lists in 2009 and in previous elections. The legal mandate of a list is essential in a PR system. In Lebanon, while lists have never been a mandatory requirement under the law, as stated above parties have formed them in the past. However, because the lists are not mandatory under the current system, voters do have the option to “mix and match” between or among the lists, depending on how many there are. For example, in 2009 the Free Patriotic Movement list in Metn was “broken” by Michel Murr and an ally, who proved more popular than candidates on the FPM list for the same seats. It’s worth noting that under a full PR system, voters would lose the option of mixing and matching, instead they would be required to vote for only one list.

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Lebanon would opt for an open list system should it adopt either a full or partial PR seat allocation system

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In a PR system, the number of seats in a district are allocated to the number of lists based on a threshold (number of votes cast divided by the number of seats), meaning seats are allocated among the top vote-getting lists in proportion to the number of votes for each. Lists with a low amount of votes (say one or two percent of the total, although the exact percentage is determined by the aforementioned threshold) would not be given seats.

In general, there are two types of PR systems, closed list and open list. A closed list system means the party whose candidates form a list gets to choose which candidates are actually elected based on the seats granted to the list through voting. An open list system means voters cast two ballots: first choosing a list and then an individual candidate (this is called a preferential vote, and the number of preferential votes that individual voters can cast varies around the world, i.e., one or more preferential votes per voter). List votes are used to determine how many seats each list is allocated and candidate votes are used to determine which candidates are elected (the method of distributing candidates varies and can impact which candidates are elected, see infograph below).

Based on past draft laws, interviews with politicians and a civil society group, as well as press reports, it seems that Lebanon would opt for an open list system should it adopt either a full or partial PR seat allocation system. This makes sense if the past is any guide. In many countries with PR, lists are formed by separate parties (meaning if there are five parties with various popularity in a district, there will be five lists). However, given the demographic mix of the country’s various districts (none are one hundred percent populated by a single religious group) and support (in some cases) for more than one party among members of the same religious group, lists in Lebanese districts tend not to reflect a single party but rather an alliance of parties. To illustrate, imagine parties A, B, C and D are popular in a district. Instead of four party-specific lists, Lebanese voters will often be faced with either one list including all the parties or two lists (A+B as list one and C+D as list two, for example). Open lists make this tendency for district-by-district alliances possible, whereas closed lists do not.

Hybrid PR-Majoritarian system

At time of writing, local press was abuzz with speculation that, should a new electoral law be agreed, it will likely mix the two aforementioned systems (i.e., some MPs would be elected based on top vote getters being awarded seats and others would be elected based on PR). In such a scenario, the country would likely be divided into two “levels” of districts: smaller districts more reflective of the qada for majoritarian allocation, and larger districts reflective of country’s five traditional governorates (mohafaza, the Arabic singular) for PR allocation. Such a hybrid system was endorsed in 2006 by a commission that was tasked with drafting a fairer and more representative electoral law and appointed by the 2005 Fouad Siniora government shortly after elections that year.

Size matters

The size of a district and how many seats it is given are important for fair and accurate representation. Consider, for example, districts as they were during the 2009 election. If one divides the number of registered voters in a district by the district’s number of seats, clear differences emerge in how strong of a “voice” individual voters in each district have in Parliament. Looking at the extremes, the district of Keserwan has five seats and 89,228 registered voters (meaning each MP represents 17,845.6 voters), whereas the district of Bint Jbeil has three seats and 123,396 registered voters (meaning each MP represents 41,132 voters).

An ideal electoral law would distribute seats more evenly based on the number of registered voters in a district. Additionally, in a PR system, the larger the district, the more accurately PR will reflect the will of the voters. Imagine a district with three seats and five lists. It’s likely that only two or maximum three lists will be allocated seats. In a ten-seat district, It is possible that all five lists would get at least one seat.

Local vs. regional

As district sizes get bigger, however, minority influence on the outcome can still diminish even with a PR or hybrid system. For example, imagine a PR district for North Lebanon (including the districts of Akkar, Tripoli, Minnyeh-Donnyeh, Batroun, Koura and Bcharre). Based on the 2009 voter roles, this North Lebanon district would have 679,699 registered voters. If 60 percent turned out, that would leave 407,819 votes in a district with 25 seats (assuming each district’s 2009 seats were added together). The PR seat allocation threshold, therefore, would be 16,312 votes for a list to be allocated one seat. Imagine a very popular local candidate (Candidate A) in one district can only make alliances with very unpopular candidates from other districts to form a list. Imagine Candidate A’s list ends up receiving only 14,000 votes, 90 percent of which come from his or her home district. Candidate A does not get a seat under the pure PR system, and the the voters in his or her district feel they have no representation in Parliament.

Sectarian sensitivities

Imagine we add the sectarian dimension of Lebanese politics to the above example. If Candidate A is of a religious community with a minority of voters compared to the overall North Lebanon district, not only do local voters feel cheated out of their candidate, but will also most likely claim that another religious community has usurped their rights by electing an unpopular candidate to represent members of their religion. This was the argument in the three election cycles after the Civil War, while Lebanon was still under the influence of its larger neighbor. Christians complained districts were drawn in such a way that non-Christian voters were the ones electing Christian candidates. This argument surfaced in some districts in 2009 as well because some districts have religious minority voting blocks large enough to tip the scales in one direction or another (i.e., the argument goes: If only Christians voted in district X, Candidate A would have won, but the Sunni voting block swayed the contest for Candidate B).

Off the table

The fear that sects would not be able to elect their own candidates gave rise in 2012 to the so-called “Orthodox Law”. Under this law, which is no longer under consideration, according to press reports, Lebanon would be represented by only one district and each sect would vote for its own candidates. This law did not envision taking a census to actually determine how many members of each sect are currently living and voting in Lebanon, rather it adopted the same seat distribution for sects used in 2009. Less in-your-face was a proposal by the Lebanese Forces (since abandoned) that would have created several non-contiguous districts to group sects as constituencies, effectively getting close to what the Orthodox Law proposed via a different route.

The “also-rans”

Another option would be dividing Lebanon into 128 districts, which would favor local candidates with a strong following. As each district would only have one seat, this could, in theory, be a majoritarian seat allocation system. However, it is still vulnerable to creative district drawing that might end up with voters feeling disenfranchised. The reverse would be having the entire nation as one electoral district with each voter getting 128 votes. This would work against strong local candidates with limited national recognition. Yet, another choice is the single, non-transferrable vote. Under this system, voters get only one vote. The 128 candidates with the most votes are elected. This system makes it especially tricky for political parties to maximize their number of seats, especially in the Lebanese context, where parties tend to have a few very well-known stars. These party stars could attract the most votes from party supporters, leaving the party with fewer seats than it would have had under a different system.

Pobody’s nerfect

There is no global best practice for designing an electoral system, and voters across the world wake up after election day feeling disappointed, or worse (just ask American supporters of Hillary Clinton, who won the popular vote for president in November 2016, yet had to watch her rival Donald Trump be sworn in as president on January 20). No matter the system used, the potential for minority voices being silenced and results being skewed, either by drawing districts in a certain way or out-right vote buying, always exists. A voting system arguably “works best” when it has the most buy-in from the electorate. It’s a worrying sign that discussions of electoral reform in Lebanon are happening behind closed doors. More concerning is the possibility that a relatively complicated law will be adopted with very little time to explain how it works to voters — surely a recipe for feelings of exclusion.

Infographic by: Ahmad Barclay & Matt Nash

February 8, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyMacroeconomic context

Real risks and fake pathos

by Thomas Schellen February 8, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

It is a funny thing with collective risk awareness. Human existence is full of perpetual risk, but our awareness of various risks differ. Even if different risks are equal in frequency and magnitude, some are perceived emotionally and with great and immediate personal involvement, while others only in intellectual terms, distanced from one’s existential core. For example, outcries over the risks of war tend to be highly emotional and gripping to the extent that songs about it can transcend the conflict they were originally about. There are scores of anti-war songs which, like 1960s ballad Eve of Destruction by Barry McGuire, are passionately replayed by several generations. They always have the same sad message of impending doom and lack of progress in defeating war.

By contrast, there are very few songs on capital risk, stock market fluctuations, or anything for that matter that is seriously related to economics – Hank Williams Jr’s Stock Market Blues (2012) or Pink Floyd’s Money (1973) are the few exceptions. This is strange, given the endless supply of market risk data with potential for conversion into lyrics and with very little variation requiring new melodies or rhythms. Economic risk is presented prosaically, in dry reports bare of lyrical elements. There are entire schools of financial analysts who offer variations of only two refrains: the cheerful chorus that money is to be made somewhere and the annually recurrent, but apparently futile, warning that we are on the eve of economic disaster (without ever eradicating the potential for such disaster).

Even without delving into the risk hikes that have been perceived by activist groups in the days since the US elections, global risk assessment in January 2017 was very high. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF)Global Risks Report (GRR), this year in its 12th edition, said last month that: “Polarized societies and political landscapes are taking center stage in many countries, with deepening generational and cultural divisions amplifying the risks associated with sluggish economic recovery and accelerating technological change.” It described political events of 2016 as “a wake-up call” to reassess the capacity to adapt to an evolving risk landscape and ominously warned that we could be at “a pivotal moment in political history” and it is a “febrile [feverish] time for the world”.

The economic uncertainty index is a design by economists to alert corporate decision makers to potential risks that could influence their business. This index, which is produced in collaboration with professors at three American business schools (Kellogg, Stanford and Booth), measures Economic Uncertainty (EU) and Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) in the US and in 15 major economies. In 2016, the GEPU reached a record level of over 270 points in October and November that year. The GEPU index has been steadily increasing since the 2000s; it had peaks of 178 points in August 2001, 200 points in September 2008 and 217 points in October 2011.

This index, which is based on key terms found in newspaper reports such as “perception drivers”, demonstrates to its creators that increased levels of economic policy uncertainty are associated with elevated stock price volatility. “At the macro level, innovations in policy uncertainty foreshadow declines in investment, output, and employment” in the United States and major economies, according to the index authors, who declared that historically, economic policy uncertainty in their country has “drifted upwards since the 1960s”.

Perennial risk scenarios

Showing spikes in high-risk moments such as tight elections, wars, large-scale terror attacks and fiscal confrontations in the United States or with American involvement, the index aims to “capture uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what economic policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy actions (or inaction) – including uncertainties related to the economic ramifications of ‘non-economic’ policy matters, e.g., military action”.

The consistent rise of global economic policy uncertainty and the ever tighter interactions that the WEF’s influencers perceive between diverse risks are notable findings of the GRR and the GEPU index. This perspective is exacerbated if one considers that the list of risk-prone events in the outlook for 2017 from outside of the economic sphere easily numbers about 50 flashpoints and events, beginning with changes in the leadership at the United Nations and the European Parliament in January.

There are also long-term and even perennial crises scenarios in countries from the divided Koreas (a presidential crisis erupted recently in South Korea) and Cyprus to South Sudan, Colombia and Venezuela, and acute ones like the Greek crisis and, above all, the wars in Syria and against Daesh. On top of all this, there are at least a dozen national elections scheduled for 2017 (in addition to the Lebanese parliamentary elections) that by definition constitute events with uncertain outcomes in economic powerhouses like Germany and France, as well as in jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, Norway, Iran, Chile, Argentina, Liberia, Hong Kong and Kenya. Bearing the unexpected outcomes of the Brexit and US elections in mind, 2017 could well be another year of unpredicted changes, and thus of manifest uncertainty.

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In economic terms, one person’s risk is another person’s opportunity

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Jumping on the bandwagon of uncertainty apostles this January was  also the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which told the world that its Doomsday Clock – a warning clock that has fluctuated between 17 minutes and two minutes before “midnight” since 1947 – is now 30 seconds closer to expected doom, at two minutes and 30 seconds to midnight after it had stood for two years at three minutes before midnight. Designed as a risk alertness tool over the possibility of nuclear war in the post-WWII environment that pulled the US against the USSR, the Doomsday Clock signals the nearness of global extinction. Only once in the past 60 years was it closer to the end of the world than today, when in 1953 it was set at two minutes. In 1991 it was set farthest from the fateful moment, at 17 minutes to midnight.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is an activist publication that seems nowadays more equipped with climate researchers and environmentalists than with nuclear experts. In 2015, the bulletin set its clock at only three minutes in large part because of their worries over the environment. Now its board of sponsors have decided to adjust the setting half a minute closer to doomsday because 2016 was a difficult year in which “the global security landscape darkened”, citing as the main motivations for the reset their concern over the usage of “cavalier and reckless language” about nuclear weapons (especially in the US in connection with the inauguration of Trump) and disregard for climate research and the views of (most) scientists.

Putting the alarm up by a notch shortly after President Trump’s inauguration earned the organization a lot of media attention, fitting in with an avalanche of worries and protests by civil society that was reminiscent of Soviet rhetoric in the Cold War or the American propaganda hype about Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction in 2002. In the sum total of exaggerated worries, 2017 is shaping into a dual year of real risks and fake pathos about these risks, meaning that the accumulation of potential risk events could be accompanied by further risk escalation due to waves of protests against some change agents like Donald Trump or change events that are not unequivocally welcome.

Mitigating factors

In economic terms, one person’s risk is of course another person’s opportunity. Consequently, and perhaps helpfully in keeping risks away from a self-fulfilling escalation cycle, the outlook for 2017 from an economic perspective is less problematic than the outlook from a political or social vantage point.

The World Bank confirmed in its Global Economic Prospects report earlier in January that it projects global economic growth to “accelerate moderately” in 2017 and reach 2.7 percent. It expects advanced economies to register 1.8 percent growth this year, slightly better than in 2016; meanwhile emerging and developing markets, “as a whole should pick up to 4.2 percent”. At the same time, however, the World Bank cautioned that “the outlook is clouded by uncertainty about policy direction in major economies” and warned about universally negative repercussions for investment in all countries if a protracted period of uncertainty were to materialize.

Expressions of what economists like to sell as their “guarded optimism” also reverberate in manyprivate sector financial institutions. Take the example of the bankers at Goldman Sachs. The bank is one of the clear winners of the US election in terms of share price gains and also in the sense that a former Goldman president and COO is now joining Trump as head of his Council for Economic Affairs, along with three other people who were also once affiliated with the bank that are now among the president’s men. The bank told the world through videos underlaid with soothing background music (no rap, sadly), that it expects 2 to 3 percent growth in the US and 3.5 percent globally for 2017

Goldman paints something of a mixed picture for Europe with 1.5 percent GDP growth that is consistent with gradual improvements in the labor market and foresees 1 percent growth for Japan. It foresees that China will grow at about 6.5 percent, but with some long-term concerns, and expects commodity producers among emerging market countries to show some recovery after “a lot of pain” in 2015 and early 2016. Brazil is still slow and has yet to move into actual recovery, whereas India is exposed to a slowdown due to currency reform after strong growth in recent years, says Jan Hatzius, chief economist and head of Global Economics and Markets Research at Goldman Sachs in December 2016.

Upbeat sentiments were also reported by Bank of America/Merrill Lynch’s January Global Fund Manager Survey. According to the survey of 215 fund managers, investor expectations for global growth in January improved by 5 percentage points to two-year highs (net 62 percent from net 57 percent in December) and the number of respondents expecting growth to be “above trend” is the highest in five-and-a-half years at 17 percent.

However, risk is never out of the picture. The three tail risks that funds managers most commonly cited as current concerns were trade war/protectionism, US policy error and China FX devaluation, according to Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.

Similar notes were intonated later in January at the World Economic Forum’s closing panel in Davos, as panelists juxtaposed strengthening global economic growth against the increased risks of political uncertainty and trade protectionism. In a panel bringing together IMF’s Christine Lagarde, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond, Japan’s central bank governor, Haruhiko Kuroda and from Black Rock USA, chairman Laurence D. Fink, global economic activity was characterized as moving up and consumer confidence was seen as strong according to a press briefing. The WEF quoted Lagarde as saying, “For the first time in years, economic growth is not being revised down,” with IMF projections for global growth of 3.4 percent in 2017 and 3.6 percent in 2018.

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What can devalue our collective awareness is that the risks that become reality are often not the ones we are concerned about  

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The limitations of forecasting

In the WEF’s GRR, a global risk is defined “as an uncertain event or condition that, if occurs, can have significant negative impact on several countries or industries within the next 10 years.” The survey for the 2016 report did not ask the participants to assess the likelihood of a Brexit or a Trump win in the US elections. Choices in the category of geopolitical risks are more general; the available options in the surveys for 2017 GRR were state collapse, failure of national and of regional or global governance (two separate questions), interstate conflict, large-scale terrorist attacks and deployment of nuclear weapons.

This report highlights the importance of how the questions in a risk survey necessarily influence the outcome. What can devalue our collective awareness is that the risks which become reality are often not the ones that we are asked about or worry about the most in the period preceding their eruption. In the GRR published in January 2016, the top risks listed for likelihood of occurrence were large-scale migrations, extreme weather events and failure to mitigate climate change, while the top risks listed for severity of impact were failure to act on climate change, weapons of mass destruction and water crises.

Four notable risks that did not top the GRR charts last year but materialized against popular expectations in 2016, were financial volatility at the start of the year, Brexit in the middle of the year, the military victory of the Syrian government forces in Aleppo and the outcome of the elections in the United States. If they were discussed at all, or considered seriously before their occurrence, all these events would probably have represented significant risks in the eyes of analysts, academic influencers and economic deciders in developed countries.

Once these events did materialize however, the economic and financial outcomes were quite different from what people warned of during and immediately after their occurrences. The sudden volatility in January did not trigger the financial catastrophes predicted by some analysts. Brexit, shocking as it was at the time, did not instantly drag European markets asunder, and the Republican win in the US elections was followed not by a deterioration in stock indices but by a market rally.   

Risks at home and in the region

Capturing Lebanon-specific risks or even Arab regional ones and assessing them is not in the remits of GRR nor the EUI. Risks, both globally shared and uniquely local ones, are ever present in Lebanon and make up half of Lebanese existence. The dangers include; a war with Israel because of an escalating altercation in south Lebanon; Syrian state collapse; economic problems resulting from troubles in the Gulf region that weaken remittances; domestic political vagaries on top of dangers of irrational US policies or belligerent Israeli politics; dangers of euro-zone inflation or movements in the euro-dollar exchange rate that are to Lebanon’s disadvantage or outright detriment;  as well as the danger of conflicts between larger global or regional powers that play on the Lebanese stage – and 90 percent of countries are bigger or more powerful than Lebanon. All of the above are on our national risk list alongside the dangers related to the environment, from pollution and weather events to earthquakes and social issues, whether an ageing population or unemployment. Continuing to live happily against all these risks is the other half of Lebanese existence, and the name of the Lebanese game.

While there is an international awareness of factors, such as growing irrationality of voters, the exploitation of this irrationality by populists, the decoupling of wealth from democracy and the shifting of global power centers (broadly from West to East in the current scenario and from North to South a few years ago), risk cycles on smaller levels and their impacts on a country like Lebanon are commonly not mentioned in the global picture.

But there are some reports of regional relevance, just like there are a handful of fun songs about economics. As the World Bank’s regional outlook for the Middle East highlighted last month, the region-wide pace of economic growth this year is forecast to reach 3.1 percent in 2017, after having experienced – for an emerging region unsatisfactory – estimated growth of 2.7 percent for 2016. The outlook, which estimates Lebanese GDP will increase 1.8 percent in 2016 and modestly accelerate to rates of 2.2 percent this year and 2.3 percent in 2018, sees oil importers achieving the strongest gains. Specifically, Saudi Arabia is forecast to grow by a quite meager rate of 1.6 percent in 2017, but this will be an improvement in comparison  to  the estimate for 2016.

The factors to watch in this regard are regional developments involving friends as well as more distant neighbors and those, whether states or non-state actors, that have shown themselves as outright foes of Lebanese progress. Besides the hope for positive change from the Lebanese parliamentary elections, it seems prudent to pay careful attention to developments in the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.   

Shuaa Capital observed in December that Saudi Arabia allocated SAR 890 billion to spending in its 2017 fiscal budget, above both budgetary and actual spending in 2016, and is also  planning for a budget deficit of SAR 198 billion in 2017, 40 percent lower than the deficit for 2016.   

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It seems there are reasons, but not enough reasons, to keep on predicting doomsday in the global economy

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A mixed regional outlook

Estimates by officials in the United Arab Emirates imply that Dubai’s economy will be increasingly on the mend in 2017. In a presentation at the UAE Economic Outlook 2017 event in January, the Chairman of Dubai’s Economic Development Committee Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed al-Maktoum said the emirate was expected to grow by 3.1 percent in 2017, after growing 2.7 percent in 2016 in real terms amid an unfriendly regional and global economic climate. 

By watching Arab equities – an exercise that is not found everywhere – Credit Suisse in January spoke of “an impressive rally” in Middle East markets, whereby the region’s 17 percent gains in Q4 of 2016 marked the “by far the strongest performance by any region and allowed the Middle East to post a modestly positive return for 2016 overall.”

“After experiencing a contractionary economic environment over the past two years, economic indicators across the Middle East are beginning to show signs of improvement. The oil exporting GCC economies are set to reap the benefits of higher oil prices and progress made on subsidy reform, while Egypt has successfully initiated the politically difficult steps towards preserving its foreign exchange reserves,” wrote Fahd Iqbal, Head of Middle East research at Credit Suisse.

In other moderately encouraging news from the region’s financial industry, the annual investment banking report for the Arab region by Thomson Reuters, which was released last month, said that investment banking fees in the Middle East reached $820.8 million during 2016, an 18 percent year-on-year increase and the highest annual fee total in the region since 2008. According to Thomson Reuters’ analysis, debt issuance in the region was the highest in over 35 years and jumped year-on-year by 145 percent to almost $78 billion, bolstered by Saudi Arabia’s $17.2 billion bond sale in October of last year. On the other hand, merger and acquisition activity, as well as equity issuances in the Middle East, were described as low in comparison to other years, with values of announced M&As with regional participation at $47 billion – the lowest since 2013 – and equity and equity-related issuances at $2.6 billion, which a director at Thomson Reuters said was “a 55 percent decline year-on-year and the lowest annual issuance total in the region since 2004”.

Meanwhile, the outlook for GCC banks is mixed according to ratings agency Standard and Poor’s. S&P Global said the agency expects the financial profiles of GCC banks to “continue to weaken in 2017-2018”, but added that this expectation had been incorporated in ratings and that it considers most GCC banks to have created “sufficient capital buffers to remain resilient to their weakened operating environment”.

In this altogether complex landscape of regional assessments, global risks and more or less fearful anticipations, Lebanon will have to find its place for the best possible economic performance, as well as conduct its domestic politics and business to the best of its capacity. By consensus of many economists, it seems there are reasons, but not enough reasons, to keep on predicting doomsday in the global economy. More likely is that we will muddle along, with risks building underneath and erupting every now and then, without us being able to evade them but also without being destroyed. Same procedure as every year.

February 8, 2017 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyInterview

A full load of plans to spur on the economy

by Thomas Schellen February 8, 2017
written by Thomas Schellen

If there is unanimity concerning Lebanon, it is that the new government signifies a chance to put the country on a new track that will create prosperity and inclusive growth for Lebanese society. At the same time, it is widely agreed that the regional and domestic challenges are significant. Not least among these challenges is the task of holding fair parliamentary elections, as well as the need to return to organized budgets, improve infrastructure, invest in the economy and achieve continuity in government. These challenges are all surmountable, but they all have to be tackled. To inquire about governmental plans and strategies for the improvement of the economy, Executive sat down with the new Minister of Economy and Trade (MoET), Raed Khoury, who is a member of the Change and Reform bloc. The interview took place right after the January 14/15 Parliament session, which focused on the rent law(discussed further in a Q&A below), among other issues.

In elaborating on economic policy priorities, Khoury starts by explaining that the ministry is currently engaged in both short-term and long-term planning involving other government ministers. Some points in this plan “relate directly to the Ministry of Economy and some are related to the whole government,” he says, explaining, “The government has assigned a number of ministers to form what is called the Economic Committee in order to address the macroeconomics of the country”.

“It is a special political opportunity that the country should take advantage of. The priorities of the new cabinet lay down the basis for the medium-to-long-term future of Lebanon,” he adds. In reference to a set of prepared answers to questions that Executive submitted in advance of the interview, he then outlines economic and general policy priorities as comprising four important pillars in the short-term; the electoral law, budget approval as a starting point to improve Lebanon’s financial conditions, agreement on a plan for rehabilitation of Lebanon’s depleted infrastructure and appropriate management of the oil and gas sector.

Elaborating in more detail on each pillar, he emphasizes that the electoral law is an urgent issue given its importance in reviving constitutional authorities and national confidence. The adoption of a budget should entail decisions on several levels, including; redirection of expenditures toward sectors where Lebanon has a competitive advantage to create balanced and sustainable growth, tightening the revenue collection processes to avoid incurring any losses and to ensure social equity by the appropriate distribution of revenues among Lebanese citizens, adjusting the wage bill in the public sector – which accounts for more than 30 percent of total spending – and rectifying what he called the “peculiar transfers” to Electricité du Liban, ideally through a public-private partnership deal for operating the power utility and addressing the issue of public debt, which is growing. “In fact, public debt has exceeded $74.5 billion to date,” he stresses.

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Khoury sees it as a priority to update the country’s consumer protection law

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According to Khoury, the plan to rehabilitate Lebanon’s infrastructure needs to tackle problems comprehensively, such as the waste crisis, shortcomings in the supply of water, road, air, maritime and urban transport, telecommunications and energy. It is important in the context of infrastructure development “to highlight the private public partnership law,” he adds.

For the fourth pillar, proper management of the oil and gas sector, the minister takes the view that development of this sector “opens the page for a new era of economic prosperity and will aid in limiting the deficits in Lebanon’s public finance”. This makes it paramount to push to advance the file on the energy sector and to invest every effort in ascertaining that appropriate planning for this new sector is carried out, he says.

From Khoury’s perspective, the recent governmental visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar make it evident that this new government has been implementing positive decisions since its formation in December. He attaches particular importance to the visits in the context of the issuance of the oil and gas decrees, for rebuilding regional confidence in the Lebanese economy and for revitalizing the relationships between Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Legal framework

When asked what the MoET would hope to achieve within the current cabinet’s term of little more than three months, he responds that he expects the current cabinet to work longer than that and be in charge for between six to nine months. “This is still very short. There are some quick wins that we need to put in place at both the ministry level the country level. It would also be an achievement if we can implement a long-term macroeconomic plan,” he says, before going on to specify that the economic vision and strategy would be based on a socio-economic developmental perspective and encompass a range of initiatives from attracting new Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the creation of a better business climate and diversification of the economy by way of supporting innovative sectors through small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and startups.

For attracting FDI, the minister envisions special incentives for investments originating in the Lebanese diaspora. Regarding enhancing the business climate, he points to the importance of avoiding unpopular austerity measures and the need to amend laws and update the legislative framework. “Several economic sectors are relying on the ratification of several draft laws by the Parliament in order to enhance the business environment. These laws include; a public-private  partnership law, a bankruptcy law, a competition law, a secured lending law, a commerce code and so forth,” he says.

Calling it of great concern that Lebanon is ranked only 126 out of 189 countries covered by the 2017 edition of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Khoury sees it as a priority to update the country’s consumer protection law and the laws relating to protection of intellectual property, just as much as improving the national trade balance by spurring Lebanese exports. To achieve the latter, he calls for strengthening existing trade relations, opening new markets and concise targeting of the Lebanese diaspora. 

Markets of importance to Lebanon cited by Khoury in this regard include West Asia, the EU, Africa and the Mercosur common market in South America. In countries around the world, it will be important for Lebanon to collaborate with the private sector, mainly with the chambers of commerce and private economic entities.

As far as strengthening consumer protection at home, he aims to enhance the role played by the Consumer Protection (CP) Directorate at the MoET, especially with regards to monitoring the quality, safety and validity of local and imported products. Calling the CP Directorate’s role “critical” for the benefit of the Lebanese, he says positive repercussions of stronger consumer protection activities will affect many sectors from hospitality to healthcare and agro-industry.

A final action point on the minister’s mind is mitigating the socioeconomic impact of the refugee crisis and spillovers of the ongoing Syrian conflict. MoET’s goal here entails following up on the management of the crisis to alleviate the repercussions on Lebanese host communities and Lebanon’s social structure, Khoury says. He points to competition between Lebanese and Syrian labor for low to high skilled jobs and also at the level of micro to small enterprises, in addition to unemployment that has climbed to more than 25 percent in general and 35 percent among youth.

Asked what the MoET plans or projects for the next few months are in relation to the insurance sector, which is under its supervision, Khoury refers to acting head of the Insurance Control Commission (ICC), Nadine Habbal, as the person with the most expertise on the subject. As she talks to Executive, Habbal emphasizes that the ICC had a very fruitful year in 2016 and was recognized in a recent report by the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Sector Assessment Program as “instrumental in maintaining the [insurance] industry in a generally sound situation”.

Addressing ICC plans for the coming months, she lists four major projects, “First, the organization of the compulsory [Third-party Liability] motor insurance policy, which can be ranked as first priority because of the new [traffic] law. We need to abide by this law and have a standard policy covering both bodily injuries and material damages.The second project will be the organization of medical insurance benefits. We want to have a standard policy with minimum benefits and we want to interfere in the pricing strategy. We have to impose minimum pricing; this will aid the policyholder in having the right coverage [in combination] with an acceptable price. Next is quantifying and managing the risks of an earthquake. We also aim for creation of a framework of soft loans that will act as incentives for mergers and acquisitions in the insurance industry.” She concluded that achieving  these four goals within five or six months would be significant and regarded as an institutional success for the ICC.

In addition to elaborating on the MoET strategy for the coming months, Khoury kindly responds ad-hoc to several questions by Executive, addressing issues from real estate to banking and the ministry’s relationship with Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank.

E   If we take a look at specific laws that are on the agenda at this time, the rent law sticks out. It was a topic in Parliament this January and is an urgent topic on the minds of the population both the side of tenants and the side of landlords. When putting them into a macroeconomic context, how important are laws like the new insurance law that has been debated for years, or modernized laws on restaurants and hospitality demanded by that industry, or the rent law that has been highly contentious? What is the most important law from the ministry’s perspective?

All of them are important but the rent law is very important for [a number of] different reasons. First, it will create fairness in how people are treated, which is important for the socioeconomic environment. Second, it creates stability in the real estate market in terms of prices, etc. Third, it also helps in creating more turnover and demand in the real estate sector, which will attract foreign and Lebanese investors to buy and sell [properties], creating a market.

E  The usual assumption is that confidence is a key factor for economic development. If investors don’t have confidence in the legal framework of a country, they are very hesitant to invest in an area like real estate.

True.

E  In order to encourage inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into real estate, and also encourage local Lebanese to invest, what can the ministry do in terms of building confidence in this market?

We have some input for the law itself from our side, and we can also try to think [in line] with [Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s] central bank. We have not yet looked into it, but there could be a project with the central bank for incentives that are geared toward this legislation in order to create what I have said before. It has to be with the central bank in terms of subsidies. Also, as the Ministry of Economy, we have a role in supervising the implementation of the law in terms of prices.

E  So in this regard and with regard to Consumer Protection Laws, the function of the Consumer Protection Unit at the MoET will be crucial?

Exactly.

E  Do you have a plan to enlarge the functionality of the Consumer Protection Unit to a greater level?

We are now studying the capacity [needed] for accompanying this law and will have our opinion later.

E  The time frame for this cabinet is limited by elections later in 2017. Is it true that there is no visibility at this time as far as the next cabinet after parliamentary elections, or is there already some agreement or personnel arrangement for the next cabinet as far as ministerial positions?

On positions, no. So we don’t know if I will stay or not. But whether I stay or go, I am part of a political party that is involved in putting together an economic plan and agenda for the country. I will be part of this regardless of my position, because I am directly involved in this and I will continue to [be].

E  That is good to hear. Prior to the 2005 elections, Executive made the rounds with most political parties in Lebanon to inquire about their economic perspectives. There was an almost total absence of party programs as far as having an economic platform. Is it different today?

First of all, concerning our political party, we have finalized an economic plan, and it is already on the table. We are now in the process of communicating this plan to other parties and developing a common paper that will be adopted as a roadmap for the future. So in this regard, I can tell you, yes, we have done something. We have been working on this plan for the past three months and have finalized it internally. Now we are at a stage of communicating with other parties and reaching agreements with at least three or four major parties in order to roll it over.

E  It is my understanding that the Lebanese constitution calls for implementation of meritocracy in filling positions from the president on down but all throughout the past 25 years we have been hearing people allege that wasta is more important than merit in getting a job in public administration. What can be done to create a stronger image that people are placed in positions because of merit?

There is a process involving the Civil Services Board which does examine people for their qualifications. When they pass [applicants] will see what vacant positions are to be filled in the government and we as ministers will have our say. We will interview them and take [the applicants] we want. I can’t tell you how to change the image but there is a process and there are exams. Wasta might come into play when two people have the exact same level of qualification and compete for the same job, but there is a process.

E  It seems that it was often difficult to attract qualified people to top positions because the remuneration in the private sector is much better.

You are right. For very high-caliber people the private sector is more competitive when you compare remuneration. But there is stability in the public sector and this weighs in because in the private sector a company can fire someone if the company is not doing well, whereas in the public sector it is difficult to fire people. There are also some institutions within the government, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or some semi-government entities, where the remunerations are higher and more flexible. There are ways to overcome the situation but in general the salary in the public sector is lower than in the private sector.

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I personally made it a point to seperate the two things by resigning from my position as chairman of a bank [when appointed minister]

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E  The insurance sector is an important sector under your supervision and the minister of economy has a role in the development of the insurance industry. Do you think that the combination of regulator and supporter of development is a  good thing in the hands of one ministry, or should the regulator be independent from ministerial decisions?

We are debating now if the [Insurance Control Commission] should be under the Ministry of Economy or should have more independence. I am the kind of person who believes that it should be more independent but again, once it is independent, the ICC’s role would be more supervisory than promotional regarding insurance companies. The regulator’s first role is to protect the sector, its second role is promoting it. What we care about is that an insurance company does not lose money and shut down. The regulator doesn’t care if it makes a million dollars or $10 million. And what we also care for is ensuring the fair treatment of clients, etc. But in terms of the ministry’s role, I believe the ministry has to work hand in hand with the regulator in order to carry out some elements of promotion as well. I am also thinking about something, that I will not talk about now, in order to promote the insurance companies to make them healthier and more developed.

E  So whether the scenario would be to keep the ICC under the ministry or independent, there would be a focus on the development of insurance?

Yes, of course.

E  In terms of banking, many international voices – not least the World Bank – have for the last five or six years spoken with some criticism of quasi fiscal policies being exerted by Banque du Liban (BDL). One of the major issues in Lebanon was the inability to create effective fiscal policy on part of the government. As a person coming from the banking field, how do you see the relationship between MoET, BDL and the banking industry?

You are right in saying that the banking sector and BDL have played a role in regard to fiscal policies. This is for two reasons. The central bank has been working in a healthy way, unlike the government, which has been interrupted many times by inability to form a Parliament or cabinet – you know the story. The second reason is because the central bank has tools, [meaning] mainly it has money which it can control to enact fiscal stimulus. The government, including my ministry, does not have the financial capability to support or subsidize anything in the economy like the central bank can do with regard to the housing sector, for small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for energy and many other sectors. After all, the central bank is supervising more than $160 billion in deposits in commercial banks and it is a wealthy institution. Going forward, we will take some of the burden from the central bank by working hand in hand with the central bank in putting more fiscal laws and regulations into place, but the stimulus will still come from the central bank.

E  The political game between monetary policy and fiscal policy is considered to involve some competition based on divergent interests of the fiscal and monetary authorities.

Not in Lebanon. The central bank is playing both roles.

E  So this will continue for the coming years?

It will continue for a long time, yes, because the fiscal situation is not healthy at the [level of] government. We have debt and a negative balance of payment, our budget is running every year in minus, so we don’t have many tools.

E  When people are appointed to public positions, one often hears in other countries that they step back from their private business because of potential conflict of interest between public and private functions. Can you say what you did in this regard?

I am not sure if regulations force [disassociation from their private business] on ministers or deputies in Lebanon. However, I personally made it a point for myself to separate the two things by resigning from my position as chairman of a bank in the private sector. I resigned on the day after I was appointed minister of economy. It was my personal decision.

February 8, 2017 0 comments
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EditorialOpinion

Free minds of Lebanon, unite!

by Yasser Akkaoui February 6, 2017
written by Yasser Akkaoui

Our economy is in tatters, and we lack uninterrupted basic services like electricity, water and waste management. There is no acceptable explanation for why our country is near ruin. Fixing these problems is simple, and 2017 is our last chance to change course.

There are plenty of free minds in this country that understand how to create a Lebanon we can be proud of. A Lebanon where pro-growth economic policies are respected. Where the rule of law is respected. Where the environment is respected. There is no shortage of research penned by local authors with concrete, easy-to-implement solutions to this country’s myriad problems. It’s time to stop writing and start moving.

Webs of dependency created by the clientelist system in place seem finally to be weakening. The cost of struggling to survive in a broken country getting worse year by year clearly outweighs the benefits of low-wage jobs and the occasional table scraps. More people are seeing this at home. And those watching this final descent from abroad are at last getting angry enough to demand change as well.

Mismanagement is destroying this country. So many of us agree on this point and on the ways to move forward with creating a nation worth living in. Unity is our only option. As our corrupt politicians go about writing an electoral law aimed at keeping themselves in power, we must stand in opposition.

Those of us who have been calling for change – academics, NGOs, the media – have never succeeded in actually fulfilling our role of becoming pressure groups that force real change. That ends today. 2017 is our year. This election is our chance.

February 6, 2017 1 comment
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Retail Overview

A balancing act

by Nabila Rahhal February 2, 2017
written by Nabila Rahhal

It’s been a mixed year for Lebanon’s retailers and luxury retailers. On the one hand, shoppers were once again bombarded with text messages urging them to hurry up and benefit from the latest discounts and offers, and passing by “70 percent off sale” signs on store windows was an all too common occurrence. Both of these are sure signs of a weak market in which consumers are not spending much of their disposable income and retailers are becoming increasingly desperate to sell their products at any price.

On the other hand, 2016 also witnessed several major store openings, including Hugo Boss’ flagship store on downtown Beirut’s Allenby Street and A. Lange & Söhne, a luxury watch store – both of which brought some much-needed dynamism to the sector.

Overall, retailers feel that while 2016 may have been a continuation of the past five years – marked by a decrease in tourist arrivals as well as dwindling local purchasing power – 2017 might just be the year that will see the economy improve, bringing a much-needed boost to their stores’ performance. The infrastructure is in place to welcome them, all that is needed are the willing shoppers.

Where are the tourists?

Similar to other sectors of the Lebanese economy, including the hospitality sector, stakeholders in the retail sector felt the sting of declining tourism figures as a result of the instability associated with the war in Syria.

The biggest spenders among tourists typically were GCC nationals, especially those from Saudi Arabia, many of whom have been avoiding Lebanon following travel advisories – and sometimes bans – by their countries’ governments. According to figures by Global Blue – which gives percentages of tourists who reclaimed their value added taxes by nationality – the first half of 2016 showed an increase in expenditure by Saudi nationals compared to 2015. Nevertheless, this is still a significant drop in spending figures from their height in 2010 (see data, below).

The first area to be affected by the drop in GCC arrivals was downtown Beirut, owing to its nature as a tourist attraction and the concentration of luxury and premium brand stores. “The first area which gets hit is Downtown because 25 percent of the turnover there is from tourism. This is in contrast to, for example, ABC Dbayeh and ABC Ashrafieh, where the turnover from tourists is only two and ten percent, respectively,” said Izzat Traboulsi, CEO of T2 trading, the retailer for Hugo Boss in Lebanon and Egypt.

Traboulsi explains that although it is true that very few tourists from the GCC came to Lebanon in 2016,  in his experience visitors from Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq somewhat compensated for the lack of visitors from the Gulf. However, figures from Global Blue reveal that percentage expenditure from Iraqis and Egyptians remains rather low, particularly when taking in consideration the high number of their arrivals into Lebanon (see data below).

A local act

Retailers who were not reliant on tourists but rather on the local market managed to perform better than most in 2016. “Hamra Shopping and Trading Company (HSTCo) has not built a retail concept exclusively designed for tourists. Our retail concepts offer international retail and customer service standards that local customers can enjoy as well as tourists. This has helped us to better cope with the declining number of tourists,” says Jamil Rayess, general manager of HSTCo, which operates Grand Stores (GS) and several other mid-range brand stores.

Still, even within the local market, retailers have noticed a decline in the spending power of the local population. Here again, it was the luxury and premium brands that were the most affected as the Lebanese who used to be able to afford high-end products either held back from purchasing to wait for better times or opted for medium-range brands instead.

That does not mean that medium or even low-end brands were exempt from this downturn, as Lebanon witnessed a general slowdown across the entire retail sector. “HSTCo’s brand portfolio and retail concepts are diverse, giving us an edge [in our ability] to cater to a wide spectrum of income brackets. Our study of the current retail market has shown that dwindling local purchasing power has affected businesses of all income brackets,” says Rayess.

While malls continued to experience more footfall than standalone shops, this did not necessarily translate into more sales for the retailers there. “Although there is more traffic in malls and department stores, we have such a great store in Downtown – in terms of location, layout, product and team – that the conversion rate is very high. And although we still have fewer people that go to our flagship in Downtown, those who do have a much higher average ticket, almost triple, than that of our stores in malls,” says Traboulsi, explaining that this could be because those who shop in Downtown tend to have a high income while malls have stores that target a variety of income levels.

A different track

Faced with such a situation, most retailers Executive spoke to were happy to have survived 2016 without any further losses, although they noted that the upcoming holiday season could tip the scales in their favor. “I consider our biggest achievement to be the maintaining of our sales and turnover figures close to previous years. Although our margins decreased, we were able to achieve fairly good results in 2016,” says Mher Atamian, managing director of luxury watch retailer Atamian.

  As such, Lebanese retailers had to once again get creative in identifying strategies or approaches which would entice the reluctant local market and the dwindling number of tourists to buy more. Providing customers with a smooth and exclusive shopping experience gained added significance in Lebanon’s competitive retail sector.

Traboulsi mentioned customer service management as a main aspect which attracted clients to Boss’ flagship store. This was echoed by AS Chronora, exclusive retailers of Rolex and Tudor in Lebanon, who also focused on enhancing their customer experience and engagement.

“Here at Rolex Lebanon, we believe that our boutiques are not only showrooms displaying an array of the latest Rolex and Tudor pieces, but also a place where relationships are built between our clients and the Chronora team that aim to last for generations to come. Engaging this community’s interest has been our objective for the past year, during which two global Rolex exhibitions were introduced,” says Zeina Annan, customer experience manager at A&S Chronora, explaining that the experience does not stop there and that Chronora intends to update its website and social media platforms to allow their customers to “express themselves and their dreams while partaking in a perfect Rolex lifestyle experience.”

Others concentrated their efforts on e-commerce. “The industry is changing, and for us to remain leaders we need to stay ahead of these changes and adapt our business model accordingly. With that in mind, and noting that the conversation is happening online where everybody is on the move, we realized that is where we needed to be,” says Rayess, speaking of the website and mobile shopping application launched by GS in October 2016.

Staff training and development also played a role in ensuring that shoppers get the best experience. “Our expert sales advisors attend the renowned yearly watch fair in Basel, thus helping maintain their place among the leading experts in the industry. Even more profound is the knowledge of our master watchmakers who continuously attend a training course at the Rolex headquarters in Geneva at least once a year. Our after sales workshop located at our Downtown Rolex boutique is at our customer’s disposal for any repairs and maintenance,” explains Annan.

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Stakeholders in the retail sector felt the sting of declining tourism figures as a result of the instability associated with the war in Syria

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New beginnings

Some retailers took advantage of the slow years the country is passing through to grow their business in the expectation of better times ahead.

GS opened its 2,500 square meter (sqm), four-floor department store facing Beirut Souks in October 2016, with an entire floor dedicated to home décor.

In June 2016, Hugo Boss opened its 350 sqm flagship store, the biggest men’s wear luxury store in Lebanon, on Allenby Street. Right from the start, Traboulsi wanted the flagship store to have the look and feel of its European counterparts, and worked aggressively to meet this goal. He believes he succeeded: “We opened the store and emerged with this dynamic look and feel when the whole economy was tired. So the customers who came in were feeling this dynamic energy and this was reflected in their buying and in a higher turnover for us. We got this feedback from the end consumers themselves,” enthuses Traboulsi.

A brighter 2017?

The enthusiasm Traboulsi has displayed for the opening of Boss’ flagship store carries through to 2017 where he believes that the election of President Michel Aoun – and the eventual formation of a government – will lead to a return of tourists and Lebanese expats and translate into more sales for retailers, especially in the luxury items department.

“2017 will witness the comeback of Lebanese expats with a high income who naturally feel more at home spending their money here rather than elsewhere. This will positively impact the luxury market more than the others since it was the most affected in the crisis,” says Traboulsi.

While some, like Rayess, share Traboulsi’s expectations for 2017, others are adopting a more cautious approach. “The worldwide retail sector has been suffering for two years now. I think 2017 will be more or less similar to 2016. We believe we are still a couple of years away from seeing positive growth,” says Atamian.

Still, there are reasons for excitement in 2017, most notably with the opening of ABC Verdun – a joint development between ABC and Verdun 1544 Holding, one of the largest companies of Bahaa Rafic Hariri Group in Lebanon – in the summer of 2017. Stretching over 180,000 sqm of built up space, ABC Verdun consists of ten floors (five of which will be dedicated to underground parking) with over 200 shops and a cineplex.

It is hoped that ABC Verdun will revitalize Verdun and Ras Beirut area. “Perceived as the symbol of business opportunity in Lebanon, this new mall underlines ABC’s commitment to the project and its faith in Lebanon and its economy. It is anticipated to generate more than 2,000 job opportunities as a thriving social hub with both tourists and residents flooding in all year long,” says Tani Ezzedine, head of real estate at ABC. Only time will tell whether 2017 will indeed be bright for the retail sector or whether it will bring more of the same.

Chart by Ahmad Barclay

Chart by Ahmad Barclay

February 2, 2017 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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