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BusinessCoronavirus CloseupInsuranceSpecial Report

Q&A with Nadine Habbal, acting head of the Insurance Control Commission

by Thomas Schellen April 22, 2020
written by Thomas Schellen

Lebanon’s insurance sector is highly fragmented, featuring extreme competition between small local players, bank-affiliate insurers, providers that are parts of multinational insurance giants, and—outside of the regulated sphere of commercial insurance companies—even quasi-insurers with competitive privileges that are categorized as mutual funds. The diverse and overpopulated sector, mired in opacity of companies, has not been able to achieve significant consolidation and has, for the last 30 years, rarely been able to find a unified voice that would have enabled to address public concerns and deliver insurance as a public good. Throughout the last few decades, the need for an adequate insurance law has moreover loomed large over the disjointed industry. Frequently faced with greatly diverging opinions from within the insurance sector and having to tear down attitudinal walls of vested interest as part of challenges it encountered, the Insurance Control Commission (ICC) has, since the early 2000s, incrementally implemented increasingly effective financial oversight over the sector and also gradually expanded its advocacy in support of insurance clients. Executive inquired with Nadine Habbal, the—by now long-term—acting head of the ICC about the oversight institution’s perspective on the dilemmas of the COVID-19 pandemic for the insurance sector.     

The ICC has published a list on its website of insurance companies that provide coverage for treatment of COVID-19 for all or part of their insured members. Is the list accurate and comprehensive as far as including all details, and what is the meaning of the phrase “all or part of their insured members”?

As listed on the ICC website, a number of insurance companies provide cover for pandemic diseases to their entire portfolio. Some companies decided to waive exclusions on pandemic diseases and cover their policyholders. There are also companies whose health insurance portfolio is divided into two parts: some policies that don’t exclude pandemics and the remaining policies that exclude pandemics. This is the reason why we put a note on our website that they cover part of their members. Finally, some insurers exclude pandemic risks entirely.

When looking at Lebanese insurance companies in terms of their coverage response to COVID-19, what is proportionally the largest group among the categories you mentioned? 

The ICC numbers indicate that up to 55 percent of insured members have no exclusions, and are consequently covered for pandemic diseases—I am telling you our estimation. The remaining 45 percent have policies with pandemic exclusions; they do not have coverage.

Is the coverage that you are discussing related specifically to in-hospital treatment of COVID-19 or is testing for the coronavirus also covered by the insurance companies under their health policies? 

The coverage may change depending on your policy. Our efforts focus on policyholders that require in-hospital treatment. Testing is covered for policyholders with outpatient coverage and no pandemic exclusion. Our aim primarily is to cover the cases that require treatment, and these are divided into three categories: mild, moderate, and severe (requiring intensive care units).

Did the ICC receive many requests over its hotline for insurance-related inquiries and complaints?

ICC-Care is recording situations related to insured persons requiring in-hospital treatment as a result of COVID-19 and we are resolving such cases based on the stipulations of the respective insurance contracts. Our interventions differ on a case-by-case basis.

Are the phones ringing off the hook, meaning are many cases that need supervisory investigation being brought to your attention simultaneously, or is the situation moderate in terms of number of complaints and inquiries about how the coverage of COVID-19 cases is handled, either from the side of hospitals or the side of insurers? 

The situation so far is manageable and we are able to accommodate and resolve all requests. The number of policyholders who require in-hospital treatment is limited; an estimated 80 percent of the cases are either asymptomatic or very mild, and do not require hospitalization. Altogether, and in as far as the insurance sector is concerned, the projected population of insured members who are infected and require in-hospital treatment is not large.

Are you playing a role as mediator in discussions between insurance companies and hospitals? 

ICC Care recorded cases where hospitals are not automatically admitting an insured member. We investigated such cases as part of our supervisory role and found out that such insured members were [being] required to make an advance deposit before being admitted. In our opinion, such practices are not fair, because they infringe the policy conditions. Therefore, we entered into discussions with hospitals to understand the reasons for the implementation of such procedures, and to defend the rights of policyholders. When COVID-19 is covered, patients should be treated as if they are admitted for any other disease. We requested that usual admission and treatment procedures should be uniformly applied for COVID-19 patients, as the case is for other services such as for heart surgeries for example. In case hospitals decide, for whatever valid reason, to apply alternative procedures, then the ICC, the insurance companies, and the public in general should be made aware of such alterations.

Our role is to protect the rights of policyholders and the sustainability of the insurance sector, and we acted with this perspective in mind. We engaged in discussions with the private hospitals in order to reach an agreement on fair tariffs that hospitals can charge for COVID-19 treatment, taking into consideration that some of the hospitals undertook investments in order to enhance their capacity to admit and treat COVID-19 patients. 

One further note is that hospitals are minimizing admissions of [patients for] non-emergency procedures, and people are tending to postpone non-essential medical treatments. There is a major change in the dynamics of supply and demand of healthcare services.

What is the ICC’s aim in the current time where people are so deeply impacted and concerned with the issue of COVID-19? Do you have updated plans or targets in light of the fact that you previously talked of provision of universal healthcare as a major need and long-term target for Lebanon?  

If we had universal healthcare with a primary or basic cover funded by the public sector and a top-up from the private sector, the situation would definitely have been better. The alarming situation that we reached provides strong supporting arguments for the urgency of the reforms needed to establish universal healthcare with a public-private partnership. We cannot postpone tackling this issue any further. Even now, with the recession and all the economic challenges that we are facing, this is the right time, especially as we consider the post COVID-19 period.

During a conference call that I attended with other insurance regulators in the region, there was a consensus that the main concern presently is not about how to fund the cost of healthcare services for COVID-19. The estimated costs are well established and documented, and the estimated incidence in the Middle East is so far largely manageable. The statistics indicate that the direct impact, especially in Lebanon, is much lower than Europe and North America. Nonetheless, we need to worry about what we are going to do post-corona, after the medical emergencies have been dealt with. This is an alarming issue that needs particular attention in Lebanon. What will happen to the people who became unemployed, and the businesses that had to stop or shift to survival mode?

Going back to your question, and as part of our efforts to improve the medical insurance offering in Lebanon, a ministerial decision was issued on April 15 requiring insurance companies to introduce a compulsory pandemic cover in every new or renewed policy. This will enhance the insurance protection for existing and new insured members, and would present a better value proposition that is uniform for all.

April 22, 2020 0 comments
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Executive talks and podcast

by RabihIbrahim April 20, 2020
written by RabihIbrahim
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April 20, 2020 0 comments
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AnalysisEconomics & PolicyFiscal policyLira peg

Leaked Lebanese government reform plan addresses lira peg head on

by Thomas Schellen April 13, 2020
written by Thomas Schellen

“The existing dual exchange rate is not suited for the long-term recovery of the Lebanese economy, because of its distortionary nature and the limited availability of FX-resources in the parallel market.”  

The Lebanese Government’s reform program, April 6 draft

Chained to the dollar for the longest time under a policy favoring partisan interests—but not Lebanon’s socio-economic best interests—the Lebanese lira has broken loose from its peg. The rate of LL1,500 to the dollar, an automatic beacon in the Lebanese economy for over 20 years, has been partially replaced by a parallel market rate that has been dancing and twirling all over the place, from LL1,800 to LL2,200 and back, and up again to within spitting distance of LL3,000 to the dollar. But it is not a happy sort of freedom. According to a new assessment that was produced as part of a nameless rescue plan for Lebanon—and leaked in draft form soon after its internal release on April 6—the emergence of a parallel market has done no good and this market has no future beyond the middle of next year. 

In principle, the paper argues, the widening gap between Lebanon’s official and parallel rates of exchange is prone to be the source of “social inequalities.” The gap could have a rentier effect of leading to economic rents for accessing dollars at official rate, which would be “prolonging an already inefficient system.” And adding to this economic burden of the parallel market that has existed for the most turbulent six months in the past 28 years is the scarcity of foreign hard currency. This scarcity is due to unofficial but increasingly stringent bank-imposed capital controls that have been in place from last October and are continuing to this date. These distortions of capital flows are preventing the emergence of a functioning parallel market and drive parallel rates to excessive highs, the paper argues. But what is the story with the dollar peg, and why is this peg officially still in existence? 

One can think of a peg as a form of partnership, a marriage of currencies in which one currency follows the other for better or worse. However, since the business of following is 100 percent one sided—it is always the pegged currency that follows slavishly, and never the currency that it is pegged to, usually the US dollar—these partnerships, at least for larger economies, rarely last more than a few years or even a few months accompanying a promise of fundamental economic reforms. And when the promises are not kept the consequences are often spectacular, as seen in examples from Mexico and Turkey in the 1990s to Argentina and Egypt. In the better cases where a peg has been engineered, it was often done for a limited time and was designed as support tool to overcome a financial crisis, allowing a pegged country to stabilize its currency. 

Pegs have been perceived by economists as limited because they come with a conceptual downside known as the trilemma or the impossible trinity—the practical impossibility to simultaneously have a fixed foreign exchange rate (peg), free flow of capital (no controls), and an independent monetary policy. Since amounts of capital behave like profit-seeking missiles, recent financial history shows that whenever the interest rate environment in a pegged country with no capital controls opens wide doors for capital to profit from carry trade, the central bank of a pegged country cannot make its own interest rate decisions to stabilize the domestic economy. It has to copy the other country’s prevailing interest rate, the hypothesis goes and practical experience of the past 40 years has corroborated.      

To get away from economic deserts full of narrow triangles, one can compare a currency pairing perhaps to generic partnership. Productive partnerships have consequences. Short-term exclusionary partnerships involving individuals, enterprises, and even currencies that begin with common interests tend to yield shared outcomes but can also produce divergences. These divergences can be curtailed by dissolving the partnership—or they end in a disingenuous breakup. 

Open-ended productive partnerships with solid foundations and processes, such as mutual/shared ownership of equal-value assets, agreed principles, and dynamically developing joint interests under adherence to proactive and transparent internal information policies, can generate continually improving superior outcomes as well as intensely align the stakeholders in the partnership—like a couple in a marriage that finishes each other’s sentence or is so in tune with each other’s intentions that they appear to read each other’s minds. 

Such intense and mutually beneficial alignments can emerge not only in social and economic partnerships of equal individuals, but also in asymmetric partnerships of senior and junior business partners, in and between enterprises and stakeholders in long-distance enterprises. But the downside risk of such uneven partnerships is immense. Total dependency can develop into hell for the weaker partner. The one-sided, open-ended, and overlong currency partnership of Lebanese lira and US dollar lasted for over two decades, in which it seemed to defy the impossible trilemma and survived many external stresses, episodes of capital outflows, and pressures of divergence.

The partnership might have continued as it had, with the knowledge that the freedom to set its own interest rate policy is something of an illusionary freedom for a small country embedded in webs of international trade. After all, no theorem in economics is unshakable, many very small countries have a fixed exchange rate policy without drawing undue attention, and there is a polar counter-perspective to every presumed truth. But the end result of the long dollar partnership—first adopted to accompany nation building, reforms, and private sector’s recovery after the Lebanese Civil War—was disaster for the Lebanese, largely due to the establishment’s perpetual failure to enact lasting reforms. 

According to the above cited draft rescue plan, the lira was increasingly overvalued during the last few years. Notable ratios of overvaluation included estimates of 6 percent in 2008, 15 percent in 2012, 18 percent in 2014, 12 percent in 2016, 19 percent in 2019, and 33 percent in 2020. Other signals of alarm have exacerbated the problem. As confidence in financial markets evaporated and the long accumulating economic imbalances came to erupt, the relationship of currency dependence turned into hell for central bank, Banque du Liban (BDL), the suddenly incapacitated banking sector, and all Lebanese. The peg of the lira to the dollar is broken in principle and for most practical purposes with it the hopes for reforms toward an efficient and functional Lebanon.  

Now, with economies and financial interests that could be not more dissimilar, and finding themselves in a totally untenable currency relation on top of a totally untenable economic hole, the question of the Lebanese is how to survive after the divorce and how to save any monetary integrity. For more than five months, this problem of the factually broken peg has become increasingly exacerbated although the nominal parity was supposedly maintained. What to do in this quagmire, one of the many life-threatening and chronic conditions of which the almost comatose Lebanese economy has for months been in need of intensive care?

Plans long overdue

This problem has been no secret. At the Executive roundtable series just before Lebanon’s Independence Day last November, the lira peg and its future was one topic on the agenda, with a plurality of discussants expressing views that the peg in the long run would not be defensible. Some participants at the table argued for a crawling peg, others saw a need to stabilize the exchange rate at the official level before carefully revising it. 

While this type of discussion has been repeated many times since—for example, in the public squares during the thawra (revolution) and via online meetings under coronavirus conditions—efforts on part of official Lebanon to disambiguate the picture of the two diverging rates until very recently were foggy. Unequivocal statements on the peg’s need for replacement were scarce both before the appointment of a new government in January this year and since that theoretically pivotal moment. 

In the early days of the mother of all crises in Lebanon, assurances that the peg would not be touched were made from the side of the monetary authorities and its highest representative, BDL Governor Riad Salameh. Even in late March, the issue of having to change the exchange rate policy was not clearly stated and the unfortunate bipolarity of the lira was only alluded to by Minister of Finance Ghazi Wazni.  

When Wazni went before a video conferencing setup on Friday, March 27, he had something to say to bond holders. Those were the people who have financial claims on Lebanon and who have hardly been happy campers since the country’s announcement in early March that they would not settle what was due in regard to the then-outstanding eurobond on March 9 (an announcement from the Ministry of Finance [MoF] later in that month had confirmed that Lebanon would not be making its payments for any of this year’s maturing eurobonds in foreign currencies). 

But what the minister told these finance professionals with regard to the schizophrenic reality of the Lebanese foreign exchange (FX) rate in his opening speech (as published on the MoF website) was only a fleeting mention of the “critical level of available foreign currency” at the central bank, after which Wazni went on to acknowledge, equally vaguely, that one of the problems facing Lebanon was the “FX liquidity crisis, including the depreciation of the parallel exchange rate.”

As several stakeholders in the challenge of realizing a national economic recovery plan for Lebanon—which includes everyone in the country—noted in the days following the MoF investor presentation, the provided content was on the light side. “Big on words and small on deliverables or plans,” as one entrepreneur put it to Executive.

Indeed, the minister’s observation was not followed in his opening speech by a rectification formula or outline of practical steps for dealing with the Lebanese exchange rate. Nor, according to content displayed on 27 presentation slides presented subsequently during the event, was such a formula made concrete there. One slide (see below) mentioned an exchange rate framework, but did not provide hints to any intended FX rate path or plan for an exchange rate framework.     

To crawl, to float, to leave well alone?

Seeking for deeper understandings of the overlong ongoing currency conundrum, Executive asked economists for their opinions on the lira peg’s sustainability and their perspectives on a devaluation—meaning a decision to revise the currency exchange rate downward from the decades old existing rate and of ca. LL1,500 to the dollar to a specific net level—or a depreciation—meaning a relinquishment of the official peg in favor of letting market forces determine the overvalued lira’s trajectory.

For economist Marwan Mikhael, it makes no practical sense for the government to embark on a redesign of the exchange rate regime at the moment. “The issue is that there are no advantages from devaluing the official exchange rate right now. As long as you have capital controls, the parallel market will depreciate more if you devalue the official exchange rate,” he tells Executive at the end of March. “There is thus no point of devaluing the official rate at this time. [Only] if you are lifting capital controls, can you devalue. This is my opinion.” 

According to Mikhael, the theoretical increase of competitiveness of Lebanese goods in international markets after a devaluation is hampered by the highly dollarized cost structure of Lebanese companies that can even include their payment of salaries in US dollars. A market with a single exchange regime could be realized on fresh money (money transferred into the country after November 17 last year), he adds: “For everything in fresh money, there should be a unified rate.” 

In his perception, Lebanon should move toward a crawling exchange rate peg—one that allows for gradual adjustments and envisions minor down and up moves of the exchange rate, even as some overshoot of the rate is to be expected in the early stage of a transition to a crawling peg via an intermediate free float decision. Describing the IMF program that has been implemented with a similar process in Egypt as successful, he advises that it would likely be beneficial to allow the market in this way to provide an indication on the rate at which to position a crawling peg. “This is why you perhaps will first float it and then get the right price that you can defend,” he explains. 

Seasoned economists Elie Yachoui and Roy Badaro (speaking separately to Executive prior to the March 27 investor presentation), both point out that the opposition to a fixed exchange rate peg in Lebanon has almost as long a tradition as the peg itself. “I am totally against pegging and have been so since the beginning [of the policy in the 1990s],” Yachoui says. “Market forces have finally overcome Banque du Liban’s policy of pegging. We are a free market economy and have to operate according to market dynamics in a monetary market and all other markets.” 

Yachoui tells Executive that he favors depreciation as the more market-compliant path over a governmental decision to devaluate, and also that he prefers a free float of the currency as opposed to a crawling peg or managed exchange rate regime in any form. “It is high time to see free float of exchange in Lebanon after 27 years of fixed rate,” he says. “I am against a devaluation to a new and lower peg or a managed exchange rate regime because I am against the central bank committing the same error again.” 

In Badaro’s perspective, the decision for a fixed exchange rate regime in the 1990s was linked to international policy preferences at the World Bank level, in line with what was then called the Washington Consensus (as defined by economist John Williamson, not to be confused with the later usage of the term). The peg might have succeeded as monetary Lebanese policy of the early 1990s if peace in the Mashreq would have been achieved then, but as peace was but a dream by the late 1990s, the policy should have been changed back then. “They stuck to it and we are paying the consequences of the decision,” he says. 

Differing in this from Yachoui, Badaro is in favor of a gradual freeing of the exchange rate and recommends a crawling peg. “I think that before October, [2019], the equilibrium rate was around LL2,300 [to the dollar],” he says. “[Adopting it] could have brought trade balance, but nobody would listen [to such advocacy].” He points out that neither the MoF nor BDL have a policy addressing the way in which the parallel market’s existence impairs lives of vulnerable population groups. 

“Many take advantage of [the black market] at the expense of the poor population,” Badaro says. “I would be in favor of freeing [the exchange rate] but at the same time of revising the minimum salary twice yearly, [so as to] catch up with inflation. There is a cost-push inflation [created by] the pass-through of the exchange rate but this inflation would decrease if we take measures of promoting a pro-competition environment, which means to abolish all the anti-competition regulations, exclusive agencies, and any monopolies.”

For Tamim Akiki, an entrepreneur and data sleuth with training in heterodox economics, the devaluation issue has to be dealt with as part of a larger context. Maintaining an exchange regime that is close to the status quo of a fixed peg would first require deep research and investigation of what benefits this could provide to a very small economy like Lebanon, and for how long and for what reason a fixed regime should be maintained. A new exchange rate policy that even considers a fixed peg should therefore first address questions such as: Do you want to maintain a fixed exchange rate for a year so that you can overcome a certain crisis? 

Saying that rather than adherence to any fixed rate, a different regime should be pursued, Akiki tells Executive: “I think there is a general consensus that having a more flexible monetary policy can be very advantageous for Lebanon. So I don’t see why we would stick to the status quo. My view is that Lebanon should move to something like a managed float, which is what exists in most of the world. Everybody manages their exchange rates—it has never been a total free floating environment. I think we have to move to something similar so that we don’t have this buildup of instability over time.”   

The top priority in his view, however, should be that a new exchange rate regime is integrated into a national strategy for the economy. “I think the devaluation has to be part of the rescue package,” he says. “My concern is much more related to seeing if this will be an opportunity to move to a modern sovereign monetary policy or will this remain a policy that has proven to be a mistake. What we need to do is start developing a master plan for the next financial system in Lebanon. This should include a floating exchange rate, which can always be influenced by the central bank [BDL].”  

With devising a promising exchange rate policy being a major challenge in itself—let alone seeking to do so in combination with measures aimed at increasing the purchasing power in the population and fostering improvements in competitiveness that is based not on price competition but on increased reliance on skilled labor—it becomes clearer why the issue of adjusting the lira exchange rate appears to be viewed by many in government and even some in industry as a hot potato. This impression is heightened even further when one considers that economists generally agree that a traditional tradeoff between pricier imports and cheaper exports will not give a significant advantage to local producers, most of whom are a long distance away from being ready to tackle international markets with efficiency. 

Economic rescue proposal

A positive flash on the thought horizon of proposing an economic rescue that incorporates a clear view on the lira reached Executive on April 1. Consultants Gerard Charvet and Ziad Hayek (who, like Mikhael, was one of the highly knowledgeable experts participating in Executive’s roundtable in November) published a plan that explicitly addresses the FX issue and lira devaluation under inclusion of inflation aspects. Stipulating that four core concerns need to be dealt with in the people’s interest, the plan lists the national debt, banking sector health, depositor protection, and the exchange rate of the Lebanese lira indispensable targets for attention. 

The consultants propose as a second thematic focus of their plan—right after advocating for the establishment of a defeasance company that holds state assets by a new law—to reset the price of the lira at LL3,000 to the dollar. As the next step in a viable currency policy, they recommend letting this devalued lira “float at least for an interim period before installing a crawling peg policy,” and soon thereafter eliminate the lira’s tail of three zeros, which would mean targeting parity at three (new and rationalized) lira to the dollar. 

In a financial projection, the Charvet-Hayek plan calculates the budgetary impact of their devaluation/float/crawling peg scenario on basis of their proposed ratio of LL3,000 per dollar rate. They say it would modify the central bank balance sheet from LL216,541 billion in assets and liabilities to LL302,981 billion. Charvet and Hayek advocate that their proposed economic measures ought to be brought on simultaneously in one comprehensive package, under inclusion of flanking measures to soften the plan’s social blows to average earners and argue: “The devaluation (free float) will restore competitiveness to the Lebanese economy, stabilize the exchange rate at a real level, and encourage depositors to return to LBP deposits.”

Reasons to be wary

As the economic crisis is showing no intent to vanish—it is behaving to the contrary—it is welcome news that the government as of now has some numbers to discuss on the exchange rate. There is much to be said about the April 6 draft. Much of it can be shocking in good ways, for example when it states early in the text—which is all marked as “strictly confidential”—that the government is committed “to change its harmful practices.” But the plan also reminds of exercises where lip service to social care is juxtaposed with actions that dissolve social stability. Terminology such as “rationalizing public sector employment” and advocacy of efforts to “rein in” salaries and benefits in public institutions (e.g. universities) is not the kind of terminology that departs from neoliberal recipes which, when implemented, regularly fell short of humane successes. As Akiki notes, the plan seems neither ambitious enough nor creative enough and offers prescriptions that “are pretty much the same as in other countries and tend to perpetuate financial and debt crises.”  

Justified criticisms on its general drift notwithstanding—and also despite some overconfident assertions on global realities in governmental treatment of systemic banks that sounded off even before the coronavirus pandemic changed every outlook on governmental support for vital economic entities—the draft plan has enticing aspect from the perspective of the need for a clear FX policy. Naming its program objectives and strategies, it declares one of eight pillars to be: “Moving to a more flexible exchange rate policy beyond the near term to lessen strains on BOP [Balance of Payments] and improve competitiveness.” 

And it puts some exchange rate policy numbers on the table. As projections, these are debatable but at least they are numbers to debate, starting from an effective exchange rate of LL2,302 to the dollar in 2020—calculated by assuming that 80 percent of economic transactions are conducted at the parallel market rate and 20 percent at the old and still existing official rate. According to the table of numerical projections in the plan, the lira rate would move further from LL2,771 to the dollar in 2022 to just below LL3,000 per dollar in 2024. A parallel market would be tolerated by the central bank as long as absolutely necessary but the bipolar market of today is expected to be replaced with a unified official exchange rate by 2022, the draft plan says. 

“The unification of the two rates and the formal depreciation of the official exchange rate require the prior stabilization of the economy and the restructuring of the banking sector,” the authors note, giving their rationale why the discussion over the devaluations and deprecation issue might not be incessantly sizzling on the front burner of governmental elaborations. 

Authors of the plan are unequivocal when they declare in relation to the dollar peg that, in their view: “For years, the lack of competitiveness of Lebanese companies has prevented the emergence of a productive and diversified economic base in Lebanon and encouraged the consumption of imported goods through artificially inflated purchasing power.” They are also unmistakably clear in making a statement a few lines earlier that: “The peg to the US dollar that has been maintained over decades is now impossible to restore and must be abandoned as part of the Government reform program.” 

For the foreseeable—and by their wording practically indefinite—outlook on the exchange rate, they say that a free float of the exchange rate is in their opinion not advisable as long as the economy has not reached a stable equilibrium but foresee, in the same vein as most economists that Executive inquired with, a managed float or a crawling peg as the best policy after a recalibration of the rate through an initial devaluation and successive depreciation driven by inflation differential.   

In theory, a currency devaluation or depreciation is a trade-off affair that makes imports more expensive but exports more competitive. But as increasing competitiveness in export markets appears to be a long struggle in conjunction with an even greater struggle for economic sanity, the deterioration of the lira exchange rate—that is all over the short, medium, and long horizons—could very well be a lesser booster of the competitiveness of Lebanese goods and services than increased reliance on skilled labor and high value-added. For the moment, the question of devaluation and the future of the exchange rate is the monster in the large herd of our economic problems that has come out of the closet and is now waiting to be tamed. 

For the credibility of the Lebanese government, the honest discussion of this monster can only be beneficial. Honest discussions and interactions with the Lebanese public, as the example of the devaluation shows, are still in need of improvement. In this sense, an open and transparent presentation of the draft plan to the public for discussion would have been vastly preferable over the emergence of a leaked copy—even if one can hardly imagine a more surefire way than the leaking of a document to whet the appetites of analysts and self-appointed finance watchdogs on social networks, or to honey-trap by definition lazy business journalists who might otherwise not bother with poring over an intellectually advanced document. But the plan did not have to be hidden. When truth comes, falsehood vanishes. Ignorance, as a saying goes, is the shadow of death where knowledge is the light of life.     

April 13, 2020 0 comments
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Coronavirus AnalysisEditorialOpinion

Dystopian nightmare

by Yasser Akkaoui April 11, 2020
written by Yasser Akkaoui

These are worrying times for all of us. In April the lockdown in Lebanon was extended for a second time. It is possible it will be extended again. On a global scale, our lives have been disrupted en masse in a way in which many people have not experienced in their lifetimes. People are anxious, anxious over their health and that of their loved ones, but not just that, over their jobs, over the bills still piling up while savings dwindle. The brutal reality is that for many, missing one paycheck was enough to push them below the poverty line. People are scared.

Here in Lebanon, it is as if we are living in a nightmare. Already suffering under an economic crisis that had cost many their jobs at a time when access to money was curtailed and prices were rising, many Lebanese had already been pushed past breaking point and others were teetering at the brink—all while our politicians continued playing the game as if people’s lives were not dependent on them getting their acts together. It seemed as though things could not get worse: Enter the coronavirus.

It would be easy to give over to despair in times such as these, where challenges seem insurmountable, and the human solidarity needed to overcome them is fractured by our imposed distance from one another. But this too will pass. And now, more than ever, is the time to be thinking of the future. Because the world will change. That is a given. Whatever path we were on before the coronavirus swept over the globe has been altered. A new future lies ahead, and it is the decisions we make now that will shape it.

What does that mean for Lebanon? On the most basic level, this crisis has shown us that our overreliance on the outside world is a vulnerability that can and must be addressed. Increasing numbers of Lebanese are struggling to afford the food they need for themselves and their families. In the short term, we need to band together and look after each other, fill in the gaps left by the state—as we always have.

But looking to the future, now is also the opportunity for us to focus our attention on developing our agriculture and agro-industry sectors and to ensure those working in them have the support they need to succeed. To date, these vital sectors have been neglected and overlooked, with no steps taken toward their improvement other than those of social entrepreneurs utilizing design thinking to solve individual problems. But these are not national programs, nor at the scale at which we need.

Agriculture works on a cycle of 21 weeks, investments in it will pay off fast. We need to start strategizing now, not just because of the coronavirus crisis but because our own home-grown economic crisis was already putting tremendous pressure on imports—imports that we rely on to a dangerous degree. What do we need to produce locally to secure a higher level of food security in this country? These are fundamental questions that we need to address. Now more than ever, there is a public need for affordable local produce, and we have to develop an agriculture industry capable of addressing this need.

Our eroding purchasing power is gnawing away at us as these crises drag on, and there is little sign that our local currency will regain its previous value. The day-to-day supplies that each Lebanese needs to feed themselves and their families are only going to be available and affordable in the coming years if they are locally produced and sold in the local currency.

Now is the time to look inward for change, to work together in these most difficult of times to secure the best future for our country.

April 11, 2020 0 comments
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Agricultureagro-industryCoronavirus AnalysisOpinionSpecial Report

Lebanon needs to lower its import dependency

by Souhad Abou Zaki April 11, 2020
written by Souhad Abou Zaki

My grandfather died in 2016 at the age of 103. He survived two world wars, the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon (1916 – 1918), and the Lebanese Civil War. A few years before he died, I was with him as he read the newspaper and he turned to me and said: “Are you storing wheat? Things aren’t going well.” I remember laughing—at the time I didn’t understand why he was so worried. Then the day came when everybody started to worry about wheat and food security in general.

Based on Food and Agriculture Organization indicators, the prevalence of undernourishment in Lebanon has been on rise since 2011, yet the issue of food security and hunger did not make it to the headlines until the economic crisis started to worsen in late 2019. With the fast deterioration of economic conditions and the outbreak of COVID-19, all pillars of food security—availability (through domestic production or imports), access (physical and economic), utilization (consumption of safe and nutritious food), and stability (of the three other dimensions over time)—seem to be at risk.

The media has been focusing on the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic and Lebanon’s economic crisis on food availability and stability—this is understandable. Lebanon is a net importer of food, with the latter accounting for 18 percent of the country’s total imports in 2018, according to the World Bank, and covering a wide range of categories from wheat to rice, sugar, fruits and vegetables, food preparations (such as spices and oils), and cattle. The reliance of domestic consumption on these imports is striking and best captured by imports to consumption ratios across food categories: these ratios exceed 80 percent for major categories such as cereals and 100 percent for others such as refined sugar, rice, and vegetable oil. This heavy dependency on imports raises concerns over the availability and stability of a large range of items, not just wheat.

Food access seems to be even more problematic. The pandemic may constrain physical access to food due to quarantine measures as well as disrupt distribution channels. While in Lebanon food producers and distributors have been allowed to continue to operate, this is happening under certain constrictions regarding the times they can open and the levels of staff they are able to work with. Some facilities and branches were forced to shut down, and restaurants, which are also part of the food supply chain, have closed. This has come at a time when the purchasing power of the Lebanese was already under strain due to the liquidity crisis. This could be compounded by the coronavirus, as it may also trigger price hikes if food exporting countries resort to trade restrictions and aggressive stockpiling—as has happened during previous crises and pandemics. Higher food prices in international markets would, in turn, be passed-down to domestic prices, making food less affordable.

In Lebanon, both poverty and extreme poverty are expected to rise to 45 percent and 22 percent respectively, according to the Ministry of Finance, while the World Bank, prior to the coronavirus crisis, warned that the poverty level could hit 50 percent if the economic situation continued to worsen. Inflation and unemployment are set to surge as well, with effects already being felt by many. With the vast majority of Lebanese households being net buyers of food (meaning they consume more food than they produce), these changes will alter what economist Amartya Sen calls exchange entitlement set—the “set of all alternative bundles of commodities they can acquire in exchange for what they own”—and eventually change their consumption habits. Based on a 2016 report by ESCWA, on average, Lebanese households spend 20 to 35 percent of their income on food and so any increase in food prices will translate into a further reduction in purchasing power and food access. Even before the pandemic’s effects began to be felt in Lebanon, a February 2020 report by the Central Administration of Statistics pointed to the substantial increases in price of staple foods such as rice (40.2 percent), flour (28.7 percent), and lentils (36.5 percent), as well as other food categories.

Practically, when faced with such price increases, households resort to different coping mechanisms to escape hunger or at least to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Coping mechanisms vary from borrowing money to substituting expensive food items with cheaper ones. Such substitutions may occur within the same food category from different sources, across categories, or in the quality of the same products that are frequently consumed, as explained in a 2008 paper on substance consumption by American economists Robert T. Jensen and Nolan H. Miller. Households may even drop certain categories or sacrifice on other areas of their budget, such as healthcare or education, to be able to continue purchasing some foodstuffs.

As much as these coping strategies provide a way to escape hunger, they can also be highly problematic as they hide a more serious trade-off between nutritious food and cheap food—particularly when done in absence of adequate understanding of their nutritional implications. This is how the current crises are impacting food utilization, the third pillar of food security. Needless to say, poor Lebanese households in general, and vulnerable groups including urban poor and refugees in specific will be hit the hardest—the food crisis in 2008-2011 provides a good illustration.

Back to wheat

Wheat and wheat products constitute an indispensable component of the Lebanese diet. On average, the consumption of wheat per individual is around 130 kg per year, the highest among cereals, according to a 2010 report by the FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)—not to mention that it is a major feed for livestock. Thus, the availability of wheat is more of a necessity than a choice—a matter of food security par excellence.

Unfortunately, 80 percent of the wheat consumed domestically is imported—a good reason to be worried about its availability. Around 90 percent of imported wheat is sourced from Ukraine and Russia, making Lebanon highly susceptible to changes in these countries. Any move toward trade restrictions in these countries would threaten wheat supplies, raise the imports bill in Lebanon sharply, and most likely the cost would be passed down to the consumer through a spike in domestic prices. Thankfully, this has not been the case so far.

To mitigate such risks, the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET) normally keeps wheat reserves in its silos at Beirut port that would cover about three months of consumption. For years, private mills had been importing wheat and supplying the market, however, with the increasing shortage of dollars and the need to carefully manage the remaining reserves, the MoET is now considering purchasing the wheat instead. This step would save costs significantly if done properly, but also reflects how critical the situation has become.

Imports have always been a cheaper alternative to domestic production. Lebanon has been importing an average of 567,958 tons of wheat annually, while domestic production averaged about 130,000 tons only, according to the FAO in 2019. Around 77 percent of the wheat grown domestically consists of hard varieties of wheat (durum), according to the MoA, which are not suitable for making the typically consumed Arabic bread but is suitable for burghul, frikeh, and pasta. In an attempt to increase the production of soft varieties of wheat and lower imports, the MoA, through the Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute (LARI), distributed free seeds in 2019 encouraging farmers to grow soft wheat, though it is too early to determine the outcome of the initiative.

In principle, Lebanon can grow its wheat, but it cannot be self-sufficient for many reasons. First, the country does not have enough land to be self-sufficient. Unplanned urban expansion has reduced the amount of land available for agriculture, although increasing cultivation area is possible. Second, wheat agriculture suffers from major anomalies. Yields vary significantly with climate conditions and the amount of rainfall every year, which make them unpredictable. Under certain conditions, supplementary irrigation can help increase yield but in most cases small farmers do not have the financial means to invest in appropriate irrigation systems. Habib Massaad, an agricultural engineer and consultant whom I spoke with for this article, clarifies that increasing output does not rely solely on expanding the area cultivated but also on increasing the productivity of currently cultivated ones. He stresses on the importance of investing in supplementary irrigation systems to reduce waste, increase productivity, and extend production over more than one season.

Third, compared to high-value crops, wheat does not generate high revenues making it less attractive to farmers. Yields vary largely between 100 kg/dunam (dn) and 800 kg/dn depending on the variety grown and the characteristics of the soil, as stated in a 2019 study by a team at the American University of Beirut titled: “Challenges and Sustainability of Wheat Production in a Levantine Breadbasket: The Case of the West Bekaa.” Despite the high yield in certain areas, the study found that costs of production remain high due to the cost of labor, inappropriate irrigation techniques, and expensive land rental rates, not to mention the post-harvest losses due to inappropriate storage or transportation methods.

Wheat producers have been able to secure consistent average revenues of $150/dn according to the FAO, due to government subsidies that are managed by the Directorate General of Cereals and Beetroot with the help of LARI. The government offers seeds to farmers at subsidized prices, buys the harvested wheat from them at a set price, and sells it to mills at discounted rates to keep the price of bread stable.

Over the years, farmers became largely dependent on these subsidies, best illustrated in the 2019 study above, which found that 42 percent of the farmers surveyed would either possibly or definitely stop growing wheat if the government suspends subsidies—an alarming statistic given the ability of the government to sustain them is now in doubt.

Restoring priorities

What to grow, how to grow, and what to specialize in are not straightforward questions to answer. It needs careful examination and a strategy to make use of abandoned lands and available resources in an optimal way. So far, the MoA has made some good efforts but these have been insufficient and scattered. The gravity of the situation now requires a more proactive and comprehensive approach to food security and agriculture, and a massive coordination of efforts among different stakeholders including different ministries and academic institutions, as well experts from other sectors such as energy and technology.

Looking at food security in a very fragmented way is no longer plausible and self-sufficiency, as much as it sounds reassuring, should not be the aim. Lowering import dependency and improving domestic production should be the priorities now.

April 11, 2020 0 comments
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Agricultureagro-industryCoronavirus AnalysisSpecial Report

Lebanese agro-industrialists discuss challenges and opportunities in times of crisis

by Nabila Rahhal April 11, 2020
written by Nabila Rahhal

Gibran Khalil Gibran’s poem Pity the Nation, published in 1933, could almost have been written about lockdown in modern day Lebanon. Most prophetic is the line “pity the nation that eats a bread it does not harvest.” Lebanon is indeed far from harvesting its own bread, given that we import 85 percent of our food needs and that even what we produce locally is reliant on imported items, be it in the packaging or raw material.

Amidst the ongoing economic crisis, now compounded by the coronavirus crisis, prices on a wide range of imported and locally produced food items (based on individual and collective observations)—including basics like potatoes, pasta, and rice—are on an increasing trajectory, while consumers’ purchasing power is simultaneously decreasing.

Back in November 2019, the World Bank warned that, if the economic situation continued to worsen, 50 percent of Lebanese could be living below the poverty line. With the situation showing no signs of improvement anytime soon, a growing number of Lebanese are worrying about how to feed their families and collectively we have all been reminded of the importance of well-developed agriculture and agro-industry sectors. Unfortunately, the agriculture sector in Lebanon is underdeveloped and contributes a mere 5 percent to GDP, with an additional 5 percent coming from agro-industry, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

It is this reality that is facing local stakeholders in food production who tell Executive, via telephone interviews, about the challenges of operating under the existing crisis and how the agriculture and agro-industry sectors can be supported in order for Lebanon to meet more of its food demands locally, and so decrease its dependency on imports.

A malnourished sector

Lebanon’s compounded crises have created new challenges for local food production sectors and brought them to the forefront of public debates on social media and news programs. However, agriculture and agro-industry had been struggling long before Lebanon’s economic woes accelerated in the last quarter of 2019. “Before we talk about the crisis, we have to know that the agro-production sector was facing many problems even before the economic crisis,” says Marc Antoine Bou Nassif, founder of L’Atelier du Miel, a honey production company that has been in operation since 2012.

L’Atelier du Miel (Photo by Greg Demarque)

One of the problems facing agro-industry, according to Bou Nassif, is a lack of government imposed regulations and control over food production, which creates a chaotic local market and regulatory barriers to exporting Lebanese products in external markets (he gives Executive the example of not being able to export honey to European markets because a test for a certain enzyme is not available in Lebanese government labs).

The regional export market is another area where the food production industry has been suffering since the onset of the war in Syria in 2012 and the subsequent closure of land borders (the impact of which was felt starting 2015), says Mazen Khoury, production manager at Khoury Dairy. Because of the longer routes refrigerated trucks had to take to reach Iraq, in the example Khoury gave, the cost of transport increased from 10 percent of overall production cost to 40 percent. The regional market, according to him, is still suffering from many of the same factors today.

Indicative of a weakening economy, and another detrimental factor for local agro-industrialists according to Khoury, was the closure of regional (in 2017) and local (in 2018) supermarket chains. “These closures, in addition to the smaller markets who were also struggling with paying back the credit they owed us, caused us an estimated annual loss of $500,000,” he says.

First came the economic crisis

It is in this fertile ground of challenges that buds of Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis made their first appearance. As the agro-industrialists interviewed for this article explain, Lebanon’s food production industry is a value-added one, in the sense that almost all raw materials are imported, paid for with foreign currency, and are used in Lebanon to make the final product.

Food producers were faced with a severe cash flow problem when, after the banks reopened on November 1, 2019 (following almost two weeks of closure), their credit lines were cut and access to their dollar accounts severely restricted. “It’s like somebody opened a new company on November 1 and they have zero cash flow,” says Youssef Fares, general manager of olive production company Olive Trade, which owns Lebanese olive oil brand Zejd. “Our only cash flow is the stock we have at hand and so we are trying to sell that and use the money to buy our supplies, because the money we have in the bank has no meaning anymore. This is the big problem.” Fares tells Executive that he only imports the bottles and containers for his olive oil because Lebanese glass production factory Soliver shut down in 2017.

The increased parallel foreign exchange (FX) rate coupled with the restrictive banking policies led to both financial and access related difficulties across the sector. Speaking for Biomass, a company which produces an organic line of fresh produce, dairy products, and pantry items, its executive manager Mario Massoud says: “Most of the organic raw material we use in farming [from the seeds and animal feed to the greenhouses and equipment] is imported. This has dramatically increased in cost and became more scarce, making it more costly to operate than before October 2019, because of the halting of the credit lines and the issues with the FX exchange.” He says that buying from local agricultural distributors is also costly since their prices have increased as well (the price of organic seeds has increased threefold, for example) and they ask to be paid in cash dollars.

Picture provided by Biomass

Khoury also tells Executive about the increased costs from local suppliers, saying that even the price of the milk they use as raw material—which they buy from the local farms they control to supplement their own supply—has increased from LL900 per liter to LL1,350 (which was the amount set by the Ministry of Agriculture on March 4 to support farmers, who have had pay the increased cost of imported cattle feed). Khoury says their cost of production has increased by roughly 50 percent because of these factors.

Another major consequence of the economic crisis, according to Nadine Khoury, CEO of Robinson Agri, is that the halting of credit lines means the company can no longer extend credit to farmers, who are dependent on that support. “The problem with the agriculture sector is that banks do not give loans to individual farmers—you need land or assets as collateral, when most farmers rent the land—so what usually happens is that private sector agriculture companies lend to most farmers,” she explains.  “The economic crisis cut off our credit limits in the banks so we were no longer able to lend to these farmers and started asking for payments in cash.” Robinson’s Khoury explains that since the spread of COVID-19 and increased fear about possible food shortages and limited imports during the crisis, several NGOs, in collaboration with agriculture companies, have launched campaigns to support small growers and sustain the agricultural sector. “These interventions could help in alleviating the hard times we are going through, although they are not enough on their own,” she says. 

Then came the coronavirus

The coronavirus has largely made matters worse for Lebanon’s food producers—although some have seen sales pick up with Lebanese in lockdown looking for healthier options.

Local sales of Taqa, a Tripoli-based wholesale bakery that produces healthy snacks, had decreased by 35 percent since the start of the economic crisis in October 2019, but Soumaya Merhi, founder of BreadBasket sal, which owns Taqa, says they have stabilized since the beginning of 2020 with the start of the coronavirus lockdown. “We have experienced a positive shift in our product sales because people are looking for healthy products to consume at home,” she says.

Taqa (Photo by Greg Demarque)

Massoud has also noticed this increased demand on health-conscious products since news of the coronavirus hit Lebanon, although he says it is too soon for him to quantify it. “Also, people are now experimenting with cooking in their homes like never before,” he says. “For farmers and sellers of fruits and vegetables or healthy foods, this is opening a bigger market for them [as those looking to prepare healthier meals at home source fresh produce].” According to Massoud, demand for Biomass products has “increased tremendously in the past month,” both regionally and locally, to an extent that he is worried they won’t be able to keep up in the supply side (these observations are based on feedback at points of sale, when asked for a percentage increase he told Executive no figures had been finalized yet). “If we want to increase the production of lettuce, tomatoes, and cucumbers, we should have done so three months ago,” he says. “We are starting to do this now and expect the augmented harvest in August. We expect the demand to remain high because people are now more aware of the benefits of eating healthy, fresh, and organic foods.”

Those Executive spoke with have attributed the desire to cook at home and eat more healthily as behind consumer decisions they have witnessed during the lockdown period, though caution it is too early to determine the longevity of these trends or their impacts on their businesses long term. Increased interest in eating healthy and home cooked meals aside, the coronavirus crisis has caused disruptions to the food production business. Besides making imported goods even scarcer and costlier to secure, Massoud says coronavirus has had a negative impact on their exports. “We used to export via air freight with Middle East Airlines but today the airport is closed,” he says. “We do have a few cargo planes, such as DHL, but they are not enough and so everyone is fighting for cargo space in air freights. Because of the corona lockdown, export is kind of limited or more expensive.”

A big percentage of Zejd’s clients are in the hospitality sector, from caterers to restaurants and hotels, according to Fares. With hospitality outlets across the country shut down because of the coronavirus pandemic, Zejd’s local market demand is down to almost zero. While Khoury admits that agro-industry is faring better under the coronavirus lockdown than other sectors that have been completely shut down, he tells Executive that, despite it being too early for exact numbers, he has noted a drop in consumption of dairy products that he attributes both to a decrease in consumer purchasing power and to people being more conscious of food waste (buying only the quantities they need and avoiding wasting food).

Maintaining the price

Food producers’ struggles with the increased cost of production, and the other operational pressures they are dealing with, makes it increasingly difficult for them to sustain their businesses without increasing their prices. Producers are in full knowledge, however, that most consumers are struggling financially and cannot afford excessive price hikes, and so tell Executive they are trying to maintain a balance between managing their costs without pricing out their customers.

Most of the agro-industrialists interviewed mentioned relying on their export markets to introduce fresh money into their local accounts, which, in turn, are used to pay their suppliers. “With the high conversion rates, it’s almost impossible for you to continue without guaranteeing fresh money so, for me, it’s become essential to keep my good books with my export partners in order to sustain my purchasing power,” says Merhi, who imports 20 percent of her raw material and now exports almost 50 percent of her production to Qatar, Canada, and very recently to Saudi Arabia.

Merhi says she has been able to keep Taqa’s price as is not only by relying on exports but also through producing less quantities, trying to access raw material locally when possible, negotiating the best possible deals with her suppliers, and creating synergies with local producers who use similar ingredients as her. 

Khoury says that, despite a long resistance to doing so, those in the dairy production sub-industry could no longer absorb the compounding cost increases and so hiked their prices by 8 percent in January 2020, followed by another 8 percent increase in March. He explains that while Dairy Khoury’s prices have increased by 16 percent so far this year, their cost of production has increased by around 50 percent. Biomass also only recently, in early April, introduced an average price increase of 15 percent on some products, although they are trying to keep their prices in check by leveraging both their export markets and stocks and attempting to negotiate better deals with their suppliers, according to Massoud.  

This increase in the price of food, in a time when a big percentage of Lebanese are losing their jobs or experiencing reductions in their salaries, has scary implications. “The potential problem is bigger than a factory closing or companies going bankrupt,” says Khoury. “Today, if people can no longer afford to feed their children, we will be facing a social problem where people might steal or commit crimes before they allow their family to go hungry. The problem started with an economic crisis and corona but it is heading to an even worse direction of a problem of famine.”

Short-term support

Given this scenario of increased prices on imported foodstuffs (and the upward creeping prices of locally produced ones) it has become clear that if the Lebanese government wants to avoid the looming threat of hunger among the country’s population, then one of the immediate and more effective ways of doing so is through supporting local food producers. “Today the crisis is an opportunity to solve the key problems facing beekeeping and agro-industry in general,” Bou Nassif says. “It is forcing us to give importance to our local production since we can no longer import at the same rate as before. We also have to export agro-industry products to get fresh money into the country so that’s another reason to support the sector.” Supporting local food production, according to Merhi, also has the added benefit of employing Lebanese, decreasing dependency on imported foods, and therefore benefiting the local economy through generating a circular economy.

Both Fares and Robinson’s Khoury tell Executive separately that the government should subsidize some of the food production industry’s imports. “A new strategy should be placed by the government who is the body responsible to provide real solutions to the current economic collapse,” Khoury says. “What is needed in the short is an immediate action plan to assist the agri input companies by subsidizing their import needs just like they are doing with fuels, grains, and medical supplies. We still only need $75 million till the end of 2020.” She explains this figure is based on the cost estimations made by the association of the distributors of supplies for agricultural production in Lebanon, and was presented to Riad Salameh, the governor of Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank, and the agriculture minister separately a couple of months ago. For Mazen Khoury, the short term measures the government can take in support of the sector are subsidizing the difference in the currency exchange or, if that is not possible, supporting agricultural businesses with exports so they can sustain themselves with the fresh money accounts. 

Up by the bootstraps

While short-term measures such as subsidies are vital to offer immediate support to the sector, it is also important to keep the lessons learned during these crises in mind and foster long-term measures to develop the food production industry. The aim, according to those interviewed for the article, is not to have food production be the sole, or even the strongest contributor to GDP—as there are too many obstacles in the way for that (see article on food sufficiency)—but rather to develop it enough to at least meet local demand and be less dependent on imports. “I hope now we understand that the economy should be built on a multitude of factors, such as a well-planned agriculture sector that can contribute 8 percent to GDP, good industry (including agro-industry) that is 20 to 25 percent GDP, and also services and tourism,” says Atef Idriss, CEO of MENA Food Safety Associates. “That way, if one sector is hit the other sectors can support it. We got to a time when our economy became too dependent on services and tourism and we spent a big portion of our budget to develop infrastructure, real estate, and tourism in urban areas, forgetting that we have citizens in rural communities such as areas of the Bekaa who can only live from their land, or in the south who want to export their olive oil—one does not cancel the other. We need a minister of economy who can look at the big picture and develop an interconnected economic model for Lebanon.”

The need for a long term vision and plan developed by the public sector that would guide the development of the food production industry was stressed by all those to whom Executive spoke. The plan would have, as its main pillar, the reduction of dependency on imports (see comment) both for needed ingredients in the agro-industry and the supply chain materials for agriculture. “For local consumption to [help improve Lebanon’s trade balance], it is important to produce locally and try as much as possible to meet local demand in some products, such as wheat or potatoes, through local production,” Fares says. “There needs to be a strategy to provide food for people at lower costs, so that means with reduced imports.”

To Merhi, any plan to support the agro-industry sector through the production of raw material should follow through the production process until the end product. “To invest in agro-industry, you need to have the supply chain buckled,” she says. “To simply plant something is not enough, you need to think of distribution, supply, and workers [employed] under good working conditions.” She adds that, in order for this to succeed, it needs private sector initiative from individual companies with the support of the public sector, the latter of which she sees as having failed agro-industrialists to date.

We are living in unprecedented times globally, where nothing is certain and the future is obscure. In Lebanon, this is compounded by an ongoing economic and financial crisis. Lebanese are dealing with the very real worry of going hungry, having lost parts of their incomes or their jobs and seen prices of food increase. This should not be a time to panic and give in to despair, however, it should instead be the time for the government to take immediate measures to support local food production. Lebanese food producers were succeeding prior to these crises, despite all the obstacles in their paths—all they are asking for now is for some support to be able to feed the nation.

April 11, 2020 0 comments
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Opinion

A letter to our readers

by Executive Editors April 10, 2020
written by Executive Editors

To our readers,

The world is living through unprecedented times, and for many of us, uncertainty and anxiety are running high as the disruption to our day-to-day lives is acute. The coronavirus outbreak is one of the greatest challenges that we face as a global community. The threat of the virus to our health, to our economies, to our way of life, all constitute an existential crisis for Lebanon.

The events of the first quarter of 2020 lead us to believe that this year will be a challenging and difficult one, and likely its knock-on effects will reverberate for years to come.

Each and every one of us is prioritizing the health, safety, and welfare of our loved ones.To flatten the curve and ensure that our healthcare system is not overwhelmed, Lebanon is adhering to a strict social distancing, through the lockdown and nightly curfew. These measures are vital to slow down the spread of the virus.

Executive has been committed to independent, ethical, and authoritative journalism since its inception. In the current climate, our investigative journalism is vital. Executive is, more than ever, convinced that the development of content to the highest standards of journalistic integrity is a priority. We firmly believe that our readers have a fundamental right to clear, accurate, and independent information on which they can form their opinions.

Given the pressing need for quality reporting amid lockdown, Executive has focused its attention on its online presence and has been deploying an online-first strategy for our content that has shifted our publishing schedule from once monthly to multiple weekly analyses. Executive’s team is dedicated to working remotely to maintain a steady stream of news and analysis regarding the impact of the pandemic on the local economy, as well as other pressing concerns that Lebanon faced prior to the COVID-19 outbreak.

For the health and safety of our readers and our staff, our April issue will be fully published online. Our aim is to empower you through, as always, free access to our online platform. We also further encourage you to follow us on our social media platforms (Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn), where we will be sharing updates from our own content as well as studies and reports relevant to our readership.

For our print readers, Executive’s printed editions will resume once the lockdown period is lifted. In the meantime, please enjoy all of our digital content on our website and social media channels.

We hope to remain your source of choice for quality, in-depth journalism amid these trying times.

Stay home, stay safe. 

     — Executive Staff

April 10, 2020 0 comments
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Coronavirus AnalysisEconomics & PolicySpecial Report

How coronavirus could bring about a historic chance for change

by Thomas Schellen April 8, 2020
written by Thomas Schellen

About two months ago, the assumption was that in terms of viral speed, the only things spreading faster than SARS-CoV2—the coronavirus’ official name—would be coronavirus rumors and fears. This view could pass as news of the month at the time when World Health Organization (WHO) Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus explained to the world that there was an infodemic going on, on top of the new epidemic—before the WHO’s declaration of the coronavirus pandemic on March 11.

But tracking what are now the four dimensions of the coronavirus crisis trajectory—infection numbers and death tallies; data on markets and rescue budgets; social catastrophe indicators; and fixation on coronavirus news and rumors (as well as its Lebanon specific impacts)—as they speed ahead on a daily basis is the new impossible task. All four of these new dimensions, by the way, are first-class generators of pain and fear. 

Staying on the virus’s trail in spite of data uncertainty 

The data on the virus itself, meaning its confirmed incident rate, its mortality, the time in which infections double in affected clusters or per country, its longevity or eventual seasonality, and the total count of unreported and unnoticed infections—is by now widely acknowledged to be overall uncertain, too much so to enable perfect decisions. 

The least uncertainty has been assumed to exist in the mortality rate. But even in the reported deaths one encounters hidden data uncertainty. For example, the numbers of COVID-19 (the name of the disease caused by the virus) fatalities reported from G7 member country France, one of the most heavily affected nations in the pandemic’s European epicenter, had a massive error margin. 

It became a matter of wider awareness only in early April that the French death tallies reported throughout March did not include deaths in nursing homes but only deaths in hospitals. Under a revised reporting methodology, a retroactively amended tally in early April showed a different and substantially higher number of deaths since March 1, which indicated that over 25 percent of COVID-19 deaths were occurring in nursing homes (which according to reports in French media also have no testing capacities for the virus).  

As to fatalities, question marks thus come into play under several perspectives. One emotionally unsettling, but for response planning necessary, angle is the need to consider how many of the confirmed deaths in a given cluster or country might have occurred without any outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic. This does not subtract one decimal from the sense of total horror that is created by the increasing fatality numbers but it could have consequences for designing optimal strategies for fighting the virus and alleviating its impact. 

Besides uncertainty over the accurate mortality rate in clusters of seniors in nursing homes in the developed world, it does not appear unreasonable to wonder if a deep information gap related to death tallies is to be found across poorer countries. To what degree do clusters of mortality exist in slums across the southern hemisphere that have at best informal governance, with deficient or totally absent state presences? How accurately will deaths from COVID-19 be identified and reported from human population clusters in MENA, whether in camps of migrants in North Africa, informal refugee camps in Lebanon, camps in conflict zones in Syria, or in densely populated Palestinian territories that are ostracized by the nominal national government, namely the occupation government in Israel?    

Confirmed incident numbers moreover are not universally transmitted into a consolidated tally with the same rapidity, even within developed countries, which is complicating analyses of infection patterns in addition to the fact that infection numbers are rising very, very fast. Nonetheless, the big picture says that the spread of the virus will not slow down anywhere with any abruptness. No country and no individual is magically protected. This means containment measures need to be strong and lasting. 

It also means that by end of March, it was a sure bet to predict that the line of one million confirmed infections and over 50,000 deaths would be crossed in the following days—in a ten-fold increase when compared with the 100,000 confirmed infections tallied by March 6, a mere four weeks earlier. The tally of infections and deaths will continue to climb.

Venturing further into granular details does nothing to remove uncertainties. The location of the first reported coronavirus outbreak, China, was tallied to have 82,278 confirmed incidents and 3,309 deaths by March 31. Germany, France, Iran, and the United Kingdom were next in the gruesome statistics, with respectively 65,600, 45,200, 44,500 and 25,500 infections. Switzerland, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria were shown as five countries that also counted more than 10,000 confirmed infections by the end of March, while earlier victim South Korea reported just below 10,000—not that the 10,000 infections line would make any difference. But as the numbers change and become more shocking by the minute, what is the value of such information for concerned global citizens by the second week of April? 

From a perspective of policy-makers having to enact and adapt virus response plans, information gaps pertain to actual incident ratios in the pandemic, to existence or non-existence of seasonality, to the availability of tests, of emergency medical supplies, and to the time until vaccines and treatments will be available. Given the additional uncertainty about the effects and, inversely, potential short-term or long-term medical and economic detriments of one or the other containment strategy, the overall data insecurity and simultaneous decision-making pressure must be a living nightmare.       

The financial world: a flood of pain mixed with determined rescue signals 

The second, very powerful contender in the coronavirus race toward a global ground zero are financial market impacts, real economy impacts, and unemployment numbers. These doomsday notices are juxtaposed with signals of new governmental—meaning fiscal and legislative—measures and rescue packages, packages of monetary stimulus, bond buying and interest rate reduction by national central banks, and announcements of financing and debt relief initiatives by global financial institutions. 

On the world’s financial markets, stocks and their trading platforms are the most sensitive seismographs, signal givers of the first order when it comes to economic health. Beginning from mid-February and all throughout March, equities around the world were impacted by radical drops followed by uncertain movements, sideway trading, and resumption of drops. 

Between record highs in American and some European stock markets on or around February 19 and market readings on March 20, lay steep drops of about 30 percent in leading US indices Dow Jones and S&P 500, 40 percent on the German DAX, a drop of over 30 percent on Italy’s MIB, and more than 20 percent weakening on large Asian exchanges. 

Sideways trading and minor temporary price recoveries made not only the indexes of equity markets show pictures of mayhem and uncertainty at end of March and into April. Markets for bonds, oil, commodities, currencies, precious metals, and cryptocurrencies were shaken into bouts of volatility. Many markets passed through phases of deterioration last month that in their sum defied comparisons and left it to the mind of the beholder whether to describe the various down phases in sensationalized terms as crashes or euphemize them as severe contractions. 

Oil prices were caught between the rock of vanished demand due to the coronavirus pandemic and a hard place of a spat over production cuts between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Already subdued to levels below $50 over the first two months of 2020, due to weakening demand, prices moved down by 25 to 35 percent relatively early in March under the added impact of the price war. Scratching a $20/barrel price level that had in the oil price cycles during the 21st century only been recorded at a time when they were emerging from the $10 dollar lows seen ten years earlier, oil climbed back to the $30s by end of March and early this April. However, these signs of slight recovery were spiced with fears of possible further drops. 

Dollar prices and currency exchange rates also had a wild and wily month—the latter in the fact that they were advantageous to investors who played their wiles best. For most countries in the developing world, the month was wild, as they were hit by capital flight and depreciating national currencies. In the confusing environments of fear and flight, even gold seemed less solid, swinging from gains to losses in coronavirus uncertainty. The supposed digital gold, bitcoin, had value sucked out of it as investors cashed out bitcoin positions to cover exposures elsewhere, and even as bitcoin and a few other cryptocurrencies were gaining some territory as markets moved in late March and into April, it seems crypto-hell was bent on demonstrating that virtual does not have the same tangibility as physical. 

And so the sad markets stories went on and on. The data flood of bad and worse numerical signals from financial markets in March have in their volume and frequency rivaled the bad news on coronavirus infections and COVID-19 fatalities—the two crucial differences being that financial epidemics with inundation of deteriorating numbers do not imply growing risks of death and that the volatile financial signals reflected human behavior patterns. A crucial further element of financial signaling to the economy last month were the fiscal and monetary promises of countermeasures to the gathering coronavirus recension and ever-larger packages of support issued to themselves by leading economies.    

Emergency rescue packages in the richest nations 

In money trails on the global emergency supply plains, the top developed economies of G7 status have constructed the largest virtual caravans. Their money wagons are equipped with supplies that other countries can only dream of. The United States has legislated a $2.2 trillion dollar package, signed into law by President Donald Trump on the last weekend in March—an upward revision of the package and addition of another $1 trillion was later put on the table as parts of the program already looked insufficient to meet needs. Emergency packages worth double and triple digit billions of dollars were adopted by governments of the other G7 group countries. They were reported in early April as being: Canada ($75 billion); France (€45 billion in emergency aid to companies alongside €300 billion state loan guarantee package); Germany (€156 billion, upping its 2020 budget by almost 45 percent); Italy (€25 billion fiscal package, expected to be followed by much larger package); Japan (package according to government announcement on April 6 will amount to almost $1 trillion); and the UK (£350 billion/$430 billion under adjustable response framework with no limit). 

On EU level, according to a statement of current European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde on March 19, the Eurozone’s central bank designed a €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program on top of a €120 billion program adopted earlier in the same month. “We are fully prepared to increase the size of our asset purchase programs and adjust their composition,” Lagarde assured. 

It is predictable that these financial packages will not remain at these levels nor be nearly enough for doing what is needed, as already seen in the US context. A report in German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung said on April 5 that documents from the German finance ministry showed a total predicted cost of almost €1.2 trillion for measures in the country when all public measures are included. 

Using a phrase that reminds of the then-ECB President Mario Draghi’s 2012 rescue assurance during the euro crisis, leaders of the G7 said in a statement on March 16 that they were “resolved to coordinate measures and do whatever it takes” to restore growth in their economies and avert downside risks. 

Another early April news update: The United States’ rescue armament according to the New York Times comes with $454 billion in ammunition to enable Federal Reserve lending programs to small businesses, large businesses, local governments, individuals, and households. As a Treasury Department program for small business relief launched on the first Friday in April, the paper reported that over 10,000 applications for more than $3.2 billion in loans were processed that day.         

The big multilateral money guns 

Multilateral development banks and international financial institutions (MDBs and IFIs) were in the first tier of engineering their responses to the coronavirus pandemic and recession. With a financing quiver holding $1 trillion, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) signalled its readiness to mobilize all of its lending capacity, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva announced repeatedly last month, as the reality of a global recession projected at least as bad or worse than seen during the Great Recession of the 2000s dawned on international markets and global institutions. 

While assuming a recovery of the global economy in 2021, the return to growth will require tremendous medical responses as well as extraordinary financial efforts, Georgieva stated on March 23 (after a regular G20 conference call), making appreciative references to efforts by major central banks and fiscal packages that had been declared by G20 countries. 

After acknowledging the coronavirus-related economic relief measures taken by many G20 countries, she emphasized the continued presence of concerns over “the negative outlook for global growth in 2020 and in particular about the strain a downturn would have on emerging markets and low-income countries.” Early in March, Georgieva had announced that about $50 billion in fast emergency IMF funding, 20 percent of it in interest-free facilities, would be mobilized toward support for low-income and emerging markets.      

The IMF endeavors to facilitate better access to its emergency facilities, given that “some 85 countries” have indicated that they would need to rely on IMF emergency funding, the IMF chief said in a further, extraordinary conference call with G20 members on March 31. According to her, besides widening its emergency support umbrella the IMF is seeking to enlarge its capacities to help its poorest member nations and assist countries that experience foreign exchange shortages. 

In related efforts, the IMF in March initiated measures asking member countries to replenish a special catastrophe fund that has previously been used to support Haiti in 2010 and countries affected by the ebola epidemic in 2015, to a size of about $1 billion. Revising the catastrophe fund’s criteria enabled the granting of debt service relief for up to two years to poor nations as balance-of-payments support. 

According to a World Bank press release from April 2, the group initiated a first wave of emergency support operations worth $1.9 billion for 25 developing countries, including Yemen and Djibouti in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. New operations are moving forward in over 40 countries under a fast-track process, in addition to redeployments of $1.7 billion in already existing projects. Further redeployments of funds for countries with approved projects could reach up to $160 billion over the next 15 months. 

An earlier World Bank Group factsheet had announced in mid-February that the group’s immediate emergency response would be dedicated to lifesaving operations, meaning support of healthcare needs, prevention and testing, medical research, and related development of community-based disease surveillance systems.  

A list compiled by Reuters in the first week of April showed 28 countries in the developing world that were beginning to receive emergency funding in support of their efforts to fight the pandemic in these countries from the World Bank Group and IMF. Containing 13 countries in Africa, 10 in Asia, and five in Latin American and the Caribbean, the highest indicated amount was destined for the most populous country on the list, India, at $1 billion, followed by Senegal with $226 million. 

Seven of the named countries, including India, were going to receive upward of $100 million, five $10 million or less. The smallest amount was earmarked for Sao Tome and Principe at $2.5 million. The countries identified on the list were of different income levels and population sizes, without apparent correlation of either factor with the amount slated for emergency support. The Arab countries benefiting from the first wave of emergency funding by the World Bank or the IMF according to the Reuters compilation were Yemen, Djibouti, and Mauritania.

Notable MDB/IFI initiatives from around Asia and the Middle East   

The four-year old Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) announced in the wake of the March 27 extraordinary G20 summit by conference call to its directors the creation of a $5 billion crisis facility for public and private sectors to alleviate financial pressures and support post-pandemic recovery. The flexible facility would be part of coordinated international response efforts and could be expanded, the AIDB said on April 3. 

Responses to the coronavirus pandemic from Islamic and Arab development institutions have come underway more recently and support announcements have been trickling when compared with the flood from global multilaterals. The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) announced on April 1 that it would support implementation of “pioneering ideas in the fight against COVID-19” with a $500 million fund designed to invest in startups and entrepreneurship. 

Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) on March 30 announced a $3.2 million grant to assist Jordan in its fight against coronavirus impacts. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) said on March 25 that it would contribute 30 million Kuwaiti dinars ($96.5 million) toward the country’s efforts in countering COVID-19. Kuwait announced its first COVID-19 fatality on April 4. 

Multilateral initiatives with private sector support angles 

The World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation announced $8 billion in support for private sector companies through its trade finance and working capital lines, in addition to support for clients and invested private sector companies in the agricultural, manufacturing, services, and infrastructure sectors. Commitments from the group also include $6 billion in guarantees from credit insurance arm, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), according to the press release.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), released a €1 billion “Solidarity Package” aimed at the countries where the EBRD is active. The measures are targeting support for private sector client companies that are in financing troubles through temporary credit problems. 

In addressing the global banking system’s very specific challenges under the coronavirus scenario, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) declared additional funding and supervisory support measures for banks on April 3. Alleviation of pressures on banks according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at BIS will relate to expected credit loss (ECL) accounting frameworks and regulatory capital requirements linked to ECL frameworks, as well as margin frameworks and annual assessment of global systemically important banks. 

On March 27, a preceding statement by the Basel Committee’s oversight body of central bank governors and heads of supervision (GHOS) endorsed measures to free up operational capacity of banks and supervisors in the corona crisis by deferring introduction of Basel III standards, revised market risk frameworks, and revised pillar 3 disclosure requirements. 

The specter of a global social crisis—a crisis of labor

What the entire relief army of fiscal and monetary initiatives in the G7 economies and the measures directed at the global economy’s countries in the “also-run” category could evidently not solve last month, was a scary momentum in the development of joblessness. The sad record in job loss news came from the United States with 10 million new claimants of unemployment benefits in the second half of March. Job losses in the first half of March, reported at over 700,000, were high by comparison with earlier periods but paled in comparison with the latter part of the month.   

This translates into a dichotomy between relatively benign US job loss numbers in the first half of March and the outlook for next month and beyond. The existing data up to March 12, while indicating that over 10 percent of the review period’s job losses actually occurred in the healthcare sector (in services not involved with the coronavirus pandemic), mainly showed that about 65 percent of jobs lost across the US during the pandemic’s initial social impacts were in hospitality-related sectors—most of them in restaurants—and that job losses generally affected younger and less educated employees. 

The shockingly high numbers of US unemployment in late March had to be expected in view of the immediate emergency of a shut-down US economy. There also is no reason to think that employment numbers in the US will become better in the medium term where a deep global recession—with, at least temporary, history-making work paralysis—now is the dominant assumption. 

Reasons why the US numbers have jumped so strongly last month and resulted in alarmed reports by news organizations might include the fact that employment preservation is less of a thing in the US than in Europe, which explains the higher spike of American unemployment when comparing these two economic areas. A perception bias is another usual suspect. Job losses in China, which were in the millions in February, seem to be perceived in western media as a statistic, not a social catastrophe.  

This is all unsurprising, and since surges in social challenges have kicked Washington into activist gear in March, the US Department of Labor in early April informed state-level authorities of a $600/week boost to unemployment benefit payments for eligible groups and instructed them in perfect bureaucratic precision to what categories of benefit claimants these additional benefits are to be disbursed. Notwithstanding specificities of the American labor market and social response system, the indications from March 2020 as to the social groups most affected by unemployment in the US foreshadow where the enormity of social troubles is likely to be clustered in other, less affluent economies.   

Overall, the outlook for restoration of labor prospects across developed markets and creation of jobs that can substitute for those lost in financially destroyed SMEs and long-term devastated sectors also appears rather dim, considering that design of emergency measures for workforces generally has been aimed at softening financial blows by compensating for losses in labor income. The most promising steps range from loan holidays, rent suspensions, and disbursement of survival cash to laid-off individuals. Regulated reduced-work arrangements—Austria’s and Germany’s employment defense recipes via labor department substitution of a part of lost wages and salaries, if employees are forced to work fewer than their contractual hours but remain on payroll—will help, just as similar arrangements in countries where governments have announced they will be assuming responsibility for paying as much as 80 percent of wages if employers keep their staff members on even if they have nothing for them to do. 

The future looks dim 

All these measures are beneficial and immeasurably superior to total absence of personal security—but they cannot negate the destruction of work in the coronavirus crisis or guarantee the creation of additional job opportunities for new labor market entrants during the interlinked national recessions that are expected to follow upon the pandemic and be unlike other cyclical downturns. Nor can the measures generate new jobs that would replace jobs lost in hard-hit sectors where, for a long time, no full recovery of pre-corona employment levels is expected, be that service jobs in travel, tourism and hospitality or manufacturing jobs in automotive and aviation industries. 

Moreover, most countries in the world do not come near to the fiscal power of the US and other G7 countries. Yet it seems unpleasantly safe to assume that similar patterns to those of the March 2020 job losses in the US will be seen by the time when downward labor developments across the world will come to be analyzed for G20 countries as well as less privileged economies. 

In a short-term outlook projection by the International Labour Organization, developing markets will be impacted more severely by evaporation of work than developed countries. Arab states will suffer the largest loss of labor that is being inflicted by the COVID-19 crisis on the world economy in the current quarter, the ILO said on April 7. The organization expects 8.1 percent of work hours to be lost in the Arab states, equating to 5 million full-time workers, which is 1.4 percentage points above the projected 6.7 percent rate of work hours that will be wiped out worldwide. Under the ILO projection, the global loss of work will be equivalent to 195 million full-time workers, 125 million of which will be in Asia.  

Job losses beyond the current quarter are very hard to anticipate because they would, to a significant proportion, depend on the timing and speed of recovery from the expected global coronavirus recession—key open questions are if recovery would start as early as the third quarter or only later on and if the recovery will be fast (a V-shaped recession), slow (U-shaped) or marginal (as in a L-shaped recession). However, the residual unemployment that has to be expected even after the pandemic has turned into a bad memory means that repercussions from increased chronic unemployment—including impaired physical health, increased emotional distortedness, and damaged mental stability—are likely to affect the entire globalized economy of the 21st century over decades. 

Socioeconomic epidemics will affect countries with highly developed analytical methodologies and data on domestic labor markets but will be even more hurtful to countries where the domestic labor market is a job casino with crooked croupiers—a large group of countries that includes Lebanon, which is in no way unique in this regard. 

The ultimate result of all this could be that job loss in the coronavirus crisis turns out to be a class of harmful societal bacteria prone to induce chronic illnesses in developed and poor countries alike, inflicting social pains and causing mental epidemics with unrestrained emotional infectiousness in all seasons and comparatively minor but unpredictable death rates.                   

The fourth stream in the deluge 

Such a social reality, unless balanced by a surge in social solidarity, looks to be no fun at all. Moreover, it links to the fourth swelling torrent that impacts and impairs daily lives in the form of a deluge of narratives. 

This torrent combines several sub-streams. One is flooding the internet and social networks with inane conspiracy theories. These dystopian fantasies are too numerous and on average far too stupid but they command a lot of attention. They can traumatize listeners with artificial fears and even lead to damages in the real world, as a brand new example from the UK demonstrates: burning mobile phone towers. Some towers were targeted by arsonists this month, apparently because of a conspiracy tale that fifth generation (5G) mobile networks have something to do with the spread of the coronavirus. Scientists were dismayed.

There are furthermore significant streams of deliberate fear mongering and disinformation. The disinformation stream’s fake news can be state-sponsored or state-aligned, suggest observatories of such data, and are revealing digital frontlines that are culturally entrenched and throwbacks to Cold War times. Unimaginative horror movie scripts about villainous military leaders underwriting secret laboratories for biological weapons research that have set a virus loose deliberately or inadvertently, are an old hat. But such allegations recently seemed to be popular fake news grenades deployed by various global powers on their disinformation fronts.   

A third detrimental sub-stream of the online information deluge is criminal with the objective of financial gain. Real world price gouging and criminal behaviors of seeking to exploit the desperate demand of municipalities, public and private healthcare institutions, and individuals by charging sky-high prices for—often substandard—emergency medical supplies from masks to ventilators for COVID-19 patients is a morally despicable and legally criminal practice that has surged with the pandemic. 

Mirroring and even preceding these practices have been cybercrime syndicates and individual crooks who fraudulently promised to deliver medical equipment, virus tests, imaginary vaccines, and even miracle cures in online environments. Further fraud strategies include scams related to banking, financial services, coronavirus research, donation solicitations—the Action Fraud reporting system in the UK warned of soaring fake governmental emails asking for donations to the UK’s National Health Service, in one example—and charities. 

While real-world property crimes saw a downturn during the lockdowns, virtual crime in connection with the coronavirus pandemic soared into existence by February and ballooned in March, to the point that platforms for reporting such crimes, such as Action Fraud, were flooded and sometimes overloaded with requests by April. 

“The pandemic opened up a business opportunity for predatory criminals,” said a report by Europol that announced the results from a global operation against counterfeit medicines, mostly counterfeit surgical masks, which, according to the report, resulted in the dismantling of 37 organized crime operations and closure or some 2,500 online links. In the US, the justice department warned of rising online scams related to the coronavirus and the National Center for Disaster Fraud asked coronavirus fraud victims to contact a hotline. It is too early in the trajectory of coronavirus-related online crime to have meaningful numbers on average damages to victims or the accumulated financial gains of fraudsters during the pandemic, but as with all crime, this online scamming epidemic will leave behind traumatized victims.   

The rise of mainstream news and economic forecasts

On the other end of the information spectrum are the not so bad guys—news organizations and individual journalists, academic research initiatives, for-profit consultancies, and individual economists, celebrity and otherwise. In this realm, the coronavirus has been dominating the attention of journalists for more than a month, which resulted in daily flows of virus-related news on every mainstream and niche media that Executive accessed during the pandemic (including Executive’s own website and social networks). 

Detailed and high-level economic research reports from academic institutions, bank research departments, and professional consultancies have flooded the global info sphere with studies, graphs, tables, projections, and guesses about the trajectory, severity, and outcome of the global coronavirus recession and nation-scale recessions. There was even a first “infodemiological study” by Chinese scholars about correlations between the COVID-19 epidemic and the COVID-19 infodemic.    

It can and must be pointed out that the work of journalists and media organizations is driven largely by people’s right to information on the pandemic and all that it implies (NB: Many for-pay online magazines and news sites have punched holes in their paywalls and are offering their coronavirus coverage pro bono, and advertising revenue at other media sites is down). This is the media’s mission. However, with the rise in mainstream reporting, daily monitoring of the flood of journalistically produced news also nurtures concerns over imbalances in reporting, the nurturing of self-fulfilling prophecies, and the reinforcing of prejudices and misperceptions in absence of sufficient verifiable information. 

Concomitantly, the relentless spike in production of economic opinions, analysis papers, and presentations suggests an increase in risks that the users of these reports will by way of selective perception chose to peruse materials that reinforce their narrow views and existing biases. 

Many economic research departments and consultancies appear to compete in bringing out reports fast (as a non-representative example: the World Economic Forum’s lineup of contributors and experts in April churned out over 25, often elaborate, online pieces in less than a week). Many such reports will have to come at the price of having to use preliminary, partial, uncertain, and not yet corroborated and robust data. Perhaps too many.      

Casually put, the fourth stream in the corona environment of spring 2020 is a lavish information kitchen that allows economic addicts to overeat on a high-protein diet of advice and opinion, conspiracy theorists to indulge in nutty snacks with no nutritional ingredients and news junkies with a taste for the morose to feast 24/7. Given, however, that the torrents of so far mostly depressing SARS-CoV2 and COVID-19 data, discouraging economic data, and highly worrying social trend data in their confluence already make any previous experience of TMI look like a joke for preschoolers, the presence of the fourth stream in the deluge seems to transmute the combined mental coronavirus experience into something like a distributed denial-of-service attack on human brains—with no telling about the damages that might be inflicted.  

In any event, as a long defunct economist and political philosopher wrote in an exchange with a fellow socialist one and a half centuries ago, “Every child knows [that] a nation which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, but even for a few weeks, would perish.” It seems that the world will in due course find out if, per chance, Karl Marx was right on this one.  

Deeply embedded in the coronavirus crisis: The case of Lebanon

And where is Lebanon in this global apocalypse that comes with the destruction of all human ability to predict what will happen to the world economy in the coming six, nine, 12, 21, 40 or even 120 months? The answer might be mostly one of cultural coherence and mental resilience.  

In terms of infection count, Lebanon, showing 541 infections on April 6 on a continually updated list maintained by Johns Hopkins University in the United States and registers in the middle field of the 183 countries that are included in the tally. The list on that day shows more than 60 countries with 10 or less infections each and just over 100 with more than 500 such incidents. 

A world map at the site shows a not too large red spot in a world that is plastered with circles of red (one must assume that the size of the circles correlates with the number of infections but does not give information on the ratio of infections to national populations). Over 70 countries have reported higher infection counts than Lebanon. The world total that day is approaching 1.3 million confirmed infections and 70,356 deaths. 

Lebanon’s tally of 19 deaths seems elevated in relationship to other countries that show between 400 and 700 infections, as countries in the group with a lower count outnumber those with a higher fatality count about three to one. The time for the doubling of infections in Lebanon is shown as about 30 days, with a stable trend and looks rather good in context of another visualization of the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 data. However, the overall robustness and depth of country data about most countries, including Lebanon, appears at a fleeting glance to not be sufficient yet to allow for real analysis and conclusions with a high degree of confidence.     

Carnage and more carnage

The economic picture in Lebanon is not one of a country that has been ripped away from its healthy economic trajectory by a sudden external shock—as is the scenario in other countries that have come to regard a lockdown as the only way to avoid an unacceptably high loss of lives among their citizens. Lebanon’s economic picture is one of sustained carnage, or rather the governmental self-dismemberment of the little that has remained of the country’s political and socioeconomic integrity after a series of vacuums and utterly result-free policy cycles in the 2010s. 

With transmission of guidance impulses into the economy through the administration’s dysfunctional central nervous system frequently interrupted over the course of a decade, vital parts of the economy started to wither and die off. The resulting dismal state of economic and financial affairs, having become unmistakably clear in the third quarter of last year, is by now known perfectly well and has been documented almost to excess. There is no need to reiterate a description. 

However, if one wishes to refresh one’s memory on the entwined elements of the Lebanese mess, one only needs to glance across national and international assessments of this existential crisis, for example by reviewing the six joint statements which the International Support Group for Lebanon (ISG) has issued in course of the past seven months. 

A meditation over such documents and the economic realities delineated therein gives the impression of only two possible approaches. In recognition of the persistent economic emergency that has only been exacerbated but not induced when the first coronavirus infection was discovered in the country seven weeks ago, the possible reactions to the twice cursed reality of pandemic and deep economic crisis are a realist’s approach and a utopian one.   

Realistically, and this is prudent, the country needs things: the virtue of hard work by motivated and determined business movers, shakers and makers—the kind of people who are investing themselves into the Lebanese economy and put their own fortunes on the line—and help from outside by whoever is willing and able to help. Leaders of industry and economists have reconfirmed earlier in the coronavirus crisis that they are determined to work with everything they have and that foreign help is vital and urgently needed, ascertaining at the same time that they would not expect the Lebanese government to be able to spend any significant own financial resources on alleviating the repercussions wrought by the coronavirus crisis or the economic malady. (See March 2020 industry story). 

All that can be said at this moment with reasonable confidence about the search for foreign help, is that talks between the Lebanese government and interlocutors on the global level, such as the IMF, the World Bank Group, and stakeholders in the ISG, have been ongoing for months now. The details discussed in these talks are by and large less transparent than one would wish for and the outcomes appear not predictable, but the potential enablers, foremost the enabler of fiscal reform, are known. 

In this regard, the latest communication between the Lebanese state and the ISG has reconfirmed this month that Lebanon is appealing for and depending on international support. The official message to the ISG reiterated baseline information on the Lebanese government’s perception on the scope, roots, and growth of the national economic crisis, and the fundamental precondition for receiving aid that consist of empowering an efficient government that enacts reforms and disavows all corruption. The message contained the assurance that “the Lebanese state is currently working on putting up a comprehensive financial and economic plan, within a national rescue program,” and the promise that “the plan is about to be completed” as President Michel Aoun told ambassadors, EU, UN, and World Bank representatives in a April 6 speech.    

An alternative utopian approach might reason differently, however. It might admit for example that unadulterated carnage of the Lebanese economy is just as strong as it was before the coronavirus struck—but continue to say that under the conditions of the coronavirus crisis, financial drainage, ballooning debt, currency blowout, poverty explosion, social emergency, and vanishing jobs are no longer just cluttering the Lebanese horizon but that these ominous signs now are looming over multiple countries. 

A utopian approach might further reason that the current outlook of a deep global recession represents an opportunity. With the entire world facing the possibility that new economic paradigms—a need that had also been debated toward the end of the 2007-09 Great Recession but that did not materialize then—a utopian Lebanese might argue that the financial and economic apocalypse is finally taking shape, but that in Lebanon it is the apocalypse of flawed finance and dysfunctional economy and does not mean the end of the world. 

Utopians are raising their voices and concerns internationally, advocating for debt forgiveness or introduction of universal basic income solutions, stakeholder capitalism and new social contracts, replacement of outdated models for externalizing climate and environmental costs, for trying out Modern Monetary Theory, for better financial constitutions in the public economy, for central banks that become pawnbrokers of last resort, or for ending the antagonism between markets and public administrations, societies and states.  

A Lebanese utopian might see an opportunity for contrarian thinking to be effective in the country’s redesign of the national economic strategy, perhaps by way of a new form for sustainable monetization of state-owned lands while retaining public ownership, or by encouragement of a creative revolution in design and tech entrepreneurship and a giant national leap into digitalization in pursuit of a moral economy, or by activation of a diaspora network for long-distance job creation, or by institution of a policy that would encourage restructured banks to deploy their knowledge into healthy banking sector growth, or, or, or. A determined utopian might even rejoice that the global powers that are, have been put under downsizing pressure by the coronavirus pandemic and its collateral recession so that they have less ability to deploy financial superiority for their own power gains, being false friends for countries that should realize that they have more than enough talent and more than enough own concentrated wealth to stand on their own feet.   

One thing to remember 

The Lebanon apocalypse is unfolding but it will not be the end of the Lebanese and not the end of Lebanon. The economic apocalypse of 2020 is a chance and a double opportunity to learn from the country’s systemic failures and step up to global challenges. 

Henrik Mueller, professional observer of international business realities and professor of economic journalism in Germany, argues this month that the coronavirus revision of everything has just successfully refuted the old accusation that capitalism subordinates everything to the almighty profit motive. Some budding economists, meanwhile, blurted out in an Austrian School economics forum in the United States their ideology that, fundamentally, freedom is more important than security, or an illusion of security.

A Lebanese observer of such discourses might ask in response, “What is most valuable and important in and after the coronavirus crisis for a society that has neither security nor could benefit from past laissez faire capitalist freedom in a rentier state?” The answer, one hopes, is human solidarity and productive collaboration between utopians and realists.   

April 8, 2020 0 comments
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Agricultureagro-industryCoronavirus AnalysisSpecial Report

Economic and coronavirus crises threaten Lebanon’s already fragile food security

by Nabila Rahhal April 1, 2020
written by Nabila Rahhal

For almost anyone residing in Lebanon, trips to the supermarket have become laced with a vague sense of apprehension. The more privileged may wonder how much the price of their favorite brand of imported cereal is now (as prices have been inflating since the last quarter of 2019), or if indeed it is still found in the Lebanese market. Those at a low income level worry that they will no longer be able to purchase the basics needed to feed their families, as prices of even staple items are rising—not to mention the requirement to wear a mask at many supermarkets now, retailing at pharmacies at LL2,000 a pop.

The ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon—and now coronavirus-inspired trade restrictions—have led to inflated prices on imported goods, which, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), account for 85 percent of Lebanon’s food basket (a list of basic food commodities calculated according to the minimum daily diet of 2,100 calories per the World Food Programme). This has led to questions about our food security, defined by the FAO as when “all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” It has also made many question Lebanon’s lack of food self-sufficiency, defined by the FAO as when “a country produces a proportion of its own food needs that approaches or exceeds 100 percent of its food consumption.”

The size and scope of global food supply chains today has made nations largely interdependent on each other for food security. According to FAO’s Food Outlook Biannual Report on Global Food Markets 2019, an estimated 168.2 million tons of wheat was traded in 2018/2019 and 172.1 million tons are expected to be traded in 2019/2020, an increase driven by larger expected imports from drought affected Morocco and higher purchases by several countries in Asia (the report was compiled before the coronavirus crisis). This year-on-year increase in trade of a key staple food is just one example of the importance and common practice of global food interdependence.

A high dependency on imports for food supplies, however, makes a country’s food security vulnerable to external factors such as lower production in source countries due to climate change-related factors or when trade routes are disrupted because of political tensions or strife in an exporting country. An example of this is the coronavirus-related trade restrictions and food hoarding being witnessed in many countries, which has a potential negative impact on global food supplies, according to an article by Reuters published on March 26, 2020. While the article assures readers that, according to analysts, global supplies of the most widely consumed food crops are adequate, it still gives several examples—such as surging prices of soymeal in Argentina—where closed borders and reduced workforces are “putting a strain on the usual supply routes.” 

These potential disruptions to trade routes are why most countries aim for a balance between food self-sufficiency and trading within the global food supply chain to ensure high levels of food security. One of the categories used by FAO to measure a country’s food security is “stability,” under which falls indicators such as per capita food production variability and cereal import dependency ratios (the higher the dependency ratio, the less food secure the country).  

Lebanon falls on the lower end of food self-sufficiency as it imports 85 percent of its food basket. This makes its food security highly vulnerable: the liquidity crisis—which cut off traders’ credit lines—and the more recent restrictions on global trade brought on by the coronavirus crisis both indicate the extent to which this is true.

Around the world

For Lebanon to strengthen its food security, it needs to begin with a better strategy for securing its food imports, says Rabi Mohtar, dean of the faculty of agricultural and food sciences at the American University of Beirut. Mohtar is critical of the fact that information regarding where Lebanon imports its foodstuff is not easily accessible through government reports, and that deciding on sources for agricultural imports does not appear to follow a strategy or plan set by the responsible ministries such as agriculture, industry, and trade.

According to Mohtar, the concept of food security has evolved from when a well-stocked silo of grain at the village entrance meant a happy and well-fed population to become “more complex and akin to portfolio management.” Just like it is considered prudent to diversify investments when managing a stock portfolio—or else risk losing all money invested if one stock plummets—it is wise to have more than one import source for staples. Mohtar gives the example of Saudi Arabia, which he says is one of the most food secure countries in the region because it imports the same staple from multiple countries, therefore diversifying its portfolio of agricultural imports and minimizing the risk to its food security.

Lebanon, by contrast, tends to opt for the cheapest source country for importing a staple foodstuff, meeting all its demands from it. For example, all of Lebanon’s wheat imports are from Ukraine (the 6th largest exporter of wheat in dollar value), according to Mohtar. “Our criteria were to import at a low cost and so we were not looking at that from a robustness of the food system and diversification perspective but I think moving forward we need to be looking at these issues and the tradeoffs,” he says. 

Made in Lebanon

Regardless of how much Lebanon diversifies its sources for imports, however, its food security will remain weak if 85 percent of its food basket comes from external sources. To decrease this dependency on global food supply chains, Lebanon needs to work toward increased food self-sufficiency. On aggregate, Lebanon is most self-sufficient in fruits (147 percent) followed by vegetables (93 percent) while it imports 83 percent of its total cereal consumption, as per ESCWA and World Food Programme’s 2016 Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security in Lebanon. 

The first and most basic step for Lebanon to become more food self-sufficient is to further develop its agriculture and agro-industry sectors, according to Kanj Hamade, assistant professor of agricultural economics and rural development at the Lebanese University. “Before we talk about food sufficiency and decreasing our dependence on imported foods, let us first talk about supporting and strengthening our local production, our local agro-industry,” he says.

The ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon and the more recent trade restrictions due to the global coronavirus pandemic have made clear the importance of productive sectors to the economy (see Q&A with Nadine Khoury) and more attention is now being given to improving the country’s agriculture and agro-industry sectors (article forthcoming). Strengthening agriculture and agro-industry is easier said than done, however. Four years ago, in 2016, Executive covered the Lebanese agricutural sector and its limitations, which back then included a problematic and traditional irrigation system, limited availability of irrigated land, and lack of planning and coordination at the ministerial level, coupled with a lack of regulations and weak implantation of existing ones. Sadly, not much has changed since. According to FAO’s website: “Agriculture plays a relatively minor role in Lebanon, contributing about 5 percent of GDP.” In terms of the number of Lebanese dependent on agriculture to make their living, however, the picture is slightly different. Both the FAO and ESCWA estimate as high as 25 percent of employment in the country is through agriculture and up to 80 percent of economic output in rural areas is agriculture-based. On agro-industry in Lebanon, the FAO says it accounts for an additional 5 percent to GDP and “constitutes a major and growing employer in the economy.” 

It is often said that opportunities lie in every challenge for those who know where to look. To Hamade, the difficulties in getting food products into Lebanon nowadays and their increased prices (caused by both the economic and coronavirus crises) creates an almost golden opportunity for import substitution in agro-industry. He sees the most potential for import substitutions in dairy production but says goat meat, pasta, and wheat-based breads—if we expand our wheat production—are all areas to consider. “In agro-industry, you can easily use existing production lines to produce and substitute items like pasta and other hard wheat products,” he says. “We have an opportunity in almost all food products to first try and get raw material from local markets—so we can support them—and if [the local supply] is not enough or not available, then import raw material to develop any part of the agro-industry sector so you can substitute imports and meet local demand.”

The best laid plans

Both Hamade and Mohtar told Executive that increasing self-sufficiency is not a zero sum game—no country in the world is a 100 percent self-sufficient. Decreasing our percentage of imports, however, is still an important goal. “Because of the economic crisis and now the corona crisis, we have an opportunity to decrease this figure, which is very good,” Hamade explains. “We don’t have to be fully self-sufficient, however—which is hard anyway because we are a small country with limited resources such as water and land that are needed if we want to raise livestock, for example—but we can move the percentage lower.” Doing so, he says, will help Lebanon reduce its balance of trade deficit and move toward having a productive economy instead of being dependent on remittances.

Mohtar believes that any plan for Lebanese food security should first take into account the modern day Lebanese diet and then concerned ministries can set a strategy for what can be locally produced and what should be imported. “The need is not to make [the percentage of agricultural products that we import] zero because at some point it becomes a tradeoff—if it is too expensive to produce locally, then it is better to import—but we need to have a national plan for food security,” he says. “A plan would say, ‘Ok, this is my food basket, I am going to import this much wheat from multiple sources because I don’t want to be dependent on one country and I am going to produce my vegetables, eggs, and chicken. I will import some of my needs for red meat but I need to reduce my consumption of it and return to the traditional Lebanese diet where red meat was not consumed daily.’” Mohtar explains that the balance between import and local production would be a function of water, land, and technological availability, which, when combined would dictate the cost of local production against importing these commodities. “A national plan to protect, invest in, or to promote certain food products will guide this balance,” he says.

As it stands today, Lebanon’s food security is highly vulnerable due to the challenges facing food imports, which our national food basket depends on, and due to years of neglect toward the agro-industry and agriculture sectors. This cannot continue as is. Lebanon is now in serious risk of seeing a significant percentage of its population go hungry, as prices of basic imported commodities increase with limited viable locally produced options. If there ever was a time for the state to have a food security plan, then it is now. 

April 1, 2020 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyOpinion

How feasible is the recovery of stolen Lebanese assets?

by Riwa Zoghaib March 30, 2020
written by Riwa Zoghaib

The Lebanese uprising that burst into the streets across the country on October 17, 2019 was a focal point for long held frustrations over a poor governance system and widely perceived endemic corruption. The trigger for the protests was a series of proposed taxes that the previous Lebanese cabinet had agreed on, as part of its austerity push amid a declared state of economic emergency. Those that took to the streets saw these measures as punching down on a populace already suffering economically, and instead directed their anger toward a political class that had, since the end of the civil war, been presiding over Lebanon’s ever-expanding fiscal deficit and public debt. Among the demands that emerged from the streets over months of protests was a call to retrieve stolen public funds and freeze the assets of Lebanese politicians located abroad. Recovering these assets, however, is not a straightforward process.

The full scale of illicit proceeds from corrupt practices is challenging to calculate. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the amount of money laundered through corrupt or criminal activities in the world ranges from 2 to 5 percent of global GDP, calculated as between $800 billion to $2 trillion per year at the time of estimation. UNODC notes that, while the margin is huge, even at the lower scale it “underlines the seriousness of the problem.”

Those engaged in corrupt activities have various strategies to conceal the origins of their illicitly gained assets. They can illegally—or legally—transform them into several forms, including but not limited to: hard or electronic currency, movable and immovable property, shareholdings, and offshore companies. These asset transformations facilitate their circulation across multiple jurisdictions, while using the names of different owners to further camouflage their real point of origin. This makes it increasingly challenging for law enforcement agencies to track, trace, and legally confiscate them. Tracing and identifying these assets is time consuming as it requires lengthy and costly legal investigations, which, in turn, require the relevant jurisdictions to have open access to public registers such as court records, company and land registers, customs records, and bank accounts. These investigations need to identify the causal link between the crime(s) and the offender(s)—and lead to prosecution and the recovery of the assets.

Effective cross-border judicial assistance requires transparent and effective communication; this is complicated by the differences, in many cases complex, between legal processes and terminologies across multiple jurisdictions. The efficiency of the assert recovery process is also hindered by the lack of qualified and experienced judges in state authorities, as well as the absence of focal point agencies and local and international assistance networks. To overcome these challenges, strong national legal and institutional frameworks compliant with the international measures and best practices—such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crimes—are indispensable.

Unfortunately, the legal anti-corruption and anti-money laundering tools in Lebanon pose several serious obstacles to the asset recovery process. A 1956 law on banking secrecy law prohibits national banks from revealing any information concerning banks’ books, transactions, or correspondence of depositors—including politicians and their relatives. Sitting unvoted on in Parliament is a now almost three-year-old draft law to amend Law 154 (1999) on illicit enrichment, yet neither the law or the awaited amendment require government officials and politicians to publicly disclose their assets in all their forms located in or outside Lebanon. Two laws designed to control, prevent, and criminalize acts of corruption—Law 44 (2015) on anti-money laundering and terrorism financing, and Law 55 (2016) on the exchange of information for tax purposes—were also not effectively implemented. Law 44 states that the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, is the focal point within the authority to seize suspicious bank accounts and to confiscate the movable and immovable assets that are proven to be the results of money laundering activities. The law is silent, however, regarding any further measures or practical procedures regulating the asset recovery process—from the pre-investigation and investigation to the judicial and the return phases. Law 28 (2017) on access to information, which took almost a decade to be passed by Parliament, has faced endless implementation challenges. In particular, Law 28 is hampered by its co-dependence on a National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that is yet to be established. Besides the slow passage of necessary legal tools to combat corrupt practices, as well as the obsolescence and the incompliance of Lebanese laws with the international measures the country has ratified, there is also an entrenched culture of secrecy that is wearing down every attempt for reform and compounding the obstacles brought on by the lack of a clear, full-fledged, and unified asset recovery legal framework.

During a seminar that took place in Beirut on January 26, 2020, on fighting corruption, tax evasion, and asset recovery, Charles Bratz, a French judge specialized in anti-corruption and asset recovery, stated that the independence of the judiciary is a prerequisite for a successful and efficient asset recovery process. The Lebanese Judges Association did call, on October 18, 2019, for the temporary seizure of the accounts of all politicians, senior officials, judges, and public sector workers, in addition to their family members, whose deposits exceed LL750 million ($500,000 at the official rate). Yet this never materialized, and, in the now over five months since the protests first broke out, there have been no indictments or investigations by our judiciary into corrupt practices. Serious questions remain over whether the Lebanese judiciary, hampered by a severely politicized judicial system lacking in basic independence, would be able to prosecute corrupt politicians and succeed in recovering stolen funds.

One further—and crucial—aspect to consider before originating an asset recovery case is cost. These kinds of investigations can often be prohibitively expensive, as they involve all kinds of anticipated or ad-hoc costs—such as employing additional experts, translating large number of documents, and managing and maintaining the frozen assets—that Lebanon currently cannot handle, given the economic, financial, monetary, and now coronavirus crises that are unfolding in tandem.

Given the above, there is a serious question to be answered: Is recovering stolen assets from abroad the entry point for Lebanon or should efforts be focused on bridging the legal gaps in ways that would prevent politicians from looting and laundering public funds in the future? In other words we must ask ourselves moving forward if the benefits, i.e. the amount of recovered assets, would outweigh the costs, i.e. the money spent throughout the process of asset recovery. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Lebanese Transparency Association or the editorial views of Executive Magazine.

March 30, 2020 0 comments
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