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Feature

Worker’s paradise?

by Hugh Jeffrey May 3, 2000
written by Hugh Jeffrey

In 1996, Ghazi Kraytem, general manager

and part-owner of Soliver, found
himself in a tight spot. A manufacturer
of glass bottles, Soliver was facing all the
difficulties afflicting local industry: high real
costs, high domestic and regional tariff
barriers, corruption and a slipping economy.
But for Soliver things were more acute.
Competition in the Gulf, its main export
market, had been growing “astronomically,” says Kraytem. In two years, industrial
capacity for glass bottles there grew 600%
while demand was barely growing. “We
got hit pretty bad,” he says. “Our competition
was selling to our customers at 25% less than
our cost.” Making matters worse was the
impact plastic containers were having on
the glass bottle market. Bottles made from
PET (polyethylene terephthalate) have
become favorites of soda and bottled water
producers, because the material offers glass-
like clarity but won’t break like glass and its
lightness makes transportation cheaper.

These factors made Soliver’s future
prospects unappealing. “We had a choice of
either closing down,” says Kraytem, “or
meeting the challenge.” In order to become
competitive, both locally and internationally,
Soliver had to cut costs, replace its outdated,
labor-intensive manufacturing equipment and invest $14 million in new
high-tech machinery.

But just hold on a minute there. What was
that first bit? Cut costs? Isn’t cutting costs
just a euphemism for laying off workers, for
firing people? In Lebanon eliminating old
machinery and investing in new equipment
is fine, but firing people, that’s a different
story. And for Soliver, it was. While the
company faced no interference with its resolution to upgrade its operations, the firm’s
“reluctant” decision to lay off 70 workers
attracted a lot of government attention.

“When we informed the ministry of
labor,” says Kraytem, “they said we could
lay off workers, but not as we wanted to.”
Instead, after talks with the prime minister
and pressure from the ministry, Kraytem
says that Soliver was required to pay $1 million
in compensation for its 70 workers, on
top of their end-of-work indemnities. In
return Soliver was given promises, such
as protection from imports, lower utility and
fuel costs. “We even had a written contract
with the ministry of labor, but nothing
came of it,” he says. And what infuriated
Kraytem even more was that many of the
laborers Soliver hired were not needed in the
first place – they were employed as a result
of political pressure.

Soliver’s case is not unusual; it’s just one of
a few companies willing to go on record
about the issue. Indeed, Kraytem says he
knows of many other companies that were
forced to hire unnecessary workers and pressured
to keep them when times got tough.

The case neatly illustrates what most
industrialists or managers of any other
labor-intensive operations know: keeping staff on,
even if they are redundant, is considered
an unwritten law in Lebanon. And
implicit in this law is the understanding
that if you fire staff, it will cost you.

We say unwritten because the labor law
itself does not encompass such a meaning.
Katia Bou Assy, an attorney at Moghaizel
Law Offices, argues that the Lebanese
labor law is quite clear. “The employer or
the employee can terminate the agreement
at any time provided the conditions are
complied with,” she says. Those conditions?
Firstly, an employee should not
be dismissed unfairly. For example, notice
must be given. An employee with less than
three years’ service at a company must be
given one month’s notice, between three to
six years requires two months, between six
and 12 years three months, and finally
more than 12 years’ service requires a less
than onerous four months. Alternatively, if
the employer is particularly keen for the
employee to go, it can choose to pay in lieu
of giving notice.

Other cases of unfair dismissal include firing
someone because of membership in a
workers’ union or because the employee has
filed legal action against the employer in
order to oblige the employer to conform to
applicable laws. Finally, the employer
can’t fire a worker who is a board member
of a union; in this case the employer must
apply to the labor court, which will in turn
make the decision.

So what about a legal dismissal? By law,
if the employee is incompetent, he or she
can be fired without notice as long as the
employee is given a minimum of three
warnings or if the employee’s negligence
causes damage to the employer. In the latter
case, the employer should inform the
ministry of labor within three days of
becoming aware of the negligence before
firing the employee. If the employee is
absent from work without a legal excuse for
more than 15 days in one year, or seven days
consecutively, the employer can also fire
without notice.

But perhaps the most important clause in
the labor law has to do with terminating
employment based on a company’s financial
difficulties. The law states that a firm can lay
off employees if it is facing financial trouble,
in other words, if keeping workers
would impair or jeopardize the company’s
survival, or if it needs to upgrade technology,
operating or manufacturing systems,
a process that may involve laying off
employees. This is critical: If a company is
not free to cut costs and upgrade during a
recession and as a consequence it folds,
many more would be hurt than the few targeted
to lose their jobs.

In order to lay off employees under this
clause, the employer has to inform the
ministry of labor of those he intends to let
go and the ministry will act as a third party
between the employer and the employee to
negotiate the level of compensation.

Again, according to the law, the level of
compensation is clear. The employer is
required to pay anywhere from two to 12
months of salary in compensation; the court
determines the amount of compensation by
taking into account things like the employee’s
age, years of service and health.

But this is in theory. Nicholas Nahas is a
shareholder and director of Sibline, one of
Lebanon’s largest cement manufacturers and an employer of about 400 people. He
argues the reality is quite different and that
companies often pay much more compensation
than is stipulated under the law,
thanks to interference from the ministry of
labor. The reason, says Nahas, was the
high-inflation period during and after the
war. When inflation was sky-rocketing, at
times the lira dropped 30% a day against the
dollar, the ministry of labor was made
responsible for determining the dollar-
pound
exchange rate; in effect, the amount
of compensation to be paid. The problem
with this, says Nahas, is that it opened the
window for the ministry to apply a greater
degree of influence on the private sector in
terms of employee compensation.

Additionally, Nahas argues that once the
economy had stabilized, the established
system continued.

The reason the ministry of labor has continued
to exercise influence over employer-employee
relations is not so much to do with
the simplistic and outdated belief that private
companies are merciless and out to rip
off workers given the chance, but more to
do with the deficiencies of the Lebanese
state. Since the government has not seen fit
to establish a welfare system that provides
unemployment benefits and job search services,
the ministry of labor has been forced
to act as a quasi-department of social security
at the expense of the private sector.

Fares Saad, the head of work force relations
at the ministry of labor, is unabashedly
direct about the ministry’s unofficial
role. “We cannot force any company not to
dismiss an employee; the Lebanese labor
law is clear on this point. But the first thing
we do when an employer wants to lay off
staff is to try to ensure [via negotiations with
the employer] the continuity of work, to
keep them at work,” says Saad. “For example,
if the owner wants 12 employees to go, we try to lower that to eight or less and ask
the employer to transfer the others to different
positions.” Negotiations don’t end
there, however. “If that doesn’t work,”
says Saad, “when we discuss the level of compensation with the business owners,
we try to ensure that the employee is given
more compensation than 12 months’
salary. Why? Because we can’t always
find vacancies at another company for
these employees.”

This is the reality of employer-worker
relations here. “In Lebanon,” says Saad,
“we have no retirement or end-of-service law
while at the same time we have no law for the
people who can’t find a new job. For this reason,
we make the employer pay penalties.”
That statement neatly reveals the conceptual
chasm between government officials
and Lebanon’s private firms. In the
absence of a functioning welfare system, the
ministry of labor wants the private sector to
pay; on the other hand, private companies
and institutions, like their international
counterparts, argue that social security is not
their responsibility.

“We prefer, as the ministry of labor,”
says Saad, “for Lebanese laborers to be
employed for $400 a month than for a foreigner
to be given the job for $150. But the
companies always prefer their profits.”

Indeed. Any manager of a private company
will argue that its number one priority is
delivering growth and profits and that it’s up to
the government to provide the legislative
framework and resources to protect worker
rights and ensure adequate welfare.

The logical extension of this thinking is
the type of labor relations exercised in the
United States, where companies routinely
hire and fire without government interference
and where private sector icons like
IBM, Boeing and Levi Strauss can lay off
tens of thousands of employees under
restructuring programs, a move that is
generally welcomed by investors.

This kind of labor flexibility is possible in
the context of the world’s strongest economy
and a well-developed social security system
originally put in place through lessons
learned during the Great Depression of the
1930s. It’s impossible to argue that this
could happen any time soon in Lebanon.

The bottom line is that with no welfare
system in place and the ministry of labor the
self-appointed guardian of the Lebanese
worker, laying off staff will remain an
expensive and politically difficult exercise
for local firms, which ultimately raises
their costs and undermines efficiency. If private
companies absolutely have to fire
employees on a large scale, they will face
pressure from officialdom. “I’ve lived
through several ministers of labor,” says
Nahas, “and they always have some connections.
It’s politics. So if you need to lay
off 30% of your work force, you never
know what’s going to happen. And I have
stories where it was really painful.”

The result is that a lot of firms try to lay
off carefully and quietly, or just not at all.
The over-staffed banking sector has a few
examples. Bank of Beirut managed to quietly
reduce its staff from 490 to 417 after its
merger with Transorient Bank at the end of
1998, and aims to reach 400 by the end of
2000. Banque Audi, on the other hand, doesn’t
lay off workers. Although it has a reputation
for a high overhead, it has refrained from
hiring new employees to staff its rapid
branch expansion and has instead been
attempting to transfer existing employees to
the new branch positions.

Until the government is in a financial position
to provide some sort of welfare scheme to
the unemployed, local businesses are unlikely
to see a more flexible labor market. So local
business owners or managers will have to grin
and bear the situation or think of new ways to
increase worker productivity, because the
law certainly won’t help them.

May 3, 2000 0 comments
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Feature

Drowning

by Robert Tuttle May 2, 2000
written by Robert Tuttle

Lebanon’s rivers are once again roaring, swollen by spring
snowmelt in the mountains. This is an annual blessing. In
the parched Middle East, where water rights are so guarded
that countries will go to war to protect the smallest of tributaries,
Lebanon is an oasis. Having so much of what other countries in the
region need, one might expect that there’s money to be made in the
export of bottled water. Certainly, there is no shortage of companies
that are trying to tap into this potentially lucrative market.

Sohat, Rim, Tannourine, Sabil, Nada and Sannine have invested millions
of dollars in the last few years to upgrade their factories. All
have converted from the use of opaque PVC bottles to the transparent
and exportable PET bottles. (Many countries have banned
the import of PVC bottles because they have been shown to pose
health risks). Water should be a booming business in Lebanon. But
the sad reality is very different.

“Nobody is making a profit,” complains Mershed Baaklini,
chairman of Rim, the number two brand on the market, according
to AMER Research. Despite the big investments, those in the business
complain that there is little money being made. Unfortunately,
most companies in the water business are not nearly as transparent
as their new bottles. Sohat, the number one brand, Nada and Tannourine, declined to speak on the record. Rim, Sannine, Sabi! and Dynamic Concepts, a supplier of 19-liter bottles, were willing
to divulge limited information. But some facts are clear.

The combined production capacity of the companies is far greater
than the demands of the domestic market. About 7-8 million cases
of water are sold in Lebanon each year. “The production capacity is
at least double,
maybe triple that,”
says Salah Osseiran,
chairman of the four-year-old Sabi!, the
newest company to
enter the market.
Sabil’s capacity is 4
million cases a year,
but it’s currently running
at 1-1.5 million.
Rim can produce 6
million boxes a year
but is only selling
about 2 million.

If the domestic market’s thirst is quenched, then there must be a market for exports in this arid region
of the world? Actually, no. Exports have dropped from $1.2 million
in 1996 to $481,000 last year. Production costs are increasing in
Lebanon, says Osseiran. “It’s very expensive here to export. Water
is not a real value-added product, so any marginal increase in cost
will make it uncompetitive,” he says. “We had opportunities to export
to Africa, but we couldn’t because it’s so competitive and our
costs are so high.” Sabil’s exports have dropped from 10% to 12%
of output in 1996 to 5% to 6% last year. “Exports are practically nil. [Bottled Water] is bulky, heavy and cheap
and that makes the cost of exports high
compared to the price of the water,” says
Jean Rizk, president of Sannine.

The Gulf represents the most important
export market. Saudi Arabia purchased
$104,000 of Lebanese bottled water in
1999, or 21% of exports, and Kuwait consumed
$219,000, or 45%. But even in these
desert kingdoms, it’s hard to compete.
Believe it or not, says Osseiran, the Saudis are
able to produce bottled water less expensively
than the Lebanese by pumping from deep
wells. In 1980, there was just one water factory
in Saudi Arabia, but today there are
nearly 20. In Saudi supermarkets, a case of
Lebanese water generally costs double the
price of the local variety. “They have many
advantages that we don’t have,” says
Osseiran. “Their cost of utilities is one
fourth of ours. They pay 2 to 3 cents a kilowatt.
We pay 12 cents. They don’t have to pay
40% of each employee’s salary for social
security. They pay only 7%. They have land
that is less than nothing to buy in industrial
areas.” In addition, Saudi water companies
benefit from 20% customs tariffs on bottled
water imports. In addition to the usual taxes required of all businesses, water companies are obliged to pay a tax of
LL35 for every liter of water extracted, whether it’s used or not.

With too many swimmers in the pool, firms are desperate to survive.
Companies have been diversifying their product lines (see box) and
investing hundreds of thousands of dollars in splashy marketing campaigns.
At the same time, a fierce price war has developed, with firms
offering supermarkets up to 60 free bottles for every 100 purchased
in an effort to win market share. Instead of passing that on to the customer,
says Osseiran, shops are pocketing the difference and giving the lowest-priced brands better shelf space.
Supermarket prices range from LL500 to LL600
for 1.5-liter bottles.

“It is a chaotic market,” says Michel Ghanem,
CEO of Rim. “Companies are dumping prices.”
So who will sink and who will swim? If the companies
themselves are to be believed, all could
drown. The some 200 to 300 unlicensed water
companies (no one knows for sure how many
there are) have become the scourge of the
industry (see box). Legal companies complain
that they are driving the legitimate players out of
business. That, despite the strict rules governing
bottled water. Based on government decree
1039, passed last summer, a water company
must have a factory that is ISO 9002 certified and
follows manufacturing procedures set by the
US Food and Drug Administration. Each company
must also have its own well or spring
located on no less than 1,000m to 1,500m of land,
a minimum investment of no less than $1 million. But the laws are
not being enforced.

Illegal companies dominate the 6-liter to 5-gallon market, which
represents more than a quarter of the total water market. Operating
out of street-level shops or garages, many provide no more than filtered
(sometimes unfiltered) tap water. Most distribute within their
own neighborhoods for prices as low as LL1,000 for a 20-liter bottle.
This has discouraged legitimate companies from entering a
very important segment of the market. Of the eight licensed companies,
only three sell 5-gallon water bottles: Mona Cool, Nahle and
Nada, which is sold by distributor Dynamic Concepts.

“We are really suffering from the little guys who are doing this
without a license,” says Baaklini. Rim is considering entering the
gallon business, but that will require an initial investment of
between $500,000 and $750,000 in bottles and equipment. “Illegal
companies are selling 19 liters for LL1,000,” he says. “I would have
to sell them for LL8,000.” Sabi! is also reluctant to enter the 5-gallon
market. Osseiran says: “The market is so uncontrolled by the
government that we have no appetite for further investment in this
country. We are the good guys, we follow the rules and these fly-by-night bunch of guys come and pay no tax, no fees, sell sickness
to people and nobody bothers to stop them.”

When Sabil opened,
illegal companies controlled
about 10% of the
market. Osseiran expected
the government to crack
down. “We never expected
it was so weak that it couldn’t
enforce its own laws.”
Sabil was expecting to
break even by 1999. Four
years later and revenues
have risen to $5 million,
but the company claims to
be losing money.

Dynamic Concepts is
one of the few licensed
companies taking on the
illegal ones. It intro-
duced 5-gallon containers in 1994.

“[Individuals and companies] used to buy 1.5-liter bottles from
supermarkets or small shops. We tried to convince the institutions
and companies that you can save by using the 5-gallon bottles,” says
Elias Barakat, commercial manager. “I have many examples
where big consumers of our products saved around 30%.” But business
soon started to turn sour. “When others saw that it has a good
rate of return, some started filling bottles without a license,” says
Barakat. “We were depending on the government to stop this, but
like everything in Lebanon, some are supported by politicians.” That
is the root of the problem, according
to the ministry of health.

Karam Karam, the minister of health,
ordered the Internal Security Forces to
shut down the illegal companies last
year, going so far as to blame influential
politicians for protecting these
outfits. Half a dozen were given
three months to get their house in
order and obtain a license. That
deadline was recently extended for
another three months. The rest were
ordered closed. About twenty were
shut down briefly, only to reopen.

Licensed companies say that the government has to make some
tough decisions, and that might involve stepping on some powerful
people’s toes. In the meantime, the number of illegal companies
has been on the rise.

A spokesman for the Internal Security Forces said it was up to the
ministry to take action against the illegal water companies. “It’s their
job to close these down, don’t they have inspectors?” he asked.

Osseiran is tired of the excuses. “Nobody in any government, not
this one or the other one, is willing to take a decision that might upset
any Tom, Dick or Harry,” he says. “Frankly, it might make sense for
all the legal companies to let the illegal ones work alone.”

May 2, 2000 0 comments
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Cover story

clawing its way back up

by Hadi khatib & Avo Tavoukdjian May 1, 2000
written by Hadi khatib & Avo Tavoukdjian

It’s nice to take a catnap. But if you
wake up to find your multi-million-dollar
company has been reduced to
almost nothing and your former employees
are your biggest competitors, then you
know you’ve overslept. A couple of
decades ago, Contracting and Trading
Company was a name to be reckoned with.
C.A.T. was a giant in the region, responsible
for building landmark structures such as
the Presidential Palace in Iraq and the
Holiday Inn Hotel in Bahrain. It was also
one of the first contracting firms to lay
down thousands of miles of oil and gas
pipelines of different diameters in the Gulf,
Libya, Ghana and Nigeria, as well as being
the first to lay down 48″ and 56″ pipelines.
C.A.T. clawed its way into everything –
from highways to stadiums, airports and
power stations in the Middle East, Gulf
and Africa. Its turnover surpassed the billion-
dollar mark.

But in the early 1980s, C.A.T. went into
hibernation, mainly because of the war and
internal conflict among its shareholders.
By the time it re-emerged five years ago,
business had dwindled to an all-time low.
Turnover was just $25.2 million and the
company had dipped into the red by a few
million. It was time for serious reconstructive
surgery. The owners began hunting for
someone who could turn things around and
stumbled across Fred Habeishi, previously
president of the US-based RUST, a design
and build firm with over 22,000 engineers
on its payroll. RUST, where Habeishi
spent 34 years before joining C.A.T., was
one of the leading contracting firms in the
United States, specializing in the construction
of plants and factories. Can this newly
appointed Mr. Fix-it rebuild C.A.T.?

As far as Habeishi is concerned, that has
already been taken care of. “We’re not coming
back,” he says. “We’re already back.”
Since his arrival, turnover more than tripled
from $25.4 million in 1996 to $80.2 million
last year. Projections for this year put that figure
at $130 million. But to do that, Habeishi
had first to get the company geared up to compete
for contracts that would put it in the big
leagues with the likes of the Consolidated
Contracting Company (CCC). “We had to
reinvest, reinvigorate and get the right people,” says Habeishi. In 1996 a capital investment
of around $50 million was raised by
C.A.T.’s owners, the heirs of founders
Emile Bustani, Abdallah El-Koury and
Shukri Shammas. But with the company
losing $4 million to $6 million a year,
Habeishi knew that wouldn’t last long.

In 1997, Aramco, the world’s largest oil
company and C.A.T.’s major customer in
Saudi Arabia, was getting
ready to kick
C.A.T. out. “They told us we hadn’t done
much in the past ten or
15 years, and the last
few years we’d done
lousy work,” says
Habeishi. Aramco
allotted C.A.T. a probation
period of a few
months. Habeishi was quick to react. “We just
about fired anyone who wasn’t doing his job right,” he says, “especially people in important
positions.” He then rebuilt the work force
with qualified personnel. C.A.T.’s staff
grew from 2,494 in 1996 to 7,452 last year,
while millions were spent on reorganization,
training people and improving standards.

Habeishi also had to replenish the company’s
fleet of equipment. In the early 80s,
C.A.T. was among the best-equipped contracting
firms in the world, with 2,300 pieces
of heavy construction equipment in Nigeria alone. For 15 years the equipment had lain dormant,
been stolen, looted and cannibalized;
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth was
reduced to almost nothing. C.A.T. managed to
salvage not much more than 60 pieces and
many of these were in need of repair. “We’ll
be spending about $130 million in the next
four years on replacements and new machinery
in the Gulf and
Nigeria combined,”
he says.

C.A.T. was once
again accepted as a
major builder for
Aramco and is now
pre-qualified. “Each
company has to go
through a pre-qualification
process, after
which the lowest bid usually wins the project.
That’s what C.A.T. has done to get mechanical works with Aramco,” says
Bassem Bou Chahine, vice president of
Albinali, a Saudi contracting firm that does
work for Aramco and Sabic and has a
turnover of more than $100 million.

In the pipeline/mechanical division,
which accounted for two-thirds of C.A.T.’s
business in 1999, turnover generated in
Saudi Arabia sprang from $3.3 million in
1995 to $44.5 million last year. That represents
55% of total turnover. Last year C.A.T. won a plant modernization project
with Aramco for $14 million. In the past two
years C.A.T. was awarded two projects
with ADCO, an oil producer in Abu Dhabi:
a $13 million contract to construct 48″
loading rings and a $38 million contract to
build water supply systems. It also landed
the Khuff Gas Project in the Hawiyah and
Hardh areas for about $500 million last
year, again from Aramco. “C.A.T. has
always been the leading contractor when it
comes to constructing pipelines,” says
Youssef Chammas, CEO of Target and
Jima, a contracting firm based in Dubai.
Chammas was general manager of CCC’s
Oman branch for over 20 years in the
1970s and 1980s and remembers when
C.A.T. was big.

Nigeria is a big playground for civil construction
work, but C.A.T. doesn’t have
the run of the place. There it comes up
against the likes of Stemco, a construction
firm with a yearly turnover of over $50
million. The value of projects for most
road and bridge works in Nigeria varies
between $20 million and $50 million,
according to Luke Okoihue, Stemco’s project
manager. And C.A.T. is better equipping
itself to face the competition. “Recently
we have opened some very substantial
credit facilities for projects in Nigeria,”
says Habeishi. “And we’re in the process of
spending around $30 million on equipment
for Nigeria alone.” Turnover in Nigeria
more than doubled from $9.5 million in
1995 to $19.3 million last year, representing
24% of total business. The civil division
as a whole generates 34% of C.A.T.’s business. It built the Sokoto-Goronyo Damsite
road, a contract worth nearly $30 million
in 1999. “C.A.T. has been a big name in
Nigeria for a long time and still is, but
today there are a lot of companies, especially in
Lagos, performing the same kind of work,”
says Okoihue.

At home, C.A.T.’s turnover rose from
$500,000 to $6.5 million – a contribution of
just 8% to total turnover. The firm has completed its part of the St. Georges Hotel
Complex, a project it was awarded in 1998
for $35 million. It has also finished 25% of
the work on the An Nahar building, a contract
worth $10 million, awarded in 1999.
But here’s the surprise: C.A.T. doesn’t do
construction work here. In fact it avoids contracting
in Lebanon altogether, preferring to
go into project management, a field that is
still not common in the country. A project manager takes on the responsibility of ensuring that a
project is properly executed on time and on
budget, hiring other contractors and engineers
to actually do the work. Should the
price exceed the guaranteed maximum or go
over schedule, C.A.T. is willing to pay a
penalty. Should it come under the maximum,
the savings are shared with the
owner. The Leisure Hill Hotel project, currently
under construction in Dbaye, is
being managed by Soludec Liban, an international
company. “Of course, the client is
informed of our decisions, but we control all
aspects of the project,” says Desire
Nicolai, Soludec’s general manager, who
agrees that project management is a novel
concept in Lebanon.

One example of C.A.T.’s project management
is the modern Lebanese Order of
Physicians Headquarters; ERGA was contracted
to do the architectural work and
Ashada for the concrete construction.
Phase one of the $14 million project is slated
for completion by February 2001. “It’s a
great idea and sure to be popular with project
owners, who have the risk completely
removed from their shoulders,” says
Souheil Abou-Habib, general manager of
Ets Nassim A. Habib, a local contracting
firm. But it might not be so popular with the
contractors: They won’t be able to underbid
to get a job, because it will be more difficult
to reduce costs by using less material.

While project management has allowed
C.A.T. to avoid costly investments in a
stagnant market, it eventually plans to do
construction work in Lebanon. “But only
after the sector picks up and it becomes worthwhile to invest locally,” says
Habeishi, who was initially intending to
do construction work in Lebanon.
Nonetheless Habeishi felt it was important
for a company to work in its home country.
But it was a painful and costly learning
experience. “We had a bunch of guys here
who knew how to build highways in
Amman and buildings in Saudi Arabia, but
they had no earthly idea what was going on
around them,” he says. At the outset C.A.T.
would bid about three times more than the
winning bid on tenders. “We had no idea
about pricing,” says Habeishi. “We didn’t
know the people, and nobody knew us.” So
he sent his staff into the field to learn the
local market. Eventually C.A.T.’s bids
became competitive, and Habeishi’s team
caught on to the aggressive underbidding tactics employed on the Lebanese market.
“Contractors bid below cost in order to get
the job,” says Abou-Habib. “Then they try
to reduce the materials used so they can
come within budget.”

C.A.T. has spent the last three years getting
ready to pounce on the market.
Habeishi believes the company is now
ready to regain its position as one of the
region’s major contractors. In the past few
years, C.A.T.’s biggest project was worth
$50 million, but now Habeishi and crew are
bidding on those in the $100 million to
$200 million range – sometimes as high as
$400 million. “It won’t be easy,” says
Chammas, “all the small companies that
existed in C.A.T.’s early days have grown
to become large contractors. They will face
a lot of competition.” One such foe is
Saudi Arabia’s Ali H. Al-Ghamdi
Est., which has a yearly turnover of
$72 million to $80 million performing
pipeline construction for
Aramco. “C.A.T. is a big name in
this area, but they’re mostly
involved in contracts for testing,
commissioning and maintaining
pipelines for Aramco,” says C.
Sundhyr, the firm’s project manager.
Estimates by some companies
in Saudi Arabia forecast an
increase of 70% from 1999 to 2001 for the pipeline business and the expected construction boom, but CCC is in a much better position to reap the
rewards. CCC employs some 36,000 people
and has a planned turnover of about $1.5 billion
for 2000, 8% of which is in the
pipeline sector. It will be difficult for
C.A.T. to muscle in on CCC’s turf. The
majority of CCC’s work is in the Arab
world and Africa, including new projects for
the Kuwait Oil Company, the Oman Gas
Company and the Abu Dhabi Gas
Company.

C.A.T.’s CEO is cautious about the pace of
growth that the company should expect.
“Today we would be comfortable going
after a project worth maybe as much as
$400 million, especially over a two, three-
year period,” says Habeishi. “I wouldn’t
fool myself that we can go after one worth
$1 billion.” That would stretch our management
and capabilities too far and require
a far greater investment than the company is
ready to make. C.A.T. would be content
with a yearly growth of 25% once it reaches
the $150 million to $200 million mark.

For Habeishi, turnover is not necessarily
a true indicator of size. “To a pure contractor,
it would be the value of the work done,
but to an EPC contractor, who is responsible
for the engineering, procurement and
construction, you also have the value of the
equipment you buy,” he says. If a contractor
builds a plant with $500 million worth
of machinery, turnover becomes misleading.
He especially believes growth through
acquisitions in this business doesn’t work.

Today C.A.T.’s name is still much bigger
than its actual size, but it has made solid
progress. After 15 years of being out of the picture,
the company is trying to build itself
back up to proportions that live up to its
name. The C.A.T. team has more than tripled
business since 1996, re-established a reputation
as potent contractors that produce quality
work, while project management further
refines its skills as a contractor. “They have
every chance of making it back to their initial
position in the market,” says Youssef, a
notion shared by many in the field. They may
just end up proving that old adage about cats
having nine lives. The company has been
reborn into its second one but seems bent on not needing any of its remaining seven.

May 1, 2000 0 comments
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Staying alive

by Tania Avoukdjian May 1, 2000
written by Tania Avoukdjian

Remember a few months ago?
You’re in the shower when the
power fails (courtesy of the Israeli
air force) and you have to dash for the generator
with a towel wrapped around you.
Generator sales must have boomed, right?
Wrong, actually.

In fact many of those in the generator
business are complaining that these are
their darkest days. The majority of those
who require a generator bought one in the
early 1990s, when wallets were thicker and
power cuts more frequent. With the country
already saturated with generators, the air
strikes barely registered on the market. And
with construction at a standstill, sales
of generators have decreased from $40 million
in 1997 to $23 million in 1999 – a
43% decrease. At the same time, imports
have decreased from $35 million in 1997 to
just $20 million in 1999. Everyone is feeling
the pinch.

M. Ezzat Jallad, the exclusive agent for
Caterpillar in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan,
saw local sales of generators decline from $5
million in 1998 to $4.28 million last year.
Sales for Saccal Power Engineering
decreased from $3.45 million to $2.33 million,
a drop of over 32% (see “Trying to
buck the downtrend,” December 1999).

Jubaili Bros., the number one retail seller
of generators in Lebanon with just over
$20 million in global revenues last year, is
also suffering. Local sales, 70% of which are
from generator sets, have tumbled by 60%
since 1995, from $15 million to about $6 million last year. Time to pack up and call
the bankruptcy lawyer? No way.

Surprisingly, overall revenues actually
increased during that period, from $18 million
to $20.2 million in 1999.

How did they do it? With the domestic
economy stagnant, the company has been
boosting its exports. “Unlike the local market,
there is much more room to grow
abroad,” says Maher Jubaili, the firm’s
director. Jubaili started shipping generators,
most directly from the FG Wilson factory
in the UK, to Nigeria and the UAE in
1996. Both countries have an erratic supply
of electricity. Today these two markets represent
about 70% of the company’s revenue.

In Nigeria alone. Jubaili currently
controls 15% of the retail and wholesale
markets for generators. It was the first
Lebanese company to enter this untapped
market. Ghaddar Machinery, a competing
retailer of generators, arrived on the scene
more recently. But unlike Ghaddar, which
works through a local agent. Jubaili markets
and sells its generators directly there. This
gives the company an edge, says Jubaili.

The firm has entered other African countries           
as well. In 1998, Jubaili spotted an
opening in Ghana, where there were only two
hours of power a day. In that year, the company
sold $2 million worth of generators in
the Ghanaian market, pushing Jubaili’s overall revenues up to $22 million. Most of
the exports were shipped directly from the
UK, but $800,000 worth were sent from
Jubaili’s Tripoli outlet, increasing the
branch’s sales from $900,000 in 1997 to
$1.7 million in 1998. But in 1999, Ghana’s
power problem was solved and sales to
that market stopped, leading to a slight
decrease in revenues last year.

Jubaili is now eyeing the Iraqi market,
another country suffering from power shortages.
But here, the company is a bit of a latecomer.
Ghaddar recently signed his third
contract in Iraq, a deal involving the sale of
250 60KVA generators for about $2 million.
Sacca!, which deals only in wholesale,
sent $4 million worth of generators there in
1999, and the latest deal was a $732,000 contract
with the Iraqi ministry of agriculture.

Despite Ghaddar’s success, Maher Saccal,
CEO of Sacca!, feels that Iraq is not a market
for retailers. “Iraq deals with public tenders
and you need to have the skills and the
know-how to succeed,” he says.

Although Jubaili has been focusing largely
on foreign markets, the firm hasn’t given
up hope that local business will improve**;** if
not now, then maybe in the long run. This has
prompted a diversification of its products in
an attempt to stimulate domestic sales. So
far, results have been mixed.

Jubaili is making a decent income from
renting out electricity. The company
recently landed some big projects, including
a $500,000 contract to provide
Bouygues, a French company in Solidere,
with 2,700 KVA of electricity for 20
months. Other successes include contracts
to provide Mannesmann in Abu Dhabi
with 2,500 KVA, and a Darwish Group
company in Qatar with 1,500 KVA.

Soundproof canopies, which Jubaili
assembles at its Sidon plant, have also
been selling briskly, accounting for
$540,000, or 9%, of local revenue in 1999.
“This is very profitable for us,” says
Jubaili, “because these days very few people
buy generators without canopies.” For
each locally assembled $5,400 27KVA
generator, Jubaili sells a $1,500 canopy.

But many new products have not paid off.
After Jallad’s sales of heavy construction
equipment declined from $7 million in
1998 to $600,000 last year, Jubaili started
selling light construction equipment. But, as
a result of the government’s budgetary policy,
construction never picked up. Jubaili
also tried selling air conditioning units, but
the added revenues were minor. “With so
many competitors in the field and too
many credit facilities, it hasn’t been a success,”
says Jubaili. The company also
earns money from after-sales services,
charging $35 for a routine checkup.
“Although 24-hour after-sales generates a
certain revenue, it barely covers our
employees’ salaries,” he says. Both Sacca!
and Ghaddar concur. With the market
depressed, profit margins are low for those
in the generator business. “We should have
a 10% profit margin,” says Ghaddar, “but it
is much less than this, even though we
have different products and services.”

As if all this wasn’t enough, the company
may soon face a challenge to its exclusive
agency rights for FG Wilson generators.
Caterpillar recently purchased FG Wilson
and Jallad is now selling the same generators
as Jubaili but under the name
Olympian. But Jubaili is not worried that the
two sides will come to blows.

“Caterpillar’s sales focus on a range of
higher-end generators,” he says.

The company has had disputes with
other competitors. Not long ago, Jubaili
began importing Perkins engines, manufactured
by FG Wilson, and assembling
them here. That prompted Ghaddar, who is
the local distributor for Perkins products, to
take Jubaili to court. “We have a right to a
percentage from the sales coming from
Perkins,” says Ghaddar. After an acrimonious
dispute, the two sides came to an
agreement. Jubaili was given full rights to
continue importing Perkins engines, as
long as they were assembled locally and
sold under a different name.

These problems have been a headache for
Jubaili, but they are minor compared to the
slowdown in the economy. Jubaili has
stayed afloat by focusing on markets
abroad, but exports will probably just keep
the company alive. If revenues are really to
grow, a turnaround is needed in the domestic
market. By leaving no stone unturned
locally, Jubaili has played his cards right.
When business in Lebanon hits an
upswing, he will be prepared.

May 1, 2000 0 comments
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Bent out of shape

by Hadi khatib May 1, 2000
written by Hadi khatib

Last year was tough for Sidem. Having long dominated the market for aluminum profiles, the company barely managed to break even. “We have reached a critical stage,” says Andre Kurdy, commercial manager at Sidem. That follows half a century of turning profits, leaving management perplexed as to how to turn its fortunes around. “In our industry, Sidem is a trademark,” says Rafik Azrak, CEO of Folda, which manufactures and supplies aluminum-based products and had a turnover of $8.4 million in 1999. “They’ve enjoyed a monopoly for so long. They didn’t feel the day-to-day competition and may have inherited a heavy structure.”

Sidem, an extruder of aluminum profiles (extrusion involves pushing aluminum cylinders through pre-shaped molds to create architectural profiles of different shapes and sizes) used in the manufacturing of doors, windows and curtain walls, dictated prices until 1995. But cheaper imports, the arrival of local competitors and reduced tariffs with Arab countries combined to push prices into a further decline, a trend that had already begun in 1990. Having operations at full capacity, high exports and about $55 million in annual sales have not been enough to secure profits.

The local demand today is an estimated 12-14,000 tons. Already that’s not enough to absorb Sidem’s production of 16,000 tons. In fact, local sales dropped from 10,200 tons in 1995 to 8,500 in 1999. Now the two newcomers, Aluxal and Alutex, are competing for a chunk of the market. Having started production in 1994, Aluxal churns out some 4,000 tons a year. It sells to the retail market, which also accounts for 75% of Sidem’s sales.

The local market is further crowded by some 2500 tons of imported aluminum profiles, largely from Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Greece. That figure could have been much higher, had Sidem not systematically reduced prices to keep imports at bay. The company was protected by 20% customs duties on imports from Arab countries three years ago. However, the Arab free trade agreement has brought the tariff down to 14%, to be followed by a drop to about 12% next year, while the bilateral agreement with Syria has cut the duty to 10%.

With the Lebanese market so competitive, Sidem has increased sales abroad, sending half of its production to Europe. But exports are not a money-maker. “The purpose of exports is to keep our factory working at full capacity, which reduces our cost per unit, creating an indirect saving rather than profits on the product itself,” says Kurdy.

The main factor for the decrease in local sales is the stagnant real estate market, bloated with 7000 empty units and a 60% drop in construction permits. Folda, which bought an average of 545 tons a year before 1999, says its purchases have dropped significantly.

As a result prices have been slashed from $4,000 to about $3200 per ton in the local market today. Imports cost $2600 per ton, but many local clients say they still prefer to deal with Sidem because of its proximity to the market, its reliable quality and service. Many imports are below standard specifications. The downturn is difficult to swallow for a company that was the region’s first to specialize in aluminum extrusion, even if it is still the dominant player on the market.

Sidem began in the early 1950s with rolling mills producing aluminum sheets. In the early 1960s, it entered a joint-venture with Pechiney, the world’s second largest producer of aluminum, which purchased an 80% share. Also a manufacturer of extruded profiles, Pechiney sold its stake to the current Sidem shareholders in 1980 because of the war. Since then Sidem has remained fully Lebanese-owned and worked in aluminum extrusion. Believing the war was reaching an end and anticipating a construction boom, Sidem in 1982 embarked on a $10 million investment to double its capacity.

By 1986 the company found itself with three presses and production capacity of 16,000 tons and a country still at war. The short-lived solution was to send 60% of its production to the region. By the mid-80s, customs barriers were fully erected due to rapid regional factories, and the only alternative for Sidem was to go to Europe, a market of some 2 million tons yearly.

Though no longer partners with Pechiney, Sidem was able to take advantage of the earlier association to gain credibility. Additionally, Sidem won the right to manufacture Technal designs under license in 1980. France’s Technal is among the top five extruders of window profiles in the world. “It was our main entry break into Europe, because it means we’re producing under high specifications using the highest of technologies,” says Kurdy. Starting in Italy, the company expanded operations into France, Germany, Holland and the UK. Exports to Europe grew from 2000 tons in 1990 to about 7500 tons today, and Sidem stays competitive by investing $500,000 to $1.5 million yearly to upgrade machinery and install new technologies.

But how will Sidem manage to make money again if its local margins continue to be squeezed and exports aren’t profitable? Sidem cannot compete in the Arab world; energy and labor costs are half what they are here, and governments provide subsidies to encourage exports. Here the government is full of promises but rarely comes through. Additionally, other governments assist industries in recycling or disposing of their waste. There are no such solutions for Sidem.

Sidem, Folda and others have been asking the government to at least restrict the import of cheap products that don’t meet specifications, such as a 4mm thick window profile, which will bend easily in normal wind conditions. “This is not allowed anywhere in Europe or even as close as Syria, but anyone can import those into Lebanon,” says Azrak, adding that since aluminum is priced by weight, the thinner the product the lower the price.

If Sidem was thinking of expanding operations in preparation for the Arab free trade zone, it will find itself at a disadvantage to other factories. “We have a plan to move our operations from our 55,000m² area to a 200,000m² area, where we could increase capacity to 25,000 tons, but we don’t see the right conditions to proceed [with the $40 million investment],” says Kurdy. Sidem might be able to increase margins by streamlining operations and reducing its staff of 500. So far there are no indications that the company is contemplating that option. Sidem is feeling the heat. It will have to make some tough decisions soon if it’s not to go from a year of zero profits to one of losses.

May 1, 2000 0 comments
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Trading on a shoestring

by Hadi khatib May 1, 2000
written by Hadi khatib

No trucks, no warehouses, not even a single forklift. Just three rooms, two desks, one secretary and a couple of phones. Not much more can be found on the premises of Arab Traders. That’s bare bone facilities for a trading company that generated $6 million in revenues last year, but keeping business simple is one of the reasons for its success. Arab Traders deals primarily in supplies for the oil and gas sector as well as aluminum, steel and power generation units. Its revenues have shot up from just $200,000 in 1996, when the company was founded. How did it do it?

Arab Traders acts strictly as a middleman, placing orders only after closing a deal with a buyer. It avoids tying up its own funds in goods that might sit idle in a warehouse. Once both parties have signed a contract, Arab Traders opens a letter of credit, has the supplies shipped and pockets a commission. The company has built up a working partnership with over 30 suppliers worldwide, including companies in the US, UK and the Czech Republic. It actively markets their products in the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. “When we receive inquiries for equipment and we don’t have a supplier, we find one,” says Wissam El-Solh, general manager of Arab Traders. “We also search for new suppliers or manufacturers producing new technologies that will give us an edge.”

Arab Traders’ international reach is a big plus. The company is headquartered in Lebanon with branch offices in the UAE and Syria, but it’s not dependent on any particular country. Unlike traders who are captive to the ups and downs of the domestic market, Arab Traders will fill an order as far away as West Africa or Central Asia. It also has the advantage of being able to search worldwide for the most competitively priced suppliers, giving it an edge on tenders.

The supply of oil field equipment, including metal casings, plastic tubing and pipes, is Arab Traders’ main money-spinner, representing about 65% of total sales, or $4.2 million in 1999. Big markets include Syria, Dubai, Iran and a number of countries in North Africa. Recent oil price hikes have been particularly beneficial. “It was harder at first when oil prices were down. But with prices going up, the governments are more willing to spend money on new equipment and we are selling more,” says El-Solh. “Governments usually set a budget for projects, a certain amount for each barrel [of oil] sold,” says Fred Habeishi, chairman and CEO of C.A.T., a contracting company, which has laid down oil pipelines in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. “When prices go down, they reduce that budget, but when they rise, they tend to spend more.”

But the oil business is also very competitive. Whenever Arab Traders wants to participate in a tender, it has to pre-qualify; references have to be submitted and the company’s track record established. Being a relatively newcomer to the market, Arab Traders often has to resort to offering quotes at cost in order to get its foot in the door. In many countries, Arab Traders has developed a list of contacts that are familiar with the quirks and characteristics of the market and can assist companies in gaining access to the right people. “Just about every other family in the Gulf deals in oil field supplies,” says El-Solh. “It takes a lot of fancy footwork to get in.”

About 16% of Arab Traders’ business comes from local sales of aluminum, supplying wholesalers and workshops with mill-finished sheets, coils and circles. Abiding by its strategy of importing only on order, Arab Traders avoids selling retail altogether. In 1996, aluminum represented 100% of its revenue. By 1999, this segment of business had grown to about $1 million in sales. Even with the real-estate market in a slump, business has been steady. “There isn’t that much going on,” says Toufic Bawab, a dealer in aluminum profiles. “Business has become very stagnant, but the manufacturers have to keep making the frames and stocking up, because with their overheads, it would cost them more to stop operating altogether.”

Arab Traders has been able to counter this problem by concentrating on the import of mill-finished aluminum, which, many in the business claim, is in higher demand than other kinds of aluminum. “It’s a modern product, it’s practical, light and long lasting,” says Fady Khairallah, managing director of Edmond Khairallah Est., a firm whose activities include aluminum wall cladding, partitioning and false ceilings. “The market for the product is always going up,” says Habib Kehdi, technical coordinator for Alumco, a company specializing in aluminum and glass contracting. “Everybody is switching to the use of aluminum in place of other materials.”

Arab Traders has also been adding new products to its line, among them pre-fabricated parts made of aluminum that are used to set up storage facilities and other light structures. “We do look for new products and try to stay ahead, but we don’t want to be a jack-of-all trades,” claims El-Solh.

But there is a downside to the firm’s methods. Though importing back-to-back avoids many of the risks that accompany the stocking of goods, safety has its price. “The margin is about 3% to 4%,” says El-Solh. “If we were to buy the goods ourselves, the margin would jump up to 25% or 30%.” The problem with doing that, says El-Solh, is that the demand for products is neither large enough nor regular enough to make such a commitment worthwhile. If Arab Traders were to have to sit on stock until it were sold, the loss in interest would be considerable.\

The company is also encountering barriers to its growth. “Although we’re selling over $4 million in oil field supplies, we don’t expect to sell much more because the markets tend to get saturated with competitors,” says El-Solh. To counter this trend, Arab Traders has been breaking new ground in the Caucasus and Central Asia of the former Soviet Union. “They will start drilling eventually,” says El-Solh. “We want to be one of the first there when they do.” Another possible new frontier for Arab Traders is Libya. “With the lifting of the embargo, it’s becoming a booming market,” says El-Solh. Are his expectations justified? Habeishi seems to think so. “We are looking for projects in some of these newly emerging countries,” he says. But new markets pose risks. “We faced a lot of problems in Iran,” says El-Solh. “After we opened letters of credit and shipped the goods, they took so long to pay us that we had to sell the LCs off at a discount just to get our money back.”

Increasing revenues from $200,000 to $6 million in four years with nothing but the bare necessities is certainly an accomplishment. But a company can only grow so big when operating on a shoestring. Further expansion may mean taking the giant leap from being a mere middleman to becoming the seller itself. And that would mean taking on new risks. Maybe Arab Traders should be shopping for a warehouse and a couple of forklifts.

May 1, 2000 0 comments
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Bullet proof bank

by Gareth Smith March 24, 2000
written by Gareth Smith

Even in the occupied zone, people still needed banks. With
its two branches, in Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil, Fransabank
enjoyed a monopoly among 100,000 people. With the
Israelis gone, the bank is in pole position to beat off rivals if stability
returns and the local economy recovers. “They were daring,”
says Nassib Ghobril, an analyst at Lebanon Invest, “and others are
now thinking of following them.”

Thinking, but not acting — at least yet. Lebanese banks are
unlikely to stampede south immediately.

“I don’t think any of the other
banks have applied to work in the
zone,” says Sarni Sfeir, press
spokesman for the Central Bank. “We
will be monitoring the situation.”

Uncertainty persists in the South,
especially with the Shebaa Farms
issue not yet resolved. This leaves
Fransabank sitting pretty. In the
short term, customers require a safe
port and, in due course, Fransabank
will have a firm base.

But think of the worst scenario:
what if someone blows up the bank?
No worries, says Ibrahim Qoleilat,
Fransabank’s deputy general manager:
“The branches in the South hold a
minimum of paper money. What’s
there? Only furniture and PCs.”

And
customers have seen it all before, says
Habib Rohayam, manager of the Bint
Jbeil branch: “People are not unduly worried.
They remember that when the
bank closed in 1978, they could still
withdraw their money from Beirut.”

Back then, the area — known not
so affectionately as Fatahland — slipped into disorder. But gradually
a strange kind of order returned, albeit under Israeli occupation.

“The people who had relocated from the South were
always asking us to go back,” says Qoleilat, “and eventually we felt
the time was right.”

The branches in Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun reopened in 1993,
around the time that the Lebanese ministries increased their presence
in the zone. But Fransabank never closed its branch in
Jezzine, which remained an unofficial part of the zone until last
summer.

In Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun, the bank found a promising
market, as trade with Israel was booming and more than 3,000 local
inhabitants were earning good wages south of the border. The Bint
Jbeil branch has 10,000 customers, which is nearly double the national
banking average of 5,500. The Marjayoun branch is
prominently situated at the entrance to the town.

Until the pullout,
a statue of Saad Haddad stood in front of the bank. (It has subsequently
been destroyed.)

“We are serving the whole region,” says
Qoleilat. “Where someone needs a banking service, we provide it.”

In practice, the services offered by the bank are less comprehensive
than elsewhere in the country. Neither branch, for example, has
an ATM. Personal loans have been “limited,” says Rohayam,
adding that it’s not due to difficulties
in assessing or collecting collateral.

Quite how the bank managed during
the years of the occupation, understandably,
is a sensitive matter. But it
has coped successfully with the
anomalies produced by 22 years of
Israeli control.

Think only of the legal
situation: the darak (police) and the South
Lebanon Army (SLA) both had “law
and order” roles; the Israeli-sponsored
civil administration worked alongside
the Lebanese government ministries.
Court decisions were left pending
until the end of the occupation.

How easy was it to deal with default in
such a peculiar legal situation? “The
bank had its own law,” says one
employee. “This could be either the
darak or the SLA.”

Rohayam declined
to elaborate on his policy for bad debts.
“I would protect myself,” he says. “I
don’t know anything else.”

It’s easy to see why Rohayam is
upbeat, at least for now. In the short
term, the cash flows into Fransabank because residents of the now
unoccupied zone save for a rainy day. The local economy went into a downturn
as soon as the Israeli government confirmed its withdrawal.

But there’s an optimistic scenario for the former occupied zone,
at least beyond the short term. A fair proportion of the 100,000 people
who have left the zone during the occupation will want to go
home, and many of them will want to bank.

Front-runners to join Fransabank are probably Al-Mawarid
and Beirut Riyad Bank, which are owned by two natives of
Hasbaiya, Marwan Kheiredin and Anwar Khalil, respectively.

“These banks will know the situation on the ground better than the
bigger, more aggressively marketed retail banks like Audi or
Byblos,” says Ghobril, who is from Hasbaiya. “Local people will
feel more comfortable with them.”

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Paridora’s mailbox

by Kirsten Vance March 24, 2000
written by Kirsten Vance

While some point the finger at the Canadian-run consortium,
which took charge in October 1998, Fakhoury, like
most, does not. The contract stipulates that all MPT
employees should be able to join LibanPost, based on an assessment
of skills. Some did choose not to transfer. But employees insist that
this was due to the lack of regulation to protect them once transferred,
that the selection process favored youth, and that political pressures
played a role in appointments. (Issam Naaman, the minister responsible,
declined repeated requests for an interview.)

“What is the future
of those who are taken by LibanPost when the contract ends?” asks
Boutros Harb, a lawyer and member of parliament. “Nothing was
stipulated, nothing at all; and I think the government was irresponsible
in this case.”

Part of the problem was trying to get the accord of the Civil Service
Board to allow MPT employees out ‘on loan’ to LibanPost.

“But this is an internal government matter,” says Nassib Husseini,
chairman of LibanPost. “The priority has always been for MPT
employees. But would you, as a customer or citizen, expect us to wait
another five years to settle this issue?”

Further, there were some
205 ‘untouchables’ that the minister retained to form a regulatory
body, and many of these are the most qualified. Almost 400 didn’t
make it through the selection process, says Husseini.

“We did
put on the table a firm 250 written job offers, and 71 of them accepted,”
he says. The current LibanPost staff totals 450.

But with the employee issue brewing, LibanPost could soon find
itself the receiver of an MPT special delivery: the matter may be headed
to the Council of Ministers.

“LibanPost will have to agree to modify
the contract,” says an MPT official.

Having a regulatory framework
in place, he argues, might sidestep the employee imbroglio and
other problems.

At the same time, MP Georges Kassarcji wants to have
the 12-year build-operate-transfer contract brought back to parliament:

“As soon as we finish with the cellular issue, I want the LibanPost file
put back on the table.”

The debate centers on the constitutionality of the contract. Harb
insists the contract contravenes Article 89 of the Constitution,
while others point to Article One of Decree 126 (see box), which governs
the former Directorate of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph.

An
independent lawyer consulted on the matter said that the decree only
touches on distribution, not running the entire concession, and
that the Constitution takes precedence.

This is not the first time such a debate has erupted. It’s an issue
that just doesn’t seem to die for LibanPost — one that threatens to
be continually questioned by MPs or with each new government
that comes into power.

“Whatever the decision of the government,
we will respect it. But we feel we have a solid contract; so if it is
challenged, there’s compensation linked to that,” says Husseini.

“Our
objective is not to kill the guardian of the vineyard; our objective
is to eat the fruits, which is a project that is good for both parties.”

There’s also the matter of the international couriers (see “Down and
Out in Beirut,” January 2000). The amendments to the contract gave
LibanPost the right to collect, as part of its revenues, what is essentially
a tax on private courier companies.

When the tax was
increased last June from $6 per kilo on inbound documents only to
$12 per kilo on both inbound and outbound,
the couriers cried foul and have
refused to pay. The outstanding tax bill
will reach about $9 million by June.

According to the MPT official, this part
of the contract will also have to be amended.

“I hope that it’s changed too. Why?
Because I am looking for a healthy
environment,” says Husseini. “I think
we share that goal with both the government
and the courier industry.”

If the MPT employees and others
have complaints, it hasn’t been smooth
sailing for LibanPost either. Husseini’s
worry? That LibanPost is working with
a fixed revenue-sharing formula and a
fixed tariff scale, as well as delivering in
villages at a loss.

“How can we compete
with someone who works without a
license and charges local tariffs that are
lower than the government’s?”

The company also suffers from the same bureaucracy that inflicts
most businesses. One problem, which has
slowed down the process of renovating post offices, has
been getting permits. It’s no secret that the municipality
isn’t exactly quick on its feet in that arena.

Some offices
have yet to be passed from MPT control to LibanPost. Bureaucracy
has also impeded the launching of new products. And red tape at
customs undoubtedly makes Lebanese hesitant to send or receive
more than letters internationally.

On the upside, items up to LL 1–2 million in value should be delivered
without going through customs very soon.

Nonetheless, LibanPost is reassessing its expectations of breaking
even by year three. Husseini declined to reveal how much the company
is losing, saying only that this is a time of investment.

While the
volume of mail more than doubled in the last year, it’s still low compared
to levels in the West.

“Unfortunately, the win-win conditions we
were hoping for didn’t materialize, and we are at a turning point,” he
says. “We should make a decision on whether the conditions are now
there to invest more.”

LibanPost has invested
$20 million so far and is committed to
investing at least $50 million over the life
of the project.

While some say the
Canadian team has threatened to leave,
Husseini refutes that claim. The coordination
committee hasn’t met in over a
year and a half — that’s a pretty clear indication
of how poor relations are between
LibanPost and the MPT.

LibanPost is two-thirds owned by Canada
Post Systems Management together with
Profac, a joint venture between Canadian
firms Bracknell and SNC-Lavalin.

The
remaining third is held by Qantara
Holdings, a Lebanese company that
Husseini set up for the project.

“We’ve
done the best we can given the conditions,”
says Husseini. There is still room for
improvement, however (see box).

So are the Canadians
worried by the cellular war?

“What we care for is to be assured
that a written contract is respected
and that arbitration clauses are respected,”
says Husseini.

March 24, 2000 0 comments
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Editorial

Cold comfort for change

by Executive Editors March 24, 2000
written by Executive Editors

It is time to celebrate. After 22 years of occupation in South
Lebanon, Israel pulled out quickly and quietly, leaving the
country with a sense of relief and a brighter picture for the future.
But it is also a time to worry. Solidere, Lebanon’s biggest company,
is reeling under the harsh economic conditions and political
uncertainties in the region. If that isn’t enough, the company is
wrestling with the government over permits.

The cabinet has approved the long-awaited privatization bill. A sell-off
of state-run assets could cut the debt by 30%, but it’s unclear how
privatization will be handled, or if it actually happens.

The country’s two cellular telephone operators, LibanCell and
Cellis, have their own reasons for worry. The government, claiming
the companies have breached their contracts, has ordered each
to pay a $300 million penalty or risk having their contracts canceled.

LibanPost, which began pumping new life into the country’s faltering
postal system over a year and a half ago, is also facing a barrage
of difficulties.

This month’s cover story examines the effects of the Israeli withdrawal
on the economy. Peace and stability following the pullout
could bring untold benefits. But if there is violence, the results could
be devastating.

All around, there are uncertainties in Lebanon, and uncertainty is
the enemy of economic development. Some matters, like what will
happen following the Israeli pullout, we have little control over. But
for others, like the cellular contracts, LibanPost, and Solidere, we
do. By hassling companies that are investing in rebuilding the country
and its economy, we are telling future investors that Lebanon
is not a safe place for business. Haven’t the Israelis done enough
of that already?

March 24, 2000 0 comments
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Executive Living

Sailing without wind

by Executive Contributor March 22, 2000
written by Executive Contributor

Centuries ago, Phoenicians set sail from these shores
for destinations as far away as the Atlantic coast of
Africa or even, some speculate, America. Today,
despite formidable obstacles, a small group of Lebanese
sailors are struggling to keep this sea-faring tradition alive.

Just four years ago, the Lebanese Yachting Federation was
reestablished after a long absence during the war. Its first
mission was to select athletes to represent Lebanon at the Pan
Arab Games, held in Lebanon in 1997. With a $50,000 grant
secured from the ministry of youth and sports, the federation
was able to buy 12 laserboats and 12 international class
mistrals (sailboards).

The Lebanese team’s performance was hardly noteworthy,
but the event marked the rebirth of competitive sailing in
Lebanon. Today, a small but proud group of passionate enthusiasts
is taking to the water in search of that elusive feeling of
freedom that can only be found on the sea.

“You must always have a strategy and expect the unexpected,”
says Eddy Nehme of Laser sailing. “You have to use your
head and angle the boat to get the most from the wind and the
water. It’s fun – the sensation of contact with water and wind.”

Besides selecting teams to compete in international competitions,
the federation organizes a regular program of about
12 regattas every year. But in its drive to advance the sport, the
federation has encountered a number of obstacles.

The federation only owns the boats it purchased for the Pan
Arab Games and one Optimist boat, donated by the Kuwaiti
sailing team. Since the federation’s boats are strictly reserved for competitions, sailors must rely on sailing
clubs to provide them with boats they need for
training. But there is only a limited number of
clubs in Lebanon and most do not have sufficient
funds to buy new boats, which cost
from $2,000 for a Mistral up to $5,000 for a
Laser. This means that only a limited number
of people can participate in the sport. “We
need new clubs,” says Joe Salame, a sailing
buff and owner of Windriders, the exclusive
distributor of Dart and Laser boats.

But huge barriers faced Salame when he
tried to set up a club. First he had to sign an
official contract with the owner of a beach
property. But the properties had to be legally
owned, which is rarely the case in
Lebanon. At the same time, the law prevents
the legitimate owners of beach properties
from subletting. “If they give a concession,
they will lose theirs,” says Salame.

The more popular clubs are private and usually
charge steep annual membership or entry
fees. “We need affordable access to the sea, so
that people can learn to sail,” says Salame.

At the same time, a lack of funds and little
sponsorship means that members of the federation
must donate money in order to keep
activities going.

“The annual budget should be $100,000 to
have a proper and professional federation,”
says Nehme. The actual budget is between
$5,000 and $10,000.

With such modest financing, there’s little
hope of finding a Lebanese sailing team at the
Olympics anytime soon.

There is some local talent around, but no
funds to nurture it. “We don’t have the budget
to qualify for the Olympics,” says Nehme,
adding that it would cost between $20,000 to
$25,000 annually to prepare just one athlete
for the Olympics

March 22, 2000 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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