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CorruptionExecutive Roundtables

Corruption looms over all aspects of Lebanese life

by Nabila Rahhal & Sarah Shaar December 23, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal & Sarah Shaar

Executive has long recognized the importance of fighting corruption as an essential step toward creating a strong economy for Lebanon. Both previous versions of Executive’s Economic Roadmap (version 1.0 published in December 2018 and 2.0 published in February 2019) had sections dedicated to combating corruption, as does the reshaped Economic Roadmap 3.0 that has been updated to reflect the reality of Lebanon in the last quarter of 2019, aided by the findings of Executive’s roundtable initiative. 

The first of six roundtables held in mid-November, roundtable one on combating corruption was chosen as the opener on November 18, given its urgency in the context of the ongoing protests and the demands on the streets. Yet, over the course of all six roundtables—on corruption, on entrepreneurship, on social development, on access to rights and information, on taxation and fiscal policy, and on financial reality—corruption was a topic that participants repeatedly cited as one of the major roadblocks in the way of long overdue and necessary reforms. 

Participants were almost unanimous in their view that Lebanon needed to fight corruption—at any cost.

The discussion brief provided in advance to participants of the corruption roundtable invited them to discuss legal initiatives to retrieve embezzled funds, the enhancement of penal codes, and the adoption of laws for prosecuting incidents of corruption. Other discussion points mentioned in the brief included the establishment of institutions to combat corruption and audit public spending, awareness and education on public service paradigms and appreciation for effective administration, and finally a redesigning of services and digital access to government. 

Changing systems not symptoms

To start the discussion, participants were asked whether institutional prevention, prosecution, or education and awareness building were the best tool in combating corruption, and which of the three were seen as a priority.

Almost all agreed the main issue lay beyond the proposed question, and that before addressing prevention, prosecution, or awareness building, the first goal must be to change the political system in its entirety—along with its leadership. It was argued that corruption in Lebanon was so flagrant because the political class failed to consider the concept of the public good, and, as a result, the citizen was never a pillar in policy-making. The consensus was that the way forward in fighting corruption was to first create a new government, independent of all current ruling parties, which would, in turn, allow for an independent and empowered judiciary system that could hold politicians to account by allowing for the legislation and implementation of anti-corruption laws—as such, participants called for the passage of laws that would grant independence to the judiciary system, as well as an independent security force that would prevent and control the use of governmental scare tactics to stop prosecution against corruption. Access to information was also brought to the table as one of the main tools that would help with the fight against corruption, in particular when it came to attempts at prosecution.

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

Corruption was also seen as being a lubricant of what was termed “the political economy of sectarianism.” Under this paradigm, corruption was not the sole purview of Lebanon’s political elite as it was argued that it was in the best interest of the latter to allow corruption to trickle down—thereby reinforcing sectarian identities and moving the populace further from an ethos of accountability. 

Leadership in the fight against corruption 

The following discussion point was the question of whether or not the fight against corruption should be led by politicians or civil society members, and whether investing in e-government would benefit this fight. Most agreed on the need for leadership in the fight against corruption and that it should come from independent judicial bodies and through the establishment of anti-corruption laws. There was, however, some disagreement on whether leadership would come from above or below. A common thread among participants was that bottom-up approaches—such as the establishment of new political parties with a background in civil society and strengthening independent voices within syndicates and orders—were a necessary long term approach to combating corruption. In this vein, the victory of independent candidate Melhem Khalaf in the elections for the head of the Beirut Bar Association the day prior to this roundtable was seen by participants as the first milestone in a long battle against corruption. 

Others, however, believed that change would be imposed from the top down, and therefore, before new political parties or leadership, it was necessary to rehaul the system itself or risk replicating the same corrupt leaders. It was argued that Lebanon’s sectarian constitution needed to be changed to eliminate the idea that citizens need their sects for protection and to start building the idea of protection coming from the government and a strong independent state.

Regarding e-governance, several participants argued that we needed leaders who understood modern technology and were able to put in place a system that would help fight corruption through eliminating the middle-men in bureaucratic procedures—who often ask for bribes—and through making it easier to trace instances of tax avoidance. However, it was also warned that given the state of the internet in Lebanon, migrating official paperwork online would be a nightmare, and the priority would need to be in fixing the internet infrastructure before even thinking of putting time and effort into e-governance. 

The battle against corruption is a long one, and it should be led by the new generation who have proven through this uprising to have a clear understanding of what needs to be done. 

Participants were asked to consider the fact that a society that has corruption also incurs some economic benefits from it. Executive editors then asked for a simple yes/no response from around the table on two questions: whether they felt that the economic benefits of corruption in Lebanon would be bigger than the cost of fighting it, and regardless, whether Lebanon could afford to not fight corruption? While there were some attempts to address the first question—several participants, while acknowledging some economic benefits, argued that the cost of opportunities lost was still greater—most responses singled out the second question, with participants almost unanimous in their view that Lebanon needed to fight corruption—at any cost. One dissenting voice was against such a fight under certain circumstances, arguing that in the past, Lebanon has been able to thrive under the stewardship of moderately corrupt leaders. At this point, the moderator quoted South Korean development economist Hyun Chang, author of “Bad Samaritans,” who argued that certain elements of anti-corruption were actually promoted in order to keep developing economies from gaining an advantage—what German economist Frederich Lust termed kicking away the ladder after you have used it. This view was well-received by the table.

An environment for change 

The judiciary’s role in combating corruption was the focus of the general debate. Participants were split between the idea of working within the current system to change it versus the need to change the system altogether. One argument for the former was that honest lawyers could impact positive change despite a corrupt system. This was met with criticism by others who again raised the point that corruption needed to be weeded out from the system itself, and the first step toward that goal would be an independent judiciary. 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

The value of a bottom-up approach was again highlighted as the preferred mechanism of achieving an independent judiciary within a corrupt environment embedded in za’ims and sectarian party leaders, with participants calling for a series of small victories—such as Khalaf’s Beirut Bar Association win—within orders and syndicates that would lead to change, giving the example of professional orders in Tunisia as key to the success of the revolution there.  

The idea that there were two battles being waged—one against the sectarian system, but also one within the system itself—was also floated. Within each sect are people who are fighting against their political parties, but also those who want to keep the regime as is because they benefit from it economically. Participants concluded that the battle against corruption was a long one, and that it should be led by the new generation who have proven through this uprising to have a clear understanding of what needs to be done. 

The question of how long the protests could last given the current economy was asked by one of the participants, two scenarios were proposed: either the current government would take action before the country goes bankrupt—because it goes against their interests—or the economic situation would severely deteriorate further. The latter was argued to be good for the protests as it would tip the scale between an uprising of middle income to lower-middle income citizens to one with full participation of lower income citizens—a full-on revolution.

Throughout, the tone of the roundtable was one of grim determination to face the difficult task of weeding out corruption through changing the current system, yet hope for a better Lebanon was evident in all the participants’ answers. 

December 23, 2019 0 comments
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Economic roadmapThird draft

Economic Roadmap

by Executive Editors December 20, 2019
written by Executive Editors

This document—Economic Roadmap 3.0—is the most definitive Roadmap yet in Executive Magazine’s ongoing quest for providing a working platform for advancing the Lebanese economy. Building on a first version published in the December 2018/January 2019 issue of Executive, and a second version published with an additional 261 measures and three entirely new national priorities in February 2019, Executive presents this third iteration at the end of 2019 in the hope that its reflection of fourth-quarter developments will accelerate the discussions seen in Lebanon after October 17 and elevate the economic discussion to one that can generate a new and healthy productive economy. As was the pattern from the beginning, we took a participatory approach in deliberations of Economic Roadmap 3.0—this time by inviting both online recommendations and querying around 50 diverse and qualified individuals in a series of six roundtables conducted in November 2019 (See intro to roundtables). The stakeholders at these tables ranged from representatives of civil society and persons with personal commitment to Lebanon’s civil thawra (revolution), to economists, industrialists, entrepreneurs, and academics.

As in the two previous Roadmap iterations, there was little or no disagreement on the top priority for moving Lebanon to safe economic ground in the face of a financial liquidity and confidence crisis that erupted from September 2019 in parallel to the October protests. However, while many needs of the Lebanese economy had not been met since we published Roadmap 2.0, priorities were added especially in the Build and Reform pillar as well as in the Combat pillar, specifically in Combat Corruption. The Build and Reform pillar addresses agenda priorities in the areas of fiscal policy, capacity building, state institutions, judicial reform, and regulatory frameworks. Moreover, while the list of pillars and agenda priorities in Roadmap 3.0 is the same as in iteration 2.0, we note that the agenda items discussed at the November roundtables (agenda priorities 1-6, 8, 11-13, and 15-18) saw more additions, new emphases, and modifications than the other five agenda priorities, but want to emphasize that the shifting toward urgent issues and short-term economic survival priorities does not detract from the importance of the remaining components in the Economic Roadmap. The fundamental question over the best economic system for Lebanon is still open but one dichotomy, a line of deceptive argumentation used throughout past periods of governmental vacuums in Lebanon and into the period after the resignation of the Hariri government at the end of October, has been revealed as fake news. This is the argumentation from some political quarters that addressing the economy is more important than adhering to the will of the people, as well as the view of some economic protagonists that political health will follow upon a vigorous private sector performance. In truth, as the last months of 2019 have proven, Lebanon needs a government that implements the will of the people and an economy that serves them. Ultimately, Lebanon has to decide what kind of system it wants to implement and move forward collectively. While the country seeking to rebalance state and society in a cogent new system, Executive is committed to contribute to this vital search by continually striving for a definitive, collaborative, and passion-empowered Economic Roadmap.

December 20, 2019 0 comments
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AnalysisBusinessOverview

The madness of clowning around in an economic tornado

by Thomas Schellen December 20, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

Two months after a blundering collage of new budgetary revenue measures drove people into a unified and spontaneous civil uprising, the state of Lebanon remains an unresolved mess. Six weeks of attempts by the political regime to uphold and reorganize what the people perceived as a corrupt system only made the country’s social and economic predicaments more intractable. Failures of the process to determine a cabinet in the first week of December then further exacerbated questions if the stakeholders in the old regime have understood the popular will and demand for a new independence of Lebanon from its soiled political past and the seriousness of the country’s economic disaster and looming financial implosion.

From a banking and finance perspective, the dire monetary state of Lebanon in the final weeks of 2019 is neither the fruit of the populace’s political struggle for a redesign of the country’s electoral and representative paradigms nor the root cause of this struggle for a new system on the threshold of the symbol-heavy year 2020. Nor is the current monetary and economic mess the direct result of just another period during which the implementation of government has been stalled by a—as socially entrenched as societally lethal—mix of political selfishness, communal inertia, and national disunity.

What was triggered by another government attempt to tap into the people’s pockets—and specifically the sensitive communication expenditure pocket—was the eruption of society telling the state “enough” with a voice that could be neither overlooked nor silenced: the unified voice of the street. This voice coincided with a crisis of confidence—according to some views long overdue and to others premature—in the sole functioning pillar of economic strength, Lebanon’s monetary stability and banking resilience.

Total information loss

What could not be expected from this voice of civil thawra (revolution) in this highly combustible constellation of vanishing confidence and financial instability, however, and what did not come to bear, were concise answers on the concrete need to maintain economic life support for the large private and public consumption needs, equally gigantic dependence on financial inflows, and the comparatively small productive capacity existing in the national economy.

The offspring of this unintended union of civil revolution in politics and draining of liquidity and confidence in the economy appeared firstly as a total loss of actionable information in the financial system. From an observer’s perspective, this collective lack of transparency and early warning signals might have been attributable in part also to the behavior of stakeholders in the Lebanese financial system, who did not make determined efforts to regain the trust of private account holders on corporate, small-to-medium business, and household levels, as would have been wise, and instead acted behind smoke screens when seeking to rein in financial transactions.

One side-effect of the worrying monetary movements that set in during the year—which in hindsight appear to have become visible to system insiders from mid-2019 but remained largely camouflaged in communications between the banking sector and the public—is that it is impossible to draw any conclusions on the health of the banking sector’s performance in the second half of 2019 on the basis of the performance up to the middle of the year.

Neither a 1.3 percent contraction in domestic customer deposits in the first half of the year, nor the slowing asset growth trajectory of alpha banks (with deposits exceeding $2 billion each) to $263.6 billion by end-June 2019 provided data that at first glance would have supported immediate alarm in response to six-month results. Alpha bank assets were recorded as a 1.6 percent growth in consolidated assets (a 2.2 percent growth in domestic assets versus an exchange value deprecation-induced contraction of assets at overseas operations). A stagnation of domestic branch network developments and a headcount decrease of some 300 banking employees in Lebanon also provided no cause for crying out. The sharpest deterioration in bank activities, a 7.5 percent drop in domestic loans, could be taken as reason for another exasperated sigh over the state of the Lebanese economy rather than as a sign of new weakness in the banking sector.

Primary liquidity ratios of banks even increased significantly on paper, to almost 60 percent (an increase by 8.7 percentage points from a year ago) and the downturn of bank profits—an 8.1 percent contraction of domestic net profits in the first six months—should, if anything, have been comforting to critics alleging disproportionate banking sector profitability. In the sum of the data, while the sector numbers gave no reason for euphoria, there appeared to be no huge noticeable alarm signals, sharp digressions from historic banking performances in multi-year time series, nor data points of any predictive crash dimension for the first half of 2019.  

Arguably, this first-half performance only made it more difficult for many business and household clients of banks to prepare adequate and rational behavior in response to the altered behaviors by banks that came as a full surprise near the end of Q3 of 2019.

Left in the dark

Moreover, when the first wave of protests was triggered in mid-October and quickly escalated into the civil thawra that resulted in the government’s demise by the end of the month, there was little else than fear, instinctive self-interest, and very short action horizons for the bulk of banking customers to go by. Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh addressed the country on November 11 with assurances that there was no intention whatsoever of embarking on a capital control, haircut, or devaluation policy, saying as reported by the National News Agency that the protection of deposits and depositors is “a basic and final matter, and we have taken the necessary procedures so that there will be no losses borne by depositors.”

Meanwhile, banks took what they considered as decisions in their best interest, dispatching updates on withdrawal and transaction barriers via messages to their customers individually and often on ultra-short notice. But in any larger sense, thawra was a non-event as far as communication by the systemically most important pillar of the private sector. Even in the beginning of December, the home pages of alpha banks contained next to no comments on the national societal situation or, as far as the deteriorating economy, either systemic financial assessments or personal advice on how to behave rationally as a customer in times of national economic crisis.   

This left the field wide open to all the legitimate concerns voiced by economic experts (but also some almost pejoratively imprecise or premature labeling of the role of banking and finance in the crisis with negative to criminal connotations), erratic exchange rate signals from the private currency market, viral anti-banking rumors and accusations as part of the thawra expressions of systemic disapproval with the ruling status quo and the exploitative cliques of corruption, and even what looked to some like orchestrated attempts to further destabilize the country through attacks against the central bank and banking sector at large. 

In published economic evaluations and discussions—such as the Executive Roundtable series that took place November 18 – 21—credible views on the scope of liquidity problems, on the extreme danger to the banking system, or even a practical “bankruptcy” on central bank level were debated. Scenarios of recovery and rescue were juxtaposed with scenarios of extended bleakness for the banking system and the economy at large.

Opaque or invisible

Some impacts on the financial fabric of the worrying liquidity and currency situation were visible by the example of the insurance market in Lebanon. A few weeks into the economic and currency dilemma, international insurance ratings agency AM Best published a snapshot report on the situation of Lebanese insurers in November 2019, in which the agency noted that amidst an accelerating decline in investor confidence and US dollar cash-flow constraints, Lebanese insurers with dollar-based fixed costs face new challenges and have been seeking to maximize their dollar inflows and minimize outflows.

“AM Best notes as an example that companies have been paying obligations such as staff costs in the local currency where possible, limiting the risk for short-term operational problems,” the report says, adding that ability of premiums collection in insurance companies has suffered. “Insurers with weak asset and liability management frameworks that have not matched their US dollar-denominated liabilities with US dollar-denominated assets may find themselves exposed to the risk of a Lebanese pound devaluation,” According to AM Best, Lebanese insurance providers have resorted to measures  such as leveling a surcharge oriented on the exchange rate in the parallel market on policyholders settling premium obligations in lira, or refusing to pay claims in dollars if a policy holder paid all or part of the premium in lira.

“Over the longer term, should BDL find itself in a position in which it is not able to refinance its US dollar debt issuances, pressure to devalue the Lebanese pound could increase, leading to a significant erosion of shareholders’ equity for companies with poor asset-liability management. A devaluation could also result in significant inflationary pressure,” the agency warned.

In an interview with Executive in the first part of November, Farid Chedid, chairman and CEO of Chedid Capital Holding, explained that the bigger worry for the Lebanese insurance sector since the eruption of protests resided in investment concerns, not underwriting issues. Attributing this to the uncertainty on the fate of investment portfolios held in the local financial system under regulatory mandates, he pointed to work interruptions, difficulties in premiums collection and achievement of renewals, and new business as additional burdens of local insurers.

He conceded that local insurers face further challenges for their reinsurance dealings where a very large currency mismatch is being created between lira and dollar at the level of insurance companies that have all their reinsurance contracts with international providers in dollars. “But having said that, insurance companies are well protected because reinsurance contracts are all in dollars. Assets of clients of insurers are well protected because contracts are in US dollars,” he noted.

Insurance stakeholders participating in the Executive roundtables further emphasized that settlements of reinsurance obligations at the end of 2019 or any point of contractual payment obligation in 2020 could unleash crises on coverages under the important insurance verticals from medical and motor to property and life business lines.

When compared with the opaque outlook for the insurance sector, the ability to predict banking sector health developments in the new year and even before the arrival of 2020 is even more limited. At this point, consensus in discussions of economists and informed stakeholders appears to be that central bank directives for the bolstering of bank capitalization and the initially temporary realignment of interest rates away from the excessive levels seen earlier in 2019 and before are steps in the right direction but may not suffice, depending on the development related to the formation of a real government and support from the international level.

Requiem for a global failure pattern

Lebanon’s financial and economic outlook for 2020 is interdependent with geopolitical factors and prone to be influenced by the wider international economic outlooks. This, however, is no comfort. The global debt problem is being increasingly thrust into the spotlight. Quoting the total combined public and private debt at world level as never-before seen 230 percent of global GDP at time of her speech in early November (something like $188 trillion dollars, up from $184 trillion mentioned in a January 2019 document), Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said that private and public debt were responsible for the high total in a ratio of about two to one. While noting that some countries with rooms in their budgets should consider borrowing to finance “productive public investments” she also highlighted the “darker side of debt” and the “devastating effects of unsustainable credit booms.” The borrowing of developing nations has to become more sustainable, transparent, and organized in collaborative ways with creditor options, she said.  

The uncertain and dichotomous global financial realities picture comes, moreover, in a frame of sharp contrasts of almost scarily complacent market perceptions in developed markets with recent boosts of vibrant consumer spending and increasing numbers of developing countries in desperate struggles against state failures, corruption, inflation, rising impoverishment, and outright hunger. In this context of a world that has over the course of the last 40 years incurred massive liabilities on the dual fronts of debt and climate under irresponsible economic behaviors of overwhelming proportions, the descent of Lebanon into a vicious cycle of national spending beyond national means no longer looks like a purely local madness.

Too important to fail

For the time being, one retrospective argument that seems in order relates to the fact that measures of quantitative easing, unconventional methods, and financial engineering have not only been the practice of the Lebanese central bank. The challenges of financialization and redefinition of fundamental monetary paradigms are universal and not a problem suited for exclusionary views on Lebanon’s monetary authority or allegations of local thievery. Other than that, it seems that in the concluding weeks of 2019, all perspectives on the local banking sector entail too many variables and unknown elements to dare predictions or rational expectations. 

In conjunction with the civil uprising’s attempts to generate, in the medium or even shorter term, a new systemic political reality, the banking system can only benefit from pursuing a path of constructive adaptation instead of passive rejection of slowly impending change. In the immediate term, the implications of the currently witnessed turning points on systemic and banking realities converge at the threshold of 2020 in the sense that any progress will have to rely on international interventions.

Sadly, it seems against the backdrop of the uprising experiences of the last quarter in 2019 up to the middle of December that the representatives of the existing communities and structures cannot be entrusted neither on the individual, nor the organizational level to be effective agents of meaningful innovation. The consequence of this for the financial and economic rescue of Lebanon is that an IMF-type program with foreign supervision is the best option for moving forward. The Lebanese banking sector, even if considered as a single bank for the purpose of discussion, in this regard does not have the advantage of being “too big to fail” in global perceptions. The best hope might be that the Lebanese polity as factor of relative stability and peace on the edge of a most volatile geopolitical crisis zone, is too important to fail.

December 20, 2019 0 comments
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Executive RoundtablesIntroduction

Executive’s roundtable initiative

by Thomas Schellen December 19, 2019
written by Thomas Schellen

When darkness and despair are the first two options on the menu for your country, followed by austerity and depression as the plat de jour proposals, nothing is more appropriate than to assemble a crowd of light seekers and path finders. In this sense, it is a testimony to the seriousness of the national economic, financial, and even political situation of Lebanon—and to the immense reservoir of smart and educated brains in the country—that proposals for this country’s betterment have been proliferating not only in form of thawra protests and public sentiments on the street, but also in more structured and tractable outpourings. The drafting of emergency economic rescue plans has become something of a national sport in Beirut intellectual and business circles as of late.

The Economic Roadmap 3.0 at the heart of this issue of Executive is one such effort. However, the Executive economic roadmap project differs from other recent proposals in that, compared to drafts that have entered into circulation in the past two months, the magazine’s project has had a head start of over 18 months from its first written draft, and of exactly one year from publication of its version 1.0 in the 2018 Facts and Forecasts issue.

It is also not a monoculture effort in the sense of representing just one economic school or narrow way of thinking found in many proposals circulated in the fourth quarter of 2019. This is a notable characteristic when one contemplates the current wave of ideologically front-loaded socioeconomic propositions in Lebanon and elsewhere, whether these approaches were voiced in a spirit of globally financialized neoliberalism (that in the past decade has been met with some acerbic assessments and not only among heterodox economists or austerity-regime critics in countries like Greece) or a post-Keynesianism that has been on the rise in some academic circles (and most recently reflected in the developments of labor-oriented political parties in countries like the UK and Germany).

A collaborative effort

But the most important distinction of the Executive Economic Roadmap in the Lebanese context is rooted in the fact that this entire project is designed for and driven by participatory passion and broad consultative collaboration. It is not an exercise that has been undertaken under any external financial dependency or in response to a political commissioning. Moreover, it has not limited its horizon politically or socioeconomically by exclusively pursuing inquiries with presumed elites and narrow
interest groups.

In that vein, when the need to draft version 3.0 became clear—version 2.0 was released in February this year following consultations across the country with civil society stakeholders on the original Economic Roadmap—given the monumental economic and societal shifts that we have witnessed in Lebanon in the final few months of 2019, Executive decided to host a series of roundtable discussions in mid-November. 

These discussions, which in the end comprised six roundtables held over November 18 – 21 at Le Gray, in Downtown Beirut, covered the following topics: corruption, entrepreneurship, education, labor, women’s empowerment, access to information, taxation, fiscal policy, and, arguably most importantly, Lebanon’s current financial reality. 

Executive’s team spent a stressful two weeks trying to turn this last minute roundtable initiative into a reality, contacting over 150 individuals across varied sectors and internally creating the topics and questions to be discussed at each roundtable. In the end, around 50 individuals—economists, academics from private and public institutions, entrepreneurs, and a diverse range of civil society actors—came together to discuss issues vital to the future of the Lebanese political economy. 

Starting points

These roundtable discussions were held under Chatham House rules—meaning that while the individuals present at each roundtable are listed as contributors to our Economic Roadmap 3.0, both the roadmap and our coverage in this issue of Executive refrain from attributing ideas or quotes to any individual persons. 

In conclusion of the November 2019 roundtables, it can be stated with confidence that, although a starting point for any possible journey toward economic rescue and revival from the present and still increasing misery has to be a competent and at least marginally accepted government, the way forward has its brightest outlook in holding recurrent discussions among stakeholders in the economy. Technical knowledge is required as a pillar in any such discussion—with taxation, fiscal, monetary, and political economy deliberations tending to the highest requirement of expertise—but based on the experience of the six Executive roundtables any future discussion rounds would actually be most productive if built on three pillars: the technical knowledge pillar and two equally important non-technical pillars, trust and commitment to Lebanon’s betterment being the first, and wide stakeholder diversity on many axes—meaning not just gender balance, but also age and professional and life experience—being the second. 

December 19, 2019 0 comments
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Overview

Executive’s “Quote of the Month” throughout 2019

by Executive Editors December 18, 2019
written by Executive Editors

JANUARY

“It’s different from Washington and London, we
should maybe teach them how to run a country without a budget.”

Then-caretaker foreign minister, Gebran Bassil, answering a question on cabinet formation in an interview with CNN, January 22, 2019.

FEBRUARY

“My decision and the government’s decision is to work, work, work.”

Prime Minister Saad Hariri, speaking to Parliament ahead of a vote of confidence in the government on February 15.

MARCH

“How does stockpiling tens of thousands of rockets and missiles in Lebanon territory for use against Israel make this country stronger?”

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking at a press conference in Beirut on March 22.

APRIL

“This decision shows that the US audacity and folly went beyond limits.”

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on the US decision to designate Iran’s IRGC as a terrorist organization, during a speech on April 10.

MAY

“The 2019 budget is not the end. This budget is the beginning of a long road that we decided to take in order to lead the Lebanese economy to safety.”

Prime Minister Saad Hariri, speaking about the proposed budget for 2019 at an iftar dinner in Beirut, on May 25.

JUNE

“The plan will help the Palestinian private sector capitalize on growth opportunities by improving access to strong, neighboring economies.”

Extract from the White House’s Peace for Prosperity plan, launched in Bahrain, on June 25-26

JULY

“They know we are lying to them, and we know that they know we are lying to them. This is the truth, so there is no problem.”

Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party MP Salim Saadeh, speaking in Parliament about the fiscal reductions in the budget and the reforms pledged to donors at CEDRE, before the budget vote on July 19.

AUGUST

“We are not here in solidarity with Mashrou’ Leila. We are here in solidarity with our freedom.”

Part of a statement read aloud by Nada Bou Farhat and Badih Abou Chakra at a concert organized on August 9 in Beirut to protest Byblos International Festival’s dropping of Mashrou’ Leila following a campaign accusing the band of blasphemy.

SEPTEMBER

“Banque du Liban has its reserves in dollars that exceed $38.5 billion and is present in the market and there is no need for any special measures especially because the fear mongering that is happening is more in the media than in the market.”

Banque du Liban Governor Riad Salameh, speaking during a televised press conference on September 23.

OCTOBER

“Kellon ya’ni kellon.”

All of them means all of them. One of the chants of the October uprising.

NOVEMBER

“If they do not like it and there is not a single decent person in power, then they should go and emigrate.”

President Michel Aoun in a live interview discussing the protesters in Lebanon, on November 12.

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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CorruptionEconomics & PolicyOpinion

Lebanon needs concrete steps to tackle corruption to restore confidence

by Arkan Seblani December 18, 2019
written by Arkan Seblani

Trust in politicians and governments is usually a result of a successful performance, but it is also—perhaps more significantly—an ingredient for success. Without it, citizens and businesses are less likely to respond to public policies, especially those that are seeking to promote economic recovery and stability. Trust is necessary to increase the confidence of investors and consumers alike, while also being essential for key economic activities—most notably finance and banking—and for upholding the rule of law.

Trust in politicians and governments has become a rare but vital commodity. Data shows that trust is deteriorating across the globe, including in OECD countries. In Lebanon, trust levels are among the worst in the world. In 2017, the World Economic Forum ranked Lebanon 128th out of 137 countries in terms of public trust in politicians, a score of just 1.7 out of a possible seven. In February 2019, a poll by Beirut-based consultancy firm Information International found that 85 percent of Lebanese lacked trust in their government. While it may be possible to argue with the methodologies of such studies, there is no denying the unprecedented social upheaval that has been sweeping across the country since October 17. And with the economy on the brink of collapse, action must be taken—now—to narrow that trust gap.

Integrity is considered a crucial element of trust, yet Lebanon does not fare well on indicators measuring integrity or the lack thereof; it consistently performs poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. In 2018, Lebanon ranked 138th out of 180 countries, with a score of 28 out of 100, compared to a regional average of 34 and a global average of 43. The score for 2019 is due in January and expected to be even worse.
Lebanese politicians of every creed are finally acknowledging that decisive action is needed to curb corruption. Nonetheless, concrete and meaningful steps forward remain absent. Decades-long inaction has been replaced by a bias to adversarial and erratic case-based action, without proper prosecutions and major convictions. If such actions were meant to restore trust, then they have done exactly the opposite.

Much needed structural reforms remain unheeded. The adoption of Lebanon’s first-ever national anti-corruption strategy has been repeatedly delayed, as has passage of, or updates to, critical legislation, such as amendments to the grossly flawed illicit enrichment law and the introduction of conflict of interest regulation. Even when relevant legislative breakthroughs are made, countless obstacles emerge barring effective implementation—the access to information law is case in point.
The widening trust gap and poor performance on anti-corruption have created a vicious circle, but one that Lebanon can escape with real political will.

Adopting the national anti-corruption strategy and establishing an independent national anti-corruption agency is just the beginning. Ensuring that both have the appropriate financial and human resources to start working immediately is the real test of trust. The independence of the judiciary is also imperative. This will require legislative amendments that allow the Higher Judicial Council to carry out judicial appointments and rotations, but beyond that, also safeguard every judge against undue influence and ensure that the council itself is formed and functions according to principles of good governance. Only with all these steps in place can real progress take place.

Beyond those initial steps, parallel paths of legislative and executive action to enhance integrity are needed in two other spheres of public policy—people in decision-making positions and public money. This includes deep and meaningful reforms related to public procurement, election financing, and modernizing the country’s audit and control system.

Such reforms will inevitably take time, but trust cannot wait. Lebanon needs swift and immediate action to ensure that specific integrity measures can be seen through in the span of a few months. This includes executive action to seize critical opportunities to demonstrate integrity in practice, namely in relation to large infrastructure projects and areas where there will be major investments, such as in electricity, or potential major revenues, such as oil and gas. It also includes ensuring full compliance with Law 28 (2017) on access to information. This can be achieved by implementing the national action plan that was drafted for this purpose, but not yet adopted. It also includes overhauling the country’s archaic systems of asset declaration by public officials and introducing effective measures to regulate the working relationship between the public and private sectors and manage conflict of interests.

As the saying goes, “a fool throws a stone into a well and it requires a hundred wise men to get it out again.” For this Christmas, I am wishing for wise men and women.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial views of Executive Magazine, nor the views of the UN or the UNDP.

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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F&B OverviewHospitality & Tourism

Lebanon’s F&B operators face an economic crisis and low tourism

by Nabila Rahhal December 18, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal

The once mighty food and beverage (F&B) sector is today falling under the weight of the current economic crisis—the dollar shortage, increased cost of living due to exchange rates, and lower purchasing power—and lack of tourists, with no respite in sight. Once optimistic F&B operators, who had always insisted that the sector was resilient enough to withstand internal turmoil, are nowadays at a loss for words when asked about the current state of F&B sector in Lebanon and its future. 

The early indicators

Despite the first nine months of 2019 being good for tourism in Lebanon, F&B operators told Executive that they did not feel the positive effects, instead continuing to face the difficulties they had encountered in 2018 and then some.

Executive reported at the end of 2018 that the F&B sector was suffering from an unregulated market and a subsequent increase in competition that had negatively impacted many venues. This continued this year as well, according to Jean Claude Ghosn, CEO of Ghia Holding, a hospitality management company that owns and operates Duo and Ahwak, among other restaurants. “The F&B industry has been suffering since the end of 2017,” he tells Executive. “This is mainly due to an increased supply of F&B outlets [coupled] with a decrease in demand as local consumers’ purchasing power dwindled. Summer in Beirut used to be busy, but over the past three years the market has been expanding to areas out of Beirut. This spread the supply and—with demand [from tourists] not increasing significantly—also created a problem: increased competition with not enough market demand was the core of the problem.”

Another issue the sector has faced since 2018 is the hike in taxes for some imported foods and alcohol in June 2019, which drove up operators’ cost margins. “Our cost was rising, but we could not increase our prices because our customers were already struggling under the increased cost of living brought on by the increased taxes on them as well,” explains Toni Rizk, CEO of TRI Concepts, a hospitality management company that owns and operates Almodovar and The Bohemian, among other nightlife venues. “As a result, people were going out less, and spending less when they did.” 

According to Joe Njeim, owner of Paname in Saifi Village and managing partner of Leila, a Lebanese restaurant with several outlets in Lebanon and the region, banks also contributed to the challenges the sector was facing by reducing the number of newly issued subsidized loans in 2019 to almost zero.  

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

All of these factors combined led the Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Nightclubs, and Pastries (SRCNP) to issue a statement in early October 2019, warning that 130 F&B establishments had shut down in September alone. The statement also alleged that summer 2019 was not as good as expected due to the security incident in Qabr Shmoun on June 30 which made some tourists wary of visiting Lebanon. Executive was unable to obtain Ministry of Tourism numbers to confirm this. 

Although the F&B sector has been resilient to challenges Lebanon has faced in the past, overcoming the events of the fourth quarter of 2019  proved harder. “Maybe the size of the disaster was bigger in July 2006 (when the majority of outlets in Lebanon closed for two months during the war with Israel), but the difference is it was coming after several years of a very solid economy, and so of good profitability and growth for the sector,” Njeim says. “So we were able to endure those two months of losses and paid full salaries and rent. Today there is a big difference, we’ve had three previous years where the sector had been suffering from a bad economy and a low
purchasing power.” 

After the last straw

The F&B sector was already suffering before the onset of the October uprising, which made withstanding its subsequent pressures that much harder.

In the early days of the uprising, when there were almost daily road closures, many F&B outlets—whether in malls, clusters, or standalones—shut down for an average of 12 days, which negatively impacted sales, according to those interviewed.

With bank closures, limits on cash withdrawals, and an absence of dollars in the market, consumers are more keen than before to hold on to their money. Even those who do have disposable cash in their hands are not in the mood to spend it, says Njeim. “You need a certain mood to spend your money on outings, and the mood on the streets today is cautious and not conducive to spending,” he says.

It is no wonder then that Ghosn says sales in his venues have dropped almost 70 percent since October 16, while Njeim places the average drop in revenues at 40 to 60 percent across the sector depending on the location (interview conducted in mid-November).

Some areas in proximity to Downtown Beirut appeared to be doing better than others—since protestors would head there for a break between demonstrating at Riad el-Solh or Martyr’s Square—but F&B operators say this is not telling of the sector as a whole. “Even if the venues in proximity to Downtown had increased activity for a week or two when the protests were at their peak, in the long run this has no real impact on their bottom lines and is not indicative of the sector,” Rizk says. “We have to think of the long-term survival and see where we are going.” 

When the doors close

On November 25, the SRCNP released another statement saying that out of 12,000 F&B outlets in Lebanon, 265 had closed down over the past two months (October and most of November), a figure which online restaurant directory and delivery app Zomato collaborated. In an interview with Executive, Tony Ramy, president of the syndicate, warned that if the situation continues like this, there could be as many as 400 outlets closed in a three month period (from start October to year’s end). 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

Putting these figures in context, according to Zomato, 1,196 outlets have closed down so far in 2019 (mid-November)—but approximately 1,209 venues have also opened. This is similar to last year in terms of restaurant closures and openings roughly negating each other, but what has changed is the rate at which this turnaround is happening. In 2018, restaurant closures and openings only reached around 500 outlets respectively for the entire year. 

Those in the sector therefore remain apprehensive, particularly in regard to what this heightened rate of restaurant closures means for the economy and the country as a whole. “Today it is about one thing and one thing only: the survivability of our operations, and the survivability of our employees,” Ayoub says. “If a sector like the [F&B] sector breaks down, it would create a high level of social chaos. It would put 150,000 people and their families at risk of losing their job, which also means being out of the national social security fund (NSSF) and not having a paycheck at the end of the month—it would be a disaster.”  

Since the protests, some of the operators Executive spoke with in interviews from mid to late November say they have given their employees pay cuts across the board, while others said they have decreased the number of shifts their staff work or cut down on opening hours in general—with the knock-on effect on salaries. Some have also shuttered some branches—Ghosn has closed two branches of Ahwak in Saida and Choueifat, for example—and laid off employees. 

Hand in hand

Those Executive interviewed in the F&B sector have called for support and understanding across the entire hospitality chain—and for personal sacrifice at each level—to keep the sector going. “Developers and landlords have to think rationally and accept deferred payments, or decrease rent to keep operators and their venue going,” says Rabih Saba, co-partner of Venture Group, an operator of hospitality clusters. “Local distributors also have to understand that they need to make less profit to keep the industry going. Employees have to understand that, in light of circumstances, they need to focus on retaining their jobs and on surviving this period—they need to think long term. International suppliers also have to understand that their profit is at stake if they are not more sensitive to the needs of the sector. The hit has to be across the board.” He argues that the F&B sector is at risk of a domino effect, whereby if one element in the chain chooses to think individualistically, the entire industry is at risk of collapsing.  

Indeed, all operators Executive spoke to have asked for leniency from landlords when it comes to rent payments, saying that this is their biggest expense. Others have asked for support from the government through tax breaks: “In most countries, private investors are encouraged to put money in by giving them tax breaks,” Rizk says. “This should be the case for F&B in Lebanon. The government should look into decreasing taxes on the sector by lowering taxes on imported goods, such as alcohol
or cheeses.” 

Photo by Greg Demarque | Executive

The list of demands proposed by the SRCNP incorporates these demands and more, for example calling for debt restructuring from banks. The syndicate has promised to lobby for the needs of the sector starting next year, if they feel that measures called for are not being taken on board.

While operators are asking for the swift formation of a government, they recognize that this alone is not enough to fix the situation that they and the country are suffering from. “Even if the government is formed today, the economic situation will take time to stabilize—and until that happens there is no purchasing power, and so no spending on F&B,” Ramy says. “When the situation stabilizes, we really need to work on the sector and have a proper tourism strategy that attracts new markets to Lebanon. There is a lot of work to be done, which includes our adjusting our prices, working on preserving our natural environment and resources—a lot of things need to be done.” 

For the first time in the seven years this writer has been covering the industry, questions on future plans have gone unanswered. Hospitality operators Executive spoke to do not want to talk about their plans for 2020, and most say all future projects are on hold (with the exception of Njeim who says he will continue with plans of opening a Lebanese cuisine restaurant in Downtown Beirut in early 2020). Operators are instead focusing all their energy on weathering the current storm, so that they and their team can live to see another, hopefully brighter, day.   

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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Hospitality & TourismHotels Overview

Lebanon’s hotels facing a bleak last quarter

by Nabila Rahhal December 18, 2019
written by Nabila Rahhal

During the winter holiday period hotels are typically full of life, from locals dining at the in-house food and beverage outlets, to tourists checking in to their rooms at the lobby—everything and everyone is covered with a festive sheen.

This year, however, if October and November performances are any indication, a busy festive season will not be on the cards for Lebanon’s hotels. When visiting five star properties in preparation for this story throughout November, this writer was struck by how eerily quiet the lobbies and adjacent cafes of visited hotels were.

Bright beginnings

The year did not start this way. On the contrary, all the hotel managers Executive interviewed spoke of an extremely positive year—marked with high occupancy at competitive room rates—up until the last quarter. Both Le Gray and the Four Seasons told Executive that until the onset of the October protests 2019 was set to be a record year for their property, the best since their openings in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

According to hoteliers interviewed, average occupancies in Lebanon’s hotels from January to October ranged from 70 to 81 percent at high room rates—in comparison to the decreased room rates most hotels were offering in previous years to attract business. Area General Manager at Le Gray Georges Ojeil placed average occupancy in his property at 81 percent, with room rates that at times exceeded $375 per night.

This success was due to several factors. The drop in the number of tourists from Gulf Arab countries in 2012 (which had only slowly begun to reverse years later) had shown those in the hospitality sector the merit of diversifying their clientele. Therefore, for the past four years, hoteliers and the Ministry of Tourism had been targeting new markets by partnering together for media campaigns and exhibitions that promoted Lebanon as a destination. These efforts, according to Tracey Bolton, cluster director of sales and marketing at Phoenicia Hotel, had finally paid off. The lifting of the travel advisory on Saudi nationals in February 2019 also had a positive impact on occupancy figures, as Executive reported in its June issue.

To Rami Sayess, regional vice president and general manager at the Four Seasons, nothing matters to tourists as much as stability. “This [our positive figures] was thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Tourism through Visit Lebanon, plus what we have done as Four Seasons with our worldwide sales offices and other resources,” he says. “But the major reason behind this influx of tourists was the stability we had in the first nine months of the year and even before. When there is no negative media about Lebanon people want to come visit.” 

When good things come to an end

The perception of stability Lebanon was enjoying the first three quarters of the year disappeared overnight with the onset of the uprising on October 17 and the ongoing turmoil since. All hotel managers Executive spoke to say they had an immediate drop in occupancy from the first full day of the protests, meaning October 18. “The problem with our sector is when negative things happen, the reaction is fast,” Sayess says. “We dropped from a 100 percent occupancy the day before the events to 4 percent within days. So yeah, it was drastic.” 

Hotel managers in Downtown’s five star hotels said they expect to finish November with single digit occupancy rates, or at best low double digits, and have a similar outlook for December if the situation does not improve. These luxury properties in Downtown have been hit both because of their location in proximity to the protests and because of the high room rates and prices at their F&B outlets. Further away from Downtown, in four star city hotels in Hamra or Ain el-Mreisseh, occupancy rates are a bit higher—in the 20 and 30 percent range on average—but still nowhere near what they typically are in his period.

In general, all the hoteliers Executive spoke with agree that the situation the country is passing through now has had a larger negative impact on their business than anything in the last decade. “The hotel has been in operation since 2009, and we have never reached such a deep valley in terms of operation and occupancy,” Ojeil says. “Even in the worst days of the so-called trash crisis [in 2015], we were at 17 percent occupancy and there was a continuous inflow [of guests].” While tourists may not care about political squabbles, he says, roads blockage and street violence deter people away from Lebanon.

The economic situation, in terms of the on-and-off bank closures and the difficulty of accessing dollars, has also prevented hotels from depending on locals’ spending in their F&B outlets. “The issue with the banks needs to be resolved as well, since today locals have issues with spending—people are only spending on necessities and not luxury these days,” Sayess says.

Just breathe

The solid performance of the first nine months of the year have left hotels with “acceptable cash flow and reserves,” according to Ojeil. However, given the uncertainty of the circumstances, all hotels are operating on what Phoenicia’s Bolton calls “survival mode,” managing their cash reserves by cutting down on costs as much as possible. Common cost saving measures taken by all hotels interviewed included cutting down on energy expenses with some properties turning off power on several floors and reducing the number of elevators in use or decreasing gas and diesel usage. Hoteliers are also sending their staff on their annual paid vacations—which have already been budgeted—and have put planned projects on hold.

Ojeil says Le Gray is trying to limit purchases through managing their stock more efficiently, while Sayess shared elements of Four Seasons’ emergency contingency plan that includes sending employees to sister properties in the region to work there for two to three months. “The Four Seasons network has 114 hotels around the world, so we contacted the hotels in the region and asked who needs help, since it is the high season,” he says. “We have sent 60 employees so far, and their salary is charged back to the hotels they are working in—so this property
saves money.” 

These cost saving mechanisms will only help these hotels survive until the end of January 2020, according to those Executive spoke with, and then they will have to decide what measures to take if the situation remains volatile. “The good thing is that Lebanon always bounces back, but the issue is how long it’s going to take and at what cost?” Sayess says. “Because the longer it takes, the more seriously it will impact businesses. Some will sustain longer than others, but if this continues for five or six months, who will fall every month? There are 400 families, if not more, that depend on a hotel of our size for their livelihood.” In an interview on November 15, Ojeil told Executive that the hotel already had losses that exceeded $1 million (in terms of room and conference booking revenues) since the onset of the protests.

Even if a government is formed today, and serious work is put into resolving the economic situation and the political tension, some hoteliers believe it will take a while for the industry to get back on its feet. “The hospitality sector needs two months at minimum to pick up after everything calms down,” Ojeil says. “Leisure tourists need time to forget and rebuild their trust in Lebanon, while local and regional corporate bookings are influenced by the economic situation in the country and will not hold conferences or invite delegations to Lebanon.” 

As 2019 draws to a close, and hoteliers close their annual budgets, they surely cannot help but look back at this year with despair at what was lost. The hope is that they will still be able to rebuild and start anew when the situation stabilizes, as they—and indeed Lebanon—have done countless times before. In the end, there is no choice but to believe in the resiliency of Lebanon and its hospitality sector.

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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EditorialOpinion

No more lies

by Yasser Akkaoui December 18, 2019
written by Yasser Akkaoui

It’s only during crisis that truth comes to light. As everyone scrambles into new positions, reality is revealed. Each time the Lebanese equation changes, players let their masks slip in their bid to defend their slice of what remains. The violations that are perpetrated in the process are often so flagrant that forgiveness seems impossible. 

Now is the time to face the truth—to be honest with ourselves and others—or instead of witnessing the rebirth of Lebanon we will all bear witness to its slow death. It is past obvious that our political class is driven by ego, arrogance, incompetence, ignorance, and corruption—all while hiding behind geopolitical excuses that no longer, and never did, make any sense. Even now, as I write this editorial, our politicians continue to bicker among themselves over how to reform a government of old faces, while our people recover from another night of violence inflicted upon them. But Lebanon has changed, even if those who cling to power refuse to accept this new reality. 

The picture we face now may be bleak, but we should never forget that we are a rich nation, through our people, our heritage, and our nature—and it doesn’t take much to put it all to good use. The pillars of our nation—our entrepreneurial private sector, educated population, and wonderful culture—need strong institutions that allow them to thrive. To achieve our promise we need leadership empowered by the people, not dictated by foreign powers. We need leaders that understand the importance of, and are able to launch and activate, the bedrocks of our economy—our agriculture, manufacturing, and services industries. Who understand the principles of competitiveness powered by education, knowledge, and healthcare. 

This Lebanon is within our reach. Executive’s Economic Roadmap 3.0 was drafted amid the revolution with a renewed nation in mind. Regardless of who leads the transition, they will have this roadmap as a guide as they embark on the long road toward Lebanon’s rebirth. 

As Lebanese we need to stand up and reclaim sovereignty over our nation. Over the course of this still ongoing uprising, we have seen the masks slip from our political elite—accusations have become incriminations—and it is no longer possible to trust those that have failed in power for 30 years. Instead, we put our trust in the people of Lebanon. We put our trust in the collective will and spirit of the Lebanese, and our optimism in the hands of those who are battling every day for change, those who reimagine Lebanon with their blood, tears, and hopes. 

Now is the time. 

December 18, 2019 0 comments
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Economic roadmapEconomics & PolicyLebanon 2020

A roadmap to recovery

by Marwan Mikhael December 3, 2019
written by Marwan Mikhael

There is one question on everyone’s mind: Is there still a way out of the current crisis or are we going to fall into an abyss with an intense deterioration of all economic indicators that could lead to dire consequences? A summary of the current economic situation will help us analyze its sustainability.  Then we can try to find a way out of the crisis with the least damage to the economy.

The protests accelerated what was already a deteriorating economic and financial environment. The protests on the street accentuated panic among the population, with the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri being the cherry on the top. When banks opened following 14 days of closure, people rushed to withdraw and/or transfer their deposits into dollars or outside the country.

Banks were obliged to adopt further restrictions in order to maintain financial stability for the longest possible time.  No banking system in the world could survive an unchecked rush on banks. When depositors place their money in a Lebanese bank, the bank in turn uses these funds to loan to other customers, or to buy government bonds or Certificates of Deposit from Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank. Such uses are standard practice world over, and so long as depositors are content to keep their money in bank and do not en masse try to withdraw their deposits, the banking system remains stable and functional. In Lebanon, the liquidity issues of banks were also exacerbated as the banking system had already lost part of its foreign assets starting in 2011, with the balance of payments (BOP) in the red for more than eight years. Moreover, the BOP deficit had accelerated during the past two years.  

The current economic and financial situation can only be transitory as its downfall has been accelerated by the protests, making the economic and financial situation unsustainable. The restrictive measures adopted by banks will make it less likely for capital to flow into the economy as investors will become worry about the risk of being unable to withdraw money from the system. It will, therefore, become more and more difficult to attract money and the economy will have to rely on its own existing stock of foreign assets to finance its imports of goods and services. Imports will decline as a result yet will continue to constitute the major drain on foreign assets.

Another source draining deposits is cash withdrawals from banks. People are withdrawing as much cash as they can, in both currencies (Lebanese lira and US dollars), to counter the restrictive policies of banks. Then, being unable to transfer cash outside the country, this money is kept in safe boxes at homes. Estimates based on the balance sheets of BDL find that the amount of cash withdrawn from banks in October and November has amounted to more than $2.5 billion.

Taking a longer view, successive governments since 1990 were never able to restore investors’ confidence level to where it was before the war started. The dollarization rate never went below 50 percent and most of the time interest rates on lira were much higher than on dollars. During the episodes of shocks like in 1995, interest rates went up to 38 percent, while in 2005, 2006, 2008, and more recently, the price of credit default swaps (CDS)—these are an insurance against the risk of default of the Lebanese government—increased to more than 2400 basis points, meaning that there is a greater risk of default. Theoretically, the five years CDS should be equal to the difference between five years Lebanese Eurobonds and five years US bonds, which has crossed 1000 basis points.

As demonstrations continue, the restrictive policies of banks will remain in place and the repercussions of both on economic growth are substantial. Analysis of various sources including the Purchasing Managers’ Index, finds that companies’ turnovers fell by more than 50 percent in October, depending on the sector. The impact in November is anticipated to be larger than the previous month as banks froze their facilities for individuals as well as for companies, and reduced credit cards limits. Consumption and imports are de facto declining and traders are feeling the heat.

The result is an economic recession combined with a liquidity drought that is unsustainable beyond the short term. Either a government is formed and the country is put on the right track of reforms or the restrictive policies will increase and the parallel exchange market will see a larger depreciation of the Lebanese lira. The cash economy will flourish as depositors will avoid putting money at banks.

So the million dollar question remains: If a government is formed, is there a way out without a haircut on deposits, a restructuring of government debt, and devaluation? The most urgent issue is to restore investors’ confidence in order to be able to levy the restrictive measures of commercial banks and for capital to start flowing in again. A way out can be found without a haircut on deposits and devaluation, but a restructuring of government debt, at the least the debt in Lebanese lira, is preferable in order to reduce the burden on public finances.

The first step before getting into any future economic plan is to form a government. This government has to be formed quickly and, according to the Lebanese constitution, it has to get the support of the majority of parliamentarians. Beyond parliamentary approval, the government has to gain the confidence of people on the streets, but, most importantly it has to get international recognition as trustworthy and cooperative. Debating the composition of the new government is like debating the sex of angels. Be it technocratic, techno-political, or purely political, the most important thing— besides being approved by the international community—is for the government to be coherent, to have an economic and financial plan for the upcoming three to four years, and to be responsible for its actions, in order to be productive and immediately start to tackle the current economic and financial crisis.

If a government with international support is formed, then resolving the current economic woes will become easier. An inflow of deposits from the GCC governments of $7 billion to $10 billion as deposits at BDL will also be very vital to support confidence, as BDL will then be able to pump dollars in the market, and banks will relax capital controls in few months’ time. Of course this will be conditional on the new government adopting an ambitious yet credible comprehensive economic reforms plan for the upcoming three to four years.

As capital controls will be maintained in the near term, the banking system has to move into reducing interest rates in order to limit the increase in its foreign currency exposure. A drastic reduction in interest rates is advisable on both dollar and lira deposits. The interest rate differential will have to decline to a quarter or half a percentage point as it is the case in economies with pegged currencies. This step will lead to a reduction in the cost of funds for banks, especially in dollars, at a time where capital inflows have been reduced to negligent levels. Banks will then move to reduce interests on corporate debt and start to provide loans again to businesses.

BDL has already issued a circular ordering the banks to increase their capital by 20 percent by mid-2020. Many analysts are arguing the fact that this may not be enough as the scenarios they are considering require a haircut on deposits. This alternative scenario is based on restoring the confidence in the banking sector and the economy at large, which will make this recapitalization enough for the current period. Any recapitalization that goes beyond this level will necessitate a better environment in order for banks to be able to attract investors.

In order to accelerate the recovery process, it would be advisable for the new government reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as soon as possible. The importance of an IMF program is that it will act as a catalyst for capital inflows. The IMF will agree with the government on three years Extended Fund Facility (EFF) that will consist of an economic program agreed with the government including a timeline with quarterly evaluation by the IMF. It will also entail a package that could go up to few billion dollars with quarterly disbursements if the review by the IMF mission is positive on the implementation of the reform program. Once the IMF gives a green light for the disbursement, international donors will do the same. Hence the IMF will act as a leverage to attract capital from abroad. If the IMF program will disburse $3 billion over three years, it is expected that this money will attract more than $10 billion over the same period. It is important to note that citizens will need to sacrifice in the short term, while gradually getting better public services over the medium term.  

Having covered the pressing issues of the current situation, let us then look more specifically at the economic reality that Lebanon finds itself in and the measures that need to be undertaken in the immediate and the long term to put the country on a path toward recovery.

I – Economic reality

Over the past few years, Lebanon has been facing increasingly challenging economic and financial conditions on the back of contradicting policies and paralyzed governments, with reforms eternally remaining in the pipeline. Economic growth has been very low—averaging close to null over the past three years including the current year—with macroeconomic vulnerabilities rapidly increasing as capital inflows dried up and Lebanon continued to rely on a consumption- and import-driven growth model. In particular, fiscal policies and projections were unrealistic, especially with the boost in wages and salaries of government employees before the 2018 elections and the increase in taxes that hit the private sector in an already weak economic growth environment. This has led to a surge in the FY 2018 fiscal deficit to 11 percent of GDP, pushing public debt to 151 percent of GDP. This fiscal policy, in addition to the structural composition of the economy, fueled the current account deficit to 18 to 20 percent of GDP last year—this time without capital inflows that used to close the gap in the past. Lackluster progress in structural reforms continued to hamper investment and allowed inefficient public enterprises to linger and a large informal economy to expand.

The government’s slow reaction and/or wrong policies adopted to face the systemic imbalances led to increased macroeconomic deterioration. While some adjustment policies were adopted since the start of 2018, these fell short of the comprehensive reforms needed to ensure macroeconomic stability. Despite some monetary policy tightening, the external sector imbalances kept on deteriorating. Similarly, fiscal deficit in the first half of 2019 remained significant despite its decline compared to the previous year, however, arrears were accumulated toward three main counterparts, namely private hospitals, contractors, and social security. Finally, the government did not agree on any tariff increases in the power sector, which may have helped reducing quasi-fiscal losses. Sizable financing from the banking sector—especially BDL at advantageous rates—provided critical financing relief, but also deferred the urgency to tackle the underlying problems.

On the back of weakening confidence, economic activity has slowed considerably and the country has started to enter stagflation. High-frequency indicators, including the purchasing managers’ index, cement deliveries, construction permits, real estate transactions, and motor vehicle sales, have continued to deteriorate, confirming a marked slowdown in economic activity. In addition, public investment and construction have contracted due to cuts in government development spending. Growth is estimated to have declined to 0.6 percent in 2018 and will go into negative territories this year, following the eruption of demonstrations on October 17. Real GDP growth is expected to register at negative 2 percent, as lost confidence led to capital controls, which in turn, hurt traders’ activity and increased non-performing loans at banks. Consumer inflation has decelerated markedly to 2.77 percent by August 2019 compared to 6.29 percent during the same period last year. It is expected to substantially increase in the last quarter of the year as the appearance of a parallel exchange market where the dollar is being traded in a large range (from LL1,700 – LL2,300/$1) has led to a jump in consumer prices of imported goods.  

Government has tried to contain the fiscal imbalances during 2019, but it has accumulated arrears. The 2019 budget was approved by Parliament in July of the same year, which left just five months to implement the new budget with the embedded tax measures. During the first seven months of the year, fiscal deficit had declined by 21.7 percent year-on-year to reach $2.4 billion with the primary balance registering a surplus of $577 million or 1 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, this primary surplus masks an underlying unrecorded spending as government has accumulated arrears of at least 1 percent of GDP in the first seven months of the year. Due to recent events, the overall fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 8.5 percent of GDP against a budget target of 7.6 percent in FY 2019 as revenues will remain constant despite the increase in taxes approved in the budget, and expenditures will decline by 6 percent compared to 2018.

The weakness of the external position has widened in recent months. Although the trade deficit has narrowed marginally by August 2019 to 20 percent of GDP, down from 20.6 percent during the same period last year (the trade deficit would have been narrower at 16.5 percent of GDP in 2019 if it was not for the imports of mineral products that have increased by more than 64 percent to reach $4.7 billion, largely on the back of EDL fuel imports), the current account is expected to have remained in a deficit of 18 to 20 percent of GDP. The balance of payments has recorded a deficit of $4.5 billion in the first nine months of the year, compared to a deficit of $1.3 billion during the same period last year. The BOP deficit is expected to reach $8 billion by the end of 2019 for the following reasons:

  1. We estimate that $500 million of debt related payments will go to foreign holders of Lebanese debt in the last three months of the year. BDL has to pay around $1.9 billion of debt related payments in foreign currencies including Lebanese Eurobonds maturing at the end of November, Eurobonds coupons, and principal payments on bilateral and multilateral loans.
  2. An additional $2.5 billion to $3 billion of outflows from the banking system is expected as a result of BDL providing the necessary amount of dollars for imports of wheat, food, fuel and medicine (for the last three months of 2019), the transfers abroad that took place before the eruption of the protests, and the ongoing cash withdrawals from banks.

II – Pillars of reform

The government should aim at restoring confidence through economic sustainability and balanced growth. The strategy should be founded on three pillars:

1.     Macroeconomic stabilization along with poverty reduction. This includes: Large reduction of the fiscal deficit over the coming three and a half years (from the second half of 2020 till the end of 2023) through an effort to mobilize revenue that will generate 3-4 percentage points of GDP in gross additional tax revenue by end 2023 (it will be 1-2 percent on a net basis due to the privatization of telecoms in 2021), and a strategy for cost recovery in Electricité du Liban (EDL); monetary policy that will continue to aim at preserving the exchange rate peg for the moment, as it is an anchor for confidence and the negative impact from floating the lira outweighs its positive impact on competitiveness and on the reduction of the current account deficit; monetary policy that will try to reach an inflation objective of 4 percent or less in order to help in shoring up confidence; and increasing social and development spending to protect the most vulnerable.

2.     Structural reforms with improved transparency and governance to strengthen public enterprises and institutions, and to foster higher economic growth. This will include: improving public financial management through better collection and better control of tax evasion to achieve more fiscal discipline and greater budgetary transparency; reforming EDL and the tariff structure to ensure a balanced budget for the energy sector and better services; modernizing and corporatizing all the enterprises owned by the government in order to prepare them for privatization; strengthening anti-corruption agencies such as the central inspection authority and the court of audit; and improving the regulatory framework of investment and job creation.

3.     Adequate new financing from the international community to support Lebanon. If such a program is adopted, the government will be able to catalyze new external financing from governments and multilateral institutions, which will help closing the financing gap and allow reforms to work.

III – Macroeconomic framework

In the near term, economic activity is expected to remain subdued and 2019 will register a recession of 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent. The high level of interest rates, together with fiscal consolidation, will constrain credit growth, incomes, and domestic demand in 2019 and the first half of 2020. A gradual increase in confidence as well as in public investment spending will offset some of the impact on the economy, while targeted increases in social assistance will help offset most of the impact on the most vulnerable.

Over the medium term, real GDP growth is projected by BLOMINVEST to improve gradually to stand between 4 and 5 percent assuming reforms are being implemented at a steady pace. As stabilization takes hold, CEDRE projects will start to move along with higher private sector investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) will also increase and credit to the private sector will spur domestic demand. When the economy improves substantially, the pegged exchange rate will have to move into a crawling peg, as it was the case between 1994 and 1998 in line with economic fundamentals. The latter, along with structural reforms, will increase the competitiveness of Lebanese goods and services, and will provide an additional boost to domestic production not only through expenditure switching but also through exports.

Inflation is expected to increase in the short term, and it already has, due to the capital controls that are in place, obliging companies to use the parallel market in order to get foreign currency for their imports. Inflation is expected to hit 5 to 6 percent by end 2019, and more than 10 percent in the first half of 2020. However, an appropriate monetary policy, in addition to confidence restoration, will be able to bring inflation down to around 3 to 4 percent in the medium term.

The fiscal deficit is expected to decline in line with the adoption of several revenue, expenditures, and financing measures. The deficit will go below 3 percent of GDP in two years’ time as the authorities’ broad-based tax policy and administrative reforms take hold. These measures will place general government debt on a declining path, reaching 120 percent of GDP by FY 2024, after peaking at 155 percent of GDP in FY 2020.

The current account deficit is expected to widen after narrowing to less than 10 percent of GDP on a year-on-year basis in the last quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020. Initially, import demand will be contained by the capital control measures, but then imports will increase again driven by more capital inflows and higher demand. At the same time structural reforms should help a gradual export recovery, underpinned by competitiveness gains from better infrastructure and new investment. Increasing remittances and FDI flows, as well as multilateral and bilateral creditor financing will provide financing in the coming years.

IV – Fiscal policies

The fiscal program should focus on putting the debt on a sustainable path by diminishing fiscal deficit on the back of strengthening revenue collection efforts and lowering spending, while creating space to support social and development spending. Given Lebanon’s low tax ratio, the fiscal program should be centered on administration reforms to increase revenue through better collection policies and well-targeted increases in taxes, while providing better services to citizens, in order to raise the tax to GDP ratio by 3 to 4 percentage points by end 2023. However, total revenue to GDP will end 2023 at 21.7 percent, as privatization of the telecom companies will reduce short term income for the government (in tandem with the privatization of telecoms, government revenues will have to be increased in order to keep their ratio to GDP constant as there is around 1.7 percentage points of GDP that will be lost due to privatization). Expenditures will remain under control and as a result the primary surplus will increase from an estimated 0.3 percent of GDP in 2019 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2023. The overall fiscal deficit will decrease from a projected 8.5 percent of GDP in 2019 to zero percent of GDP in 2023. Moreover, the government should stop accumulating any kind of arrears. Old arrears should be paid through the issuance of government Treasury Bills to concerned parties, and new budgets will have to include better spending management and forecasting in order to avoid the accumulation of future arrears.

Being able to increase government revenues to GDP ratio throughout the next four years is a great achievement for Lebanon. As tax evasion is large in Lebanon, it is not an automatic thing to assume an increase in tax revenues that match the increase in nominal GDP, especially during high growth period coupled with an increase in GDP deflator. A lot of collection effort is needed with some tax measures in order to have an increase in tax revenues that outperform the increase in nominal GDP.  

The FY budget 2020 approved by the government and sent to Parliament includes a 0.6 percent deficit without any tax adjustment. However, this low deficit is a one-off due to the contribution of mainly BDL and to much lesser extent commercial banks through the provision of financing at 1 percent to the government. The budgets for future years should include fiscal measures and a drastic reduction in EDL deficit. The most important issue is that the primary budget balance will turn into positive territories from 2021 onward. If the government adopts the measures outlined in this paper, an adjustment to the current version of 2020 budget has to be made. 

The budget for 2020 comprises an increase in social safety nets spending. The program for poverty reduction in coordination with the World Bank has been expanded to include more families in need. When the government starts the implementation of more fiscal measures, an adjustment, toward an increase, should be considered for the most vulnerable in order to alleviate the impact of a restrictive fiscal policy.

A sustained effort over several years should be put in place aiming at revamping tax policy and tax administration. With low tax compliance in Lebanon—tax evasion reaches around 2.5 percent of GDP and an estimated 30 percent of the GDP value is in the informal economy—in addition to uncollected bills in the energy sector, the potential improvement in tax revenues is huge and could reach 4 percentage points of GDP. Tax policy and tax administration measures should center on broadening the tax base while maintaining a low tax rate, aiming to ensure progressiveness of the tax system.

Tax policy reforms will help improve government revenues substantially in the near term. Measures include removing exemptions and preferential treatment to reduce distortions in the tax system and broaden the tax base. These include the removal of VAT exemptions, except for basic foodstuffs, a measure that will significantly improve revenues. It is also important to put a floor on gasoline prices as these prices are the lowest when compared to similar non-oil producing emerging markets. In addition, other tax policy measures include: further strengthening taxation on real estate especially on high value properties and empty apartments, increasing the taxes on the infringements on maritime properties, and ensuring equivalent taxation of all sources of income in order to reduce the rentier behavior by investors.

Tax administration reforms will strengthen tax collection ability over the medium term. Legal penalties for noncompliance should be increased, but at the same time an American-based way of settlement should be provided to companies. Companies should be able to negotiate with the Higher Judicial Council to reduce the penalties rather than bribing the tax comptroller and banking secrecy has to be lifted on all employees at the Ministry of Finance. Measures to install e-government at the Ministry of Finance should be accelerated; a lot of work has already been done. Finally, the government should stop granting further tax amnesties.

V – Public debt restructuring

Public debt restructuring is essential if Lebanon wants to get out of the vicious cycle of debt and deficit and put the debt to GDP ratio on a sustainable path. However, it should not include a haircut on the principal of the debt. Restructuring the debt does not mean a haircut on the debt as it will de facto lead to a haircut on deposits, even if it is the one held by the central bank only. The idea of BDL writing off its holding of government debt in order to substantially reduce the stock of debt—BDL holds close to $38 billion of Treasury Bills and Eurobonds—is not a viable option. Any decline of this magnitude in BDL assets will have to lead to a decline in its liabilities, meaning a haircut on banks deposits at BDL, which will result in banks having to do a haircut on their customers deposits.

Restructuring of government debt has to entail lengthening the maturity of government debt, while drastically reducing interest rates on the debt for the coming three years. Of course, this decline will hit the banking system profits for the upcoming few years. However, it is the least painful compared to any other measure that will help getting out of the current crisis. In our scenario, we considered a decline in the effective interest rate on government debt to 1 percent in 2020, 2 percent in 2021, and 3 percent in 2022 and 2023. Interest rates will go back to market rate starting 2024. This decline in debt service will help the government reduce total deficit at a time when tax measures and expenditure tightening will help boosting the primary surplus. In our scenario, public debt to GDP ratio will decline from 154.7 percent at end 2019 to 113.7 percent at end 2023.

VI – Social safety nets

The social safety nets program put in place since 2007 is a good one and should be expanded, with the help of the World Bank, to cover more families as unemployment has increased drastically following the Syrian refugees’ crisis. Lebanon lags well behind peers and other emerging markets in poverty reduction and especially in inclusive growth, with those living below the poverty line estimated at 33 percent of the population in 2018. Programs targeting poor people in Beirut and its suburbs should be put in place in addition to boosting agriculture and agroindustry in the rural areas to reduce the extreme poverty there and reduce urbanization. The poverty reduction strategy should be aimed at reducing inequality and supporting the economic empowerment of women.

The Ministry of Social Affairs is the responsible entity for coordinating social policies and will have to work with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry, and international stakeholders, to implement a comprehensive social policy. The latter will have to include conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs, creating cooperatives in rural areas, encouraging farmers to join these cooperatives, and providing technical assistance to these cooperatives as it will help increasing the negotiation power of farmers (see box below on rural development).

If the government adopts tax measures other than the ones mentioned above, it will have to boost its social assistance program by:

  1. Providing a one off disbursement of LL300,000 to the most vulnerable in order to protect them from the impact of tax policies (if covering 40,000 families the projected cost would be $120 million).
  2. Strengthening financial inclusion by launching an initiative to reach the goal of having one bank account for every woman and boosting girls’ educational enrollment—by providing grants to families enrolling their girls in schools (as well as for boys from the most vulnerable parts of society)—and guarantee their participation in the labor force afterward.
  3. Conditional cash transfers as well as unconditional cash transfers are an effective way of reducing poverty. Out of 142 countries that distribute cash transfers, according to a report compiled by the World Bank, 70 percent are implementing unconditional cash transfers and 40 percent went with conditional payments, whereby recipients must fulfill certain criteria in order to get paid. These criteria comprise, among other things, children’s school attendance, up-to-date vaccinations, and regular visits to healthcare centers by pregnant women.

VI – Structural reforms

Structural reforms are essential in any government program to spur investment and job creation and reach balanced growth and human capital development. The government will have to instill a policy to strengthen governance and transparency and an improved business environment in order for Lebanon to realize its full economic potential. Lebanon ranked 143 out of 190 countries in the International Finance Corporation’s Doing Business Indicator for 2019, with Lebanon’s best ranking on the property registration sub-indicator at 110. The major weaknesses are lengthy procedures in all sub-indices and a major weakness in the implementation of the rule of law to enforce contracts. The government has recently introduced a major overhaul to the Code of Commerce, which constitutes a good step forward but not enough in the current circumstances.

In order to tackle the structural problems of the country, it is important to analyze the size, shape, and responsibilities that we want the government to provide. Without having an ideological background on the type of government and society—and it should not be taken as a taboo—it is important to lessen the Lebanese government’s role to the maximum. The issue is that we have to accept that we are living in a third world country. And in these types of countries, the rule of law and government management of public enterprises, do encompass major inefficiencies due to political interference and impediments linked to cronyism. If we were living in a Scandinavian country or in France, I would vote for a welfare state because the government is efficient and is providing its citizens with all the needed services at a very high quality by imposing high tax rates on their income.

Moving from a third world country to a first world country does not happen overnight. Singapore had an “benevolent dictator” and it took the country 30 years to climb up the ladder. When understanding the fact that fighting corruption and restoring the efficiency of the public sector is not an easy task, we can accept to streamline the government and give the private sector a more important role, while ensuring the right regulatory framework. This is the ideal solution for Lebanon in the current circumstances, until we reach our target to become a developed country.

Areas for structural reforms

i) Energy Sector

The government has already prepared an ambitious plan to reform the energy sector, aimed at addressing inefficiencies and eliminating losses in EDL, but this plan should be accelerated and a regulatory authority should be appointed as soon as possible. Structural weaknesses in the energy sector have remained unaddressed since 1993, and they include, but are not limited to, pricing policies, technical and non-technical losses, and supply and demand management. If the government delivers the improvements needed, it can make Lebanon’s energy sector an engine of growth rather than a burden on the economy. Tariffs are below the production costs, which are exorbitant as EDL is using fuel to produce electricity, hence indicating implicit subsidies provided by the government. The latter has already started to address these shortcomings through the electricity plan that was set in motion with the help of the World Bank. 

Structural milestones in the electricity plan should be put in a schedule with monthly updates to the public and to the Council of Ministers. The plan has to include the steps to implement on different fronts in order to get to a 24/24 electricity by end 2020 or mid-2021, at the latest, while having a profitable company. EDL should enter into a public-private partnership in order to improve its management by bringing in a strategic investor on a revenue sharing basis.

The government should adopt a policy that protects, to a certain degree, low-income households from an increase in energy prices. The increase in tariffs for households consuming up to 200 kwh/month has to be minimal, if any, compared to the increase for higher tranches. Manufacturing industries should also benefit from low tariffs to reduce their input costs in order to encourage exports. The use of gas for producing electricity in the near future by using Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) will help solve this problem by reducing the cost of producing electricity. EDL will be able to reach its targets through a lower increase in tariffs.

ii) Education

The Lebanese government is spending large amounts of money on education, without being able to provide its citizens with adequate quality. The number of teachers in public schools is high and reaching alarming levels without providing the right quality of education to students. Overall pupil to teacher ratio stood at 7:1 in Lebanon’s public schools (for Lebanese students), while it is at 21:1 in the private sector, based on estimates by BLOMINVEST and the Center for Educational Research and Development. Public schooling embraces weak quality control and frail teaching that need to be reformed urgently. Restructuring the existing public schools is fundamental as many are non-efficient and only increase education costs. The repetition rates are much higher at public schools than in private schools and dropout rates are also important, especially at the primary level.

Lebanon needs to go for a twinning with a developed country like Finland in order to put in place a model school. However, the government will continue to finance public schools. As the country has failed to create a high educational level at public schools, the government can turn to the best educational system in the world these days, namely the Finnish system. A model school managed by the Finnish (or any other developed country system with excellent public education) has to be shaped and all other public schools have to be benchmarked against this school. If public schools are not capable of matching the level of this model school, then the Finnish will be given the opportunity to manage all the other public schools. In this case, the government will be paying for public education but it will be providing its citizens with an upgraded service that the users will surely appreciate.

Last, but not least, the education system should be overhauled to fit the needs of the labor market. Education should start to be more focused on the knowledge economy and vocational education. A partnership should start to emerge between the Lebanese public education institutions and the stakeholders in the different Lebanese sectors in order to cater the education toward the needs of the economy.

iii) Health

On the health front, the country will also have to turn to the private sector to manage public hospitals. It has already been found that appointing boards to public hospitals was not enough to ensure a better performance, especially given that most of the time the financing is not adequate. Treating public hospitals the same way the government is paying private hospitals is the only solution to improve public health services. The government should provide the management of the public hospital to foreign entities from the developed world as public-private partnerships, with key performance indicators put in place to measure the performance of these entities.

Turning to the private sector for management will help the government get out of the current high cost – low quality of public hospitals. Healthcare expenditure reached $4.39 billion in 2018, representing 7.6 percent of Lebanon’s GDP. In addition, per capita spending on health was calculated at $640, high by regional standards. Government healthcare expenditure constituted 51 percent of the total or 4.1 percent of 2019 GDP with the private sector holding the remaining 49 percent share. The market is forecast to grow by 4.5 percent in 2019, reaching $4.59 billion by 2023. Spending on healthcare is expected to reach a value of $5.90 billion, experiencing a local currency compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.1 percent in US dollar terms.

iv) Telecommunications

The main issue in telecommunication sector is to set a medium term goal in order to put Lebanon on the map of major advanced economies in the sector. The goal will be to rank among the top three countries in the world having the fastest broadband fiber optics internet connection. What is more important than having this connection is to widen it to cover the whole country and especially the rural areas. It is important to reduce the cost of starting a business related to the knowledge economy by not having to incur the costs of implementing the business in Beirut. Providing the right infrastructure for the skilled Lebanese labor should be a top priority for the government.    

The telecommunication sector still has a long way to go, as the poor infrastructure of the sector keeps on hindering the quality and speed of internet connections. Even though fiber optics is already installed in big cities but not yet operational, Lebanon actually relies on copper cables to have access to the internet. However, these cables have limited capacity in terms of data transfer and speed. Based on the latest data released by Akamai, a global provider of content delivery network services, the average connection speed in Lebanon stood at 1.8 Mbps in Q2 2016, compared to 4.0 Mbps in Egypt and 4.3 Mbps in Jordan. South Korea topped the list with an average connection speed of 27.0 Mbps and was trailed by Japan (17.2 Mbps) and the United States (15.3 Mbps). It was also noticeable that, while the global average connection speed grew by a yearly 14 percent in Q2 2016, Lebanon’s slipped by 0.8 percent over the same period.

Another major issue faced by the ICT sector in Lebanon is the lack of competitiveness due to the government’s tight control over the sector. Despite the sequential declines in communication prices since 2014, the fact that both telecom companies, Alfa and touch, are publicly owned entities operated by private companies for the benefit of the government, creates a sort of duopoly agreement between the two companies. According to World Bank sources, “limited competition in telecommunications and broadband is stifling growth of the sector. The fixed-line and broadband market sees the dominant position of Ogero, while the mobile sector, unlike most countries in the world, is under the control of the government.” Besides inhibiting growth and innovation, government control is keeping tariffs high and limiting product differentiation. According to Arab Advisors Group, Lebanon ranked 17th in 2015 out of 19 Arab countries in the Cellular Competition Intensity Index.

v) Fighting corruption and improving competition

Anti-corruption has to be strengthened. A coordination committee between the different institutions dealing with anti-corruption has to be put in place. All government employees and employees in government-related institutions have to lift banking secrecy on their accounts in Lebanon and abroad. Auditing of these accounts has to be performed by the committee and related agencies.

Currently, there is a competition law but there is no enforcement of the law, especially on politically backed oligopolistic sectors. A competition authority has to be created and will coordinate with the regulatory authorities in different sectors. 

The Lebanese industrial or agroindustrial private sector has to be protected against unlawful competition. This competition is harming the local productive sector through under-invoicing of imports especially from Turkey and China. Besides these countries, the government may also provide protection for domestic producers against competition from other countries. However a different approach to customs has to be adopted. Both ministries of industry and economy have to identify the domestic sectors that should be given some protection and will have to look into the details of which domestic products are being at risk in order to take the right decision.

A case in point for showing the right way of protecting domestic products will be the wine industry. The protection of domestic wine should not entail increasing custom duties by an ad-hoc percentage on all imported wine. Rather, it should put a minimum tax of $10 dollars on any imported bottle of wine as price of Lebanese wine in Lebanon varies between $5 and $50 dollars per bottle. It is the low cost of imported wine that is causing the most harm to domestic wines. A percentage increase of the customs duties on imported wine will not serve the purpose. A minimum charge in this case is the solution. This scenario is applicable to all cheap imported liquors. 

The judicial system has to become independent. The government has to pass a law to provide independence to the judicial system. The supreme judicial council has to be elected by the judges. At the same time, banking secrecy has to be lifted on judges in order to be able to fight corruption in the judicial body.

vi) Privatization

The government has to initiate the privatization process of the telecom companies. The Higher Council for Privatization and PPP (HCP) will have to coordinate with the Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRA), which has to be appointed as soon as possible, in order to prepare for the privatization of the two telecom companies.

The best privatization strategy will have to bring in both citizens and strategic investors along with the government. It will serve three purposes: to develop capital markets, to give ordinary people a stake in the company to be privatized, and to ensure better management and higher future profits by bringing in a strategic investor. This strategy is based on the fact that the government will do an initial public offering (IPO) for a certain percentage of the company, open to the public. People will get a share of the profits while the strategic investor and the government will divide the remaining share. The government will continue to collect the taxes on the sector and will keep a share in the company, however, it will be a minority share.

Saying that the government should not privatize companies that are providing large profits to the Treasury is not an accurate statement. The privatization of the telecom companies will help reduce government debt by more than $6 billion in one shot (in our scenario, the privatization of the two mobile companies will take place in 2021), in addition to the fact that it will enhance the management and will reduce political interference. Services will improve and prices may decline while key performance indicators will be set for the companies to implement government strategy, mentioned above, in the telecom sector.

vii) Other structural reforms

The other structural reforms that the government will have to undertake are summarized below and will entail improving the management of public enterprises by strengthening their governance, transparency, and efficiency in order to prepare these entities to get in a partnership with the private sector:

  1. Increasing transparency in all public enterprises or semi-independent public institutions. There should be an external audit for all the institutions that were not previously under the umbrella of the Court of Audit, even those that have to be liquidated: Council of the South, Council for Reconstruction and Development, the Displaced Funds, Casino du Liban, Middle East Airlines, Electricité du Liban, etc. All public enterprises that will remain in the hands of the government and will not be privatized will have to go under the supervision of the Court of Audit.
  2. Provide a better legal framework for public enterprises to simplify the process of privatization. The authorities will have to present to Parliament the necessary laws in one year’s time that will modernize and clearly define the role of the government as owner, regulator, and shareholder of these public enterprises.
  3. Issue implementation decrees for passed laws. There are a large number of laws approved by Parliament for which the government has not yet issued implementation decrees. Some of these laws have been passed by Parliament years ago and yet implementation decrees have not been issued rendering them inapplicable. This includes laws such as the trade law and the government must set a time frame that will not exceed six months in order to issue the implementation decrees for all approved laws.
  4. Improve the business environment: Trading across borders has to be improved while fighting corruption. Modernizing the processes for imports and exports related activities is crucial to shorten the time needed and to reduce bribery and tax evasion. This will include reducing custom-related processing time and reducing hours to prepare import/export documents in order to be in line with one-stop customs portal promoted by the UN. Enforcing contracts time has to be shortened. Currently the rule of law is not well enforced and when it is, the time needed is 720 days. The amount recuperated is 31 percent of the claimed value and the judicial processes remain archaic most of the time. Procedures to start a business must be streamlined: The government should move forward in simplifying procedures by adopting e-registration and streamlining the required documentation as it needs currently 15 days, eight procedures, and costs 42 percent of income per capita to start a business.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial views of Executive Magazine.

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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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