January’s Mashreq Conference on Women’s Economic Empowerment was a welcome initiative at a time where socio-economic conditions for women in Lebanon are dire. In addition to a discriminatory legal, political, and social environment, women continue to make up less than 25 percent of the labor force, according to 2018 World Bank estimates. Donor pledges to support women’s economic empowerment are a huge opportunity, but efforts to fund empowering programs often ignore core issues at the heart of Lebanon’s economy. A big concern is the encroachment of social entrepreneurship as a one-size-fits-all approach to women’s roles in the economy. As an emerging terminology into the entrepreneurship ecosystem, it tells women the sky is the limit, but in reality allows the government to shirk its responsibilities while trapping women in a model that has not proven itself to be sustainable.

What social entrepreneurship is—and is not

Broadly defined social entrepreneurship is an approach to solving socio-economic problems through sustainable income-generating tools. The entrepreneurship ecosystem in Lebanon has focused some of its efforts on promoting social enterprises through incubators and other programs targeting women in both urban and rural settings. But such programs often leave the government on the sideline and focus more on the logic that women themselves need to create their own economic opportunities. That is not to say there are no success stories; notably Soufra (Full Table), a food truck run by Palestinian women in the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp, the documentary of which was recently screened in Beirut and followed the story of its founder, Palestinian refugee Maryam Shaar.

Shaar’s story is not an unfamiliar one; countless women in Lebanon have been driven to set up small businesses to survive, including my own grandmother, a Palestinian refugee who set up her own grocery store to feed her seven children and provide jobs for her community at the brink of the civil war. Social enterprise is simply the new watch-word that development donors have decided to use to label the inherent ability of women to be versatile and creative in times of distress. But social entrepreneurship is not—nor should it be—the main strategy for economically empowering women.

The lessons from Soufra’s success

Soufra’s model pushes us to think of structures of financing and opportunities to integrate women in the formal economy in three ways. First, Soufra is funded via Alfanar, an Arab venture philanthropy. This means that Soufra has actual investors who expect a return on their investment, whereas the overwhelming majority of funding to the Lebanese social entrepreneurship ecosystem is via foreign donors. This is reminiscent of the 1990s/early 2000s, when NGOs in Lebanon mushroomed without improved governance. Instead, these NGOs filled the gap in service provision, letting the state off the hook. Social enterprises do the same to women: they make for nice photo-ops with donor agencies, create temporary jobs, and allow the state to shirk its responsibilities—eventually the funding will run out. 

Second, social entrepreneurship does not effectively provide women with sustainable jobs because it does nothing to address structural market inequalities. Sexual harassment, wage inequality, gender-based violence, and political marginalization are just some of the reason why women in Lebanon do not work—or work but do not reach managerial positions. Social enterprises create parallel alternative economic models that last as long as income keeps coming in, but which collapse the moment the initial success wanes off. There is almost no data and little evidence that social enterprises can last longer than the initial round of seed funding.

Third, the main players setting criteria for and supporting social enterprises have no relevant experience and expertise. It is not people like Shaar, nor like my grandma, running these programs. Few of the organizations championing social entrepreneurship for women are actually social enterprises themselves or are headed by women. These approaches tend to leave out the contextual factors that make the Lebanese workforce especially difficult for women. There are cultural, societal, and political intricacies that cannot be solved using a textbook based on outside experiences. They need to be addressed by transforming the workplace to be more equitable to young women, working mothers, disabled women, and elderly women.

Rethinking the approach

Not all social enterprises are without merit, but to truly encourage women to enter the workforce we need to talk about the role of the state in social justice. The pressure should be on government to play a more direct role in making businesses more inclusive. The private sector and civil society should not wait on the government forever, but sidelining the role of legislation and policymaking, while Lebanon continues to receive foreign funding will not yield sustainable results. There have been similar experiences with previous Paris donor conferences, and it may occur yet again with the CEDRE pledges. The onus should not be on women themselves to improve their economic conditions because this will exclude the majority of women whose efforts do not go under the label of social entrepreneurship. It excludes women fighting inside their workers’ unions for better access to social security, it excludes women facing harassment at work, it excludes refugee women and migrant workers. The way to empower women is to fix Lebanon’s endemic economic problems, not to create temporary solutions.

In winter, Lebanon seems to have an abundance of rainfall. When the rainy season is over, however, the country’s traffic woes are often compounded by large tankers blocking roads as they supply buildings with water.

Lebanon is rich in water resources, but these are replenished seasonally,  through rain and snow that generally falls between October and April. With improved management, there is the potential to significantly enhance water storage, preserving the water supply for use during dry summer seasons and occasional droughts. Improving water collection and storage is not a difficult task, and one made easier with multisectoral collaboration.

Water gained, water lost

A 2001-2002 State of the Environment report by the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) presented the worst case scenario for Lebanon’s water supply: On average, yearly precipitation in Lebanon results in 8,600 million cubic meters (Mm3) of water, feeding 40 major streams and rivers, including 17 perennial rivers, and more than 2,000 springs. Of that, approximately 50 percent gets lost through evapotranspiration—the process by which soil loses moisture via a combination of evaporation and plant transpiration. Additional losses stem from surface water flows to neighboring countries, estimated by the Litani River Authority to represent almost 8 percent, and groundwater seepage estimated at 12 percent. This leaves Lebanon with 2,600 Mm3 of surface and groundwater, of which 2,000 Mm3 is deemed exploitable and available for supply. This is not far off 2014 estimates from the United Nations Development Program where Lebanon’s water balance in a dry year was estimated at 2,140 Mm3.

With the Ministry of Electricity and Water (MoEW) expecting the country’s total annual demand for water to increase to 1,802 Mm3 by 2035, Lebanon, in theory, has more than enough water available to supply anticipated demands for at least the next 15 years. However, local natural water availability is seasonal, and currently there are not enough water storage tools in place to avoid water shortages during summer droughts. This needs to change.

One prime example of a multisectoral water stewardship initiative to secure future water supply was set up following recommendations from a study on groundwater management in the Shouf Biosphere Reserve—The 2017 Groundwater Assessment of the Shouf Biosphere Reserve (SBR)-Lebanon. The report, prepared by global environmental consulting group Antea, in collaboration with Nestlé Waters, found that the area’s overall groundwater balance was positive, by around 12 Mm3 per year, but noted important seasonal water fluctuations as well as high impacts from climate change and human activities.

A multisectoral partnership involving water authorities, farmers, the private sector, the Shouf Biosphere Reserve, the MoEW, the MoE, municipalities, and others, was established to tackle the issue and is already beginning to help the reserve successfully enhance the recharge of natural groundwater reservoirs in the area during the rainy season. Through the use of retaining walls (micro dams in the valleys) and terraces that increase water infiltration, among other tools, the partnership aims to reduce the impact of summer droughts. Such recharge techniques enhance water infiltration into underground natural water reservoirs and can be good alternatives to dams, especially in karstic/fractured geological contexts, as they help store river and runoff water that otherwise flows naturally toward the sea and is lost during the rainy season.

A model to replicate

A full action plan recommended by the study’s authors has been underway since October 2018, aiming to improve the quantity and quality of water supply in the area. Its key recommendation—to improve water storage—needs to be rolled out across the country using varying methods dependent on a given area’s geological, environmental, and social needs. For example, if an area’s surface rocks are fractured and include faults and cracks, underground storage is preferred over surface water storage, whereas if surface rocks are impermeable and can store water easily, surface water dams are worth considering.

Other recommendations from the study include: to continue monitoring water resources in the watershed and improving the existing database; to improve protection around municipal springs and water wells, as well as their hygienic design to guarantee better water quality; to further reduce leakages from municipal networks and piping; to engage with farmers to introduce best irrigation practices; to promote the building of small reservoirs for irrigation on the catchments of Damour, Bisri/Awali, and Beirut rivers; and to form a steering committee of major stakeholders.

In a nutshell, water storage in winter is vital to mitigate summer droughts even during a wet year such as this one, where the registered rainfall amounts until end March were almost double the usual yearly average.

Actions being implemented at the Shouf Biosphere Reserve in collaboration with other water management stakeholders can serve as a model to be replicated in other water basins around the country in order to improve local water resource management. This is especially pertinent, given the collaboration is in line with the water code that was ratified in June 2018, which supports multisectoral collaboration.

The reality is that collaboration between multiple sectors is needed and can be easily established to ensure that water is stored during rainy periods, either on the surface by building well-planned eco-friendly dams, or underground by enhancing water infiltration to replenish groundwater reservoirs and springs.

More initiatives can and should be launched across Lebanon, each tailored to suit the geological, environmental, and social needs of different areas of the country: All they need is multisectoral collaboration.